PPT CASES Statcon.pptx

Eugenio
v. Drilon
22 January 1996
G.R. No. 109404

Facts:
Private respondent (Palmiano), on installment basis,
purchased two lots in the E & S Delta Village in
Quezon City from petitioner (Eugenio) and his co-
owner/developer Fermin Salazar.
The Delta Village Homeowners’ Association, Inc. filed a
complaint of non-development NHA. Acting on this,
the NHA ordered petitioner to cease and desist from
making further sales of lots in said village or in any
project owned by him.
And while these NHA Cases were still pending, private
respondent (Palmiano) filed with the Office of
Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, a complaint
against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina
Relevo

Facts:
He alleges that in spite of the NHA ruling petitioner
resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo,
in whose favor title to the said property was
registered.
Furthermore, private respondent suspended his
payments because of petitioner’s said failure to
develop the village.
Respondent also prays for the annulment of the sale
to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot
to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision
upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the contract
with private respondent and dismissed private
respondent’s complaint.

Facts:
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission reversed the
OAALA and (applying P.D. 957) ordered petitioner to
complete the subdivision development and to
reinstate private respondent’s purchase contract over
one lot, and as to the other, to immediately refund to
Palmiano all payments made thereon, plus interests
computed at legal rates from date of receipt hereof
until fully paid.”
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, also
affirmed the decision of the HSRC.
THUS, petitioner filed a Petition for review before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
WON P.D. 957, “The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers’ Protective Decree” has retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes, it is retroactive.
Although, P.D. 957 did not
expressly provide for
retroactivity in its entirety,
such can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent
of the law.

Ruling:
The intent of the law, as culled from its
preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and conditions it sought to
remedy must be enforced.
xxx
Preamble:
“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that
many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain
properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic
requirements, thus endangering the health
and safety of home and lot buyers

ANTONIO V. MIRANDA
G.R. NO. 135869,
22 SEPTEMBER 1999
The parties here are rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of
Bgy. Ilaya, Las Pinas, Manila.
After Antonio was proclaimed winner, Miranda, Jr. filed an election
protest before the MTC of Las Pinas.
The trial court ruled in favor of the latter and declared Miranda as
the duly elected Barangay Chairman. Nine days from receipt of the
decision, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal before the COMELEC.

ANTONIO V. MIRANDA
G.R. NO. 135869,
22 SEPTEMBER 1999
The Commission, however, dismissed the same on the ground that
Antonio failed to perfect his appeal within the prescribed time.
In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
SEC. 21. Appeal From any decision rendered by the court,
the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on
Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of
the decision.

ANTONIO V. MIRANDA
G.R. NO. 135869,
22 SEPTEMBER 1999
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from
decisions of the Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts
involving barangay officials is governed by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679
and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the
proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest
within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan
trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed.

ANTONIO V. MIRANDA
G.R. NO. 135869,
22 SEPTEMBER 1999
SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. A sworn petition contesting the
election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or
metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election
protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or
metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case
within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final.

ISSUE
:
WON the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial
court to the COMELEC in an election protest involving a
barangay position is 5 days per COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or 10 days as provided for in RA 6679 and the
Omnibus Election Code.

RULING:
The protest is within 5 days.
Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the
COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day period for
taking an appeal consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-
related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to
maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests.
In view of the Flores vs. COMELEC case, jurisprudence has consistently
recognized that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in
election protests heard by a regional trial court.

RULING:
The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC that the procedure
for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in
a barangay election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
More recently, in Calucag vs. Commission on Elections, the Court en banc
had occasion to state that:
xxx. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within five
days after the promulgation of the MTC s decision. xxx.

RULING:
Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part
that [r]ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The period for filing an appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law
or procedure.
It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from
would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all.

RULING:
The right of appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions
of the law.
By virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides that an appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either
party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to file a notice of
appeal within the prescribed period, the COMELEC is precisely given the
discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the
action or proceeding.

G.R. No 63915,
24 April 1985
TAÑADA V. TUVERA

Facts:
The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus in order
to compel respondents to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations, and administrative orders.

