SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 35
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Risk Driven Development
J.vanEkris@Delta-Pi.nl
My Projects
Reliability
Availability
Maintainability
Safety
IEC 61508: Required activities for safety related systems
Risk and the design process
• Each design step includes the refinement of the
risk analysis
• Each design solution has to be measured against
the risk analysis
• Constant design questions:
– Is the design balanced?
– Can it be made?
– Can it be done simpeler?
Simplicity is
prerequisite for
reliability
Edsger W. Dijkstra
Risk management process
Slide 715 June 2016
Failure definitions
• What can go wrong
exactly?
• When do we
consider the system
to be failed?
An example…
• Not extracting landing
gear when commanded
without error indication
• Spontaneous
irreversible landing gear
extraction while
travelling overseas
Top-down vs. Bottom-Up analysis
• Bottom-up: structured
brainstorm about
everything that could
happen given a specific
scope
• Top-down: think about
your biggest fears first,
than find out what could
cause it.
FME(C)A: bottom-up thinking
• Failure Mode and
Effect (Criticality)
Analysis
• Reasoning from
failure of the
components,
thinking about the
consequences
Risk: System does not perform trick?
Guide words…
Look at every component and
investigate what happens if:
– It doesn’t work
– It is very slow
– Does the wrong thing
– Sends messages spontanously
– Loses messages/state
– Leaks information
Structured FMECA approach
Function Failure Mode Causes Local Effects System Effects Criticality
Inwin Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic
Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited
No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic
Spontanous output Switching error Unjustified open Onterechtesluit False Positive
Process Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic
Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited
No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic
Spontanous output Switching error Power failure No closure Catastrophic
… … … … … …
… … … … …
… … … … …
… … … … …
Certainty…
Rank beliefs not according to their
plausibility but by the harm they may
cause.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb
Slide 1515 June 2016
Identifying measures
• Risk = Chance * Impact
• Moments allowing measures:
– Preventive
– Detection
– Repression
– Correction
– Ignore
– Accept
Slide 1615 June 2016
You can’t mitigate everything…
• You can’t prevent everything
• You can’t plan for everything
• You can’t predict everything
• You couldn’t do any business
• But, you can’t ignore
everything either
Structured FMECA approach
Function Failure Mode Causes Local Effects System Effects Criticality Detection
Mitigating
Measures
Inwin Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic None Multiprogramming
Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited None
No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic None
Failsafe behaviour
Process
Spontanous output Switching error Unjustified open Onterechtesluit False Positive None
Process Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic None Multiprogramming
Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited None
No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic None Deadlock detection
Spontanous output Switching error Power failure No closure Catastrophic None Safety relay
… … … … … … … …
… … … … … … …
… … … … … … …
… … … … … … …
New functional and
design requirements!
Disadvantages FME(C)A
• It is impossible to calculate an overall risk
exposure
• Relation between risks is missing
– Common mode failures usually aren’t modelled
• Complex scenario’s are hard to model
– Multiple failures aren’t modelled
– Are there root causes that could trigger multiple failures?
• Usually identifies irrelevant risks
Top-Down Risk analysis
• Start with a dominant
concern
• Identify potential
causes
• Detail further
A small FTA
Typical risks identified
• Components making the wrong decissions
• Power failure
• Hardware failure of PLC’s/Servers
• Software failures
• Network failure
• External factors
• Human maintenance error
22
Breaking a cut-set
Alternate component
Alternate service
Measures and FTA
15/06/2016
24
Before After
Design decisions…
• Every design decision is accompanied by a Risk
analysis focussing on RAMS aspects
• In the end the cost, RAMS effects and other
trade-off aspects will determine which design
option will be used
Option 1
FTA Option 1
Option 2
FTA Option 2
Info
Hoogtebepaling Aansturing
Hoogtemeting
Waterkering
Diesels
Meeta
Meetb
Stuura
Stuurb
Software failure
Chance: 1/1.000 year
Measurement error
Chance: (1/1.000.000 year)3
Software failure
Chance: 1/1.000.000 year
Software failure
Chance: 1/1.000 year
Design Option 1
Info
Hoogtebepaling Aansturing
Hoogtemeting
Waterkering
Diesels
Meeta
Meetb
Stuura
Stuurb
Software failure
Chance: 1/10.000 year
Measurement error
Chance: (1/1.000.000 year)3
Software failure
Chance: 1/100 year
Software failure
Chance: 1/10.000 year
Design Option 2
IEC 61508: Required activities for safety related systems
Testing
Function Impact wrong/not
functioning
Impact spontanous
functioning
Function 1 Small Medium
Function 2 Disasterous Huge
Function 3 Serious Huge
Function 3 Serious Small
Function 4 Serious Serious
Function 5 Serious Small
Function 6 Huge Huge
…
Test depth and acceptable risk
• Level A: Thorough endurancetest aiming to
prove function reliability with high accuracy.
• Level B: Thorough endurancetest aiming to
prove function reliability with medium
accuracy.
• Level C: Thorough endurancetest aiming to
prove function reliability with low accuracy.
• Level D: Test to verify if the function works
once.
• Level E: Function testd alongside other
functions, might leave paths untested.
Test effort
Level #Tests Effort
Level A 50.000 120 hours
Level B 10.000 24 hours
Level C 1.000 4 hours
Level D 1 1 hour
Level E - PM
Test depth…
Functie Not functioning Spont. Function
Function 1 Level E NOT
Function 2 Level A Level A
Function 3 Level A Level A
Function 3 Level B Level B
Function 4 Level A Level A
Function 5 Level E NOT
Function 6 Level A Level A
… … …

