Ancient Greece: Persian Wars

1. The Triumph of Greece in the Great Persian Wars

2. The Power of Persia
The Ionian Revolt
The Expedition Against Eretria and Athens
The Second Persian Invasion
The Greek Victories at Plataea and Mycale

3. While Greek civilization was preparing to enter its golden age, a new power had arisen in the East. The Achaemenid Empire of Cyrus the Great was on the march, conquering all before it, and its path led directly to Greece.

4. In the winter of 546 B.C. the kingdom of Lydia, one of the 4 great powers of the near-eastern world in that era (along with Babylon, Egypt, and the Median Empire which had already been conquered) under king Croesus was conquered by Cyrus the Great.

7. This brought the Persians into direct contact with the Greek states for the first time, as the cities of the Asiatic coast of Anatolia now passed to Achaemenid control.

8. This was not the end of Persia's long road to world domination: in the coming decades both Babylon and Egypt would fall, and by the late 6th century B.C. the Empire stretched from modern Libya to India, and from Central Asia and the Caucasus to the deserts of Sudan. Virtually the entire ancient world was under their suzerainty, and now their gaze was directed at Europe.

9. After crossing into Thrace and Macedon, the Persians attempted to conquer the Scythians of the Ukraine, but were unable to defeat this nomadic race of warriors. It was decided that a more secure base in Europe was needed, and the fractious Greek states offered a perfect opportunity for Persia to expand its influence, allowing for further expansion into Europe while subjugating the Greek states in the process.

10. Sparta was consistently hostile to Persia, and had been allied to Lydia, Egypt, and the Scythians. The tendency of Persia to install Pro-Persian tyrants in the conquered Greek states likewise coincided with Sparta's hatred of tyrants.
The expulsion of the Pro-Persian Peisistratids from Athens in 510 B.C. was in accordance with Spartan policies, but the attempt to overthrow the Athenian government in 506 B.C. was merely to salve the wounded pride of the Spartan king Cleomenes, and his allies along with his fellow king Demaratus withdrew from the campaign.

11. In 505 B.C. the Spartans, who usually dictated policy to each ally individually, invited representatives from each of the Spartan Alliance's members to meet in Sparta to discuss the situation regarding Athens. While Sparta wished to overthrow the Athenian government, the allies disagreed, and as a result the Alliance as whole abandoned this policy.

12. After this the allies met regularly to discuss policy and actions to be taken, with two equal councils presiding: the Spartan assembly representing the Lacedaemonian state and the executive head of the alliance, and the council of allies, each one receiving a single vote. If both councils agreed, then a policy was adopted, if one rejected it then it was rendered null.
Sparta
The Allies
Convenes the allies when it desires to do so and sets the agenda.
Only it can put forward policy options, but cannot enforce them on its own.
Each ally directly tied to Sparta and receives a single vote in alliance meetings.
Cannot enforce policies on Sparta, but a majority decision on their part needed for Sparta to enact policy.

13. This realistically balanced the powers of the two groups, as without Sparta there was no alliance, and without the allies Sparta was just one exceptionally strong state. Moreover, an efficient way to come to a fair decision on important affairs by the majority of the mainland Greek states had been reached just as the shadow of Persian aggression fell across Greece, and would set the stage for the later Hellenic Congress.

14. Around the same time as the fall of Lydia to the Persians, the states of Boeotia formed a league to promote their mutual economic and military interests. While in theory this was a federation of equals, the city of Thebes (the largest and most powerful of the member states) was the administrative centre, and in time began to exert more and more power over its immediate neighbours.

15. While this imperious attitude scared off some potential members in the border areas, it gave the Boeotian League a powerful and decisive leadership element, and this would see Boeotia one day rise to the greatest position of power in the Greek world.

16. In more distant parts of the Aegean, Greek ideas such as this were giving birth to federations consisting of both Greek and tribal peoples, often based around newly founded settlements or vested in a particular ruler. While these states were of relatively little importance, they are a good example of the power exerted by Greek cultural practices, which would become more pronounced as time went on.

17. The example set by Peisistratus (to establish a tyranny with foreign troops and money) combined with the disruptions caused by the Persian conquests led to several tyrants acquiring power in the eastern Aegean. The reign of these men was extremely destructive for several Greek states, and in the end relative prosperity returned to the region.