Facts:
Petitioners contention:
• Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are
not;
• that publication means complete publication; and
• that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.

Facts:
Respondents contention:
• Issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or of particular persons did not have to
be published;
• that publication, when necessary, must be in full and in the
Official Gazette; and
• the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it
was not supported by eight members of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
WON the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws
and not to the requirement of publication

RULING:
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC
refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of
publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties,
both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to
the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

RULING:
The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot
be dispensed with.
lt is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it.
Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication),

RULING:
it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as
a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply
with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law
on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons
they may affect before they can begin to operate.

RULING:
For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity,
the term "laws" refer not only to those of general application, but
also to laws of local application, private laws; administrative rules
enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in
the details of the Central Bank Act; but not mere interpretative
rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal
operations only.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

RULING:
An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such
law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice.
In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.

RULING:
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to
the public as a whole.

RULING:
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

RULING:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding
that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directy
affects only the inhabitants of that place.

RULING:
All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements.
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce.

RULING:
Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not
covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are
municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local
Government Code
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the
Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on
the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by
the Local Government Code.

RULING:
Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number
of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.

RULING:
This is not even substantia compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration.
The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on
this vital law

RULING:
Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be
made in full in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law
or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function.
That function belongs to the legislature.
Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance
with the prescribed procedure.

RULING:
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

RULING:
Laws must be published as soon as possible.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as
soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.
There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties
that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is
a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Tanada
v.
Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915,
December 29, 1986
WON the Publication of Laws and Decrees in
the Official Gazette and Newspaper of General
Circulation is a mandatory requirement of the
Constitution?
ISSUE:

RULING:
Yes, Publication is indispensable in every
case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended.

RULING:
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason. is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could
validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed.

RULING: One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law
on prescription, which must also be communicated to
the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.
The conclusive presumption that every person knows
the law, which of course presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all.

RULING:
It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the
Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern,” and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.

WHITELIGHT CORP.
V.
CITY OF MANILA,
G.R. NO. 122846
20 JAN. 2009

FACTS:
Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
The City claims that it is a legitimate exercise of police power.
Herein petitioners, assails the validity and constitutionality of the
ordinance arguing that it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

FACTS:
The RTC declared the ordinance null and void, thus, the City of Manila
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is valid

RULING:
The court ruled in the negative.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established.
A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.

RULING:
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than
twice a day.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for
their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and
our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.

CREBA VS. PRBRES AND PRC
G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the “Real Estate Service Act of
the Philippines” was signed into law on June 29, 2009 by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the
real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners
(real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and
salespersons) in the country.

G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc.
(REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association
(CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and
unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646:

G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. –
The provisions of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the
following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself
the acts mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own
property, except real estate developers;

G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate
Service. – No person shall practice or offer to practice real estate service
in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as real estate service
practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or any sign tending to
convey the impression that one is a real estate service practitioner, or
advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to
practice the profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or
assessor in any national government entity or local government unit,
unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure examination given by
the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid
certificate of registration, and professional identification card or a valid
special/temporary permit duly issued to him/her by the Board and the
Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers,
they have paid the required bond as hereto provided.

G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646
are unduly oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule against
deprivation of property without due process of law.

ISSUE:
WON Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646] are
unconstitutional for violating substantive due process.

RULING:
No, R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional.
Substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners
exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers, and the
classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose.

RULING:
Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent for all
persons who will engage in acts constituting real estate service,
including advertising in any manner one’s qualifications as a real estate
service practitioner, compliance with licensure examination and other
registration requirements including the filing of a bond for real estate
brokers and private appraisers. R.A. No. 9646 aims to regulate the real
estate service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and
raising the level of ethical standards for licensed real estate
professionals.

RULING:
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for
the development of “a corps of highly respected, technically competent, and
disciplined real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally
accepted standards and practice of the profession.”
In approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of
imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners,
including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working
for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated
transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses
and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is
highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot
buyers.

