3. Isabella has worked as the executive assistant to Martina for ten years. Isabella has worked overtime on many occasions when Martina had special projects to complete. Martina has not given Isabella a raise in her salary for three years and Isabella is thinking about looking for a new position which could pay her more money. Martina is concerned about losing Isabella to another employer but is worried that her own company has not made a profit in the last two years. Isabella and Martina sit down in the conference room to negotiate a possible raise in salary for Isabella. ROLE #1: ISABELLA ROLE #2: MARTINA ROLE #3: OBSERVER (Take notes and report about negotation)
59. Negotiation Considerations Social How will others view the agreement Emotional How will you feel about the agreement Successful Negotiations Lewicki and Fisher Economic Will you be satisfied with the economic results Triad of concerns
85. Role of Perception Subjective. Always check your views, opinions and analysis of your position!! One’s view of fairness. (Barry Bond’s homerun). Be very careful of your client's (and your own) perception of fairness.
86. Bias Perception: Fixed Pie the erroneous belief that the other party’s interests are directly opposed to one’s own interests when, in fact, they are often not completely opposed.
87. Bias Perception: Thompson and Hastie Explored the consequences for outcomes. They measured individual fixed-pie perceptions after just five minutes of negotiation They found fixed pie predicted individual and joint negotiation payoffs such that fixed-pie perceptions were associated with lower individual and joint profits. Negotiators with strong fixed-pie perceptions failed to identify interests that could be profitably logrolled or that were completely compatible.
88. Bias Perception: Why does this occur? Biased information search (negotiators’ faulty search for necessary information) Biased information processing (negotiators’ faulty processing of available information).
89. Bias Perception: Extremism Partisan perceivers believe that their own perceptions map onto objective reality. When they realize that the other side’s views differ from their own, they first attempt to “straighten out” the other side; when this does not work, they regard the other side as extremist. partisan perceivers tend to view the other side as having interests that are more opposed to their own than is actually the case.
90. Bias Perception: Problems with Extremism Exacerbates conflict Partisan perceivers ascribe more negative traits to their negotiating partner even when partisanship has been randomly assigned right before the negotiation Reduces the likelihood of reaching comprehensive integrative agreements during face-to-face negotiations
91. Bias Perception: Reactive Devaluation Bias Negotiators discount or dismiss concessions made by the other party merely as a function of who is offering them
92. Bias Perception: Stillinger, Epelbaum, Kelter, and Ross (1990) Experiment Participants negotiated with a confederate over the policy of their university regarding a political issue. Constant The antagonism of the negotiating confederate was held constant. During the negotiation, the confederate for a time adopted a stubborn position. Concession In two experimental conditions, however, the confederate ultimately made a concession; in the third (control) condition, no concession at all was made. Rating Subsequently, participants rated the attractiveness and significance of a number of different proposals, including the ones that had been offered in their negotiation session. Results Non-offered concessions were rated as more attractive and significant than offered concessions: The very fact that their counterpart offered them a concession diminished its value in the eyes of the participants.
93. Bias Perception: Fundamental Attribution Error People tend to view their own behavior as largely determined by the situation BUT B. regard other’s behavior as driven by chronic dispositions Larrick and Su (1999) Demonstrated this bias operated in negotiation. Negotiators erroneously attributed tough bargaining behaviors to difficult personalities rather than to situational factors. Fundamental attribution error often results from lack of sufficient information about the opponent’s situation.
94. Bias Perception: Coercion Bias People erroneously believe that A. coercive tactics will be effective in generating concessions when dealing with opponents BUT B. believe that these same tactics, when applied to the self, will have the opposite effect—that is, to increase their resolve not to concede. Rothbart and Hallmark (1988) in-group and outgroup members differed in the judged efficacy of coercion and conciliation as social influence strategies. Out-group members perceived coercion as more effective than conciliation when applied to others, In-group members perceived coercion as less effective than conciliation when applied to their own social or categorical group members.
95. Perceptions: Framing Framing: constructing and representing interpretations. Defining key issues and key problems. Perspective. Separates issue from other ideas. Aggregate and process information. Language we choose engage. notion of what we are doing: discussion, argument, fight Frames persist as long as they are useful. When people hold to their frames, conflict can occur. Frames can be transformative. Change frame, change conversation. Frames can be shifted.
112. Perceptions: Three Views of Frames Categories of experience Interests, rights, power Process of issue development
113. Language Ohio negotiation. Environmentalist. Developers. Environmentalists. Called polluters developers. Conflict. Result of nonverbal looks and glances. Polarizing language.
114. Trust/Distrust Frame Trust distrust different frames. Main role of negotiator / mediator. Decide which you are doing: Building trust. Managing distrust. Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos. Posicion principal del negociador/del mediador. Decida cuál usted está haciendo: Confianza del edificio. Desconfianza de manejo.
