Pickett's Charge: An investigation into the causes of the Civil War's most renowned strategic blunder

Pickett’s Charge (1090-145) 1
Pickett’s Charge: What Events Caused It To Fail?
Jeff Streitmatter IV
(1090-145)
Riverview High School
Sarasota, FL, USA
History
Word Count: 3996

Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to analyze the actions of General J.E.B Stuart,
General Longstreet, and General Lee at the battle of Gettysburg on July 3, 1863 through
comparing memoirs and other secondary sources such as maps and historians in order to
investigate my research question which is: According to the actions of General Stuart, General
Longstreet, and General Lee on the day of the battle, who was responsible for the catastrophic
failure known as Pickett’s charge? My Hypothesis is that the blame should fall on General Lee,
whose plan of attack wasn’t accomplishable; furthermore, as the leader of the Confederate
forces, all success or failure of his army should ultimately be attributed to him.
General Stuart is known to have deserted the army for the first two days of the battle,
leaving Lee with no scouts as Stuart was his primary source of scouting information. General
Longstreet was blamed because of his delay in delivering the attack on the 3rd
of July. General
Lee was blamed for ordering the attack, which in retrospect seemed impossible to accomplish. I
will examine memoirs of Confederate officers to gather insight on who they hold responsible for
the defeat. Secondary sources such as maps and historians will be important to represent a source
who has analyzed many sources and reached a conclusion.
The conclusion that I reached was that although Lee’s plan may have been slightly
misguided, it was the culmination of many faults that led to the collapse of the charge. It wasn’t
one man’s mistake but many men’s minor errors which ultimately led to the attack being a

failure. My Hypothesis was misguided due to the fact that I overlooked that Lee’s plan may have
been altered from Lee’s original intentions due to the mistakes of those carrying it out.
Word Count: 300

Table of Contents
Introduction 4
Argument
Stuart 6
Longstreet 10
Lee 14
Conclusion 17
Bibliography 18

Introduction
Pickett’s charge was the attack made by the Confederates on July 3rd
, 1863, on third day
of battle at Gettysburg. There is no clear evidence to determine why the attack was a failure.
Therefore I will investigate possible causes that contributed to the failure of the attack. Before
the campaign, Lee had sent Stuart to ride through enemy territory and disrupt whatever he could.
However, Lee intended that Stuart rejoin the army if Stuart saw the Union forces mobilizing.
Stuart failed to do this and consequently when there was battle, Lee had the disadvantage
because he didn’t have Stuart’s scout cavalry to tell Lee how many men he was fighting. Stuart
did finally rejoin the army on July 2nd
. It is possible that if Stuart had been there from the start,
Lee could have been better informed of the enemy’s strength, and may have seen a more
profitable course of attack on July 3rd. General Longstreet was the man Lee trusted to carry out
Pickett’s charge. Longstreet believed that it would be a massive failure and a slaughter.
Consequently, Longstreet was reluctant to deliver the attack. Also, since he believed the attack
would fail no matter what he did, Longstreet failed to attentively coordinate the artillery
bombardment with the following charge. Therefore the Southern artillery wasn’t as effective as
Lee had planned, and couldn’t match the Union guns in the battle. After the war there were those
who started pointing fingers. Some said that had Longstreet diligently followed Lee’s orders
correctly in attacking promptly, the attack would have been successful. General Lee could also
be blameworthy for making this plan of attack, which turned out to be such a disaster. It is
possible that despite Stuart’s absence and Longstreet’s delay, Lee’s plan was doomed to be a
failure, and Lee chose to ignore it. By reviewing memoirs and other’s accounts, it may become
evident to why the charge was such a failure. Other secondary sources, such as esteemed
historians and maps will be useful because their view isn’t based on their own perspective, but

on the perspective of many. This investigation will attempt to link any errors of those three
Generals to the failure of the attack.