RULING:
R.A. No. 9646 is a valid exercise of the State’s police power.
No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a
valid exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their
conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals.

Caltex v.
Palomar
29 September 1966
G.R. No. L-19650

Facts:
Caltex initiated a promotional scheme entitled “Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest” where contenders would
guess the amount of liters contained in a covered
pump.
To join, participants need not purchase any Caltex
products but only to request entry forms from their
local Caltex stations. Choosing winners would be of
three-levels: Dealer, Regional, and National Contest.
At the first level, whoever has the closest
determinations of the hooded pump contents wins
along with other two runner-ups with corresponding
prizes. First prize for Dealer Contest elevates to
Regional and the same mechanics of first, second,
third prizes come into play. First prize from the
Regional goes to National Contest.

Facts:
Foreseeing the imminent bulk use of mail for the
scheme, Caltex asked postal authorities to be cleared
of some pertinent provisions in the Postal Law.
The Postal Law enumerates non-mailable matters,
authorizes issuance of fraud order, and identifies
effect of violating said law. Some items under non-
mailable matters are advertising on lottery, gift
enterprise, or other similar schemes.
In response to Caltex’s request, Postmaster Palomar
denied Caltex’s plea saying that its scheme falls under
advertising for lottery, which constitute non-mailable
matter.

Facts: Caltex asked for reconsideration;
Postmaster reiterated his stance and added that if
scheme pushes through, fraud order would be served.
Caltex sought judicial intervention.
And trial court ruled in their favor.
Postmaster now appealed.

ISSUE:
WON “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” violate Postal Law

Ruling: No, it is retroactive.
What is prohibited by the
Postal Law is lottery, inter alia.

Ruling:
Lottery necessarily includes consideration,
prize, and chance. Caltex’s contest does
include the elements of prize and chance
but not consideration as no purchase is
required of participants.
Is it a gift enterprise? Still no because no
purchase. Lottery is prohibited if there is
consideration; thereby gift enterprise is
also prohibited if there is consideration,
following noscitur a sociis.
But as demonstrated, neither is Caltex’s
game a lottery nor a gift enterprise.
Hence it should be allowed to proceed.

Ruling:
The true test for having consideration is
whether the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance, and not
whether those conducting the enterprise
receive something of value in return for the
distribution of the prize.

G.R. No. 78780
23 July 1987
NITAFAN V.
COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE

Facts:
Judges salaries have been deducted for tax purposes.
Petitioners filed the present petition to halt the deduction.
In their petition they assert that the law provides that their
salaries should not be decreased.
To substantiate this, they postulate the previous and
current formulations of the relevant law:

Facts:
1935 Constitution: “[Judges] shall receive such compensation
as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office.”
1973 Constitution: “The salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of
inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be
decreased during their continuance in office” and “No salary or
any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment
of income tax.”

Facts:
1987 Constitution: “The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased.”
Petitioners claim that framers intended to use original concept of “non-
dimunition” as 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner judge's salary be subject to
income tax

RULING:
Yes, their salaries should be subject to income tax because such is
the intention of the Consitutional Commission..
Peeking at the transcript of Concom, it can be found that
Commissioner Rigos intended to delete proposed exemption grant
to judiciary to equalize three branches. Other than Rigos,
Commissioner Bernas also quipped to subject their salaries to
general income tax like all taxpayers. Commissioner Aquino opines
that the exemption grants privilege to judges and is against the
principles of tax uniformity and equal protection of laws.

RULING:
Commissioner Rigos proposed changing “diminished” to
“decreased” in line with intergovernmental equality.
Commissioner Bernas agreed with “decreased” but with the
understanding that it is subject to tax.

Tañada v.
Yulo
G.R. No. 43575,
31 May 1935
Juan Tañada, the petitioner, was appointed justice of the
peace of Alabat, Tayabas, by the Governor-General with
the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission on
December 4, 1911.
He continued in that position until September 8, 1934,
when at his own request, "Pursuant to the provisions of
section 206 of the Revised Administrative Code", he was
"transferred from the position of justice of the peace for
the municipality of Alabat, Province of Tayabas, of the
same position in the municipality of Perez, same
province", by a communication signed by the Governor-
General from which the foregoing is quoted.