18. One of the major results however was the island of Naxos acquiring a position of power in the Aegean after the ruination of several of its rivals. A Persian attempt to install a tyrant by the name of Aristagoras in Naxos failed, and the hard feelings left by this event were a precursor to the coming Ionian revolt.

19. As the Greek colonies in the west grew, they came into conflict with one another, as well as the two major powers in the region: the Carthaginians (in Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearic islands) and the Etruscans (in mainland Italy and Corsica).

22. Much like the Persian menace, these threats did not encourage the Greeks to unite. Instead they continued their endless strife, with brutal conflicts between themselves and the powers of the western Mediterranean. The tyrants here, much like their compatriots in the eastern Aegean, combined bloodthirstiness with mercenary troops for imperial ambitions. Compared to them, the tyrants of Athens were indeed men of moderation.

23. With the fall of the great powers of Egypt and Lydia, Greek mercenaries had to turn for employment to various tyrants (either independent or Persian pawns). In this way they eventually brought a detailed knowledge of the Persian's methods of warfare to the Greek world.

24. Besides this infusion of knowledge, the Greeks natural predilection for war meant that they themselves were developing many innovations. Besides the great advances in the building of fortifications (especially city walls) the Greeks were likewise making strides in naval warfare, where a new type of warship, the Trireme, was coming to the fore.

25. Greek warfare was also becoming less formalized, as a variety of tactics and strategies were demonstrated in this period, though the ferocious hoplite infantry and phalanx remained the mainstay. While the armies and navies of the Greek states looked puny compared to even individual provinces of the Persian Empire, this was illusory: Greek ships and troops were choice weapons of war for rulers around the Mediterranean, highly trained and skilfully led.

26. The Persian Empire's control of the Greek cities of Asia could only last for so long before revolt broke out. When it did, it would launch both civilizations into a war that neither side could have possibly imagined.
In 499 B.C. the Greek cities on the coast of Anatolia rose in what became known as the Ionian Revolt. The Ionians banded together, and appealed for aid from mainland Greece (while Sparta demurred, Athens and Eretria sent ships to help).

27. Early in the revolt the rebel army advanced to and burned the local Satrapy's capital of Sardis, an act which helped to rally fellow Greeks under Persian rule. Greek cities on the Hellespont and the Bosporus as well as in Cyprus rebelled, and it was hoped that by cutting off the Persian forces in Europe the Empire would be forced to negotiate.

28. However, the rebels failed to consolidate either their allies (many of whom withdrew aid) or their naval forces (they failed to properly support Cyprus, and thus deny the Persians access to the Aegean). Over time the Persians ground down the Ionians with their superior numbers, and after the great naval Battle of Lade in 495 B.C. the Ionian cause was all but lost. By the summer of 493 B.C. all the Greek cities of Anatolia were back under Persian control, and Persia began to angrily eye those who had assisted the Ionians in their revolt.

29. Persia had won the war with the Ionians thanks to its skillful deployment of armies and superior strategic planning (i.e. the high priority accorded to capturing Cyprus as an advanced naval base). However the Ionians had fought skillfully and hard, and worked together with a remarkable degree of purpose, setting a fine example to the Greek homeland. In the end however, they had been overcautious, and lost the initiative to the Persians.

30. The Empire's punishments were severe, especially for Miletus, the city that led the revolt (killing the men and enslaving the women and children). However, the Persians did learn from their mistakes, and after control was re-established, they set up democracies in the Ionian cities as opposed to tyrants.

31. The Persians then began the process of establishing a firm base in their European Satrapy, and sent emissaries demanding the customary offerings of 'Earth & Water' to signal submission from the Greek cities. Many Greek states accepted the Persian demands, effectively neutralizing some of the greatest Greek naval powers.

32. By the summer of 491 B.C. it was evident to both Eretria and Athens that in the next year the Persian fleet would be descending upon them and that they were, for the most part, on their own.

33. While Athenian policy towards Persia during this period was sometimes in doubt, they had furnished troops and ships to assist in the Ionian Revolt, and they were determined to meet the threat from Persia not with capitulation but with war. While the recent history between Athens and Sparta was one of acrimony, Sparta had consistently opposed Persia for over fifty years by this point, and Persian attempts to subvert members of the Spartan Alliance pushed these two Greek cities closer together.

