Rl33745 20170512

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
(name redacted)
Specialist in Naval Affairs
May 12, 2017
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL33745

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
Summary
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for
conducting BMD operations. Under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy
Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 33 at the end of FY2016 to 49 at the end of FY2021. The
figure for FY2020 may include up to four BMD-capable Aegis cruisers in reduced operating
status as part of a program to modernize 11 existing Aegis cruisers.
Under the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD
operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from
potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. BMD-capable Aegis ships also
operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential
ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2017 budget requests a total of
$1,774.8 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts,
including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania that are to be part of the
EPAA. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military
construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:
 required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships vs. available numbers of BMD-
capable Aegis ships;
 whether the Aegis test facility in Hawaii should be converted into an operational
Aegis Ashore site to provide additional BMD capability for defending Hawaii
and the U.S. West Coast;
 burden sharing—how European naval contributions to European BMD
capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to European
BMD capabilities and operations;
 the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight
of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile; and
 technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Strategic and Budgetary Context............................................................................................... 1
Aegis Ships ............................................................................................................................... 1
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers........................................................................ 1
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers.............................................................. 2
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies .............................................................................................. 2
Aegis BMD System................................................................................................................... 2
Versions of Aegis BMD System ......................................................................................... 3
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles ........................................................................................ 5
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD.......................................... 6
Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Interceptors................................. 6
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain ...................................................... 7
Aegis BMD Flight Tests............................................................................................................ 8
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program......................................................... 9
Japan ................................................................................................................................... 9
Other Countries................................................................................................................... 9
FY2017 MDA Funding Request ............................................................................................... 9
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 10
Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ............................................ 10
Potential Aegis Ashore Site in Hawaii .................................................................................... 12
Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to European BMD......................... 12
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues....................................................................... 13
December 2016 DOT&E Report ...................................................................................... 13
April 2016 GAO Report.................................................................................................... 18
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM......................................... 19
Legislative Activity for FY2017.................................................................................................... 20
Summary of Action on FY2017 MDA Funding Request........................................................ 20
FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4909/S. 2943/P.L. 114-328) .................. 21
House ................................................................................................................................ 21
Senate................................................................................................................................ 25
Conference........................................................................................................................ 28
FY2017 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 5293/S. 3000/H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31)...................... 30
House ................................................................................................................................ 30
Senate................................................................................................................................ 30
Conference........................................................................................................................ 31
Figures
Figure 1. Aegis BMD System Variants............................................................................................ 4
Tables
Table 1. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles............................................. 7

Table 2. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2016-FY2021............................................... 10
Table 3. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2017 Request for MDA Procurement
and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program......................................................................... 21
Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests From January 2002 to the Present........................................ 33
Appendixes
Appendix A. Aegis BMD Flight Tests........................................................................................... 32
Appendix B. Homeporting of U.S. Navy Aegis BMD Ships at Rota, Spain................................. 56
Appendix C. Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program........................................ 59
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 69

Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and
the Navy, and gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD
operations. Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base.
Background
Strategic and Budgetary Context
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Aegis BMD program may be
considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) .
Aegis Ships
The Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the
Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays,
weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. The
Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats. The system was first deployed
by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
Overview
A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and
FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs
47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged
by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005,
leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73).
“2-4-6” Program for Modernizing 11 Existing Aegis Cruisers
Congress has directed the Navy to implement the so-called “2-4-6” program for modernizing the
11 youngest Aegis cruisers. Under the 2-4-6 program, no more than two of the cruisers are to
enter the modernization program each year, none of the cruisers is to remain in reduced status for
modernization for more than four years, and no more than six of the cruisers are to be in the
program at any given time. Among the 11 Aegis cruisers that are to be modernized under this
program are four that are BMD-capable—CG-67 (Shiloh), CG-70 (Lake Erie), CG-72 (Vella
Gulf), and CG-73 (Port Royal). The Navy, as part of its FY2017 budget submission, is proposing
an alternate schedule for modernizing the 11 cruisers. Congress in the past has rejected this
alternate schedule, but the Navy is once again asking Congress to adopt it as a replacement for the
2-4-6 plan.

Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers1
Flight I/II and Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured in FY1985-FY2005
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first
entered service in 1991 and the 62nd
entered service in FY2012. The first 28 ships, known as
Flight I/II DDG-51s, are scheduled to remain in service until age 35. The next 34 ships, known as
Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes and are scheduled to remain in service
until age 40.
No DDG-51s Procured in FY2006-FY2009
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured
three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis
system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy plans do not call
for modifying DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.
Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured in FY2010-FY2016
Procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s resumed in FY2010. A total of 11 were procured in FY2010-
FY2016. The 11th
Flight IIA ship was one of two DDG-51s procured in FY2016.
Flight III DDG-51s Procured Starting in FY2016
Beginning with the second of the two DDG-51s procured in FY2016, the Navy has shifted DDG-
51 procurement to a new version of the DDG-51 design called the Flight III version. The Flight
III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR),
that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.2
Aegis BMD System3
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are to be built from the start with a BMD capability.
1
For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) .
2
The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
3
Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to
CRS and CBO analysts on the MDA’s FY2016 and prior-year budget submissions.

Versions of Aegis BMD System
The Aegis BMD system exists in several variants. Listed in order of increasing capability, these
are the 3.6.X variant, the 4.X variant, the 5.0 CU (Capability Upgrade) variant, and the 5.1
variant. Figure 1 summarizes the capabilities of these variants and correlates them with the
phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA; see below) for European BMD
operations.

CRS-4
Figure 1.Aegis BMD SystemVariants
(Summary of capabilities)
Source: MDA briefing slide provided to CRS on March 25, 2016.

Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
Standard Missile-2 Block IV (SM-2 Block IV). The SM-2 Block IV is to be succeeded in coming
years by a BMD version of the new SM-6 interceptor.
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor
The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-
to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead
by colliding with it.
MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years.
The current version, called the SM-3 Block IA, is now being supplemented by the more capable
SM-3 Block IB. These are to be followed by the even more capable SM-3 Block IIA.
Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting
its course.
In contrast to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the
bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version
has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches
provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout velocity
(a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater than that
of the Block IA and IB versions,4
as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The United States
and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, with
Japan funding a significant share of the effort.5
MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded by a still-more-
capable interceptor called the SM-3 Block IIB. The effort to develop that missile, however, was
ended, and MDA reportedly is not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA.6
4
Some press reports and journal articles, all of which are now a decade or more old, report unconfirmed figures on the
burnout velocities of various SM-3 missile configurations (some of which were proposed but ultimately not pursued).
See, for example, J. D. Williams, The Future Of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, point paper dated October 15, 2004,
accessed online at http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Williams-The-Future-of-Aegis-Ballistic-Missile-
Defense.pdf; “STANDARD Missile-3 Destroys a Ballistic Missile Target in Test of Sea-based Missile Defense
System,” Raytheon news release circa January 26, 2002; Gopal Ratnam, “U.S. Navy To Play Larger Role In Missile
Defense, Defense News, January 21-27, 2002: 10; Hans Mark, “A White Paper on the Defense Against Ballistic
Missiles,” The Bridge, Summer 2001, pp. 17-26, accessed online at https://www.nae.edu/File.aspx?id=7315; Michael
C. Sirak, “White House Decision May Move Sea-Based NMD Into Spotlight,” Inside Missile Defense, September 6,
2000: 1; Henry F. Cooper and J.D. Williams, “The Earliest Deployment Option—Sea-Based Defenses,” Inside Missile
Defense, September 6, 2000 (guest perspective; including graphic on page 21); Robert Holzer, “DoD Weighs Navy
Interceptor Options, Defense News, July 24, 2000: 1, 60 (graphic on page 1); and Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Gathers
Strength, Allies in NMD Showdown,” Defense News, March 15, 1999: 1, 42 (graphic on page 1).
5
The cooperative research effort has been carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999.
The effort has focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the
second-stage propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. The Block IIA development effort includes the development of a
missile, called the Block II, as a stepping stone to the Block IIA. As a result, the Block IIA development effort has
sometimes been called the Block II/IIA development effort. The Block II missile is not planned as a fielded capability.
6
See, for example, Justin Doubleday, “Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA
Interceptor,” Inside the Navy, October 24, 2016.

