Please view and share the presentations from the latest Queen's Brexit Clinic.

1. Professor David Phinnemore
Setting the Scene
@DPhinnemore
d.phinnemore@qub.ac.uk

2. Article 50 Process – A Timeline2017
29 March Notification X
29 April European Council (EUCO) adopts guidelines X
22 May Council Negotiating Mandate X
19 June Negotiations start X
19-20 October EUCO – consider move to second phase
2018
October Negotiations to conclude
December Withdrawal agreement signed
2019
January UK Parliament votes
February European Parliament Consent
March Council Decision
30 March UK Withdraws from the EU

3. Article 50 Negotiations
The main purpose of the negotiations will be to ensure the UK’s orderly
withdrawal so as to reduce uncertainty and, to the extent possible,
minimise disruption caused by this abrupt change.
To that effect, the first phase of negotiations will aim to:
• provide as much clarity and legal certainty as possible to citizens,
businesses, stakeholders and international partners on the
immediate effects of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the
Union;
• settle the disentanglement of the United Kingdom from the Union
and from all the rights and obligations the United Kingdom derives
from commitments undertaken as a Member State.
The European Council will monitor progress closely and determine
when sufficient progress has been achieved to allow negotiations to
proceed to the next phase.

5. 11. The Union has consistently supported the goal of peace
and reconciliation enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement in
all its parts, and continuing to support and protect the
achievements, benefits and commitments of the Peace Process
will remain of paramount importance. In view of the unique
circumstances on the island of Ireland, flexible and imaginative
solutions will be required, including with the aim of avoiding a
hard border, while respecting the integrity of the Union legal
order. In this context, the Union should also recognise existing
bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United
Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.
European Council, Guidelines following the United Kingdom's
Notification under Article 50 TEU, Brussels, 29 April 2017
European Council Guidelines for Negotiations:
Northern Ireland and Ireland

6. Council Negotiation Directives:
Northern Ireland and Ireland
14. In line with the European Council guidelines, the Union is committed to
continuing to support peace, stability and reconciliation on the island of Ireland.
Nothing in the Agreement should undermine the objectives and commitments set
out in the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts and its related implementing
agreements; the unique circumstances and challenges on the island of Ireland will
require flexible and imaginative solutions. Negotiations should in particular aim to
avoid the creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland, while respecting the
integrity of the Union legal order. Full account should be taken of the fact that Irish
citizens residing in Northern Ireland will continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens.
Existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between Ireland and the United
Kingdom, such as the Common Travel Area, which are in conformity with EU law,
should be recognised. The Agreement should also address issues arising from
Ireland’s unique geographic situation, including transit of goods (to and from Ireland
via the United Kingdom). These issues will be addressed in line with the approach
established by the European Council guidelines.
Council of the European Union, Directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal
from the European Union, Brussels, 22 May 2017

7. UK Government
Position Paper
(August 2017)
Areas
• Upholding the Belfast (‘Good Friday’)
Agreement in all its parts
• Maintaining the Common Travel Area and
associated rights
• Avoiding a hard border for the movement of
goods
• Aiming to preserve North-South and East-
West cooperation, including on energy
Proposals
• New UK-EU customs partnership
• Customs exemption for smaller traders (<250
employees) (80% trade)
• Continued peace funding
• Continued operation of Single Electricity
Market

8. Professor Lee McGowan
Views from the EU
@leemcgowan3
L.McGowan@qub.ac.uk

13. EU Reaction to
Position Paper
(August 2017)
European Commission
‘Magical Thinking’
UK needs to make political commitment ‘where
the UK accepts responsibility for the
consequences its decision to leave will have on
the island of Ireland.’
“The decision to leave was the UK’s decision,
not the decision of Ireland and not the decision
of the EU, and the UK has to take responsibility
for that,” the official said in Brussels.
European Parliament
"To be in and out of the Customs
Union & "invisible borders" is a
fantasy. First need to secure citizens’
rights & a financial settlement
(Verhofstadt)

