Lauren Schmidt- Turkey Paper Final

The Turkish Experience:
Addressing Market Failure in the International Provision of Refugee Protection
Lauren Schmidt
Independent Study, Prof. John Gould
October 14th, 2015
L. Schmidt, “The Turkish Experience...” 1
Carsten Koall/Getty Images

Table of Contents
1. An Introduction to the Syrian Refugee Crisis ..........................................................................3
2. Conceptualizing Failures of the International Response ............................................................4
3. Addressing Failures in the Refugee Provision Market................................................................7
4. Turkey: An Illustrative Case Study ........................................................................................12
4. Moving Forward: Reconciling “Role Conﬂict’ .......................................................................23
5. Bibliography .............................................................................................................................27

An Introduction to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Since the conflict began in 2011, more than half of Syria’s citizens have been displaced
by violence and instability. The global community has struggled to accommodate the 4 million
refugees, largely failing to offer durable solution for the vulnerable incoming population
(Albayrak, para. 4). Due to the perceived costs of providing the good, its in-excludable benefits,
and the lack of an overarching international power to ensure others also contribute, many states
have oriented policies towards minimal provision. This collective strategy has resulted in a
tremendous under-provision of refugee support which not only harms the vulnerable forced
migrants but their host nations as well. By analyzing the ways in which current policies and
initiatives fail to realize a state’s current domestic, regional, international and ideological goals in the
framework of Korany and Dessouki’s ‘role theory’, insight into how current responses might be
improved to encourage a most efficient humanitarian response can be gained. Such an understanding
has the ability to ensure current structures are empowering affected populations with the agency to
rise above the difficulties of their current situation while minimizing the cost of distributing aid for
host communities.

When addressing market failure in the provision of refugee services, analyzing the
policies and initiatives of Turkey is crucial. Sharing a 560-mile border, the state has absorbed
over half Syria’s refugees and is, consequently, host to more asylum seekers than any other
country in the world (McClatchy, para. 1). The ability of Turkey’s current asylum to achieve its
domestic, regional, international, and ideological aspirations will be evaluated utilizing the ‘role
theory’ framework, and ways to achieve any unrealized aims and address the collective action
problem through an increase in refugee provision will be explored.

Conceptualizing Failures of the International Response
The Collective Action Problem of Refugee Protection

When seeking to understand the reasons for shortages in the international supply of
protection for Syrian refugees, it is critical to first contextualize refugee provision as a public
good. Since the late 1960’s, political scientists have utilized public goods analysis as primary
means of interpreting global issues (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 2). This framework
characterizes an international public good as any good which is ‘non-excludable’; meaning no
country can be excluded from benefitting from another’s contribution, and ‘non-rival’; meaning
one state’s consumption of the good does not reduce the amount available for the consumption of
others (3). When applied to the provision of refuge and services for asylum seekers, the benefits
of increased national security, transnational stability, and peace of mind- that the displaced
population has reached safety- can be understood as public goods (Hatton 607).

Despite such benefits to be gained, ‘market-failure’ remains endemic to international
refugee protection as it occurs in an environment with no hegemon or overarching governmental
institution with the ability to ensure all states contribute to a public good (Thielemann, “Burden-
Sharing...” 4). The absence of a coercive power forces states to rely on strategic interactions to
achieve socially optimal outcomes. As actors know that others may enter into agreements they
have no intention of keeping, and that imperfect information of a situation leads to pervasive
uncertainty and risk, states are often deterred from contributing to the public good themselves
(Kohane 160-162). Because it is not possible to exclude others from the benefits of the good,
states are further enticed to under-provide themselves and free-ride (obtaining the benefit without
effort or cost) upon the contributions of others (Stein 123). An attempt of states to pursue short-
term strategies which avoid the negative externalities of providing the public good themselves

while maximizing the positive consequences of others doing so, facilitates a collective action
problem, in which “the [long-term] outcomes of individual decisions will be collectively
inefficient” (Feiock 398).

Although theories on collective action have primarily been employed to describe the
under-provision of defense, it can be translated to the refugee context. States have immense
discretion in how they address asylum seekers within their borders; They can recognize their
asylum claims and grant official status, give them some other protection status (i.e. that of a
recognized ‘guest’), or reject the asylum claim altogether and send them back to their home
country (repatriation) (“International Trade...” 11). Emerging as the dominant power after WWII
and the Vietnam War, the United States was able to orchestrate the resettlement of hundreds of
thousands of refugees and ensure the various host nations officially recognize their status
(“International Trade...” 8). As the political hegemony of the United Stated has declined in
recent years, there no longer exists an entity capable of orchestrating the international protection
of refugees and distributing consequences to states who choose to free-ride. Consequently,
offering minimal protection and repatriation has become an increasingly attractive and viable
option for many actors. The inequitable distribution of the impure public good has begun to
stabilize over time, “with states accepting or unable to change the pattern of burden-
distribution” (2).
Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good: Identifying Private Benefits

Closer inspection, however, reveals this understanding of the collective action problem to
be insufficient as refugee provision is not a purely public good. The supplying of care yields
additional benefits which are enjoyed almost exclusively by the donor state, including: increased
regional security, enhanced international and domestic status, and the achievement of its

ideological goals (“International Trade...” 12). As the security and stability achieved by the
provision of refugee services typically prove “more limited in reach than global public goods
suggests, [it] should be interpreted as a predominantly regional good” (Thielemann, “Burden-
Sharing...” 4-5). A raise in international and domestic status resulting from a demonstrated
commitment to humanitarian efforts is another benefit exclusive to the donor state. Additionally,
as the state’s actions recognize democracy and human rights, it will gain from the achievement of
its ideological goals (“International Trade...” 12). Because these outputs are ‘partially-rival’--
offering “excludable benefits which are not shared equally among contributors” or non-
contributors-- the provision of refugee services is most aptly described as an impure public good
(Roper and Barria, “Burden Sharing...” 623).