SM-2 and SM-6 Terminal Interceptors
The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-
atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as
of February 2012—was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept
aircraft and ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and 3 were used in BMD
flight tests.
MDA and Navy plans are now procuring a more capable terminal-phase BMD interceptor based
on the SM-6 air defense missile (the successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). The SM-6 is a
dual-capability missile that can be used for either air defense (i.e., countering aircraft and anti-
ship cruise missiles) or ballistic missile defense.
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for regional BMD
operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The first application of the approach is in
Europe, and is called the European PAA (EPAA). EPAA calls for using BMD-capable Aegis
ships, a land-based radar in Europe, and eventually two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and
Poland to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran.
Phase I of EPAA involved deploying Aegis BMD ships and a land-based radar in Europe by the
end of 2011. Phase II involves establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Romania with SM-3 IB
interceptors in the 2015 time frame. Phase 3 involves establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Poland
with SM-3 IIA interceptors in the 2018 time frame. Each Aegis Ashore site in the EPAA is to
include a structure housing an Aegis system similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship and 24
SM-3 missiles launched from a re-locatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the VLS that
is installed in Navy Aegis ships.7
The Aegis Ashore site in Romania was operationally certified on
May 12, 2016.8
Although BMD-capable Aegis ships have deployed to European waters before 2011, the first
BMD-capable Aegis ship officially deployed to European waters as part of the EPAA departed its
home port of Norfolk, VA, on March 7, 2011, for a deployment to the Mediterranean that lasted
several months.9
Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and
SM-3 Interceptors
Table 1 shows planned numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships and SM-3 interceptors under
DOD’s proposed FY2017 budget submission. Numbers of BMD-capable ships in the table reflect
7
For additional discussion of the Aegis Ashore sites, see Edward Lundquist, “Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based Missile
Defense System to Protect Europe,” National Defense, September 2016.
8
See “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System-Romania Operationally Certified, Navy News Service, May 12, 2016;
Sam LaGrone, “Aegis Ashore Site in Romania Declared Operational,” USNI News, May 12, 2016.
9
Karen Parrish, “Milestone nears for European Missile Defense Plan,” American Forces Press Service, March 2, 2011
(accessed online at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62997); Untitled “Eye On The Fleet” news item,
Navy News Service, March 7, 2011 (accessed online at http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=98184); “Warship
With Radar Going To Mediterranean,” Washington Post, March 2, 2011; Brock Vergakis, “US Warship Deploys to
Mediterranean to Protect Europe Form Ballistic Missiles, Canadian Press, March 7, 2011.

the Navy’s proposed schedule for modernizing Aegis cruisers rather than the congressionally
directed 2-4-6 plan (see the above section ““2-4-6” Program for Modernizing 11 Existing Aegis
Cruisers”).
Table 1. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles
FY15 FY16
FY17
(req.)
FY18
(proj.)
FY19
(proj.)
FY20
proj.)
FY21
(proj.)
BMD-capable Aegis ships
3.6 version 22 19 17 14 11 7 6
4.X version 8 10 10 12 15 19 20
5.0 CU version 3 4 7 11 9 4 2
5.1 version 0 0 0 0 5 13 21
Total 33 33 34 37 40 43 49
Aegis Ashore sites 0 1 1 1 2 2 2
SM-3 missile cumulative deliveries / inventory (including RDT&E purchases)
Block I/IA 150/119 150/101 150/85 150/60 150/49 150/37 150/35
Block IB 59/49 107/92 146/128 185/166 221/202 256/236 295/271
Block IIA 0/0 0/0 0/0 4/2 15/11 17/12 20/14
Total 209/168 257193 296/213 339/228 386/262 423/285 465/320
Source: For numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships and Aegis Ashore sites: Table prepared by CRS based on
MDA briefing slide provided to CRS on March 25, 2016. For SM-3 cumulative deliveries/inventory: FY2017 MDA
budget submission.
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain
On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the
EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval
base at Rota, Spain.10
The four ships are the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG-
75), which moved to Rota in FY2014, and the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and Porter (DDG-
78), which moved to Rota in FY2015. The fourth and final ship to be moved, DDG-64, arrived at
Rota on September 25, 2015.11
The move involves an estimated 1,239 military billets (including
1,204 crew members for the four ships and 35 shore-based support personnel),12
and about 2,100
family members.13
The Navy estimates the up-front costs of transferring the four ships at $92
10
“Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
11
Sam LaGrone, “Destroyer USS Carney Arrives in Rota Completing European Ballistic Missile Defense Quartet,”
USNI News, September 25, 2015.
12
Source: Navy information paper dated March 8, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on
March 9, 2012.
13
Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012.

million in FY2013, and the recurring costs of basing the four ships in Spain rather than in the
United States at roughly $100 million per year.14
Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65
miles northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have
been homeported at Rota at various points in the past, most recently in 1979.15
For additional
background information on the Navy’s plan to homeport four BMD-capable Aegis destroyers at
Rota, Spain, see Appendix B.
Aegis BMD Flight Tests
DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 29 successful exo-
atmospheric intercepts in 36 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 3 successful intercepts in
4 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships, and one successful intercept in one attempt using the Aegis
Ashore system), and 6 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 6 attempts using the SM-2
Block IV missile and the SM-6 Dual I missile, making for a combined total of 35 successful
intercepts in 42 attempts.
In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii
used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance
satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit.16
Including this intercept in the count increases the totals
to 30 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 37 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 36
14
Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012. The briefing
slides state that the estimated up-front cost of $92 million includes $13.5 million for constructing a new weapon
magazine, $0.8 million for constructing a pier laydown area, $3.4 million for constructing a warehouse, $5.0 million for
repairing an existing facility that is to be used as an administrative/operations space, and $69.3 million for conducting
maintenance work on the four ships in the United States prior to moving them to Rota. The briefing states that the
estimated recurring cost of $100 million per year includes costs for base operating support, annual PCS (personnel
change of station) costs, a pay and allowances delta, annual mobile training team costs, ship maintenance work, the
operation of a Ship Support Activity, and higher fuel costs associated with a higher operating tempo that is maintained
by ships that are homeported in foreign countries.
15
Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.
16
The modifications to the ship’s Aegis BMD midcourse system reportedly involved primarily making changes to
software. DOD stated that the modifications were of a temporary, one-time nature. Three SM-3 missiles reportedly
were modified for the operation. The first modified SM-3 fired by the cruiser successfully intercepted the satellite at an
altitude of about 133 nautical miles (some sources provide differing altitudes). The other two modified SM-3s (one
carried by the cruiser, another carried by an engage-capable Aegis destroyer) were not fired, and the Navy stated it
would reverse the modifications to these two missiles. (For additional information, see the MDA discussion available
online at http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_one_time_mission.html, and also Peter Spiegel, “Navy Missile Hits Falling
Spy Satellite,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2008; Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Navy Missile Hits Satellite,
Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, February 21, 2008; Thom Shanker, “Missile Strikes A Spy Satellite Falling From Its
Orbit,” New York Times, February 21, 2008; Bryan Bender, “US Missile Hits Crippled Satellite,” Boston Globe,
February 21, 2008; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Hits Wayward Satellite On First Attempt,” NavyTimes.com, February
21, 2008; Dan Nakaso, “Satellite Smasher Back At Pearl,” Honolulu Advertiser, February 23, 2008; Zachary M.
Peterson, “Lake Erie CO Describes Anti-Satellite Shot,” NavyTimes.com, February 25, 2008; Anne Mulrine, “The
Satellite Shootdown: Behind the Scenes,” U.S. News & World Report, February 25, 2008; Nick Brown, “US Modified
Aegis and SM-3 to Carry Out Satellite Interception Shot,” Jane’s International Defence Review, April 2008: 35.)
MDA states that the incremental cost of the shoot-down operation was $112.4 million when all costs are included.
MDA states that this cost is to be paid by MDA and the Pacific Command (PACOM), and that if MDA is directed to
absorb the entire cost, “some realignment or reprogramming from other MDA [program] Elements may be necessary to
lessen significant adverse impact on [the] AEGIS [BMD program’s] cost and schedule.” (MDA information paper
dated March 7, 2008, provided to CRS on June 6, 2008. See also Jason Sherman, “Total Cost for Shoot-Down of Failed
NRO Satellite Climbs Higher,” InsideDefense.com, May 12, 2008.)

successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 43 attempts using both SM-3 and SM-2 Block
IV missiles.
The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, is often described as
following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little,
test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, then tested and
validated before moving on to the next step.17
For further background information on Aegis BMD flight tests, see Appendix A.
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Japan’s interest in BMD, and in cooperating with the United States on the issue, was heightened
in August 1998 when North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile that flew over Japan
before falling into the Pacific.18
In addition to cooperating with the United States on development
of technologies for the SM-3 Block IIA missile, Japan is modifying all six of its Aegis destroyers
with Aegis BMD system, and in November 2013 announced plans to procure two additional
Aegis destroyers and equip them as well with the Aegis BMD system, which will produce an
eventual Japanese force of eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers. Japanese BMD-capable Aegis
ships have conducted four flight tests of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor,
achieving three successful exo-atmospheric intercepts.
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Spain, Germany, Denmark, South Korea, and Australia. As mentioned earlier, Spain, South
Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other
countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential
for contributing to BMD operations.
For additional background information on allied participation and interest in the Aegis BMD
program, see Appendix C.
FY2017 MDA Funding Request
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. As shown in Table 2, MDA’s proposed FY2017
budget requests a total of $1,774.8 million in procurement and research and development funding
for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for the two Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the
EPAA, which is referred to in the table as funding for the land-based SM-3. MDA’s budget also
17
See, for example, “Aegis BMD: “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot”,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed
September 11, 2013, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan
B. Hicks, USN, Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Some of our Philosophies In a
Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessed September 11, 2011, at http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/743.pdf.
18
For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and
Prospects, by (name redacted) . This archived report was last updated on March 19, 2002. See also CRS Report
RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by (name redacte d) .

includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the
Aegis BMD program.
Table 2. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2016-FY2021
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
FY16
FY17
(req.)
FY18
(proj.)
FY19
(proj.)
FY20
(proj.)
FY21
(proj.)
Procurement funding
Aegis BMD (line 24) 566.7 463.8 727.3 962.4 1,079.9 1,221.1
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 28) 30.6 57.5 69.9 0 0 0
Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 30) 145.3 50.1 139.5 93.2 122.0 86.0
SUBTOTAL Procurement 742.6 571.4 936.7 1,055.6 1,201.9 1,307.1
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 79) 830.6 959.1 841.7 700.6 592.9 528.7
Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 107) 78.5 95.0 127.7 91.5 88.2 98.5
Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 109) 35.0 43.3 29.0 19.3 21.3 21.6
Aegis SM-3 IIA (PE 0604881C) (line 110) 172.6 106.0 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL RDT&E 1,116.7 1,203.4 998.4 811.4 702.4 648.8
TOTAL 1,859.3 1,774.8 1,935.1 1,867.0 1,904.3 1,955.9
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2017 MDA budget submission.
Issues for Congress
Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
One potential issue for Congress concerns required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships vs.
available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships. Some observers are concerned about the
potential operational implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative
to the required number. A March 13, 2015, Navy information paper states:
The 2014 update to the 2012 [Navy] Force Structure Assessment sets the requirement at
40 advanced capable BMD (Baseline 9+) ships [i.e., ships equipped with the Baseline 9
version of the Aegis system, or later versions, and a BMD capability], as part of the 88
large surface combatant requirement [i.e., the Navy’s requirement for the fleet to have a
total of 88 cruisers and destroyers of all types], to meet Navy unique requirements to
support defense of the sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites.
The basic and intermediate capable BMD ships remaining in inventory will continue to
contribute to the sourcing of Combatant Commander (CCDR) requests independent of
the Navy unique requirement. This CCDR demand has increased from 44 in FY12-14 to
77 in FY16. Navy continues to be challenged to meet all CCDR demand for BMD ships,
but will meet 100% of Secretary of Defense adjudicated requirements in FY16. To better
meet CCDR demand and the Navy unique requirement, Navy is building advanced BMD
capability in new construction ships and modernizing existing destroyers with advanced
BMD capability....

The minimum requirement for 40 advanced capable BMD ships is based on the Navy
unique requirement as follows. It accepts risk in the sourcing of CCDR requests for
defense of land.
— 27 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups
— 9 in FDNF Japan to meet operational timelines in PACOM
— 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM19
The issue of required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships vs. available numbers of BMD-
capable Aegis ships was discussed at some length at a June 17, 2015, hearing on U.S. Navy
surface combatant capacity before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee. At this hearing, the Navy witnesses stated in their prepared
testimony that
The 2014 update to the 2012 FSA resulted in a total requirement of 308 ships [of all
types].... Of particular note, the combination of employment cycle changes, home porting
of additional LSCs forward, shifting of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) of land
mission to ashore assets, and independent deployment of DDG 1000s results in no change
to the LSC objective of 88 ships. However, the 2014 FSA update did provide the
additional detail that 40 LSCs require advanced BMD capabilities to meet Navy-unique
requirements to provide defense of the sea base and expeditionary land base sites, and 11
LSCs require the ability to support an embarked Air Defense Commander....
Navy BMD continues to be in high demand, as COCOM demand has increased from 44
in FY 2012-2014 to 77 in FY 2016. As mentioned previously, the 2014 update to the
2012 Force Structure Assessment sets the requirement at 40 advanced capable BMD
ships, as part of the 88 LSC requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support
defense of the sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites. To better meet COCOM
demand and the Navy unique requirement, Navy is building advanced BMD capability in
new construction destroyers and modernizing existing destroyers with advanced BMD
capability. The basic and intermediate capable BMD ships remaining in inventory will
continue to contribute to the sourcing of COCOM requests independent of the Navy
unique requirement. Navy continues to meet 100% of Secretary of Defense adjudicated
requirements.20
During the discussion portion of the hearing, one of the Navy witnesses—Rear Admiral Peter
Fanta, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare Division—when asked about
the situation, stated:
My requirement at this point is 40 advanced capability ships that have the capability of
both knocking down an incoming ballistic missile while simultaneously looking for and
firing upon an incoming cruise missile that’s at the surface of the ocean. So that is a
minimum of 40 advanced capability ballistic missile ships.
19
Navy information paper dated March 13, 2015, entitled “BMD Capable Ships Requirement,” posted April 14, 2015,
at InsideDefense.com (subscription required). See also Lara Seligman, “Memo To Congress: Navy ‘Challenged’ To
Meet Soaring Demand For Missile Defense,” InsideDefense.com Defense Alert, April 14, 2015.
20
Statement of Rear Admiral Victorino Mercado, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Assessment Division,
and Rear Admiral Peter Fanta, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Surface Warfare Division, Before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Capacity of the U.S.
Navy to Project Power With large Surface Combatants, June 17, 2015, pp. 2, 3.

I have approximately 33 ballistic missile capable ships. That is not to say they are
advanced to that level. And we will reach that in a current build rate of that 40 ships in
approximately the mid-2020s at this point, of those advanced capability ships, sir.21
In a subsequent exchange, Fanta stated that
the advanced capability ships are primarily used to defend Navy assets in a high-end fight
at sea against a near-peer competitor with advanced capabilities. BMD ships that I spoke
of earlier that we have in the low 30s right now and continue to build more, are primarily
for COCOM requests to defend other assets such as defended asset lists in various parts
of the world.
So they are perfectly capable of handling advanced threats, but just in that one BMD
capability. What we don't want to do is mix the peacetime presence requirement of
those—I won’t call them lesser capable, but baseline capability ballistic missile ships
with the advanced ones. I need to beat a high-end competitor at sea in the middle of a
fight in the middle of the ocean.22
Potential Aegis Ashore Site in Hawaii
Another potential issue for Congress is whether the Aegis test facility in Hawaii should be
converted into an operational Aegis Ashore site to provide additional BMD capability for
defending Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast. It was reported in January 2016 that some DOD
officials, including Admiral Harry Harris, commander of Pacific Command (PACOM), are
interested in studying this option.23
Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to
European BMD
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns burden sharing—how European naval
contributions to European BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions
to European BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S. defense
spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some U.S. and
European observers (particularly after Russia’s actions in March 2014 to gain control of Crimea)
for increased defense efforts by NATO countries in Europe. Potential oversight issues for
Congress include the following:
21
Spoken testimony of Rear Admiral Fanta, as reflected in transcript of hearing. See also Lara Seligman, “Surface
Warfare Chief: Navy Won’t Meed BMD Ship Requirement Until 2026,” Inside the Navy, June 22, 2015.
22
Spoken testimony of Rear Admiral Fanta, as reflected in transcript of hearing. See also Lance M. Bacon, Missile
Defense Ships Face Arms Race, High Op Tempo,” Navy Times, January 31, 2015; Megan Eckstein, “Stackley: Fleet
Needs More BMD Ships to Meet Demand,” USNI News, March 4, 2015; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials: Current
BMD Strategy ‘Unsustainable’; Greenert Asked Hagel for Review,” USNI News, March 19, 2015; Lance M. Bacon,
“BMD Mission Demands Outstrip Fleet’s Capabilities,” Defense News, April 13, 2015; Lara Seligman, “Navy Tells
Congress It’s Struggling To Meet Soaring Need For BMD Ships,” Inside the Navy, April 17, 2015; Sydney J.
Freedberg, Jr., “Aegis Ambivalence: Navy, Hill Grapple Over Missile Defense Mission,” Breaking Defense, June 30,
2015; Sydney J. Freedberg, “Aegis Ashore: Navy Needs Relief From Land,” Breaking Defense, July 2, 2015.
23
See, for example, Andrea Shalal, “Exclusive: U.S. Weighs Making Hawaii Missile Test Site Operatioal—Sources,”
reuters, January 22, 2016; Wyatt Olson, “PACOM Commander Harris Supports Study of Aegis Missile Defense for
Hawaii,” Stars and Stripes, January 28, 2016; Michael Fabey, “Pacom Chief Eyes More Missile Defense In Asia-
Pacific, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 28, 2016: 3. See also Ariel Cohen, “How to Protect Hawaii from a
North Korean Missile Attack,” Huffington Post, March 10, 2017.