Argument
J.E.B. Stuart
J.E.B. Stuart was in charge of a cavalry division, whose main job was to scout. When Lee
invaded the North in the summer of 1863, he instructed Stuart to use his cavalry division to ride
north and cause havoc, which Stuart interpreted as meaning this was his only assignment. What
Stuart failed to do was to rejoin Lee when the Union and Confederate armies met at Gettysburg.
Many Historians agree that Lee’s orders to Stuart didn’t explicitly order Stuart to make his
primary objective to be the eyes of the army. However, Colonel Marshall, Lee’s chief of Staff,
claimed that when he gave Stuart Lee’s orders, “Marshall called to Stuart’s attention that the
great advantage to having his cavalry on the right was to keep the Confederates informed of the
enemy’s movements” (Ryan). In other words, Marshall hinted that Stuart should stay close, and
ideally be on the right side of the army. “Additionally, Marshall pointed out the disastrous
consequence of the South being without cavalry to feed Lee information about the enemy”
(Ryan). Paul Mengel, who wrote his Theses on Gettysburg, acknowledges that Lee’s order
weren’t clear cut, but Stuart should have had better judgment in interpreting the orders. Mengel
states, “Stuart was expected to use his own judgment. In this case, regardless of the technical
nuances of his orders, his judgment may have been poor” (Mengel 89).Without Stuart informing
Lee of enemy strength and movements, Lee was at a disadvantage. At Gettysburg, while Stuart
was still absent, Lee is reported to have said to Longstreet, “In the absence of reports from him, I
am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, or it
may be a detachment” (Longstreet 357). This shows just how crippling Stuart’s actions were to
Lee’s plans. To illustrate the seriousness of Stuart’s mistake, several of Lee’s Lieutenants wanted
Stuart to be court Marshaled. One quote incorporated in a recent article in a Civil War Magazine

records that, “Colonel Marshall was telling Lee that Stuart should be shot” (Tucker)! This shows
just how significant Stuart’s blunder was.
Since Lee had no scout at the battle, the lack of Intelligence Lee received may have led
him to think Pickett’s charge could crush the Union army. Lee was insistent that Pickett’s charge
would be successful because Lee was unaware of just how strong the Union army was and also
The Confederate army was overconfident (Mengel 207-208). Had Stuart been at the battle,
feeding Lee intelligence, Lee may have recognized the Strength of the Union force and may have
chosen a more cautious plan of attack on the 3rd of July. Another proponent of Lee’s plan of
attack, known as Pickett’s charge, was for Stuart (who had arrived July 2nd) to maneuver behind
the Union lines to attempt to create pandemonium. Lee intended for Stuart to go around the top
of the Union “fishhook” defense. What Lee didn’t know was that
location was where the Union was strongest. For Stuart’s small
force to be able to combat such a densely packed enemy was
ridiculous, but Lee didn’t know this because he hadn’t received
scouting reports on the Union forces, which is again Stuart’s
fault. Today, it is agreed that Lee’s orders for Stuart’s raiding
party were vague, especially in emphasizing the importance of
Stuart scouting for the army; However Stuart should have known
to be there to aid the army when in would meet the enemy.
There are many who accuse Stuart of being a scoundrel, most famously Colonel
Marshall. The Killer Angels, a historical novel about Gettysburg based on memoirs and other
primary sources, also portrays Stuart as being a reckless scoundrel. However there are also
numerous historians who defend Stuart on the premise that his orders did allow such action.
Figure 1 Fishhook defense line