Current research suggests the recognition of these private benefits serve as incentives for
individual states to contribute to a refugee crisis (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 7). Numerous
studies by Roper and Barria reveal donor countries are likely to spend significantly more on
emergencies that are geographically closer, illuminating that states perceive the disproportionate
gains in stability. Additionally, the literature suggests state’s are more likely to donate upon the
condition their nationals are placed in key positions of humanitarian programs and donations are
made public, meaning countries recognize the private socio-political benefits to having their
contributions made visible to domestic and international observers (“Burden Sharing...” 624).
Furthermore, a perception of ideological gains is made evident as those with a higher record of
political rights and civil liberties are significantly more likely to contribute (626). As these
observations suggest:
“[A] country’s contributions to the provision of refugee protection... will be
positively related to the proportion of excludable benefits accruing to that country.

The greater the proportion of private benefits to overall benefits, the greater the
incentive for individual states to contribute to the provision of an international
collective good” (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 8).
Although these private benefits ensure refugee protection will be provided to a greater extent
than is expected given the ‘exploitation model’ of purely public goods, the problems of collective
action-- mainly, under-provision and inequitable distribution-- remain as countries continue to
perceive the good’s non-excludable benefits. As a result, the various means through which the
collective action problem can be mitigated should be explored.
Addressing Failures in the Refugee Provision Market
Analyzing Methods of Improvement

There exists a myriad of ways in which the collective suboptimality of individual
behavior care can be addressed. The primary modes remain the creation of international
institutions, the harmonization of international asylum policy, and increased specialization in the
provision of refugee services. International institutions are defined as a set of “implicit or explicit
principals, norms, rules, and decision making procedures” around which actors expectations can
converge (Koehane 141). These institutions can be likened to contractual agreements, which
increase cooperation in addressing international issues by minimizing the risk of other’s free-
riding. They establish mutual expectations for actors by introducing a finite set of rules, create
disincentives for deception, and increase the quantity and quality of communication between
participating nations (Kohane 160-162).

To mitigate the market failures in refugee provision, some international institutions--
most notably the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-- aim to

orchestrate “private and public intermediary actors on a voluntary basis, by providing them
ideational and material support” (Abbott 1). The gains from mutual cooperation are made
possible by the institution’s ability to reduce the uncertainty of other actors, and increase security
by minimizing the deflection of asylum applicants from one destination to another (Hatton 606).
Also “Membership in institutions can provide all states a form of prestige which allows them to
influence policy and shape norms of international behavior” (Roper and Barria, “Donor
Fatigue...” 12). The limited political agency of the UNHCR and similar transnational
organizations incentivized collaboration as participants receive tremendous economic and
political benefits at low sovereignty costs (Abbott 3). Institutions can also serve to lower the
professional and financial burden on the host country. The most prominent example of financial
burden-sharing is the EU’s European Refugee Fund which seeks to ensure each Member State
donates an equal amount of resources to the crisis, irrespective of how many refugees the are
physically faced with (“International Trade...” 18).

Although the UNHCR, European Refugee Fund and other international institutions have
the power to improve the market-incentives to contribute to the public good, their minimal
coercive power demonstrates that institutionalized cooperation may “decline quite apart from the
real intentions or objectives of the policy makers involved” and fail to solve the collective action
problem (Kohane 163). The UNHCR’s limited capacity to influence local policies in a way
which would facilitate a more efficient use of its resources severely limits its competency as the
sole provider of the public good. Similarly, the European Refugee Fund is unable to punish those
who fail to contribute resources and is thus perpetually insufficient in its efforts to compensate
those nations which are bearing the financial cost of the crisis (“International Trade...” 18). As
this analysis demonstrates, difficulties coordinating and dividing up specific contributions and

offering real punishments for failing to provide prove tremendous challenges to achieving a
collectively optimal outcome through the formation of international organizations (Feiock
406-7).

The reformation of forced migration policy between nations is an alternative way in
which the transnational community seeks to address the unequal distributions in the cost of
providing the public good (“International Trade...” 14). History has proven the that
harmonization of policy is a similarly feeble endeavor in addressing the collective action
problems present in the global provision of refugee services. Although numerous examples of
international policy harmonization have been enacted to bind states into providing the public
good-- most notably the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial
Asylum-- none have proven tremendously effective. There is no overarching power to enforce
adherence to such agreements (20). Also, harmonization of asylum policies between nations can
prove harmful as they curtail a state from choosing their most efficient means of crisis response
(financial, physical, etc.) based upon existing resources. Therefore “policy harmonizing is... more
likely to undermine than to facilitate opportunities for implicit burden-sharing in this
area” (20-21).