 How does the total value of European naval contributions to European BMD
capabilities and operations compare to the total value of the U.S. naval
contributions (including the Aegis Ashore sites) to European BMD capabilities
and operations?
 Given constraints on U.S. defense spending, worldwide operational demands for
U.S. Navy Aegis ships,24
and calls by some U.S. and European observers for
increased defense efforts by NATO countries in Europe—as well as the potential
for European countries to purchase or build BMD-capable Aegis ships, upgrade
existing ships with BMD capabilities, or purchase Aegis ashore systems—should
the United States seek increased investment by European countries in their
regional BMD capabilities so as to reduce the need for assigning BMD-capable
U.S. Navy Aegis ships to the EPAA? Why should European countries not pay a
greater share of the cost of the EPAA, since the primary purpose of the EPAA is
to defend Europe against theater-range missiles?
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in
the Aegis BMD program.
December 2016 DOT&E Report
A December 2016 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—
DOT&E’s annual report for FY2016—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD
program:
Assessment
• The Aegis BMD 4.0 system, which is the latest, widely deployed version of Aegis
BMD and the primary sea-based firing asset for EPAA Phase 2, participated in HWIL
[hardware in the loop] and distributed ground test events in FY16 primarily to
demonstrate LRS&T [long-range search and track] improvements in support of Ground-
based Midcourse Defense (GMD) with the Aegis BMD 4.0.3 update.
• Prior IOT&E [initial operational test and evaluation] flight testing and supporting M&S
[modeling and simulation] demonstrated that Aegis BMD 4.0 has the capability to engage
and intercept non-separating, simple-separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles
in the midcourse phase with SM-3 Block IB guided missiles. However, flight testing and
M&S are not yet sufficient to assess the full range of expected threat types, ground
ranges, and raid sizes. Details on Aegis BMD 4.0 performance can be found in the
classified December 2014 Aegis BMD 4.0 IOT&E Report.
• In FY16, Aegis Baseline 9.B1 and Baseline 9.C1 underwent operational flight testing of
those systems’ remote engagement capabilities with SM-3 Block IB TU [threat update]
guided missiles using data from an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar (during FTO-02 Events 2a
and 1a). The successful intercept in FTO-02 Event 1a by the Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Complex at PMRF demonstrated an MRBM defense capability relevant to
EPAA Phase 2. During FTO-02 Event 2a, the SM-3 failed in flight; however, this event
contributed tracking and engagement processing data relevant to an assessment of Aegis
BMD’s remote engagement capabilities. Similar to previous tests with remote
24
See, for example, Lance M. Bacon, “Missile Defense Ships Face Arms Race, High Op Tempo,” Navy Times, January
31, 2015.

engagements (FTM-15 in FY11 and FTM-20 in FY13), the system did not use remote
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar data throughout the engagement. Instead, the firing assets
consummated the engagement using local AN/SPY-1 radar data. Although Aegis BMD
HWIL, distributed ground testing, and unaccredited high-fidelity M&S have
demonstrated all remote engagement modes, the lack of a flight test demonstration of a
fully remote engagement reduces certainty in that capability. High-fidelity digital M&S
run results using accredited models in support of Aegis Baseline 9.B1 will be available
1QFY17 to support future assessments.
• In FTO-02 Event 2a, the SM-3 Block IB TU guided missile failed early in flight due to
a faulty G-switch in the guidance section of the missile. The malfunctioning G-switch
precluded the separation of the missile’s second stage from the first stage. A failure
review board (FRB) determined that the G-switch malfunctioned due to mechanical
failure caused by abnormally high sticking in the component’s lubricant. The program
implemented improved testing and screening of the G-switch before acceptance for
installation to address the problem. The MDA implemented the new process changes
prior to the successful SM CTV-01a and -02 flight tests.
• The MDA demonstrated the efficacy of the SM-3 Block IB TU re-designed TSRM
[third stage rocket motor] aft nozzle area, to improve missile reliability following the
FTM-16 Event 2 (FY11) and FTM-21 (FY13) failures during two flight tests (SM CTV-
01a and -02) and six design verification and qualification ground test firings.
• Additional SM-3 Block IB component anomalies have occurred in recent flight and lot
acceptance testing, one resulting in a failed SM-3 launch.
- Low TSRM Attitude Control System cold gas regulator (CGR) pressures were observed
in FTM-25 (FY15) and during lot acceptance testing. The CGR anomaly in FTM-25 did
not preclude the target from being intercepted; however, the cold gas pressure observed
was much lower than that commanded. If the regulated pressure from the CGR is too
low, the Attitude Control System may not function properly. The Prime Contractor
(Raytheon Missile Systems) established an FRB, which determined that now-defunct
tooling procedures caused the FTM-25 CGR anomaly. The FRB determined that changes
to the CGR C-seal’s spring dimensions, additional inspections, and an enhanced
acceptance test process addressed the low pressure anomalies from the lot acceptance
tests.
- A second anomaly was observed during SM CTV-01 when an SM-3 Block IB TU failed
to launch due to the missile failing a pre-launch booster nozzle response built-in test
designed to ensure safe missile egress from the firing ship. An FRB determined that
random minor voltage glitches in guidance section components caused short-duration
(tens of milliseconds) corrupted commands to be sent to the booster nozzle, which
resulted in a failure of the built-in test. To address the problem, the program developed
software that mitigates the possibility of failure by introducing logic to re-send
commands up to two additional times. The new software was successfully flown in SM
CTV-01a and -02, and will be installed on new production rounds.
- Third, lot acceptance testing revealed a number of SM-3 Block IB TU kinetic warhead
guidance units that were unresponsive at power up. An FRB established the root cause to
be related to memory management during boot up. The MDA has implemented a minor
change to the kinetic warhead’s guidance unit software to correct the anomaly. These two
software changes will be loaded on all Block IB TU missiles at their 4-year recertification
periods.
• The successful simulated engagement in the Pacific Dragon Fleet exercise demonstrated
the organic engagement capabilities of the Baseline 9.C2 system.
• The FTX-21 flight mission demonstrated the endo-atmospheric tracking capabilities of
the Aegis Baseline 9.C1 system, which are relevant for the SBT engagement mission;

however, no SBT engagements were attempted in FY16. To date, intercept testing of the
Baseline 9.C1’s SBT capabilities consists of the first two multi-mission warfare events in
FY15. These events demonstrated that SM-6 Dual I and SM-2 Block IV missiles can be
used to conduct SBT engagements against non-separating SRBMs, but high-fidelity
M&S analyses conducted using models accredited by the BMDS OTA [operational test
agency] have not yet occurred, so SBT [sea-based terminal] engagement performance
cannot be quantitatively evaluated. Completion of a subset of the SBT M&S analyses is
expected in 1QFY17.
• The MDA demonstrated Aegis Baseline 9.C1 system’s IAMD capabilities to a limited
degree in FTO-02 Event 2a, when the firing ship performed a remote ballistic missile
engagement with the system operating in IAMD [integrated air and missile defense] radar
priority mode while conducting an anti-air warfare engagement against a single cruise
missile surrogate. The demonstration of IAMD capabilities in FTO-02 Event 2a was not
stressing, even less so than during FTM-25 (FY15), where a raid of two cruise missiles
and a single ballistic missile target were simultaneously engaged in an organic
engagement.
• Reliability, maintainability, availability, and supportability (RMA&S) data collected
during Aegis Baseline 9.1 BMD-related testing through FY15 show that the system has
lower than desired software stability. Also, the data show that the system does not
currently meet its requirements for availability and mean time to repair hardware, mostly
due to a series of early Aegis Display System failures and an AN/SPY-1 radar coolant
leak that downed the system for an extended period of time. The majority of the Aegis
Display System problems have since been addressed with the installation of new console
graphics cards. DOT&E will reassess RMA&S once the MDA completes FTM-27
planned for December 2016.
• ASD-15 demonstrated Aegis BMD 3.6.3 retention of Aegis BMD 3.6.1 midcourse
engagement capabilities against non-separating SRBMs, when an Aegis BMD 3.6.3 ship
detected, tracked, and intercepted an SRBM using an SM-3 Block IA guided missile.
ASD-15 also demonstrated that Aegis BMD can interoperate with NATO defenses and
exchange air and ballistic missile message information across operational communication
architectures during cruise missile and ballistic missile engagements. The MDA further
demonstrated Aegis BMD 3.6.3 capabilities in FY16 during SM CTV-01a and -02, when
an Aegis BMD 3.6.3 destroyer fired SM-3 Block IB TU missiles for the first time. Aegis
BMD 3.6.3 is the only variant of the Aegis BMD 3.6 system that can fire SM-3 Block IB
missiles.
• The MDA continues to utilize Aegis BMD assets and HWIL representations in ground
test events and warfighter simulation exercises during operational flight test campaigns
(e.g. FTO-02), which has helped to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and
overall interoperability of the system with the BMDS. However, the test events routinely
demonstrated that inter-element coordination and interoperability need improvement. The
tests highlighted multiple classified suitability and effectiveness shortfalls.
• The MDA continues to participate in tests of opportunity like the Pacific Dragon
exercise, which provide a venue to explore interoperability between Aegis BMD assets
and foreign ballistic missile defense assets. In Pacific Dragon, Aegis BMD successfully
exchanged data with Allied units from Japan and the Republic of Korea.
• Following the integration testing failure of an SM-3 Block IIA flight test round, the
MDA initiated a Failure Investigation Team process and developed a fault tree. The flight
test round will be disassembled and will undergo further analysis to determine the root
cause of the failure.