115. Trust/Distrust Frame Trust Frame. Little step by step process. Reliability. Competence. Distrust Frame. Apologies. Reparation. Say vs Do. Marco de la confianza. Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos. Papel principal del negociador. Poco proceso paso a paso. Confiabilidad. Capacidad. Marco de la desconfianza. Apologías. Reparación. Diga contra hacen.
116. Managing Trust Creating positive expectations. Confident expectations about the other. Shape them by: Language. Clear exceptions. Manage expectation. Crear expectativas positivas. Expectativas confidentes sobre la otra. Fórmelas cerca: Lengua. Excepciones claras. Maneje la expectativa.
117. Managing distrust Tools. Boarders. Boundaries. Processes. Not trust building. Manages downside risk. Distrust binding. Prenuptial agreement. Herramientas. Huéspedes. Límites. Procesos. No edificio de la confianza. Maneja riesgo de baja. Atascamiento de la desconfianza. Acuerdo Prenuptial.
182. techniques such as search for common ground and visioning/search processes enable reframing around a smaller set of issues. and characterizations, narrative forums, and listening circles allow disputants to understand the conflict and its dynamics.
186. las técnicas tales como búsqueda para los procesos del terreno común y el visioning/de la búsqueda permiten reframing alrededor de un sistema más pequeño de ediciones. y las caracterizaciones, los foros narrativos, y los círculos que escuchan permiten que los disputants entiendan el conflicto y su dinámica.
189. Motivational Biases Self-enhancement, Closure and consistency, Cooperation (maximization of shared goals) Accountability (or constituency pressure)
190. Self-Enhancement One of the most fundamental goals of human life is the preservation and maintenance of self-identity. De Dreu, Nauta, and van de Vliert (1995) found that negotiators tend to make self-serving evaluations of conflict behavior. self-serving evaluation of conflict behaviorwas associated with increased frustration, reduced problem solving, and enhanced likelihood of future conflict. Thus, self-enhancement may be a central motivational antecedent of conflict escalation.
191. Egocentric Bias Egocentrism leads negotiators to perceive fairness in a biased manner Specifically, the egocentric bias tends to make parties believe that it is fair for them to have more of the negotiated Negotiators claim what they want and, at the same time, believe that their claim is fair. Egocentrism leads parties to anticipate that others will make over-harvesting decisions and deplete common goods
192. Self-affirmation theory People experience a threat to their self-esteem, they need to affirm the self (Steele, 1988). When people are given feedback indicating that they have not performed well on a task, they are more likely to promote themselves Derogating a stereotyped target increases the self-esteem of people whose self-image has been threatened (Fein and Spencer, 1997). More likely to evaluate that person stereotypically if their self-images have been threatened by negative feedback (Fein and Spencer, 1997).
193. Closure Need for closure (NFC) refers to the notion that some situations elicit an epistemic state of wanting a quick solution through, for instance, time pressure and proximity to decision deadline. Some individuals have a chronic tendency to terminate hypothesis testing and information searches prematurely (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). People are more likely to engage in thoughtful or novel information processing when their NFC is low.
194. Cooperation In general, this research has consistently found that negotiators who Anticipate future interaction with another party Adopt a communal or a social value orientation are more likely to behave more cooperatively and attain outcomes of higher joint value.
195. Accoutablity Negotiators who are accountable to their constituents make higher demands and are less willing to compromise than those not accountable to constituents Two motivational processes may explain this finding: decision-making vigilance evaluation apprehension.
196. Decision-making vigilance Decision makers who are accountable for their actions are vigilant in that they consider relevant information and alternatives more carefully than those who are not accountable (Tetlock, 1985, 1992).
197. Evaluation apprehension Tendency for accountable negotiators to be concerned with how they are viewed by others and, consequently, to use face-saving strategies. Research suggests that wanting to save face leads to negotiators being more aggressive and uncompromising in negotiation (Neale, 1984; Wilson, 1992).
198. Two More Motivational Theories Defensive bolstering When people are accountable for positions to which they feel committed, they devote the majority of their mental effort to justifying those positions Preemptive self-criticism When people do not know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they are motivated to think in relatively flexible, multidimensional way.
204. Lazos en los intereses a menudo vastos de tenedores de apuestas en un conflicto.
205.
206. Since all parties must agree to the final document and offensive entries may lead to a cessation of the process, disputants must be sensitive to how their changes to the text will be perceived by the other parties.
207. Se prepuso ser la fundación para un acuerdo ratificado final.
208. Puesto que todos los partidos deben convenir el documento final y las entradas de la ofensiva puede conducir a una cesación del proceso, los disputants deben ser sensibles a cómo sus cambios al texto serán percibidos por los otros partidos.