As the formidable shortcomings of forming international institutions and harmonizing
asylum policy demonstrate, a third option must be considered when aiming to improve the
collective action problems of refugee protection. A focus on the ways in which specialization in
the market can lower the costs of providing the public good- and, thus, the incentive to free-ride-
offers a new way of addressing market failure. Because nations are not likely to incur the same
costs of production for any particular contribution, specialization in refugee care can
significantly reduce the costs of participating by allowing states to choose their preferred means

of providing the public good (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 7). The two primary means of
provision are reactive contributions (provision of protection opportunities after persons have
been displaced) and proactive contributions (engagement in unilateral and multilateral peace-
keeping operations aimed at preventing refugee flows before they occur). It is reasonable to
assume countries have a comparative advantage in one of the two areas; States boasting well
established asylum infrastructure will find reactive measures easier, while those with large
armies and experience intervening abroad will find proactive action easier (10). It is important to
note that the building of individual capacity may create disincentives for other actors to provide,
furthering the collective action problem.

Additionally, some states possess a political comparative advantage as determined by a
country’s domestic political environment. In any political system, policy-makers are constrained
by the

preferences of their constituents, particularly their attitudes towards the refugees and the
source country itself (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 11). According to Hatton, research
demonstrates:
“[A]ttitudes towards asylum seekers are shaped partly by political and religious
perspectives by feelings of personal or cultural insecurity... (and also) fears about
personal safety or crime, threats to security, and challenges to the majority
culture...” (Hatton 623).
It follows that host nations which identify closely with the political, ideological, religious,
linguistic and cultural characteristics of the incoming population are less likely to perceive the
influx as a direct threat to their way of life, and will incur a lower political cost when providing
support. In such circumstances, it is possible for the provision of refugee services to become a
private good as domestic audiences applaud the state’s recognition and protection of the rights of

those with whom they closely identify. Ultimately, the “economic and political sources of
comparative advantage... provide incentives for specialization and trade in contributions to
international collective goods” (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 11).

By first reorienting international focus to highlight the private gains to providing the
public good, states may become more willing to engage in initiatives which force countries to
increase and equalize their contributions. As the “legitimacy of the international institution does
not emerge from any waiving of national interest, but from an interest developed in the
institutions themselves”, international regimes and will prove much more sustainable if they
appear to facilitate the comparative advantage of the state (Stein 138). Similarly, if the policy
initiatives instituted appear to encourage-- rather than dictate-- public good contributions in a
manner which aligns with existing comparative advantage, a nation’s perceived cost of provision
will appear lower (Roper and Barria, “Donor Fatigue...” 5).
Utilizing ‘Role Theory’ as a Framework to Identify Private Benefits

The socio-political framework of Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Dessouki’s ‘role theory’ can
be utilized as a primary means of ascertaining the ways in which contributions to international
refugee protection can achieve private benefits for a state. ‘Role theory’ seeks to understand the
ways in which a country conceptualizes its function within the global environment and considers
how such constructs might influence behavior by analyzing its ‘foreign policy output’-- which
consists of an actor’s ‘role conception’ (specific aspirations of the country as defined by its
unique national identity, regional interests and international goals) and ‘role performance’ (what
the state’s policies and initiatives actually achieve) (27). Korany and Dessouki point out that a
state’s insufficient understanding of the consequences of various policies and initiatives will lead

to ‘role conflict’: the failure of outcome (‘role performance’) to realize aspirations (‘role
conception’) (28).

When applied to the provision of refugee services, an observation of the international
market-failure shows that the public nature of the good causes many states to assume a ‘role
performance’ which minimizes the states commitment to its refugees. However, closer inspection
reveals that under-provision fails to fully actualize the social, economic, and political ‘role
conceptions’ of the state. By illuminating the ways in which reorienting policies and initiatives to
increase contributions to the good of refugee support can help actualize the country’s private
interest, a state may be able to reform its ‘role performance’ in a way which simultaneously
reconciles such ‘role conflict’ and minimizes the collective action problem.
Turkey: An Illustrative Case Study

A case study of Turkey’s response to the Syrian crisis will contextualize the theoretical
explanations for market failure in international provision of refugee services and illustrate how
the state’s current policies aimed at under-providing the good not only contributes to the global
collective action problem, but also results in a ‘role performance’ which does not actualize the
states ‘role conception’. An analysis of the unforeseen private benefits-- including: furthered
domestic agendas, increased regional security, enhanced international status and the achievement
of ideological goals-- Turkey’s stands to gain from raising its commitment to the issue can
inspire a process of specialization and policy reformation which will not only serve the state, but
its vulnerable refugee population as well.

‘Role Orientation’: the Private Interests of Turkey

It is crucial to ﬁrst understand Turkey’s national, regional and international goals when
ascertaining the ways in which an increase in its support for the refugee crisis can help achieve
them. As Korany and Dessouki argue, the state’s goals or ‘role orientation’ “refers to the way the
state’s... elite perceive the world and their country’s (pragmatic or idealogical) role in it” (39).
This perception is described to be stable, yet in a state of constant evolution based upon new
information and shifting power dynamics (40). By investigating the roots of Turkish national
identity, insight into its current domestic, regional, international and ideological goals can be
gained.

The cultivation of a uniquely “Turkish” identity can be traced back to the foundation of
the modern Republic of Turkey by president Mustafa Kemal Ataürk. Inheriting a politically and
economically vulnerable new nation, born of the Ottoman Empire’s ashes, Atatürk’s primary
concern was engendering the territory with a nationalist sentiment around which legitimate
cultural, economic and political systems might be fostered (Finkel 25). Atatürk’s approach to
nation-building is embodied in his popular mantra: “Happy is the one who says ‘I am a
Turk’” (8-11). Such sentiment can be interpreted to mean that-- despite not consisting of a
distinct ethnic group-- Turkish nationalism is a construction validated by a shared religion,
language and commitment to modern values. Although he embraced the merits of an
overwhelmingly Muslim, Turkic-speaking population when fostering a strong sense of
community, Atatürk sought to emphasize a socially cohesive state through its determinedly
modern orientation. His bold decisions, including: moving the capital from Istanbul to Ankara,
making men wear a Western-styled hat instead of the fez, adopting a Western democratic model
of governance, replacing Arabic script with the Latin alphabet as the mode of communicating

Turkish, and encouraging women to become more involved in public life, changed the
atmosphere of the country and effectively gave Turks a shared experience which was completely
their own (Finkel 29).