• Cybersecurity testing results from the Adversarial Assessment of the Aegis Ashore
Missile Defense Facility in Romania will be included in DOT&E’s classified 2016
BMDS Annual Report to Congress.
• Testing has uncovered a number of classified survivability problems, which will be
discussed in DOT&E’s classified 2016 BMDS Annual Report to Congress.
Recommendations
• Status of Previous Recommendations. The program:
1. Addressed the first recommendation from FY13 to conduct flight testing of the Aegis
BMD 4.0 remote engagement authorized capability against an MRBM or IRBM target
using SM-3 Block IB guided missiles, when it conducted FTO-02 Events 1a and 2a using
Aegis Baseline 9.1 (BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade) firing assets.
2. Partially addressed the second recommendation from FY13, to conduct operationally
realistic testing that exercises Aegis BMD 4.0’s improved engagement coordination with
THAAD and Patriot, when it conducted FTO-02 Event 2a using an Aegis Baseline 9.C1
destroyer and THAAD firing assets. This flight test did not include Patriot.
3. Addressed the second recommendation from FY14, to determine the appropriate
LRS&T TTPs for the transmission and receipt of Aegis BMD 4.0 track data for GMD
use. GTI-06 Part 3 (FY15), GTI-06 Part 2, and GTD-06 Part 2 demonstrated that GMD
can use data provided by Aegis BMD 4.0.3.
4. Partially addressed the third recommendation from FY14, to ensure that sufficient
flight testing of the Aegis Baseline 9.C1 system is conducted to allow for verification,
validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of the M&S suite to cover the full design to Aegis
BMD battlespace. Flight testing conducted in FY15 and early FY16 provided additional
VV&A data, but the BMDS OTA has not yet accredited the high fidelity M&S suite.
5. Addressed the fourth recommendation from FY14, to conduct sufficient ground and
flight testing of the redesigned insulation components in the SM-3 Block IB TSRM
nozzle to prove the new design works under the most stressing operational flight
conditions. This occurred when the program completed a series of six design verification
and qualification ground test firings and the SM CTV-01a and CTV-02 flight tests.
6. Addressed the first recommendation from FY15, to use an industry-led FRB process to
identify the root cause of low cold gas pressure anomalies observed in lot acceptance
testing of the SM-3 Block IB CGR, and determine the appropriate corrective actions
needed to ensure proper functioning. The FRB process determined that changes to the
CGR C-seal’s spring dimensions, additional inspections, and an enhanced acceptance test
process were required and a follow-on study is underway to investigate the possibility of
re-designing the CGR seal.
7. Has not addressed the second recommendation from FY15, to conduct stressing
simultaneous air and ballistic missile defense engagements with the Aegis Baseline 9.C1
system operating in IAMD radar priority mode, with multiple ballistic missiles and anti-
ship cruise missile threats being simultaneously engaged.
8. Has not addressed the third recommendation from FY15, to perform high-fidelity
M&S analysis over the expected Aegis Ashore engagement battlespace for EPAA Phase
2 to allow for a broad quantitative evaluation of engagement capability. The MDA plans
to complete the high-fidelity M&S analysis in FY18.
• FY16 Recommendations. The MDA should:
1. Conduct high-fidelity M&S runs-for-the-record for the Aegis Baseline 9.2 system
(Aegis BMD 5.1) to assess performance across the expected engagement battlespace in

all Combatant Commands’ Areas of Responsibility and develop an appropriate M&S
VV&A plan to support that effort.
2. Conduct a live-flight test demonstration of a fully remote engagement.
3. Include BMDS OTA RMA&S data collectors in all flight test missions to improve the
accuracy and statistical confidence of future suitability assessments.25
Regarding the SM-6 missile, the December 2016 DOT&E report also stated:
Assessment
• In FY16, the Navy completed FOT&E [follow-on test and evaluation] live fire testing.
These tests provided validation data for the modeling and simulation runs for the record
phase of the FOT&E. The Navy will conduct this phase of test during FY17, which will
complete the SM-6 BLK I FOT&E.
• During FY16 flight tests, there were no occurrences of the uplink/downlink antenna
shroud reliability deficiency. DOT&E considers the uplink/downlink antenna shroud
reliability deficiency to be resolved. To date, the Navy has fired 34 SM-6s with full
production antennas with no observations of anomalies. At the 80 percent confidence
level, the reliability of the antennas is at least 95.4 percent.
• The March 2015 SM-6 BLK I mission D1G misfire remains under investigation by the
Navy with no root cause determination to date.
• In the May 2013 SM-6 IOT&E report, DOT&E assessed SM-6 BLK I as suitable. This
assessment considered combined data from the IOT&E and developmental/operational
flight tests. During FY16 testing, DOT&E collected additional reliability data and
assessed that the SM-6 BLK I continues to remain suitable. DOT&E will continue to
collect suitability and effectiveness data throughout SM-6 BLK IA FOT&E testing in
FY17, as well as during all SM-6 flight testing in support of NIFC-CA [Naval Integrated
Fire Control—Counter Air] FTS [from the sea], Missile Defense Agency, and Aegis
software baseline development.
• The performance deficiency discovered during IOT&E and outlined in the classified
IOT&E report remains unresolved and continues to affect DOT&E’s final assessment of
effectiveness. The Navy is assessing several options for a solution, each with varying
degrees of complexity. A primary concern is to ensure the solution causes no degradation
to the existing SM-6 performance envelope. The corrective actions will be incorporated
into production of the SM-6 BLK I and BLK IA configurations and tested during FOT&E
in FY17.
• In FY16, the Navy successfully demonstrated the maximum range KPP during SM-6
FOT&E and the maximum cross‑range Key System Attribute.
• DOT&E assesses the launch availability KPP to be resolved. The Navy stored seven
missiles aboard an operational ship for at least 8 months prior to firing during FOT&E
with no launch availability problems noted. This yields a launch availability of 1.0 with
an 80 percent confidence lower bound of 0.81, against a requirement of 0.98.
• Upon completion of the SM-6 FOT&E in FY17, the Navy will have conducted
sufficient testing to allow an assessment of the SM-6 Capability Production Document
performance requirement for interoperability.
• The failure during the Aegis Agile Prism test remains under investigation by the Navy.
25
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2016 Annual Report, December 2016, pp. 417-
419.