14. Reaction from
Member States
(August 2017)
‘Making it up as they go along’
‘Farcical’ ‘A disgrace’
View of German politicians on UK Treasury’s
response to Brexit
Juncker – none of the papers presented so far
are ‘satisfactory’
Barnier – ‘start negotiating seriously’
Ireland
‘Ireland will not be used as a pawn in any
bigger negotiations between the UK and
Europe ….we will be stubborn in defending
Ireland’s interests’ (Coveney)
“Brexit is England’s
biggest policy blunder
since George III fumbled
away the American
colonies,” Daniel
McFadden, Nobel Prize
Winner stated at
meeting with senior
Germany officials last
week

16. Dr Katy Hayward
Implications for the Border
@Hayward_Katy
k.Hayward@qub.ac.uk

17. 1998 Agreement
Clearer
• Particular themes
• the constitutional context and
framework for North-South and
East-West cooperation;
• the border;
• citizenship rights;
• the importance of economic
prosperity to sustaining peace
process.
• Irish citizenship
• “Irish citizenship also confers EU
citizenship, with all the rights that
go with this. ”
• Continuation of PEACE IV
• Potential future programme post-
2020, protecting position of
SEUPB
Still unclear
• Particular arrangements for “close
engagement” throughout negotiations and
afterwards
• ‘In all its parts’..
• What potential for new or enhanced
N/S, E/W bodies, or new scope for
devolved matters (NB tension with EU
withdrawal bill)
• Whether willing to use this as a basis
for new relationships and structures
• Citizenship
• How rights of Irish citizens as EU
citizens will be upheld (role for Irish
state)
• Funding
• How will PEACE V relate to the EU?
• Enforceability

18. Common Travel Area
Clearer
• British-Irish cooperation
• “Continuing joint programme of work on
CTA external border”
• Inc. data sharing, investment in border
procedures
• No passport checks at land border
• “CTA can continue to operate as it does,
no restrictions on Ireland’s obligations to
EEA nationals”
• It is not about right of entry but right
to work/benefits
• “Controlling access to the labour market
and social security have long formed an
integral part of the UK’s immigration
system.”
Still unclear
• Security
• How will link into EU
security
measures/cooperation
• Rights
• What rights for family
members
• What rights for non-Irish
and non-British residents in
NI, or cross-border workers
• Plan for full legal framework
for the CTA and rights of
Irish citizens as necessary
• Checks
• What ‘point of contact’
controls may look like

19. The Border
Clearer
• Territorial differentiation
• “the UK and the EU should consider this in a flexible
way rather than one that assumes a uniform
approach”
• BUT no new customs barriers within the UK
• Cross-border trade exemptions in island context
• For small traders
• Waivers from security and safety declarations
• No requirement for product standards checks or
intellectual property rights checks at the border
• UK-wide approach
• Membership of Common Transit Convention
• Continued waiver from the requirement to submit
entry and exit summary declarations for goods being
moved between the UK and the EU
• Mutual recognition of Authorised Economic
Operators
• Integrated nature of agri-food industry
• An ‘agreed reciprocal solution’ for sanitary-
phytosanitary checks.
• “the island of Ireland to be treated in policy and
operational terms as a single epidemiological unit”
Still unclear
• What type of differential
arrangements sought
from EU? Willing to allow
differentiation within the
UK?
• Sectoral differences
• How citizens and
consumers in UK will be
protected from effects of
smuggling
• How regulatory
equivalence to be
maintained and enforced
• Institutional
management of the
single unit for animal
health and welfare
• Specific technological
tools to be applied, costs
of compliance

20. Customs: the two ‘proposals’
• “A highly streamlined customs arrangement between the UK and the
EU, streamlining and simplifying requirements, leaving as few
additional requirements on UK-EU trade as possible.”
• This would require:
• Regulatory equivalence (monitoring and enforcement)
• Coordination of customs procedures
• Ensuring matching of systems of customs declarations and administration
• Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
• “A new customs partnership with the EU, aligning our approach to
the customs border in a way that removes the need for a UK-EU
customs border”
• This would require:
• [UK membership of the Single Market]
• UK accepting terms of EU Free Trade deals with third countries
• An agreed arbitrator
• Need to prevent goods that meet UK but not EU standards from finding
their way into the EU market