Turkey’s identity can be further explored to understand the state’s domestic goals of
maintaining a secular, yet Muslim, identity and its internal legitimacy. Turkey is distinct in that it
is both a Muslim-majority country and an avowed secular state, subsequently representing the
“unique marriage of ﬁrmly-rooted Muslim and religious cultural commitments with Western
governmental institutions and social practices” (Cyr 222-223). Guaranteed by Article 24 of the
1982 constitution, constituents maintain freedom of religion as long as it does not threaten the
integrity and secular character of the state (Finkel 138). The state’s unique ability to uphold a
separation of mosque and state has become a point of national pride and its perpetuation and can
thus be presumed a domestic aspiration of the government.

Although a deep-rooted commitment to combining Islam and democratic governance
persists, Turkey suffers from internal disagreement regarding the practicality of such an identity.
Accusations of the state carrying out an Islamist agenda have heightened since the rise of the
socially conservative Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) to power in 2001 (Finkel 73, 138).
Many citizens believe the threat of Islam is overshadowing the once secular Turkish identity, as
“Turk” is now reserved for someone who is born into the Muslim faith and whose native tongue
is Turkish, a narrow categorization which implies there are Turkish citizens who are not really
“Turks”. Currently, the population of non-Muslim citizens is on the decline, minorities making
up less than 250,000 of the 75 million Turkish citizens (10). The most notable of such minority
groups may be the Kurds, a people whose struggle for political recognition and rejection of the
AKP’s growing authoritarianism continues to generate signiﬁcant domestic challenges

(107-122). Turkey’s inability to integrate traditionally disempowered groups is exacerbated by
tremendous regional economic inequality. A stark disparity in development between the Western
and Mediterranean coast and the Eastern Central Anatolia and Black Sea regions afflicts the
country, generating disillusionment regarding the intentions and capabilities of those in power
(48). As the uprisings and demonstrations of disempowered groups proliferates, the Turkish
government is continually trying to find ways to maintain its legitimacy and quell dissent.

Turkey hopes the realization of such political and cultural tranquility will allow it assume
a larger role as the enforcer of regional stability. The dominance of Atatürk’s primary policy
principle: “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” emphasizes the state’s goal of serving as a role
model for other actors in an unstable region (“Synopsis...”, para. 15). Although ambitions of
leading by example continue, recent turmoil in the region-- proliferated by the Arab Spring and
the emergence of Daesh-- has caused policy orientation to become more regionally assertive
Turkey’s “own security and stability can only be achieved through the security and stability of
the region” (para. 4-5). Despite still being primarily interested in reaching diplomatic solutions,
the country is increasingly pursuing an eradication of “traditional security threats such as
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organized crime and illegal
immigration” by any means necessary (para. 2). The country’s increased willingness to intervene
in regional matters illuminates its goals of being the primary agent of regional stability.

Internationally, Turkey hopes its role in facilitating regional success will serve as a means
of the asserting its international relevance. In demonstrating its close cultural ties with the region
and an eagerness to work through multilateral fora (such as the UNHCR and NATO) in the
resolution of various conflicts, the country aims to garner favor with the Western community,
particularly with the European Union (EU) (“Synopsis...”, para. 12). Turkey has pursued EU

membership in recent decades and , upon finally earning candidate status in 2004, began the
“complex process of harmonizing its laws and procedures to European norms” (Finkel 89).
Although adopting European norms has proven difficult for the heavy-handed AKP, Turkey sees
increased political clout, and enormous economic opportunities to be gained form such a deal. As
roughly half of Turkey’s trade and FDI is from the EU, a seat at the table would allow policy
makers to influence the Customs Union decisions which already deeply affect its economy (92).
Backed by the U.S., liberal Turks see the EU as “providing a framework for the country to
contain the excess of ultranationalist or doctrinaire Islamist politics” (95). Turkey believes
recognition would allow its country “to reach the highest level of contemporary
citizenship” (“Synopsis...”, para. 9). The appeal of EU membership would not only realize
economic and political goals, but cultural aspirations as well. With roughly 5 million ethnic
Turks presently residing in Europe, and many Turks of Europeans origin themselves (over
500,000 Turks were expatriated from Greece as part of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and
300,000 Bulgarian Turks fled to Turkey in 1989 to avoid a program of forced assimilation), most
citizens self-identify as European, rather than Arab, and view membership as a means of cultural
reconciliation (Finkel 97).

In addition to asserting domestic legitimacy, achieving regional stability, and gaining the
respect of Western powers, Turkey aims to propagate its ideological goals as well. In addition to
continuing to enjoy its unique secular, yet Muslim, system, Turkey claims want to assert itself as
an agent of peace. Furthermore, the nation “hopes to recognize the human rights of all both
within and outside its borders” (Schmidt).