34. In Sparta itself bitter feuding between the two kings spilled over into their policies towards Persia (Cleomenes adamantly anti-Persian, Demaratus more conciliatory). To remove the threat of internal disunity appearing as weakness, Cleomenes engineered Demaratus downfall and replacement by a new anti- Persian king (Leotychidas). Cleomenes himself had a mental breakdown, and after committing suicide was replaced by his brother Leonidas.

36. Taking advantage of Sparta's temporary distraction, its treacherous ally Aegina (which had tried to submit to the Persians) launched a surprise attack on a sacred Athenian vessel. Athens responded by defeating Aegina's navy and invading its island, giving it a good beating. The results of this short conflict were to give Athens a boost in morale and confidence, to keep Aegina from offering to support Persia in the coming war, to make Corinth and Sparta sympathetic to Athens’ cause, and to demonstrate the courage, intelligence, and determination of Athens’ leaders.

37. In the summer of 490 B.C. the Persian King Darius ordered the expedition against Athens launched. The Persian fleet ferried some 25,000 troops across the Aegean, capturing Naxos and Eretria en route. They then deployed their army on the Greek mainland near the town of Marathon.

38. The Athenian Assembly immediately ordered their army to march for Marathon, where they encamped and engaged in an uneasy standoff with the Persians. An appeal was sent to Sparta for aid, and while the Spartans wished to assist Athens, a religious festival meant they would be unable to march for another 6 days.

39. The situation was desperate: Darius believed that if Athens fell, all the Greek states inclined to submit would do so, and control of Greece would secure his nearby provinces while allowing for further advances into Europe. Thus it was not merely Athens, but the entire Greek world that was now threatened with conquest. The Athenian army spent the coming days deliberating: the ten tribal generals each had an equal vote and took turns holding command day by day.

40. Five supported attacking the Persians and five supported waiting for Spartan help. The tie breaker was the Athenian Archon Polemarchus, Callimachus, who while not holding a command in the field had an eleventh vote alongside the 10 generals.
The leader of the pro-attack generals, Miltiades, convinced Callimachus to break the tie and vote for an attack, and the other 4 generals who supported this gave up their days of command to Miltiades, making him effectively supreme commander.

41. The Athenians formed their battle line and waited for an opportunity. It came one night when an Ionian soldier from the Persian camp revealed to them that the Persian cavalry was away. They immediately prepared, and at dawn all 11,000 troops (10,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataeans) began to march, charging at the enemy when they got to within range of the archers.

42. The better equipped hoplites smashed through the enemy troops, and while the Persians broke through the weakened Athenian centre, the Greeks two flanks reformed and crushed the Persians between them. In this confused melee the returning cavalry were useless, and the Persians fled back to their ships.

43. Fearing they would descend upon a defenceless Athens, the army force-marched back home, and arrived before the Persian fleet. Upon seeing this, the Persians returned back to Asia to report their defeat. The Spartans had in the meantime arrived, inspected the battlefield to learn of the tactics used (and were awed by the success: 192 Athenian dead vs. 6,400 Persian), congratulated the Athenians on a splendid victory, and returned home to Laconia.

44. The Athenians commemorated the victory with a great painting which highlighted many of the important individuals involved, included Miltiades, Callimachus (who had died in the fighting), and the playwright Aeschylus among others (including mythological heroes and even the Persian leaders).
This tomb the dust of Aeschylus doth hide, Euphorion's son and fruitful Gela's pride How tried his valor, Marathon may tell And long-haired Medes, who knew it all too well

45. Fighting in the forefront of the Hellenes, the Athenians at Marathon destroyed the might of the gold-bearing Medes.

46. Overall, the battle lifted Athenian spirits immensely, showed Sparta the tactics to defeat Persian troops, and gave all the other Greeks hope and the will to resist. In this way, the Battle of Marathon was a decisive event in world history.

47. Athenian victory at Marathon did not put an end to imperial Persian designs on Greece. Rather, it convinced them that an even larger force was needed, one that would dwarf every other army in the history of the world up until that time.

48. After the failure of the first invasion, Darius gave orders to prepare a vast army and fleet to crush Greece, having realized a mere punitive expedition would not suffice. His plans were upset however by the rebellion of Egypt, and shortly thereafter he died, never to see his dream realized.

49. His successor, Xerxes, quelled the Egyptian uprising and continued with the preparations. It took 10 years, but by 480 B.C. the Persian behemoth was once again ready to march, and this time it would accept nothing less than the complete conquest of Greece.