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systemsJaap van Ekris
 
Normal accidents and outpatient surgeries
Normal accidents and outpatient surgeriesNormal accidents and outpatient surgeries
Normal accidents and outpatient surgeriesJonathan Creasy
 
Steer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew Rendell
Steer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew RendellSteer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew Rendell
Steer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew RendellValtech UK
 
What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)
What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)
What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)Michael Diamant
 
Secure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael Denipotti
Secure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael DenipottiSecure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael Denipotti
Secure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael DenipottiRaphael Denipotti
 
How to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOps
How to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOpsHow to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOps
How to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOpsZane Lackey
 
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...Jaap van Ekris
 
Building a Modern Security Engineering Organization
Building a Modern Security Engineering OrganizationBuilding a Modern Security Engineering Organization
Building a Modern Security Engineering OrganizationZane Lackey
 
Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?
Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?
Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?Thoughtworks
 
BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...
BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...
BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...BlueHat Security Conference
 
What the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping software
What the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping softwareWhat the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping software
What the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping softwareMichael Ewins
 
Functional safety by FMEA/FTA
Functional safety by FMEA/FTAFunctional safety by FMEA/FTA
Functional safety by FMEA/FTAmehmor
 
How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...
How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...
How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...AdaCore
 
HouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from Scratch
HouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from ScratchHouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from Scratch
HouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from ScratchSpencer Koch
 
Predict Software Reliability Before the Code is Written
Predict Software Reliability Before the Code is WrittenPredict Software Reliability Before the Code is Written
Predict Software Reliability Before the Code is WrittenAnn Marie Neufelder
 
OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management - How to be Agile in Secu...
OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management -  How to be Agile in Secu...OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management -  How to be Agile in Secu...
OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management - How to be Agile in Secu...Simone Onofri
 
Classic Testing Mistakes 0226
Classic Testing Mistakes 0226Classic Testing Mistakes 0226
Classic Testing Mistakes 0226MBA_Community
 
Introduction to Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis
Introduction to Software Failure Modes Effects AnalysisIntroduction to Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis
Introduction to Software Failure Modes Effects AnalysisAnn Marie Neufelder
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
 
Normal accidents and outpatient surgeries
Normal accidents and outpatient surgeriesNormal accidents and outpatient surgeries
Normal accidents and outpatient surgeries
 
2016 virus bulletin
2016 virus bulletin2016 virus bulletin
2016 virus bulletin
 
Steer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew Rendell
Steer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew RendellSteer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew Rendell
Steer and/or sink the supertanker by Andrew Rendell
 
What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)
What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)
What to Expect When You're Expecting (to Own Production)
 
Secure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael Denipotti
Secure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael DenipottiSecure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael Denipotti
Secure Agile SDLC BSides 14 - 2017 - Raphael Denipotti
 
How to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOps
How to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOpsHow to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOps
How to adapt the SDLC to the era of DevSecOps
 
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
 
Building a Modern Security Engineering Organization
Building a Modern Security Engineering OrganizationBuilding a Modern Security Engineering Organization
Building a Modern Security Engineering Organization
 
Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?
Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?
Chaos Engineering, When should you release the monkeys?
 
BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...
BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...
BlueHat v18 || Go build a tool - best practices for building a robust & e...
 
What the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping software
What the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping softwareWhat the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping software
What the music of the 1980s taught me about shipping software
 
Functional safety by FMEA/FTA
Functional safety by FMEA/FTAFunctional safety by FMEA/FTA
Functional safety by FMEA/FTA
 
How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...
How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...
How should we build that? Evolving a development environment that's suitable ...
 
HouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from Scratch
HouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from ScratchHouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from Scratch
HouSecCon 2019: Offensive Security - Starting from Scratch
 
Predict Software Reliability Before the Code is Written
Predict Software Reliability Before the Code is WrittenPredict Software Reliability Before the Code is Written
Predict Software Reliability Before the Code is Written
 
OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management - How to be Agile in Secu...
OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management -  How to be Agile in Secu...OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management -  How to be Agile in Secu...
OWASP AppSec EU 2016 - Security Project Management - How to be Agile in Secu...
 
Classic Testing Mistakes 0226
Classic Testing Mistakes 0226Classic Testing Mistakes 0226
Classic Testing Mistakes 0226
 
Introduction to Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis
Introduction to Software Failure Modes Effects AnalysisIntroduction to Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis
Introduction to Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis
 
Dfmea
DfmeaDfmea
Dfmea
 

Andere mochten auch

2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…
2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…
2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…Jaap van Ekris
 
2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijk
2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijk2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijk
2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijkJaap van Ekris
 
2016 02-15 - IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...
2016 02-15 -  IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...2016 02-15 -  IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...
2016 02-15 - IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...Jaap van Ekris
 
2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheid
2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheid2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheid
2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheidJaap van Ekris
 
2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...
2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...
2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...Jaap van Ekris
 
What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)
What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)
What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)Jaap van Ekris
 
Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)
Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)
Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)Jaap van Ekris
 

Andere mochten auch (7)

2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…
2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…
2010-09-21 - (ISC)2 - Protecting patient privacy while enabling medical re…
 
2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijk
2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijk2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijk
2011-04-29 - Risk management conference - Technische IT risico's in de praktijk
 
2016 02-15 - IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...
2016 02-15 -  IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...2016 02-15 -  IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...
2016 02-15 - IASTED Innsbruck 2016 - the role and decompesition of delivery ...
 
2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheid
2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheid2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheid
2016 11-15 - nvrb - software betrouwbaarheid
 
2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...
2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...
2011-03-12 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Ervaringen met Windows Phone 7 in ...
 
What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)
What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)
What the hack happened to digi notar (28-10-2011)
 
Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)
Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)
Windows Phone 7 and the cloud, the good, the bad and the ugly (17-06-2011, SDN)
 

Ähnlich wie 2016-05-30 risk driven design

18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice
18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice 18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice
18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice Intland Software GmbH
 
Incident Command: The far side of the edge
Incident Command: The far side of the edgeIncident Command: The far side of the edge
Incident Command: The far side of the edgeFastly
 
Risk Management
Risk ManagementRisk Management
Risk ManagementSaqib Raza
 
Failure Mode Effects & Analysis
Failure Mode Effects & AnalysisFailure Mode Effects & Analysis
Failure Mode Effects & AnalysisMuhammad Rezvani
 
Risk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees Blokland
Risk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees BloklandRisk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees Blokland
Risk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees BloklandKees Blokland
 
Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)
Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)
Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)Jaap van Ekris
 
Risk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation SlidesRisk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation SlidesSlideTeam
 