Plenty of Blame to Go Around is a well known book on the subject. The Authors, Eric J.
Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi, are well recognized Historians on the subject. In their book
they say, “Lee’s strategic plans were rather vague and incomplete, and had no specific
geographic objectives to tie Stuart to a fixed course or deadline date” (Wittenberg 241). So we
can see Stuart had his reasons to believe that his orders were left up to the discretion of himself.
Lee may have assumed it to be obvious that Stuart would rejoin the army promptly, so Lee chose
not to state it in his orders. What Lee didn’t realize is that he was giving these “loose” orders to a
man who was already searching for an opportunity to make himself a hero. Stuart was probably
so eager to prove himself that when he heard these orders, his excitement caused him to ignore
any good sense in him that would have made Stuart stay closer to Lee’s side, instead of going out
on a reckless joyride. “It was Lee who authorized the raid, but he also didn’t set any rules for his
raid, his faith in Stuart led him to indicate his wishes, thus giving Stuart considerable leeway in
carrying them out” (Zimmerman). “Had Lee written unequivocal orders, the dispute that raged
over their meaning (or whether Stuart violated them) wouldn’t have erupted” (Wittenberg 294).
On the night of July 2nd, when Stuart returned, Lee was extremely disappointed in him. Stuart
had literally almost allowed the Union army to completely destroy the Confederate army. But
Lee’s lack of scout reports may not have been completely Stuart’s fault according to the book
research done in the book Plenty of Blame to Go Around. Aside from not explicitly stating
Stuart’s orders, Lee actually had 2 brigades of cavalry covering his rear, which he chose not to
use (but this is investigated later). The bottom line is that according to this view, the failure at
Gettysburg seems to have been blamed on the lack of scouting, which is attributed to Stuart;
However, Lee had other scouts he could have used but chose not to. Furthermore Wittenberg
goes on to say, “Nothing in the historical record suggests he would have acted differently if

Stuart’s three brigades had been present” (Wittenberg 294)“The ultimate responsibility for
Stuart’s raid lies with Lee, who authorized the raid” (Zimmerman). And we can clearly see that
through Lee’s vagueness in his orders, he indirectly allowed Stuart to leave him.
Longstreet
General Longstreet was the man who was to carry out the attack ordered by Lee. Lee’s
plan of attack was: first, the Confederate artillery would concentrate their fire on the center of the
Union defense line (the shaft of the fishhook), which was marked by a small clump of trees, in
order to weaken the spot where the confederates would charge. Then, he would send 15,000
Confederate troops to charge at the spot. Ideally the charging men would act as a wedge to split
the enemy in two, at what Lee thought was their weakest point, and divide the army into two
conquerable halves. When Lee disclosed his plans about the assault he was preparing,
Longstreet was adamantly opposed to it. Longstreet’s reluctance to believe the attack would be
successful fueled his reluctance to make the attack. On July 3rd, the day of the attack, Longstreet
delayed in making any attack until mid afternoon (the exact time wasn’t recorded). Longstreet
could be blameworthy for committing Pickett’s charge to failure and therefore failed to carry out
an early attack and make necessary plans for the attack. In an essay written by James Crocker, a
Confederate veteran, he stated “Lee ordered Longstreet to attack the next morning,” He went on
to write that Lee said that, “If the attack had been made as he ordered, it would have been
successful” (Rollins 3-4). So Crocker It is possible that Crocker misrepresented the truth, as
many southerners sought to keep Lee’s name free from blame. Nevertheless Longstreet was in
no hurry to commence the attack, he spent the day trying to prolong the inevitable, considering
the grave task ahead of him. He was very burdened by the fact that he knew he was sending his

men to certain death. Longstreet was so depressed by his conviction, that he was unaware of any
failure in preparation. Dr. Freeman, a late 19th century historian who studied the civil war, said
this about Longstreet on that day, “ His failure to prepare for the attack was due to his inability to
deliver the assault, instead he was dragged through every second by the very ticking of his
watch, counting down to the inevitable hour” (Freeman 590). The burden on Longstreet rendered
him unable to do anything but wait for what he thought was his inescapable doom. So, it is
possible that Pickett’s charge was a failure not only because it was doomed from the start, but
because Longstreet had already deemed it to be a failure, and therefore failed to make the
necessary preparations to make the attack successful. For
example, Lee wanted Pickett’s two brigades to charge
en echelon, a v shaped formation. Longstreet overlooked
this and as a result the left side of the attack was only one
line strong.
Another thing Longstreet failed to do was manage
his artillery correctly to provide adequate support for the charge. Since ammunition was low,
Longstreet should have ordered all the ammo to be concentrated at the Union line all at once.
Then he should have immediately charged, so as not to allow the Union army to regroup.
However, the Longstreet gave no clear indication of exactly when he would charge, and
consequently much of the artillery fire was wasted throughout the day. Furthermore, as the day
progressed, more and more Union guns came into action, continually increasing the enemy’s
strength. Porter Alexander, who was in charge of the artillery, knew his supply of ammunition
was limited, and that he would have to save his shots for the bombardment immediately
preceding the charge. Longstreet would charge when the artillery fire was at full firing power,
Figure 2 aircraft en echelon formation