‘Role Performance’: the Manifestations of Asylum Policy and Initiatives

Upon understanding the ‘role orientation’ of the state, a depiction of Turkey’s current
asylum policies and initiatives will prove useful when assessing their ability to actualize the
goals of the state. In regards to international policy, Turkey is a fellow signatory of the “1951
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” which recognizes a refugee as
any individual who:
"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country or return there because there is a
fear of persecution..." (“Refugees and Displaced Persons...”, para. 2).
States are obliged to assure no refugee in search of asylum is “penalized, expelled, or refouled,
that every refugee enjoys the full complement of rights and benefits to which he or she is entitled
as a refugee; and that the human rights of every refugee are guaranteed”, the rights to health and
livelihood significant among them (Goodwin-Gill, 2014, para. 8).

It is crucial to note that Turkey is one of the few nations which defies the international
standards by maintaining a “geographic limitation” on asylum seekers, meaning the state is only
obliged to grant European forced migrants official refugee status, while asylum seekers from
other areas will only be accommodated until they can be repatriated or resettled in a third country
(Özden 5). Turkey has actively pursued such policy with the recent plight, officially recognizing
Syrian refugees as “guests” (Yeginsu & Shoumali, para. 10). As “guests”, the refugees are denied
the right to work and many are unable to attend local universities or legally obtain quality
housing (Yinanc, para. 3). The AKP maintains this is necessary to manage an escalating security

dilemma in a world of limited resources, one ofﬁcial explaining that, “Turkey must protect its
own people. If the government offers all these things, the refugees will continue to rush in. What,
then, will be left for us?” (Schmidt). A major consequence of denying Syrians the basic rights,
such as that to work, is that many are being employed without permits and are forced to work in
exploitative conditions at the hands of ‘opportunistic’ businessmen. One shopkeeper in Istanbul--
who employed ten refugees at about half the wage of Turkish workers-- epitomized the
sentiments of many local employers in saying, “Everybody wins here. I get to lower the cost of
business and [the refugees] get a job. I am not keeping them here, it is obvious they wouldn’t
stay if they had a better offer” (Schmidt). In addition to creating the circumstances which allow
such violations to happen, authorities seldom respond to exploitation reports (Özden 7-8).

In addition to implementing policies in discordance with international law, the Turkish
government has taken steps to limit the presence of international institutions within its borders.
The state “aims to prevent the interference of UNHCR or other international bodies in Turkish
control over the Syrian refugees”, for fear such interventions might jeopardize the nation’s
sovereignty (Özden 5). To ensure the refugee population within its borders is manageable,
Turkey’s asylum seekers must to go through a lengthy and bureaucratic registration process
called “refugee status determination” (RSD) before being transferred to ‘satellite cities’ (Biehl
66). The government’s twenty-three settlements offer various services, such as basic healthcare,
primary education and opportunities to local universities, and were designed to “monitor
mobility and contain any inﬂuence these populations might have upon Turkey’s
citizens” (Schmidt).

In accordance with an extremely centralized approach, the AKP does not allow any
independent observers, journalists, NGO’s, or other relief organizations into the government-run

camps. The only exception has been the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, an organization
many criticize as being ideologically and financially intertwined with the current government
(Özden 9). A few non-governmental organizations-- most notably: the International Rescue
Committee (IRC), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC),
the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), the Association for Solidarity with Refugees, Refugee
Advocacy and Support Program (RASP), and Sohram-- have been permitted to provide aid
outside the camps within strict governmental limitations (Albayrak, para. 10).

Reacting to the increasing costs of an exponentially growing refugee population, the
Turkish government has recently renounced its famed “open border policy”, which ensured that
there were at least two-border points where the prosecuted could seek security within its borders
(Yeginsu & Shoumali, para. 2). The complete sealing of the border came after multiple reports on
the conditions surfaced which divulged that the Turkish patrols had resorted to practices of
physically barring refugees from entering the country using live fire as a barricade and beating or
shooting those trying to cross irregularly as a means of dealing with the over-capacity (“Turkey:
Border Abuses...”, para. 1). The Turkish government has also begun establishing camps on the
Syrian side of the border, in hopes of “significantly reduc[ing] the number of refugees exploiting
Turkish hospitality by stopping them before they ever get to the border” (Schmidt).
‘Role Conflict’: Shortcomings of the Current Approach

An evaluation of Turkey’s ‘role performance’ suggests that the state’s current policies
severely conflict with the ultimate aspirations of the state. The state’s orientation towards
providing minimal legal and resource support for refugees not only contributes to a collective
action problem, but presents ‘role conflict’ (discord between the government’s capabilities and its

aims) as it severely conflicts with the ultimate domestic, regional, international, and ideological
aspirations of the state.

In regards to domestic goals of maintaining domestic tranquility and asserting the
legitimacy of the government, Turkish asylum policies prove inadequate. Discontent with
Turkey’s present policies are wide-spread in the Southeastern regions which host the ‘satellite
cities’. The various services provided within the camps have strained relations the host
communities and the government (Özden 8). This hostility can be attribute to the fact that these
communities usually consist of local minorities who are also struggling, yet have note received
the same support from their own government.

Despite the services offered, the government’s twenty-three settlements are nowhere near
adequate to handle the magnitude of the issue, and, consequently, many Syrians have begun
“fleeing into virtually every corner of the country, most notably the cities” (Schmidt). As urban
refugees are accorded no official status, and international organizations operating within the area
remain limited in their ability to provide social and financial support, many asylum seekers are
forced to beg along the city streets. As the burden to provide for the refugees falls upon the
people, many citizens have begun to question the government’s legitimacy, expressing a
“complete lack of faith in the AKP’s ability to handle the problem” (Schmidt). Additionally,
denying the right to work is generating a loss for the state’s economy as they forgo opportunities
to harness the influx of human capital.