50. After the Battle of Marathon, political quarrelling continued as per usual in Athens. While the leading personalities clashed, it became imperative to choose a leader in order to face the expected Persian invasion. A new political procedure was thus established, Ostracism: each citizen cast a vote for a politician they wanted to see ostracised (exiled for 10 years, but with no loss of property of honour), and the politician with the most votes was subsequently exiled.

51. This went on for several years, as those who were viewed as unfavourable or disruptive were exiled, until by this process of elimination the Athenian's supreme leader was chosen: Themistocles. When invasion was imminent in 480 B.C. the exiles were recalled and an amnesty declared, and the result was an Athens far more united in purpose than in 490 B.C.

52. Another important development was a reform in the election of Archons: before they had been popularly elected by the Assembly, now they were picked by lot from 500 candidates elected by the Demes. This had the effect of making it more difficult for the powerful to assume the Archonship (and one day end up in the Areopagus), and limited the ability of powerful families and clans to wield power.
This likewise had the effect of making the popularly elected tribal Generals into far more powerful figures, with the result that they became both political and military figures. All this contributed to the selection of a supreme commander by the Athenian people to meet the coming storm.

53. Another development, just as important to Athens’ chances in the coming war, was the discovery of a rich vein of silver in the mines of Laurium. While some proposed to distribute the enormous sum of 100 Talents amongst the citizenry, Themistocles urged the Assembly to approve the expansion of the fleet to 200 state of the art Triremes.

54. Themistocles also argued that Athens would stand no chance if its old foe Aegina Medized and brought its own fleet to aid Persia. While the Athenians feared Persia, they hated Aegina, and approved the motion to expand the fleet. This was in keeping with Themistocles aspirations of turning Athens into a naval as well as a land power, and this proved to be the salvation of Greece.

55. While the Greeks admired Athens for its victory at Marathon, they turned to Sparta for leadership in the coming conflict. It headed its own alliance of Greek states, had the most powerful army on the mainland, and along with Athens was marked for destruction by Xerxes. While the prophecies from the Oracle of Delphi were grim (to say the least), the Greeks nonetheless gathered at Sparta to create a plan of action.

56. Emissaries were sent to the Greeks of Argos, Crete, Corcyra, and Sicily, but no aid was forthcoming. Regardless, in the spring of 480 B.C. the Greeks who wished to resist Persia met at the Isthmus of Corinth where they formed the Hellenic Congress to oversee this great Alliance.

57. To their credit, Sparta did not simply assume command, and had the same single vote as every other member. Likewise, the other Greeks gave Sparta the command of both the armies and fleets of the Hellenic League. This new League learned the lessons of the Ionian Revolt well, and the Congress was given great powers with regards to military, financial, judicial, diplomatic, and even religious decisions to better coordinate their resistance to Persia.
While the Hellenic League numbered some 31 states by the summer of 479 B.C., the most important by far were Sparta, Athens, and Corinth. All told, the League at its most powerful fielded 40,000 hoplites, 70,000 light infantry, with some 400 Triremes & additional supporting vessels.

58. Knowing even this vast host would be outnumbered by the Persians, they prepared to hold narrow choke points to prevent the Persian advance into Greece, and to make their superior numbers count for nothing. While they initially hoped to hold the Persians outside of northern Greece, the strategic situation compelled them to forfeit the north and to attempt a defence in the middle of the country, at the pass of Thermopylae.

59. While the ancient sources vary widely, the size of the Persian invasion force all told probably amounted to some 500,000 men and 1,200 Triremes (with support ships perhaps 3,000 all told). Much of the army consisted of vast, disorganized hosts levied from the subject races of the Empire, but at its core were thousands of elite Persian cavalry and infantry (including the 10,000 Immortals of the Imperial Guard), while the entire navy was drawn from the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cypriots, and subject Greeks (with Persian marines).

60. The entire force was commanded by Xerxes in person, with assistance from a staff of 10 Generals and 4 Admirals, all of noble Persian birth (and some his own relatives). This enormous force took months and months to advance from Anatolia, across the Hellespont, and through northern Greece.