• The Navy’s NIFC-CA FTS Increment I test events conducted to date were sufficient to
demonstrate basic capability; however, these demonstrations were not conducted under
operationally realistic conditions or against aerial targets representative of modern
threats. Additionally, the scenarios conducted were not sufficiently challenging to
demonstrate the NIFC-CA FTS requirements defined in the Navy’s September 2012
NIFC-CA FTS Testing Capability Definition Letter. Nevertheless, since NIFC-CA FTS
Increment I has been fully integrated as a tactical option in fleet air defense, DOT&E
removed the NIFC-CA FTS, as a distinct program, from test and evaluation oversight.
DOT&E will assess and report NIFC-CA FTS (Increment II) performance as part of the
FY18-23 ACB 16 and ACB 20 Aegis Modernization operational testing and SM-6
FOT&E.
• In September 2016, at White Sands Missile Range, the Navy and Marine Corps
successfully conducted a NIFC-CA FTS Increment I demonstration event using an F-35
Lightning II as a targeting source to allow the ACS (partial) installed at the Desert Ship
test facility to engage an aerial target with the SM-6. The configuration of the F-35 and
the Desert Ship was not operationally representative and not all the required
communications links were present. This demonstration was part of developmental
testing and did not represent a fleet operational configuration of the ACS. The
demonstration used a non-tactical engineering computer software build in the Aegis
Desert Ship test site – itself not fully representative of the ACS – interfaced to a datalink
gateway that could receive the F-35 MADL and port track data from the aircraft sensor to
the AWS. Using these track data, an SM-6 successfully engaged an MQM-107 unmanned
target drone. This demonstration was conducted as a proof of concept to show that the
NIFC-CA FTS Increment I capability could utilize additional airborne sensors to provide
fire control quality data to the AWS. In the context of the event, this objective was met;
however, this demonstration should not be construed as an operational capability.
• In September 2016, at the Pacific Missile Test Center, the Navy successfully conducted
an at-sea flight demonstration of the NIFC-CA FTS Increment I. This test resulted in the
longest-range SM-6 interception to-date.
Recommendations
• Status of Previous Recommendations. The Navy is addressing the previous
recommendations from FY14 to complete corrective actions of the classified performance
deficiency discovered during IOT&E and develop a flight test program to test those
corrective actions. The Navy plans to conduct verification flight tests in FY17. The Navy
has not addressed the FY15 recommendation; however, this recommendation is rescinded
as NIFC-CA FTS Increment I has been fully integrated as a tactical option in fleet air
defense, DOT&E removed the NIFC-CA FTS, as a distinct program, from test and
evaluation oversight and will be tested as a normal tactic in future Aegis/SM-6 testing.
• FY16 Recommendations. None.26
April 2016 GAO Report
An April 28, 2016, Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on BMD testing stated:
MDA continued to make progress towards achieving its individual elements’ asset
delivery goals in fiscal year 2015. For instance, Aegis BMD delivered Aegis Ashore in
Romania and most planned SM-3 Block IB interceptors. GMD delivered all planned CE-
II interceptors. THAAD, however, experienced setbacks in delivering interceptors, only
26
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2016 Annual Report, December 2016, pp. 326-
327.

delivering 3 out of 44, due to delays to address memory and shelf-life issues. Once
corrections were made and testing was completed, deliveries resumed.
MDA took actions to mitigate some acquisition risks in fiscal year 2015. Specifically,
MDA delayed the production decision for the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB interceptor in
order to conduct testing for a redesigned component. Further, it delayed the full-rate
production decision until after these tests. MDA took these actions in response to our
recommendation, which we made to strengthen and improve its Aegis BMD SM-3
acquisitions and outcomes. In addition, MDA successfully conducted an intercept flight
test prior to restarting production of the GMD CE-II interceptors. Delaying production of
the interceptors until after a successful test was a positive step, because it minimized the
risk of having to recall interceptors to fix any issues identified during testing.
However, MDA continues to use acquisition practices that put BMDS elements at risk for
cost growth and performance shortfalls. In the past we have found that MDA has used
some high risk acquisition approaches that do not build knowledge before program
commitments and test before production is initiated. As an example, MDA awarded a
production contract for the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB interceptors prior to finalizing the
costs for a redesigned component and testing software and hardware upgrades.
Consequently, costs could increase if additional design changes are needed after flight
testing this component in fiscal year 2016.27
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the lack of a target for simulating the
endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile. DOD’s
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), in a December 2011 report (DOT&E’s
annual report for FY2011), stated:
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Target
A threat representative Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) target for operational open-
air testing has become an immediate test resource need. China is fielding the DF-21D
ASBM, which threatens U.S. and allied surface warships in the Western Pacific. While
the Missile Defense Agency has exo-atmospheric targets in development, no program
currently exists for an endo-atmospheric target. The endo-atmospheric ASBM target is
the Navy’s responsibility, but it is not currently budgeted. The Missile Defense Agency
estimates the non-recurring expense to develop the exo-atmospheric target was $30
million with each target costing an additional $30 million; the endo-atmospheric target
will be more expensive to produce according to missile defense analysts. Numerous Navy
acquisition programs will require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a
limited number of targets (3-5) may be sufficient to validate analytical models.28
A February 28, 2012, press report stated:
“Numerous programs will require” a test missile to stand in for the Chinese DF-21D,
“including self-defense systems used on our carriers and larger amphibious ships to
counter anti-ship ballistic missiles,” [Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of
operational test and evaluation] said in an e-mailed statement....
27
Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery
of Capabilities, GAO-16-339R, April 28, 2016, pp. 5-6.
28
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p. 294.

“No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s
trajectory,” Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy “has not budgeted for any study,
development, acquisition or production” of a DF-21D target, he said.
Lieutenant Alana Garas, a Navy spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that the service
“acknowledges this is a valid concern and is assessing options to address it. We are
unable to provide additional details.”...
Gilmore, the testing chief, said his office first warned the Navy and Pentagon officials in
2008 about the lack of an adequate target. The warnings continued through this year,
when the testing office for the first time singled out the DF-21D in its annual public
report....
The Navy “can test some, but not necessarily all, potential means of negating anti-ship
ballistic missiles,” without a test target, Gilmore said.29
The December 2012 report from DOT&E (i.e., DOT&E’s annual report for FY2012) did not
further discuss this issue; a January 21, 2013, press report stated that this is because the details of
the issue are classified.30
A December 16, 2016, press report states (emphasis added):
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said its new Sea Based Terminal (SBT) system
achieved its second ballistic missile intercept during a Dec. 14 test over the Pacific
Ocean.
During the test, the USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53)... fired a salvo of two Raytheon
[RTN] Standard Misisle-6 (SM-6) interceptors in immediate succession against a
medium-range ballistic missile target launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility on
Kauai, Hawaii. The first interceptor was not armed and was designed to collect test data,
MDA said. The second interceptor, which carried an explosive warhead, intercepted the
Lockheed Martin-built target....
MDA called the target “complex” but declined to elaborate. However, according to
the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, the target emulated China’s Dong-Feng 21
(DF-21), a ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle and
designed to destroy U.S., aircraft carriers.
The event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-27 (FTM-27), was SBT’s first salvo
test and its second intercept in as many tries.31
Legislative Activity for FY2017
Summary of Action on FY2017 MDA Funding Request
Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the FY2017 request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.
29
Tony Capaccio, “Navy Lacks Targets To Test U.S. Defenses Against China Missile,” Bloomberg Government
(bgov.com), February 28, 2012.
30
Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD Testing Chief Drops Public Discussion Of ASBM Target Shortfall,” Inside the Navy,
January 21, 2013.
31
Marc Selinger, “Missile Defense Agency Scores Second Intercept With Sea Based Terminal System,” Defense Daily,
December 16, 2016: 3-4.

Table 3. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2017 Request for MDA
Procurement and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
Request
Authorization Appropriation
HASC SASC Conf. HAC SAC Conf.
Procurement
Aegis BMD (line 24) 463.8 528.8 463.8 528.8 463.8 513.8 513.8
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 28) 57.5 82.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5
Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 30) 50.1 50.1 50.1 50.1 50.1 50.1 50.1
Subtotal Procurement 571.4 661.4 571.4 636.4 571.4 621.4 621.4
Research and Development
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 79) 959.1 959.1 959.1 939.1 929.1 924.1 919.1
Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 107) 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0
Land-based SM-3 (PE0604880C) (line 109) 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3
Aegis SM-3 IIA (PE0604881C) (line 110) 106.0 106.0 106.0 106.0 106.0 106.0 106.0
Subtotal RDT&E 1,203.4 1,203.4 1,203.4 1,183.4 1,173.4 1,168.4 1,163.4
TOTAL 1,774.8 1,864.8 1,774.8 1,819.8 1,744.8 1,789.8 1,784.8
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’s FY2017 budget submission and committee reports,
authorization conference report, and appropriations conference explanatory statement.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.
FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4909/S. 2943/P.L.
114-328)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 114-537 of May 4, 2016) on H.R.
4909 of the 114th
Congress, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of
Table 3. The recommended increase of $60 million for Aegis BMD (line 24) is for “Increasing
BMD capability of Aegis ships.” (Page 464) The recommended increase of $25 million for Aegis
Ashore Phase III (line 28) is for “Classified adjustment.” (Page 464)
Section 1654 of H.R. 4909 as reported states:
SEC. 1654. Maximizing Aegis Ashore capability.
(a) Anti-air warfare capability of Aegis Ashore sites.—
(1) EVALUATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a complete evaluation of
the optimal anti-air warfare capability—
(A) for each current Aegis Ashore site by not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act; and
(B) as part of any future deployment by the United States of an Aegis Ashore site after
the date of such enactment.