Furthermore, the decision to establish refugee settlements on the Syrian side of the border
proves very troublesome for Turkey’s goals of establishing regional stability. Enacted against the
cries of prominent state and independent actors-- including Amnesty International and UNHCR--
who reasoned such camps to be tremendously problematic because they are established in zones

with very limited military support (essentially making them “open targets” for a terrorist attack),
these settlements endanger both the refugees and also the many Turkish officials working there.
Recent deaths of Turkish humanitarian workers and military personnel working in these
settlements has fueled tensions along the Syrian-Turkish border (Yinanc, para. 15). Additionally,
the state’s under-provision of the refugee services good has exasperated relations with the state’s
Greek and Bulgarian neighbors as “refugees failing to find legal protection and social support
within Turkey come to their doors” (Schmidt). As one Syrian Refugee, Imad Habbab, explained:
“We come to Turkey in search of a better life, but when our only options are stay
in a government camp and remain reliant upon the small aid they give us or move
to the city and work at exploited wages or beg, what can we do? This is no life.
We are forced to press onward, up to Europe” (Schmidt).

In addition to posing threats to regional goals, Turkey’s mode of accommodating the
refugee population proves damaging to its aspirations of garnering international respect. The
state’s refusal to lift geographic limitations to refugee protection has been condemned by
Western powers as it ignores the standards set by the Geneva Convention. Although the state has
hoped to demonstrate its prowess through independent policies, the abundance of domestic and
regional issues continue to leave the EU and other international actors unimpressed.

Although Turkey is willing to accept aid, the lack of donor transparency and inability for
donors to access the camps renders many who have the power to help unwilling to take the risk.
Additionally, the government’s refusal to grant refugees official status creates incentives for
international organizations operating within the country to under-provide. As one humanitarian
worker put it, “Since many of the refugees we are supposed to be serving aren’t officially
recognized, no one is following up with the work we are doing here. There are really no

incentives for our organization to provide efficient services or increase its programs.” (Schmidt).
Eight out of fifteen humanitarian workers interviewed reported that they perceived corruption to
be a natural part of humanitarian business in Turkey, seven of the eight believing the lack of
accountability to be the main cause (Schmidt). Having only accrued a meager $264 million in
international donations, such policies have forced the majority of the financial burden upon the
state, much to the dismay of the local taxpayers (Albayrak, para. 5). Andrew Gardner, a
researcher on Turkey for Amnesty International, said that the international response has been
disappointingly low, but “Turkey needs to do more to request and facilitate it” (“Turkey: Border
Abuses...”, para. 3). The AKP’s severe limiting of international involvement in favor of
sovereignty has further earned the country an reputation of being unwilling to cooperate with
international institutions in most of the Western world’s minds.

It should be noted that the Turkish government has indeed been internationally applauded
for “prioritizing human solidarity over national and personal fears... [T]here is an unflinching
recognition on the part of the Turkish officials that helping these refugees is a moral imperative,
even if it is difficult, costly, unpopular, and risky” (Groody, para.15). Although international
admiration still exists,

Turkey’s continued attempt to provide most of the financial and human
capital needed to combat the crisis has fallen drastically short and encouraged desperate actions
(such as brutal border tactics, inefficient satellite cities, camps in Syria, etc.). These actions
continue to be well-documented in international media, consequently undermining the positive
work Turkey is doing in service of the refugees. Ultimately, the adoption of these policies serves
to undermine the ideological commitments to peace, human rights and democracy claimed by the
state.

Moving Forward: Reconciling ‘Role Conflict’
Reforming Policy: Actualizing Private Interest

Having demonstrated the pitfalls of current ‘role performance’, it is imperative Turkey
reform its policies and initiatives in a way which better reflects the interests of the republic and
addresses the collective action problem. As this evaluation will demonstrate, the state can reduce
its ‘role conflict’ and gain many private benefits by increasing the scale of refugee services its
offers.

Critically, to proactively counter Turkey’s developmental disparity and growing unrest
among the Southeastern regions of the country, Turkey should adopt a non-discriminatory policy
in regards to aid recipients. This policy would allow international aid flowing in to serve both
local and refugee populations as needed, mitigating the grounds for contention between the two
groups and fostering a sense of governmental responsibility and regional interest for those
currently dissatisfied with the AKP. The economic burden the influx has placed upon local
communities can be further mitigated through the re-imagination of employment policy. Turkey
should stipulate all international organizations operating within the country employ a certain
percentage of Turkish nationals. The increase of jobs in traditionally disenfranchised areas and
development of professional expertise are additional private benefits to be gained from
increasing the provision of refugee services. It is reasonable to assume slight shifts in policy
might cultivate a domestically stable nation more able to achieve substantial increases in regional
peace.

State’s ‘role orientation’ towards being an enforcer of regional stability can also be
improved by increasing the state’s contribution to the refugee provision. The removal of the
settlements in Syrian would serve to decrease border tensions and reduce Turkish casualties. Also

the reinstitution of Turkey’s “open-border” policy would facilitate a safer, more humane, and
better regulated way for those fleeing tragedy to reach asylum. Additionally, by offering official
status to refugees the state could more effectively regulate and coordinate the refugees migrating
to Greece and Bulgaria, thus reducing tensions with their neighbors. As these benefits
demonstrate, Turkey can legitimize its claims of being an agent of peace to the regional
community by contributing to the good of refugee services.