Risk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation SlidesRisk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation SlidesSlideTeam
 
Safety and security in mission critical IoT systems
Safety and security in mission critical IoT systemsSafety and security in mission critical IoT systems
Safety and security in mission critical IoT systemsEinar Landre
 
PA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdf
PA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdfPA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdf
PA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdfhulk smash
 
Risk Event Modeling and Event Chains
Risk Event Modeling and Event ChainsRisk Event Modeling and Event Chains
Risk Event Modeling and Event ChainsIntaver Insititute
 
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory TeamsBridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory TeamsICS
 
The Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can Steal
The Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can StealThe Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can Steal
The Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can Stealmozilla.presentations
 
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory TeamsBridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory TeamsICS
 
FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS
FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSISFAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS
FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSISANOOPA NARAYANAN
 
Perfect Profilers Final Presentation
Perfect Profilers Final PresentationPerfect Profilers Final Presentation
Perfect Profilers Final PresentationJulie Michlinski
 
The Seven Deadly Sins of Incident Response
The Seven Deadly Sins of Incident ResponseThe Seven Deadly Sins of Incident Response
The Seven Deadly Sins of Incident ResponseLancope, Inc.
 
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software jamieayre
 
fmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdf
fmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdffmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdf
fmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdfRajendran C
 
Software Defects.pdf
Software Defects.pdfSoftware Defects.pdf
Software Defects.pdfNishaVatwani
 

Ähnlich wie 2016-05-30 risk driven design (20)

18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice
18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice 18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice
18 Jul 2018 - FMEA and Risk Management in Practice
 
Incident Command: The far side of the edge
Incident Command: The far side of the edgeIncident Command: The far side of the edge
Incident Command: The far side of the edge
 
Risk Management
Risk ManagementRisk Management
Risk Management
 
Failure Mode Effects & Analysis
Failure Mode Effects & AnalysisFailure Mode Effects & Analysis
Failure Mode Effects & Analysis
 
Risk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees Blokland
Risk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees BloklandRisk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees Blokland
Risk Based Testing in Agile context - Kees Blokland
 
Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)
Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)
Testing safety critical systems: Practice and Theory (14-05-2013, VU Amsterdam)
 
Risk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation SlidesRisk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan PowerPoint Presentation Slides
 
Risk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation SlidesRisk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation Slides
Risk Management Plan Powerpoint Presentation Slides
 
Safety and security in mission critical IoT systems
Safety and security in mission critical IoT systemsSafety and security in mission critical IoT systems
Safety and security in mission critical IoT systems
 
PA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdf
PA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdfPA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdf
PA2557_SQM_Lecture7 - Defect Prevention.pdf
 
Risk Event Modeling and Event Chains
Risk Event Modeling and Event ChainsRisk Event Modeling and Event Chains
Risk Event Modeling and Event Chains
 
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory TeamsBridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
 
The Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can Steal
The Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can StealThe Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can Steal
The Most Important Thing: How Mozilla Does Security and What You Can Steal
 
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory TeamsBridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
Bridging the Gap Between Development and Regulatory Teams
 
FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS
FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSISFAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS
FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
Perfect Profilers Final Presentation
Perfect Profilers Final PresentationPerfect Profilers Final Presentation
Perfect Profilers Final Presentation
 
The Seven Deadly Sins of Incident Response
The Seven Deadly Sins of Incident ResponseThe Seven Deadly Sins of Incident Response
The Seven Deadly Sins of Incident Response
 
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
HIS 2017 Paul Sherwood- towards trustable software
 
fmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdf
fmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdffmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdf
fmea-130116034507-phpapp01.pdf
 
Software Defects.pdf
Software Defects.pdfSoftware Defects.pdf
Software Defects.pdf
 

Mehr von Jaap van Ekris

2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebben
2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebben2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebben
2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebbenJaap van Ekris
 
2018-11-08 risk and reslience festival
2018-11-08 risk and reslience festival2018-11-08 risk and reslience festival
2018-11-08 risk and reslience festivalJaap van Ekris
 
2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequenties
2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequenties2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequenties
2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequentiesJaap van Ekris
 
TOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleiding
TOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleidingTOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleiding
TOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleidingJaap van Ekris
 
Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)
Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)
Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)Jaap van Ekris
 
2010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 7
2010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 72010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 7
2010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 7Jaap van Ekris
 
2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemen
2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemen2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemen
2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemenJaap van Ekris
 
2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...
2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...
2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...Jaap van Ekris
 
2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...Jaap van Ekris
 
2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patterns
2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patterns2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patterns
2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patternsJaap van Ekris
 
2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…
2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…
2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…Jaap van Ekris
 
2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?
2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?
2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?Jaap van Ekris
 
2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...
2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...
2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...Jaap van Ekris
 
2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...Jaap van Ekris
 

Mehr von Jaap van Ekris (14)

2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebben
2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebben2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebben
2020 09-08 - sdn - waarom klanten een hekel aan software ontwikkelaars hebben
 
2018-11-08 risk and reslience festival
2018-11-08 risk and reslience festival2018-11-08 risk and reslience festival
2018-11-08 risk and reslience festival
 
2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequenties
2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequenties2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequenties
2015 10-08 Uitwijken, het hoe, waarom en de consequenties
 
TOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleiding
TOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleidingTOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleiding
TOPAAS Versie 2.0, een praktische inleiding
 
Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)
Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)
Cloud Security (11-09-2012, (ISC)2 Secure Amsterdam)
 
2010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 7
2010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 72010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 7
2010-04-17 - PDAtotaal Usergroup meeting - Introductie in Windows Phone 7
 
2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemen
2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemen2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemen
2009-07-09 - DNV - Risico en betrouwbaarheid van ICT systemen
 
2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...
2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...
2009-02-18 - IASTED Innsbruck 2009 - Factors in project management influencin...
 
2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2009-02-12 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
 
2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patterns
2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patterns2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patterns
2008-10-09 - Bits and Chips Conference - Embedded Systemen Architecture patterns
 
2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…
2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…
2008-07-15 - (ISC)2 - Mobile Phone Security, you have to let go in order t…
 
2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?
2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?
2008-06-23 - SDN - Kwaliteit van software, wat is dat nu eigenlijk?
 
2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...
2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...
2008-02-14 - IASTED Innsbruck 2008 - Customer Retention and Delivery Quality ...
 
2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
2008-02-07 - VU Amsterdam - Customer Satisfaction and dealing with customers ...
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsEnterprise Knowledge
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityPrincipled Technologies
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...Neo4j
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Paola De la Torre
 
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slidevu2urc
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesSinan KOZAK
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountPuma Security, LLC
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Miguel Araújo
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...Martijn de Jong
 
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law DevelopmentsTrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law DevelopmentsTrustArc
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Allon Mureinik
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Scriptwesley chun
 
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 SlidesSlack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 Slidespraypatel2
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdfhans926745
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEarley Information Science
 
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of ServiceCNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Servicegiselly40
 
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure serviceWhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure servicePooja Nehwal
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
 
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law DevelopmentsTrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 SlidesSlack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
 
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of ServiceCNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
 
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure serviceWhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
 