(2) ASSESSMENTS INCLUDED.—Each evaluation under paragraph (1) shall include
an assessment of the potential deployment of enhanced sea sparrow missiles, standard
missile block 2 missiles, standard missile block 6 missiles, or the SeaRAM missile
system.
(3) CONSISTENCY WITH ANNEX.—The Secretary shall carry out this subsection
consistent with any classified annex accompanying this Act.
(b) Aegis Ashore capability evaluation.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees an evaluation of each
of the following:
(1) The ballistic missile and air threat against the continental United States and the
efficacy (including with respect to cost, ideal and optimal deployment locations, and
potential deployment schedule) of deploying one or more Aegis Ashore sites and Aegis
Ashore components for the ballistic and cruise missile defense of the continental United
States.
(2) The ballistic missile and air threat against the Armed Forces on Guam and the
efficacy (including with respect to cost and schedule) of deploying an Aegis Ashore site
on Guam.
(c) Aegis ashore site on the Pacific Missile Range Facility.—
(1) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of Defense may not reduce the manning levels or test
capability, as such levels and capability existed on January 1, 2015, of the Aegis Ashore
site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, including by putting such site into a
“cold” or “stand by” status.
(2) ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT.—
(A) Not later than 60 days after the date on which the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency submits to the congressional defense committees the report under section
1689(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
114–92; 129 Stat. 1144), the Director shall notify such committees on whether the
preferred alternative for fielding a medium range ballistic missile defense sensor for the
defense of Hawaii identified by such report would require an update to the environmental
impact statement required for constructing the Aegis Ashore site at the Pacific Missile
Range Facility.
(B) If the Director determines that an updated environmental impact statement, a new
environmental impact statement, or another action is required or recommended pursuant
to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. et seq.), the Director shall
commence such action by not later than 60 days after the date on which the Director
makes the notification under subparagraph (A).
(3) EVALUATION.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly
submit to the congressional defense committees an evaluation of the ballistic missile and
air threat against Hawaii (including with respect to threats to the Armed Forces and
installations located in Hawaii) and the efficacy (including with respect to cost and
potential alternatives) of—
(A) making the Aegis Ashore site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility operational;
(B) deploying the preferred alternative for fielding a medium range ballistic missile
defense sensor for the defense of Hawaii described in paragraph (2)(A); and
(C) any other alternative the Secretary and the Chairman determine appropriate.

(d) Forms.—The evaluations submitted under subsections (b) and (c)(3) shall each be
submitted in unclassified form, but may each include a classified annex.
Regarding Section 1654, H.Rept. 114-537 states:
Section 1654—Maximizing Aegis Ashore Capability
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct an evaluation of the
optimal anti-air warfare capability for each current Aegis Ashore Site by not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. This section would also require that
such evaluation is a part of the future deployment of an Aegis Ashore site. The
assessment of Aegis Ashore anti-air warfare capability would include use of enhanced
sea-sparrow missiles, standard missile block 2 missiles, standard missile block 6 missiles,
or the SeaRAM missile system. The Secretary of Defense would be required to carry out
this subsection consistent with the classified annex accompanying this Act.
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also be
required to submit to the congressional defense committees not later than 120 days after
the date of enactment of this Act an evaluation to include:
(1) The ballistic missile and air threat against the continental United States and the
efficacy of deploying one or more Aegis Ashore sites and Aegis Ashore components for
the ballistic and cruise missile defense of the continental United States; and
(2) The ballistic missile and air threat against Guam, and the cost and efficacy of
deploying Aegis Ashore there.
Regarding the Aegis Ashore site on the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in
Hawaii, this section would restrict the Secretary from reducing the manning levels or test
capability of that site as they were on January 1, 2015, or to put the site into a “cold” or
“stand by” status. This section would also require the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency to notify the congressional defense committees if the preferred alternative for
fielding a medium-range ballistic missile defense sensor for the defense of Hawaii,
identified through the study conducted by the Director pursuant to section 1689(b)(2) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92),
would require any study or assessment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (Public Law 91–190). The Director would be required to initiate that study or
analysis not later than 60 days after his notification.
Lastly, this section would also require the Secretary and the Chairman to jointly submit to
the congressional defense committees not later than 60 days after the enactment of this
Act an evaluation of the ballistic and air threat to Hawaii; the efficacy (including with
respect to cost and potential alternatives) of making the Aegis Ashore site at PMRF
operational; deploying the preferred alternative for fielding a medium-range ballistic
missile defense sensor for the defense of Hawaii; and any other alternative the Secretary
and Chairman determine appropriate. (Pages 330-331)
SEC. 1663. Procurement of medium-range discrimination radar to improve homeland
missile defense.
(a) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall issue a request for proposals for
such radar by not later than October 1, 2017.
(b) The Director shall plan to procure a medium-range discrimination radar or equivalent
sensor for a location the Director determines will improve homeland missile defense for
the defense of Hawaii from the limited ballistic missile threat (including accidental or
unauthorized launch) and plan for such radar to be fielded by not later than December 31,
2021.

Regarding Section 1663, H.Rept. 114-537 states:
Section 1663—Procurement of Medium-Range Discrimination Radar To Improve
Homeland Missile Defense
This section would require the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to issue a request
for proposals for a medium-range discrimination radar by not later than October 1, 2017.
This section would also require the Director to plan to procure a medium-range
discrimination radar or equivalent sensor to improve the ballistic missile defense of
Hawaii. (Pages 334-335)
SEC. 1666. Sense of Congress on initial operating capability of phase 2 of European
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense.
(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:
(1) President Obama, during his announcement of the European Phased Adaptive
Approach on September 17, 2009, stated, “This approach is based on an assessment of
the Iranian missile threat,” and “the best way to responsibly advance our security and the
security of our allies is to deploy a missile defense system that best responds to the
threats we face and that utilizes technology that is both proven and cost-effective.”.
(2) The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense review stated that “The [European] Phased
Adaptive Approach utilizes existing and proven capabilities to meet current threats and
then will improve upon these capabilities over time by integrating new technology.”.
(3) Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, during a speech in Brussels on October 5, 2011,
stated, “The United States is fully committed to building a missile defense capability for
the full coverage and protection of all our NATO European populations, their territory
and their forces against the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles.”.
(4) Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, during a press conference on March 15, 2013,
stated, “The missile deployments the United States is making in phases one through three
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, including sites in Romania and Poland, will
still be able to provide coverage of all European NATO territory as planned by 2018.”.
(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States is committed to the defense of deployed members of the Armed
Forces of the United States and to the defense of the European allies of the Unites States
by increasing the ballistic missile defense capability of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (in this section referred to as “NATO”);
(2) phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach will provide NATO with a
substantial increase in ballistic missile defense capability since NATO declared Interim
Ballistic Missile Defense Capability at the Chicago Summit in 2012, and such phase
consists of—
(A) Aegis Ashore in Romania;
(B) four Aegis ballistic missile defense capable ships homeported at Rota, Spain; and
(C) a more capable SM–3 interceptor;
(3) NATO is moving forward with the modernization of the defense capabilities of
NATO that is responsive to 21st century threats to the territory and populations of
member states of NATO;
(4) the member states of NATO recognize the importance of this contribution, which
sends a clear signal that NATO will not allow potential adversaries to threaten the use of

ballistic missile strikes to coerce NATO or deter NATO from responding to aggression
against the interests of NATO; and
(5) phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is ready for 24-hour-a-day,
seven-day-a-week operation, with proven military systems and command and control
capability, and should be so declared at the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland.
A May 16, 2016, statement of Administration policy regarding H.R. 4909 as reported states that
the Administration objects to section 1663, which would direct the Director of the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) to issue a request for proposal to procure a medium-range
discrimination radar or equivalent sensor for the defense of Hawaii. DOD is conducting a
study to determine the appropriate balance of sensors and locations to best defend the
homeland, including Hawaii; it will be completed in the fourth quarter of FY 2016.
Section 1663 could limit the Administration's ability to defend the entire homeland and
the flexibility to apply the best capabilities to address rapidly evolving threats.32
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 114-255 of May 18, 2016) on S.
2943 of the 114th
Congress, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of
Table 3.
Section 1011 of S. 2943 as reported states (see parts in bold):
SEC. 1011. Availability of funds for retirement or inactivation of cruisers or dock landing
ships.
(a) Limitation on availability of funds.—Except as provided in subsections (b) through
(g), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2017 may be obligated or expended to retire, prepare to retire, or
inactivate a TICONDEROGA–class cruiser, WHIDBEY ISLAND–class dock landing
ship, or HARPERS FERRY–class dock landing ship.
(b) Certification of requirement for operational cruisers and dock landing ships.—
The Chief of Naval Operations shall certify to the congressional defense committees
the Navy requirement for operational cruisers and dock landing ships, as provided
under subsection (d)(1), from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2030. The
certification shall also state the requirement for basic (BMD 3.X), intermediate
(BMD 4.X), and advanced (BMD 5.X) ballistic missile defense capability on
operational cruisers from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2030.
(c) Ship modernization, operations, and sustainment fund (smosf).—Funds within the
Ship Modernization, Operations, and Sustainment Fund (SMOSF) shall only be used for
11 TICONDEROGA-class cruisers (CG–63 through CG–73) and 3 WHIDBEY
ISLAND-class dock landing ships (LSD–41, LSD–42, and LSD–46).
(d) Phased modernization.—The Secretary of the Navy shall retain the current inventory
of 22 TICONDEROGA-class cruisers and 12 WHIDBEY ISLAND- or HARPERS
FERRY-class dock landing ships until the end of their service lives, as follows:
(1) OPERATIONAL FORCES.—Through fiscal year 2030, the Navy shall maintain not
less than the Chief of Naval Operations’ requirement for operational cruisers certified
under subsection (b) or 11 operational cruisers, whichever is greater. The Navy shall
32
Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4909—National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017, May 16, 2016, p. 8.