Turkey’s international aspirations of gaining the EU and other Western actors’ respect,
exhibiting a willingness to work through multinational flora and showing an ability to respond
responsibly to a complex issue can also be better recognized through a reformation of current
‘role performance’. The current situation demonstrates that Turkey is incapable of handling this
project alone and should open both its bank accounts to foreign aid and its camps to international
expertise. As many agencies have claimed an unwillingness to send aid to virtually unregulated
camps, allowing agencies to collaborate in relief efforts would allow the Turkish government to
take a more administrative role which aims at improving the overwhelmed security apparatus.
Additionally, allowing international actors to collaborate within the camps is crucial to national
interest as it demonstrates a willingness to cooperate with multinational institutions and non-
governmental organizations.

Turkey can still achieve the global acclaim it sought through its
previous policies by “earmarking” its independent donations to the international organizations
“Earmarking” would allow Turkey to not only retain control over how and where their resources
will go, but also to highlight their important contributions to the cause (Roper and Barria,
“Burden Sharing...” 624). As one local official explained, “Taking these steps will not only
combat security issues and relieve the Turkish people, but will highlight Turkey’s strategic

importance for the West as a rational partner within a hostile region, committed to the alleviation
of suffering” (Schmidt).

In addition, the brutal border tactics, employment exploitation, and the restriction of
refugee mobility must be repealed so as to actualize Turkey’s ideological aspirations of ensuring
human rights, peace, and democracy. As many of the refugees are also practitioners of Islam,
Turkey retains a political comparative advantage to accepting the refugee population, when
compared to their European counterparts. Though some have voiced concerns that the refugees
population also includes individuals of other backgrounds-- such as: Kurds, Yazidis and
Christians-- which could poses a treat to Turkey’s unique secular, yet Muslim, system, an
embrace of competing religious and political ideologies would serve to highlight the state’s
strength being able to transcend the traditional confines of nationalism while maintaining its
unique identity. (Groody, para. 3).

Although Turkey’s commitment to the Syrian refugee crisis thus far should not be
undervalued, the proposed policy changes will better streamline these efforts in the service of
Turkey’s immediate domestic, regional, international, and ideological goals. A responsible and
collaborative response to such a high-profile issue proves undoubtedly in Turkey’s best interest,
as it will improve Turkey’s image as a capable ally, strong leader, and champion of human rights
in the global context.
Concluding remarks

As Syria’s conflict and consequent refugee population continues to proliferate, it is
imperative the global community improve upon the current provision of protection. As an
analysis of the market reveals, the public nature of the refugee protection good has created
tremendous deficiencies in the current supply of support as most states seek to undersupply

themselves and free-ride upon the provision of others. However, as the Turkish case study
demonstrates, illuminating the private benefits to be gained through providing refugee support
can lower the perceived costs of provision and increase incentives for actors to raise their
individual contributions. Although the benefits illustrated by the example remain specific to
Turkey, other important actors may have similarly unrealized gains to increasing provision. The
identification of such benefits through Korany and Dessouki’s ‘role theory’ framework, various
states may choose to increase their contributions to the provision of refugee care and, thus,
generate large-scale improvements in minimizing the current collective action problem. As we
move forward, an improved response to the Syrian crisis will create the international
infrastructure, policies, and institutions necessary to alleviate the suffering of and create
opportunities for refugees in the future.

Bibliography
Abbott, Kenneth W., Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. "Orchestrating

Global Governance." International Organizations as Orchestrators (2014): 349-79.

Academic Search Complete [EBSCO]. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.
Abbott, Kenneth W. "Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New

Governance." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 (2009): 501-79. SSRN- Social

Science Research Network. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.
Albayrak, Ayla. "Outlook Darkens for Syria Refugees in Turkey." WSJ- World News. The Wall Street

Journal, 26 Jan. 2014. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Alghothani, Nora, Yousef Alghothani, and Bassel Atassi. "Evaluation Of A Short-Term Medical

Mission To Syrian Refugee Camps In Turkey." Avicenna Journal Of Medicine 2.4 (2012):

84-88. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Altay Atlı. "A View from Ankara: Turkey’s Relations with China in a Changing Middle East."

Mediterranean

Quarterly 26.1 (2015): 117-136. Project MUSE. Web. 6 May. 2015.

Balci, Bayram. "A New Turkish Foreign Policy?" World Policy Blog. World Policy Institute, 27 Aug.

2014. Web. 07 May 2015.
The Battle for Syria. PBS: FRONTLINE. PBS, 18 Sept. 2012. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Betts, Alexander, Dr, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan, and Naohiko Omata. "Refugee Economies:

Rethinking Popular Assumptions." University of Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre. The

Humanitarian Innovation Project, University of Oxford, June 2014. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Biehl, Kristen Sarah. "Governing Through Uncertainty: Experiences of Being a Refugee in Turkey as

a Country for Temporary Asylum." Social Analysis 59.1 (2015): n. pag. Research Gate. Web.