2016-05-30 risk driven design

  • 4. IEC 61508: Required activities for safety related systems
  • 5. Risk and the design process • Each design step includes the refinement of the risk analysis • Each design solution has to be measured against the risk analysis • Constant design questions: – Is the design balanced? – Can it be made? – Can it be done simpeler?
  • 8. Failure definitions • What can go wrong exactly? • When do we consider the system to be failed?
  • 9. An example… • Not extracting landing gear when commanded without error indication • Spontaneous irreversible landing gear extraction while travelling overseas
  • 10. Top-down vs. Bottom-Up analysis • Bottom-up: structured brainstorm about everything that could happen given a specific scope • Top-down: think about your biggest fears first, than find out what could cause it.
  • 11. FME(C)A: bottom-up thinking • Failure Mode and Effect (Criticality) Analysis • Reasoning from failure of the components, thinking about the consequences
  • 12. Risk: System does not perform trick?
  • 13. Guide words… Look at every component and investigate what happens if: – It doesn’t work – It is very slow – Does the wrong thing – Sends messages spontanously – Loses messages/state – Leaks information
  • 14. Structured FMECA approach Function Failure Mode Causes Local Effects System Effects Criticality Inwin Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic Spontanous output Switching error Unjustified open Onterechtesluit False Positive Process Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic Spontanous output Switching error Power failure No closure Catastrophic … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
  • 15. Certainty… Rank beliefs not according to their plausibility but by the harm they may cause. Nassim Nicholas Taleb Slide 1515 June 2016
  • 16. Identifying measures • Risk = Chance * Impact • Moments allowing measures: – Preventive – Detection – Repression – Correction – Ignore – Accept Slide 1615 June 2016
  • 17. You can’t mitigate everything… • You can’t prevent everything • You can’t plan for everything • You can’t predict everything • You couldn’t do any business • But, you can’t ignore everything either
  • 18. Structured FMECA approach Function Failure Mode Causes Local Effects System Effects Criticality Detection Mitigating Measures Inwin Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic None Multiprogramming Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited None No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic None Failsafe behaviour Process Spontanous output Switching error Unjustified open Onterechtesluit False Positive None Process Wrong output Logical error Unjustified open No closure Catastrophic None Multiprogramming Delayed output PLC error delayed closure Closure delayed Limited None No output Application hang No closure No closure Catastrophic None Deadlock detection Spontanous output Switching error Power failure No closure Catastrophic None Safety relay … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … New functional and design requirements!
  • 19. Disadvantages FME(C)A • It is impossible to calculate an overall risk exposure • Relation between risks is missing – Common mode failures usually aren’t modelled • Complex scenario’s are hard to model – Multiple failures aren’t modelled – Are there root causes that could trigger multiple failures? • Usually identifies irrelevant risks
  • 20. Top-Down Risk analysis • Start with a dominant concern • Identify potential causes • Detail further
  • 22. Typical risks identified • Components making the wrong decissions • Power failure • Hardware failure of PLC’s/Servers • Software failures • Network failure • External factors • Human maintenance error 22
  • 23. Breaking a cut-set Alternate component Alternate service
  • 25. Design decisions… • Every design decision is accompanied by a Risk analysis focussing on RAMS aspects • In the end the cost, RAMS effects and other trade-off aspects will determine which design option will be used
  • 30. Info Hoogtebepaling Aansturing Hoogtemeting Waterkering Diesels Meeta Meetb Stuura Stuurb Software failure Chance: 1/1.000 year Measurement error Chance: (1/1.000.000 year)3 Software failure Chance: 1/1.000.000 year Software failure Chance: 1/1.000 year Design Option 1
  • 31. Info Hoogtebepaling Aansturing Hoogtemeting Waterkering Diesels Meeta Meetb Stuura Stuurb Software failure Chance: 1/10.000 year Measurement error Chance: (1/1.000.000 year)3 Software failure Chance: 1/100 year Software failure Chance: 1/10.000 year Design Option 2
  • 32. IEC 61508: Required activities for safety related systems
  • 33. Testing Function Impact wrong/not functioning Impact spontanous functioning Function 1 Small Medium Function 2 Disasterous Huge Function 3 Serious Huge Function 3 Serious Small Function 4 Serious Serious Function 5 Serious Small Function 6 Huge Huge …
  • 34. Test depth and acceptable risk • Level A: Thorough endurancetest aiming to prove function reliability with high accuracy. • Level B: Thorough endurancetest aiming to prove function reliability with medium accuracy. • Level C: Thorough endurancetest aiming to prove function reliability with low accuracy. • Level D: Test to verify if the function works once. • Level E: Function testd alongside other functions, might leave paths untested. Test effort Level #Tests Effort Level A 50.000 120 hours Level B 10.000 24 hours Level C 1.000 4 hours Level D 1 1 hour Level E - PM
  • 35. Test depth… Functie Not functioning Spont. Function Function 1 Level E NOT Function 2 Level A Level A Function 3 Level A Level A Function 3 Level B Level B Function 4 Level A Level A Function 5 Level E NOT Function 6 Level A Level A … … …