maintain no less than the Chief of Naval Operations’ requirement for dock landing ships
certified under subsection (b) or 9 operational dock landing ships, whichever is greater.
(2) PHASED MODERNIZATION.—The Navy is authorized to conduct phased
modernization of not more than 11 cruisers and 3 dock landing ships. During the phased
modernization period, the Navy may reduce manning on these ships to the minimal level
necessary to ensure safety and security of the ship and to retain critical skills. Only the
ships listed in subsection (c) may undergo phased modernization. Ships undergoing
phased modernization shall comply with subsection (e).
(3) TRANSITION FROM PHASED MODERNIZATION TO OPERATIONAL
FORCES.—Each of the cruisers described under paragraph (1) may be decommissioned
at the end of its service life concurrent with being replaced by a cruiser that completes
phased modernization pursuant to paragraph (2). After being reintroduced into the
operational fleet, each of the cruisers modernized pursuant to paragraph (2) may be
decommissioned upon reaching its expected service life.
(4) AVAILABILITY FOR WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT.—For purposes of this
subsection, an operational cruiser or dock landing ship is available for worldwide
deployment other than during routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.
(e) Requirements and limitations on phased modernization.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of phased modernization authorized under
subsection (d), the Secretary of the Navy shall—
(A) continue to maintain the ships in a manner that will ensure the ability of the ships to
re-enter the operational fleet in accordance with paragraph (3) of such subsection;
(B) conduct planning activities to ensure scheduled and deferred maintenance and
modernization work items are identified and included in maintenance availability work
packages;
(C) conduct hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) and combat system modernization
necessary to achieve a service life of 40 years;
(D) conduct basic (BMD 3.X), intermediate (BMD 4.X), and advanced (BMD 5.X)
ballistic missile defense capability upgrades to meet or exceed the Chief of Naval
Operations’ requirement certified under subsection (b); and
(E) complete maintenance and modernization of the cruisers, including required testing
and crew training, to allow for a one-for-one replacement of operational cruisers in
accordance with subsection (d)(3).
(2) RESTRICTED ACTIVITIES.—During the period of phased modernization
authorized under subsection (d), the Secretary of the Navy may not—
(A) permit removal or cannibalization of equipment or systems, unless planned for full
replacement or upgrade during phased modernization, other than equipment or systems
explicitly identified as—
(i) rotatable pool equipment; or
(ii) necessary to support urgent operational requirements approved by the Secretary of
Defense;
(B) make any irreversible modifications that will prohibit the ship from re-entering the
operational fleet;
(C) through fiscal year 2030, reduce the quantity of operational cruisers below the
number certified to be required by the Chief of Naval Operations under subsection (b) or
11 operational cruisers, whichever is greater;

(D) through fiscal year 2030, reduce the quantity of operational dock landing ships below
the number certified to be required by the Chief of Naval Operations under subsection (b)
or 9 operational dock landing ships, whichever is greater; and
(E) through fiscal year 2030, reduce the basic, intermediate, or advanced ballistic
missile defense capability on operational cruisers below the quantities certified to be
required by the Chief of Naval Operations under subsection (b).
(f) Report required.—The Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional
defense committees an annual report on the status of the phased modernization program.
This report shall accompany the budget of the President submitted to Congress under
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code. The report shall include, with respect to
the ships undergoing phased modernization pursuant to subsection (d)(2), the following
information:
(1) The status of modernization efforts, by vessel, including availability schedules,
equipment procurement schedules, and annual funding requirements from the fiscal year
of induction into the phased modernization program through the fiscal year of planned re-
entry into the operational fleet.
(2) Each vessel’s current readiness, operational, and manning status.
(3) An assessment of each vessel’s current materiel condition.
(4) A list of rotatable pool equipment that is identified across the classes of cruisers and
dock landing ships as necessary to support operations on a continuing basis.
(5) A list of equipment, other than rotatable pool equipment, removed from each vessel,
including a justification for the removal, the disposition of the equipment, and plan for
restoration of the equipment.
(6) A list of planned obligations and expenditures, by vessel, for the fiscal year of the
budget of the President submitted to Congress.
(g) Notification required.—The Secretary of the Navy shall notify the congressional
defense committees in writing 30 days prior to executing any deviations to the plans
provided pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (6) of subsection (f) of the most recent report
required under such subsection.
Regarding Section 1011, S.Rept. 114-255 states:
Availability of funds for retirement or inactivation of cruisers or dock landing ships
(sec. 1011)
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit fiscal year 2017 funds from
being used to retire, prepare to retire, or inactivate a Ticonderoga-class cruiser, Whidbey
Island-class dock landing ship, or Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ship, unless
prescribed criteria are met.
First, the Chief of Naval Operations would be required to certify to the congressional
defense committees the requirement for operational cruisers, dock landing ships, and
ballistic missile defense-capable cruisers from fiscal year 2017 through 2030.
Second, funds within the Ship Modernization, Operations, and Sustainment Fund
(SMOSF) could only be used for 11 Ticonderoga-class cruisers (CG–63 through CG–73)
and 3 Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships (LSD–41, LSD–42, and LSD–46).
Third, the Secretary of the Navy would be required to retain the current inventory of 22
cruisers and 12 dock landing ships until the end of their service lives with the following
restrictions. Through fiscal year 2030, the Navy would be required to maintain not less
than the Chief of Naval Operations’ requirement for operational cruisers or 11
operational cruisers, whichever is greater. The Navy would be required to maintain no

less than the Chief of Naval Operations’ requirement for dock landing ships or 9
operational dock landing ships, whichever is greater. The Navy would be authorized to
conduct phased modernization of not more than 11 cruisers and 3 dock landing ships.
Fourth, the Secretary of the Navy would be required to adhere to five requirements and
five restrictions during the phased modernization period.
Fifth, the Secretary of the Navy would be required to submit an annual report with the
President’s budget on the status of the phased modernization program.
Sixth, the Secretary of the Navy would be required to notify the congressional defense
committees in writing 30 days prior to executing any deviations to the plans provided in
the most recent annual report.
The committee does not support a smaller fleet and notes the Navy stands at 272 ships
this year, far below the 308 ship requirement. However, the committee does recognize the
fiscal pressure the Navy is under to maintain the readiness of the current force while
continuing to modernize for future threats, including the requirement to procure the Ohio-
class replacement submarine program. The committee also notes the Navy has fully
funded this budget request’s phased modernization plan, unlike past budget submissions.
The committee would not be supportive of any effort to decommission any cruiser or
dock landing ship earlier than provided for in this provision and views this provision as
necessary to ensure the ships that enter phased modernization are returned to service.
(Pages 264-265)
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 114-840 of November 30, 2016) on S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of
December 23, 2016, recommended the funding levels shown in the authorization conference
column of Table 3. The recommended increase of $65 million for Aegis BMD (line 24) is for
“Increasing BMD capability for Aegis Ships.” (Page 1367) The recommended reduction of $20
million for Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 79) is for “SM–3 IIA development excess growth.”
(Page 1418).
Section 1685 of S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 states:
SEC. 1685. Maximizing Aegis Ashore capability and developing medium range
discrimination radar.
(a) Anti-air warfare capability of Aegis Ashore sites.—
(1) AUTHORIZATION.—Using funds authorized to be appropriated by sections 101 and
201 of this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 for procurement and
research, development, test, and evaluation, the Secretary of Defense shall continue the
development, procurement, and deployment of anti-air warfare capabilities at each Aegis
Ashore site in Romania and Poland.
(2) LONG-LEAD COMPONENTS.—Of the funds specified in paragraph (1), not more
than $25,000,000 may be obligated or expended for the procurement of long-lead
components to provide the anti-air warfare capabilities described in such paragraph.
(3) REPROGRAMMING AND TRANSFERS.—Any reprogramming or transfer made to
carry out paragraph (1) shall be carried out in accordance with established procedures for
reprogramming or transfers.
(b) Aegis Ashore capability evaluation.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees an evaluation of the
ballistic missile and air threat against the continental United States and the efficacy
(including with respect to cost, ideal and optimal deployment locations, and potential

Rl33745 20170512

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