6 May 2015.
Cyr, Arthur Iris. "Turkey's Continuing Role as a Pivotal Ally in a Rapidly Changing Region." Orbis

59.2 (2015): 215-32. Turkey's Continuing Role as a Pivotal Ally in a Rapidly Changing

Region. Elsevier/ Foreign Policy Research Institute, 14 Feb. 2015. Web. 07 May 2015.
Feiock, Richard C. "The Institutional Collective Action Framework." Policy Studies Journal 41.3

(2013): 397-425. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.Spiro,
Finkel, Andrew. Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012. Print.
Goodwin-Gill, G. International Law of Refugee Protection. In E. Qasmiyeh (Ed.), The Oxford

Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies. 2014.
Groody, Daniel. "Refugees, Fleeing ISIS, Threaten To Overwhelm Turkish Resources." America

211.10

(2014): 9-10. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Gutman, Roy. "Who’s Helping Millions of Syrians Displaced by War?" PBS: FRONTLINE. PBS, 27

May 2014. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Hatton, Timothy J. "Asylum Policy in the EU: The Case for Deeper Integration." CESifo

Economic Studies 61.3-4 (2015): 605-37. Academic Search Complete [EBSCO]. Web. 26

Sept. 2015.
"Inter-Agency Regional Update- Syrian Refugees." UNHCR. UNHCR, 18 Feb. 2015. Web. 21 Feb.

2015.
Keen, David J. Complex Emergencies. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. Print.

Kuru, Ahmet T., and Alfred C. Stepan. Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey. New York:

Columbia UP, 2012. Print.
Lewis, Corinne. UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From Treaties to Innovation. Milton Park,

Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012. Print.
Malkki, Liisa H. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu

Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1995. Print.
Malkki, Liisa H. "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization."

Cultural Anthropology 11.3 (1996): 377-404. JSTOR. Web. 12 Apr. 2015.
Molloy, Tim. "1.7 Million Syrian Refugees To Lose Their Main Source of Food Aid." PBS:

FRONTLINE. PBS, 1 Dec. 2014. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Özden, Şenay. "Syrian Refugees in Turkey." (n.d.): n. pag. Migration Policy Center. European

University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre,

May 2013. Web. 7 May 2015.
Ozdogan, Hatice K., et al. "Syrian Refugees In Turkey: Effects On Intensive Care." Lancet 384.9952

(2014): 1427-1428. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Phillips, Melissa, and Kathrine Starup. "Protection Challenges Of Mobility." Revista Migraciones

Forzadas 47 (2014): 27-30. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
“Refugees and Displaced Persons”. Academic Search Complete. Web. 30 Nov. 2014.
Rieff, David. A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster,

2002. Print.
Roper, Steven D., and Lilian A. Barria. "Burden Sharing In The Funding Of The UNHCR:

Refugee Protection As An Impure Public Good." Journal Of Conﬂict Resolution 54.4

(2010):

616-637. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.

Roper, Steven D., and Lilian A. Barria. "Donor Fatigue In The Funding Of Human Rights

Institutions: Factors Which Inﬂuence State Commitments To Human Rights." Conference

Papers -- American Political Science Association (2007): 1-30. Academic Search

Complete. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.
Seferis, Louisa. "Turkey:DRC Experiences of Cash Assistance to Non-camp Refugees in Turkey and

Lebanon." UNHCR. DRC- Danish Refugee Council, 2014. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Spiro, David E. "The State of Cooperation in Theories of State Cooperation: The Evolution of a

Category Mistake." Journal of International Affairs 42 (1988): 205-25. SSRN: Social

Science Research Network. 6 May 2009. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.

"Synopsis of Turkish Foreign Policy." Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Republic of

Turkey, n.d. Web. 06 May 2015.
"Syria Refugee Crisis." International Refugee Committee. International Refugee Committee,

n.d.

Web. 20 Feb. 2015.
"Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 2013: Field Survey Results." UNHCR. Republic of Turkey Prime

Ministry- Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, 2013. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Syria's Second Front. PBS: FRONTLINE. PBS, 11 Feb. 2014. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Thielemann, Eiko R. and Torun Dewan. "International Trade In The Provision Of Public Goods?

The Case Of Refugee Protection." Conference Papers -- International Studies

Association (2006): 1-23. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.

Thielemann, Eiko R. "Burden-Sharing": The International Politics Of Refugee Protection."

Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2006): 1-16. Academic Search

Complete. Web. 26 Sept. 2015.
Ticktin, Miriam Iris. Casualties of Care: Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France.

Berkeley: U of California, 2011. Print.
"Turkey: Border Abuses and Destitution Aggravating Plight of Syria Refugees." Amnesty

International. Amnesty International, 20 Nov. 2014. Web. 21 Feb.2015.
"Turkey." Syrian Refugees- A Snapshot of the Crisis- Int the Middle East and Europe. European

University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre,

n.d. Web. 20 Feb. 2015.
"Turkey, UN Sign Agreement to Assist Syrian Refugees." Anadolu Agency. Anadolu Agency, 7 Jan.

2015. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
"2014 Syria Regional Response Plan: Turkey." UNHCR. United Nations, 2014. Web. 21 Feb.

2015.

Yeginsu, Ceylan. "Turkey Strengthens Rights of Syrian Refugees." The New York Times. The

New

York Times, 29 Dec. 2014. Web. 21 Feb. 2015.
Yeginsu, Ceylan, and Karam Shoumali. "Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border With Syria."

The New York Times. The New York Times, 29 Mar. 2015. Web. 07 May 2015.
Yinanç, Barçın. "Poor Transparency Shadows Turkey's Syria Refugee Policy." Poor Transparency

Shadows Turkey's Syria Refugee Policy. Hurriyet Daily News, 27 May 2013. Web. 07 May

2015.

Lauren Schmidt- Turkey Paper Final

Empfohlen

Empfohlen

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Andere mochten auch

Andere mochten auch (16)

Ähnlich wie Lauren Schmidt- Turkey Paper Final

Ähnlich wie Lauren Schmidt- Turkey Paper Final (16)

Lauren Schmidt- Turkey Paper Final