and he left it up to Alexander to decide when to start the bombardment. In Alexander’s memoirs,
he states that, “I felt that if artillery fire opened, Pickett must make the charge” (Rollins 35). He
then says that in order to convey his convictions to Longstreet, Alexander sent this message to
Longstreet: “When our artillery fire is at best, I will advise Gen Pickett to advance” (35).
Alexander believed that when the enemy would begin their artillery fire, he would return fire and
Pickett would charge. As further evidence of much of the artillery ammunition being wasted,
Alexander reports in his memoirs: “much of their ammunition had been prematurely wasted”
(35). After the bombardment, Longstreet didn’t immediately charge, Alexander sent a message
to Longstreet saying that he didn’t have enough ammunition to continually shell Union troops
and that his supply was just enough to provide an artillery barrage for the charge. At 1:25
(according to Alexander’s memoirs), Alexander sent a message to Longstreet saying, “If you are
coming at all you must come immediately or I cannot give you proper support,” (88). It was 1:40
and Pickett had still not come, Alexander wrote that he sent a message to Pickett saying, “For
God’s sake come quick... Come quick or my ammunition will not let me support you properly”
(88-89). This startled Longstreet, who then replied, “Go stop Pickett right where he is, and
replenish your ammo” (Freeman 593). Alexander replied, “We can’t do that sir! The train has
but little. It would take an hour to distribute it, and meanwhile the enemy would regroup in
strength” (593)! The Longstreet said something which encompasses my entire argument of
Longstreet. He said, “I don’t want to make this charge, I don’t believe it can succeed. I would
stop now, but that General Lee has ordered it and expects it” (593). Longstreet goes on to say
that Lee should have put the command in the hands of a capable officer who believed it could be
done (Rollins 19). As we can see through the conversation of Longstreet and Alexander,
Longstreet tried to prolong or forgo the attack for as long as possible. It seems as if Longstreet

knew that, regardless of what preparations he made, the attack would be a failure. Longstreet’s
failure to prepare was a sign that he had prepared to fail, which is exactly why Longstreet could
be held partially responsible for the defeat. Lee had wanted the men to charge en echelon; he
hoped that the wedge-shaped formation of his men could split the Union defense line. But
Longstreet sent his men in a straight line formation. As the fighting intensified, the left of the
advancing Confederate line crumbled and soon after the advancing army was ripped apart. It is
possible that the formation contributed to the attack falling apart. However it is just as possible
that no formation could have saved the relatively small force from breaking such a well defended
hill (Freeman). It is important to note that I have cited Dr. Douglas Freeman quite often in this
paragraph, perhaps allowing certain biases to creep in. Dr. Douglas Freeman is the son of a
Confederate Soldier, who spent eight years writing Lee’s Lieutenants, the book which is cited.
Being the son of a Confederate Soldier, he may have a southern based view, which would incline
him to represent facts to keep Lee from blame, like any good southerner. However, he is still a
highly esteemed and credible historian.
Another question in debate is whether Lee gave the order of attack on the night of July
2nd or the morning of July 3rd. In an address in 1984, James Crocker, a Confederate Veteran,
defended that Lee’s orders were to attack the next morning. He said this, “You will thus observe
Lee’s plan of attack. It was to be made in the early morning –presumably in the early morning-
with the whole of Longstreet’s corps” (Address by James F. Crocker). Additionally, late in
Crocker’s address he claimed that Lee had said that if the attack had been made as he ordered, it
would have been successful (Address by James Crocker)! Major General Jubal Early affirmed
this in a quote by him stating, “had the attack been made at daylight, as contemplated, it must
have resulted in a brilliant victory” (Tucker 3). General Lee himself said that the attack hadn’t