61. By the time it arrived at Thermopylae, the Greeks had occupied the pass, while their fleet was based at nearby Artemisium. The Persian fleet attempted to bypass the Greeks opposing them, but violent storms destroyed hundreds of Persian vessels, while determined Greek resistance further eroded Persian numbers. It was on land however that the decisive engagement took place. Xerxes ordered his forces forward into the pass of Thermopylae (including his precious Immortals), and for two days they were slaughtered by the Greek (and especially Spartan) troops holding the pass.

62. However, when a treacherous Greek revealed a secret path around the pass, King Leonidas ordered the majority of the Greek forces to retreat to the south, while the Spartans and Thebans (who were of dubious loyalty) would hold the pass. The brave Thespians refused to leave however, and they too remained behind.

63. The final battle saw this rear-guard advance into the attacking Persians, slaughtering as they went, fighting until their spears and swords broke and then continuing on with fists and teeth. In the end the Greeks withdrew to a defensible hill, and after the surviving Thebans surrendered, a massive volley of arrows killed the rest. Leonidas body was beheaded and crucified, and the Persian advance continued south, while the Greek fleet departed Artemisium and likewise headed back to the south of Greece.

64. While the totals will never be known definitively, some 4,000 Greeks (half Helot auxiliaries) lay dead while the Persians buried some 20,000 of their best infantry, and some half the Persian battle fleet was destroyed or damaged. While this was a Persian strategic victory, the Battle of Thermopylae inspired the Greeks with its tales of heroism, and the Battle of Artemisium showed the Greeks that even a portion of their fleet could withstand the full might of the Persian navy. The stage was set for a decisive engagement in the south.
Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by,
That here, obedient to Spartan law, we lie.

65. With the loss of Thermopylae the Greeks fell back upon the Isthmus of Corinth, leaving central Greece to the advancing Persians. In the coming weeks both sides squared off for a decisive battle, one that would determine the future course of Western Civilization.

66. As the Persian army marched south, most of central Greece medized rather than face Xerxes wrath, while Plataea and Thespiae were burned. The Greek fleet meanwhile had based itself at the island of Salamis, just off the coast of Athens, while the army fell back to defend the narrow neck of the Isthmus of Corinth.

67. Realizing the inability of the Hellenic League to defend Attica, Themistocles convinced the people of Athens to heed the Oracle of Delphi's prophecy and retire behind their 'wooden wall', which he took to mean the wooden hulls of their ships. Every military aged citizen was embarked onto the fleet, while the Athenian navy evacuated the rest of the population to the islands of the Saronic Gulf and the Peloponnese.

68. Soon the Persian army arrived at Athens, storming and then burning the Acropolis and killing the few holdouts that remained. While Xerxes was most pleased by this, he also worried about the military situation. Already it was September, and foul weather might make naval operations impossible and cut off the army from its vital lines of supply and communications.
Action was needed, and he decided that a naval battle would probably yield results more quickly than an assault on the Isthmus. His Admirals agreed while the lone dissenting voice was that of the only female to accompany the expedition, Queen Artemisia of Halicarnassus, who led her state's military contingent.

69. But the Persian fleet needed time to refit and replenish its numbers from the subject states in the Aegean. In this time the Greeks themselves were busy planning: while many wished to flee to the Isthmus, Themistocles convinced the Spartan admiral in command, Eurybiades, to maintain their position at Salamis.
When during the debates he was mocked by a Corinthian as a man with no city, he threatened to order the entire Athenian fleet to load up all its civilians and set out to establish a colony in the far west of the Mediterranean, leaving the rest to their fate. In the face of this, the other Greeks grudgingly remained at Salamis.

70. Themistocles was still afraid that the Greeks would eventually flee, so he concocted a clever ruse. He sent a slave of his to Xerxes camp, claiming that Themistocles would gladly join him and that the Greek fleet was planning to flee. Xerxes jumped at this possible breakthrough, and ordered a squadron to block the western exit from the gulf of Salamis, while the rest of his fleet moved in from the east to crush the Greek fleet before it could escape.

71. When a defecting Greek trireme from the Persian fleet confirmed the Persian's dispositions, the Greeks knew the plan had worked. Their fleet was prepared for action, 310 of their ships against almost 1,000 Persians. However, the confined space of the channel nullified the Persian numbers, and allowed the Greeks to practice their superior naval training.

72. As the Persian ships crashed into one another, they were set upon by the Greeks, who rammed and smashed their vessels, while Greek marines boarded and butchered the Persian's crews. In the end the Persian fleet hoisted its sails and made for open water.