Tañada v.
Yulo
G.R. No. 43575,
31 May 1935
Tañada completed the age of sixty-five years on October
5, 1934.
Thereupon the Judge of First Instance of Tayabas, acting
in accordance with instructions from the Department of
Justice, directed Tañada to cease to act as justice of the
peace of Perez, Tayabas.
Tañada surrendered his office under protest, and
thereafter instituted this original action of quo warranto.

Tanada
v.
Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915,
December 29, 1986
WON Act No. 3899 applies to petitioner
ISSUE:

RULING: No, Act No. 3899 does not apply to petitioner.
Natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in
Act No. 3899, leaves room for no other deducting than that
a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of
the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on
September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act,
which was on November 16, 1931, and to the date fixed for
cessation from office which was on January 1, 1933, is not
affected by the said Act.

RULING: We have again examined microscopically word for word
the terminology used in Act No. 3899.
Having done so, all of us are agreed that a justice of the
peace like the petitioner who became sixty-five years of
age on October 5, 1934, was not included in a law which
required justice of the peace sixty-five years of age to
cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.

RULING:
It is of course fundamental that the determination of
the legislative intent is the primary consideration.
However, it is equally fundamental that that legislative
intent must be determined from the language of the
statute itself.
This principle must be adhered to even though the court
be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the
Legislature intended to enact something very different
from that which it did enact.

RULING: An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by
construction and hidden meanings at variance with the
language used cannot be sought out.
To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is
quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial
construction.
To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is
to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret.

RULING: By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language
use, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing
them are able to find their true meaning.
There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction
of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law
something that has been omitted which someone believes
ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal
construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power.
The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite
division of powers among the three departments of
government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

ROMEL ARNADO V.
COMELEC & CAPITAN
G.R. NO. 210164, 18 AUG. 2015.
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
after he was naturalized as a US citizen.
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San
Francisco. He took the Oath of Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship.
He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010
elections. However, his co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that
he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after
executing his Affidavit of Renunciation.

ROMEL ARNADO V.
COMELEC & CAPITAN
G.R. NO. 210164, 18 AUG. 2015.
While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded,
wherein Arnado garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.
COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.
Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the
application of the rule on succession.

ISSUE:
WON Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for
public office by virtue of his subsequent use of US passport,
which effectively disavowed or recalled his 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation.

RULING:
Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in
Maquiling, his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Since then
up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not cured the defect
in his qualification.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA
9225 at the time he filed his COC for the May 13, 2013 elections.

RULING:
Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified
from running for any elective local position. This refers to dual
allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
naturalization abroad to reacquire their Philippine citizenship and enjoy
full civil and political rights.

RULING:
Hence, they may now run for public office provided they:
• Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and
• Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath,
prior to or at the time of filing their COC.

Lito Corpuz
v. People
29 Apr. 2014
G.R. No. 180016

Facts:
Private Complainant Danilo Tangcoy and Petitioner
Corpuz met at a Casino in Olongapo where Danilo
Tangcoy at that time was engaged to a business of
lending money to casino players and owned some
pieces of jewelry. Lito Corpuz offered to sell some
pieces of jewelry on a commission basis.
They both agreed that petitioner (Lito Corpuz) shall
remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
The period expired without petitioner remitting the
proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry.

Facts:
When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will
pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but
to no avail.
Petitioner was sued for estafa.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter
denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
WON the penalty imposed were excessive

Ruling: There seems to be a perceived injustice
brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes
against property committed today, based on
the amount of damage measured by the
value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
However, this Court cannot modify the said
range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the
said crimes cannot be remedied through this
Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another
branch of the government.

Ruling: This, however, does not render the whole
situation without any remedy.
It can be appropriately presumed that the
framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including
Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with
acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision, and
shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should
be made the subject of penal legislation.

Ruling:
In the same way, the court shall submit to
the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.

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