21. Dr Viviane Gravey
@VGravey
V.Gravey@qub.ac.uk

22. QPOL Brexit Clinic
“Some Dismal Science”
Dr Graham Browlow
@GrahamBrownlow
graham.brownlow@qub.ac.uk

23. Kinsella’s (2017) “weasel phrase translation rubric”
regarding the NI and Ireland position paper.

24. “Gains” “Losses”
Less regulation Possible tariffs on exports to
the EU
Savings on EU contributions Loss of access to the single
market
Ability to strike new trade
deals
Damage to the City of London
Skills-based migration policy Drop in investment caused by
uncertainty
Table 1: Predicted sources of possible gains
and losses from Brexit (UK level)
(source: Woodford, 2016)

25. Some unpleasant Brexit arithmetic
• EU membership and the UK’s supply-side “tug of war” (1972-2019)
(Crafts 2012; 2016). NI?
• Official documents (what’s not stressed in them in them)
Future Customs arrangements (p.4 apart, EU membership & productivity?)
Northern Ireland and Ireland ( a lot of detail, but feasibility?)
• Eichengreen (2017) Brexit and potential UK slowdown
1. Sterling depreciation led consumers to bring forward spending to avoid
higher import prices;
2. But while consumers spent first half 2016, now with additional debt
consumer spending will not continue to grow;
3. Inflationary pressures will force up interest rates.

26. State of play August 2017 and clues on the
future
• Clues from the LSE/Centre for Cities July 2017 (NI not included
because of data gaps). Covers 62 Primary Urban Areas (PUAs) in GB
(see Dhingara et. Al, 2017).
• On average economic output of the GB cities/PUAs (as measured by
GVA) compared to if UK remained in the UK:
‘Hard Brexit’ (UK-EU trade under WTO rules) 2.3 per cent lower
in cities (2.0 in non urban LAs )
‘Soft Brexit’ (UK-EU form a free trade area zero tariffs) 1.2 per
cent lower (1.1 in non urban LAs )
• Extending to NI: Budd (2015) 3 per cent figure plausible, Border
trade costs? Agrifood? Multiplier? Greater Belfast vs rest?
Dynamic?)

27. Some tentative findings
• So regarding “gains”
• Little evidence deregulation & trade deals will easily occur
• EU contributions may end but compensation will not
• Migration still an issue
• Regarding “losses”
• Investment? Trade deals, City? Single market?
• Regardless of balance between “gains “ and “losses” probability of
losses appear more certain.
• Policy bit
• Brexit needs to be supplemented with ‘horizontal’ industrial policy
(Pryce, 2012; Moretti, 2012).

28. CROSSCUTTINGTHEMES
(Equality,balancedsub-regionalgrowth,sustainabledevelopment)
WEALTH AND
EMPLOYMENT
CREATION
EXPORT-LED
ECONOMIC
GROWTH
IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES &
EMPLOYABILITY
(e.g. promoting employment and labour market
participation and addressing wider barriers to
employment, particularly those facing the inactive)
PROMOTING EMPLOYMENT
(e.g. protecting sustainable jobs in the aftermath of the
recession, and promoting investment offering accessible
job opportunities in areas of disadvantage)
INCREASED
PRIVATE
SECTOR
PRODUCTIVITY
COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(e.g. attracting FDI, growing / diversifying exports)
ENCOURAGING BUSINESS GROWTH
(e.g. entrepreneurship, rural economy, social economy, green economy,
access to finance, planning)
STIMULATING INNOVATION, R&D AND CREATIVITY
(e.g. R&D and absorptive capacity, wider innovation,
business to business / HE / FE collaboration)
IMPROVING EMPLOYABILITY AND THE LEVEL, RELEVANCE
AND USE OF SKILLS
(e.g. Improving relevance / quality of education / training, increasing skill
levels and tackling barriers to employability )
DEVELOPING ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE
(e.g. transport links, energy, telecoms, tourism product, water & sewage)
Short, Medium and Longer Term Rebalancing Themes
Short to Medium Term Rebuilding Themes
INCREASED
EMPLOYMENT
IN EXPORT
FOCUSSED
SECTORS
Strategic Aim
BUILDING
ECONOMIC
& LABOUR
MARKET
STABILITY
Providing stable
economic base
for …