73. The Greeks had won the Battle of Salamis, but prepared for an immediate counterattack. None however was forthcoming, as Xerxes, fearing that the Greeks would sail to and destroy his bridge across the Hellespont, ordered his fleet to sail back to defend it.
He likewise left a sizeable force in central Greece, and then marched the majority of his army back to Asia, many dying in the poor weather of hunger, disease, or exposure. It was hoped that the army still in Greece under the command of General Mardonius would, after wintering in Thessaly, complete the conquest in the coming year.

74. While the Greeks had gained a large victory at Salamis, it was far from decisive. The Persian army remaining in Greece consisted of the best Persian troops and cavalry, and without its horde of low quality troops was more easily manoeuvred and supplied. With the arrival of spring 479 B.C. Mardonius offered a separate peace to Athens, hoping to sow dissension in the Hellenic League.

75. However, when he was refused and later learned that the Greek army was moving out from behind its defensive line on the Isthmus, he burned Athens to the ground and ravaged Attica, before moving north to Boeotia where the land favoured his cavalry and the population was more assuredly pro-Persian.

76. When the Greeks marched to meet him there they fielded almost 40,000 hoplites (and by some accounts 70,000 light troops, though this has been debated, and at any rate the hoplites would be the decisive arm). The Persians on the other hand had somewhere between 80,000 and 120,000 troops, which included a number of Greek allies as well as excellent cavalry.

77. For some 3 weeks the two sides squared off, the Greeks being constantly harassed by Persian cavalry. Finally the commander of the Greek army, the Spartan Regent Pausanias, decided to move the army to a better position, but his insolent subordinate Amompharetus refused to retreat, and as a result some of the Greek army had moved off the field while much remained there.

78. Mardonius decided to strike at this moment, and soon the isolated Greek units were engaged by enemy forces, while those off the field rushed back to help. The Spartans, despite being isolated from the rest of the Greeks, smashed their way through the Persian infantry.

80. The Persians fought with great bravery, but could not hold the line, and were pushed back. The Athenians likewise crushed the Boeotian troops they faced, and a general route of the Persian army followed. Mardonius was slain in the thick of the fighting, and when the Greeks overran the Persian camp, they killed everyone they could lay hands upon to avenge the massacres of Greek civilians in the previous months. When the slaughter ended, the Persian army was no more, and the Spartans it was agreed had proven themselves the finest infantrymen of the entire civilized world.

81. After this, great celebrations were held, and every year sacrifices and festivities would be marked by the Greeks at Plataea, where for centuries to come these events would conclude with the Plataeans chief magistrate toasting: "I drink to the men who died for the freedom of the Greeks".

82. Much of Greece remained under Persian rule, and provisions were made to continue campaigning to liberate it, one of the first acts of which being to besiege and punish Thebes for its craven betrayal of the Greek cause. Meanwhile, on the very same day as the Battle of Plataea, the fleet of the Hellenic League under the leadership of the Spartan King Leotychidas and the Athenian General Xanthippus engaged in the Battle of Mycale.

83. Realizing that Greece would never be safe with Persia controlling the Aegean, the fleet had set out to annihilate the Persian navy. When they found the Persian fleet, it had beached itself at Mycale and built fortifications around the ships. The Greeks proceeded to land up the coast, marched down to the Persian camp, and promptly overran it, burning the fleet and slaughtering some 40,000 Imperial troops.

84. This secured the Aegean for Greece, and many of the island states entered into the Hellenic League (but not so on the mainland, as Sparta was unwilling to commit to a land war in Asia). Shortly thereafter most of the fleet sailed home, while the Athenians headed north to besiege Persian positions in Europe. They returned home in the spring, with vast sums of loot and the bridge cables of Xerxes vaunted Hellespont bridge.

85. Here the historian Herodotus ended his history of the Persian Wars, but more conflict was yet to come, as Persia was far from defeated. Nonetheless, the immediate threat to Greece had passed. The Greeks had stood against the might of an Empire that ruled the world, and won.

86. As the world today is overwhelmingly indebted to the Greeks for so much of our modern civilization, their victory and its importance to the rest of human history are nearly without parallel. Perhaps the war is best commemorated by the Epitaph of Simonides, which though variously translated, has in its simplicity reached down through the ages:
Friend, tell the Spartans that on this hill, we lie obedient to them still