been made as early as expected (Longstreet 388). In Lee’s report, he expresses his plans for an
attack on July 3rd: “The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett, would
attack the next morning” (Longstreet 385). This infers that Lee had assumed that he had
communicated to Longstreet that he should attempt another morning attack. In Longstreet’s
memoirs, he confronted this quote by Lee and wrote: “He didn’t give or send me orders for the
morning of the third day, nor did he reinforce me by Pickett’s brigades for the morning attack”
(385). And in 1877, Longstreet wrote an article which destroyed any of these claims made my
General Early which said that Longstreet was ordered on the night of the 2nd, and many of Lee’s
staff defended Longstreet.
Lee
When Lee confronted Stuart about Stuart nearly deserting the army, he said that he had
no scouts and he was fighting blind. However there were 2 brigades of cavalry (6000-12,000
men) that Stuart left with Lee. When Lee found Stuart to be absent, he should have summoned
these cavalry, and used them as scouts but he chose not to. According to Daniel Zimmerman, a
historical article author raised in the north, Lee had available scouts, but didn’t use them
(Zimmerman). Had Lee used his scouts, he could have known how well defended the hill was.
And he may have chosen a different course of action. Daniel Zimmerman’s view of Lee is more
critical than most, which may be due to Daniel’s northern bias.
Today, it is thought that a cause for ordering the doomed Pickett’s charge was Lee’s
arrogance. At Gettysburg, the army of Virginia was at its highpoint and the army of the Potomac
was at its low, so Lee had every right to feel arrogant. Dr. McPherson wrote that, “Lee hadn’t felt
that his troops had been defeated” (Freeman 588). And apparently Lee thought his men wouldn’t

be defeated. Lee hadn’t had enough scouting material to fully know what situation he was in. He
may have been deceived about the Confederate’s success. Although they had done well in the
fighting the Union army had great numbers and a strong position to defend. Lee seemed to have
underestimated his opponent. The Killer Angels portrays Lee as being very convinced of the
victory Pickett’s charge would bring. Longstreet was ever doubtful, but Lee wouldn’t be moved.
In the book, Lee even says that this attack is God’s will and that it would be successful, no
matter what the odds were (Shaara). After the attack failed, Lee felt that it was entirely his fault.
The order he had so stubbornly defended, which his subordinates were highly skeptical of, had
been a failure, and had killed thousands of his men. After the charge Lee said, “It’s all my fault”.
In an essay Longstreet wrote after the war he commented on Lee’s statement and said, “We
reflect that it [Lee’s statement] was the utterance of a deep-felt truth rather mentions that after
the failed charger than a mere sentiment” (Rollins 17). So, from Longstreet’s point of view, Lee
held the ultimate responsibility for defeat. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, on the events at
Gettysburg, Lee reiterated that the blame for the defeat shouldn’t be a reflection on the actions of
any of the men or officers at the battle. He said, “I am alone to blame, in perhaps expecting too
much of its [the army’s] prowess & valour” (Robert E. Lee). He says later, “With my present
knowledge, & could I have foreseen that the attack on the last day would have failed to drive the
enemy from his position, I should certainly have tried some other cause” (Robert E. Lee). From
General Lee’s own admission, he expected too much from his men, he believed that his men
were superior to the enemies’ and that the sheer will of the southern soldiers would lead the
charging men to victory. In another recorded quote Lee said, “It’s all my fault, I thought my men
were invincible” (Freeman 597), again reinforcing that the mistake was with Lee, overestimating
the ability of his troops. However, Lee’s overconfidence may have been tempered had there been

scouts to inform Lee of the true strength of the Union army. So, Stuart may be also responsible to
blame in not being present to scout the enemy and therefore encourage Lee to be more cautious.
Lee also said to Colonel Fremantle, a British observer, “The attack should have been made with
30,000 troops and not 15,000 and that the men who gave way and fled during the attack, were
young soldiers who had never been under fire before” (597). So, from Lee’s own perspective, the
error in his planning was the number of men he had in the assault. However, Longstreet later said
that not even 40,000 men could have taken the hill which the Federals so well defended
(Longstreet 404).
However, the 15,000 men in the charge were not all that Lee had. Perhaps another
contributing factor to the failure of Pickett’s charge was the man Lee chose to carry out the
order. Longstreet was sure the attack would be a failure and therefore may not have been the best
man to organize the attack in order for it to be successful. In Longstreet’s memoirs Longstreet
acknowledges that he wasn’t the best man for the job. He wrote, “He [Lee] knew that I didn’t
believe that success was possible… and he should have put an officer in charge who had more
confidence in his plan” (Longstreet 388). In other words, Lee should have put the operation in
the hands of an officer who believed it could be done, or Lee should have carried out the order
himself.
Conclusion

I chose to investigate General Lee, General Stuart, and General Longstreet at the Battle of
Gettysburg in order to see if their actions and mistakes at the battle is what lead to the collapse of
Pickett’s Charge. Prior to my investigation, I hypothesized that it was General Lee’s fault for
ordering this impossible task and he is responsible for the failure of the attack. My investigation
included searching primary sources such as journals and supplementing them with secondary
sources like Historian’s input. My greatest triumph was when I found a book which was a
collection of eyewitness account about Pickett’s charge.
One severe limitation to researching history is that there are many biased sources and
there are slants to every source. I found battle maps useful to determine what actual took place,
and I could compare it to what was supposed to happen or why the attack fell apart. One book
that I found was very helpful was “Lee’s Lieutenants,” The author had done a very
comprehensive (8 year) study about the events surrounding Pickett’s charge and had collected
many sources. The evidence presented in the book points to everyone as being responsible for
the defeat. My other research confirms this theory as I found many examples of
miscommunications and errors, the most profound example being the miscommunication
between General Lee and General Stuart which led to Stuart being absent from the army for
several days when he was most needed. I didn’t see that the attack was a failure because of one
cataclysmic error, but it was the culmination of mistakes that made the charge fail.
Bibliography

“Address by James F. Crocker, Before Stonewall Camp.”Southern Historical Society
Papers, Vol. 33, pages 118-134. June 10, 2012.
Digital Image. The Gettysburg, Pennsylvania Welcome Center. N.p. N.d. Web. 31 June,
2012 <http://www.gettysbg.com/battle.shtml>
Digital Image. Horizontal Rain. Wordpress, 5 August, 2008. Web. 31 June, 2012
<http://horizontalrain.com/blog/2008/08/05/gunfighters-and-indians-workups-for-red-flag-day-
4/>
Freeman, Douglas Southall, and Stephen W Sears. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in
Command. New York: Scribner, 1998.
J. Wittenberg, Eric, and David Petruzzi. “Plenty of Blame to go Around.” Savas Beatie,
2011. Google books (Web). June 11, 2012.
Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox :: Memoirs of the Civil War in
America. 1st Da Capo Press ed. New York: Da Capo Press, 1992.
Mengel, Paul, "The Union Army had something to do with it : General Lee's plan at
Gettysburg and why it failed" (2008). Masters Theses and Doctoral Dissertations. Paper
206.http://commons.emich.edu/theses/206
“Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis.” Reprinted in Clifford Dowdey, editor, The Wartime
Papers of R. E. Lee (New York: Bramhall House, 1961), pages 564-565.
<http://www.sewanee.edu/faculty/Willis/Civil_War/documents/LeeDavis31July63.html>
Rollins, Richard M. Pickett's Charge: Eyewitness Accounts At the Battle of Gettysburg.
Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005. 3-4, 17, 19, 35.
Shaara, Michael. The Killer Angels: A Novel. Array New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.
Bibliography (continued)

Tucker, Glenn. "LONG STREET Culprit Or Scapegoat?." Civil War Times 51.1 (2012):
59-65. Academic Search Complete. Web. 30 July 2012.
Zimmerman, Daniel. “J.E.B. Stuart: Gettysburg Scapegoat?” America’s Civil War
September 23, 1998. June 18, 2012 <http://www.historynet.com/jeb-stuart-battle-of-gettysburg-
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