1. StewartHundley,IanTunnell,andMackenzie Keck
SIS310
ProfessorJensen
30 April 2015
Drugs and SystemicViolence
Introduction
Since the late 2000’s the drug war inMexicohas steadilybecomeworse,andrecentnewsof
heightenedkidnappingsandrampantdrugrelatedviolence drawsseriousquestionstothe source of
such violence.Suchviolence comesata time whenmarijuanalegalizationeffortsinthe U.S.are fueled,
at leastby some,withthe intenttoundercutthe blackmarketwhichreliestoagreat extentondrugs
traffickedfromMexico.The linkbetweenwholesale drugprice andsystemicviolence inMexicoprovides
interestingquestionsnotonlyaboutthe strengthof sucha link,butof how we enforce domesticand
foreigndrugcontrol policies.Thisresearchaimstoexplore the linksbetweenthe wholesaleprice of
drugs(inthiscase cocaine) andthe amountof systemicviolence inMexico.
Mexicoremainsanincredible areaof studyforthistopicfor a numberof differentreasons.In2010,
90% of all cocaine enteringthe UnitedStatescame throughMexicoorits territorial waters.Thisfact
worksinconjunctionwithanumberof otherfactorswhichsupportMexico’spositionasaprime
traffickinglocation,factorswhichinclude issueswithgovernmentcorruption,poverty,andthe factthat
the AndeanregioninSouthAmericaremainsthe world’ssole sourceregion forcoca and cocaine.Due to
these numerousfactorsMexicobecomesthe spotlightforcocaine trafficking.Unlike methamphetamine
or marijuanawhichcan be producedor grown,respectively,anywhere alongtraffickingroutesor
throughoutMexico,cocaine remainsaproductwhichreliesonMexicandrugcartelsto receive cocaine

2. fromSouth Americantraffickersandworkto move itintothe UnitedStatesfor wholesale transaction.
Additionally,cocaine makesupthe largestportionof the profitsreceiveddue todrugtraffickingbythe
cartelsinquestion.Itisfor these reasonsthatthispaperwill focusonthe traffickingof cocaine asan
illicitsubstance andMexicoasthe traffickinglocation.
Hypothesis
Our hypothesisisthatdrugpricesand systemicviolenceare inverselyrelated.We expecttofindthata
decrease indrugcartel profitswill yieldincreasinglyviolentbehavior.Asdrugproducerslose profit
margins,theywill become more violentandwill take more risksinconfrontingauthorities,defendingor
maintainingspecifictraffickingroutes,andothergivenriskseekingbehaviors.
IndependentVariable:Wholesale cocaine price (kg)triannually(APR,AUG,DEC)
DependentVariable:Drugtraffickingrelatedhomicidestriannually(APR,AUG,DEC)
Methodology
We will use aregressionanalysistoexplore the relationshipbetweendrugpricesandsystemic
violence.We willrepresentourfindingsusinggeographicinformationsystems,utilizingdatasetson
wholesaledrugpricestriannuallyfrom2007-2010 reapingourwholesale cocaineprice datafrom
academicswhohave utilizedopen-source methodsof information.Forourdependentvariable we will
analyze academicswhohave aggregateddrugrelateddeathsusingopensource methods.
Research Design
The bodyof literature onthistopiccentersondrug policyandhow it affectsdrugmarketsas well as
the nature of criminal organizations.We intendtoevaluate Reuter,Warbetal,and Carpenter’s
assertionthatdrug violence isonlyaresponse tomilitarizedaggressionfrompolice.We hypothesize

3. that there isa more rational decisiongoingon,wherebydrugcartelsare weighingthe costsof violence
ina thrivingmarketversusthe costof violence inarestrictedmarket.Whenprofitmarginsare tight,
cartelsare more willingtoengage inviolentassertionstoprotecttheirsmallermarketshare. A
regressionanalysisof ourdata will allowustomathematicallystudycorrelationbetweenourdata
pointsandwill be conductedusingSPSS.A scatterplotaswell asadjoiningtableswilldisplayour
informationandcanbe foundinourdata analysis.
Wholesale value of cocaine wasusedasa price metricthroughoutthe study,avalue that reflects
“what youcan get” fora kilogramof cocaine at the wholesalelevel.Thisprice wouldlikelybe the price
mostassociatedwithdrugtrafficking organizations(DTO) andwouldlikelybe the price DTO’swouldbe
mostresponsive to.Thoughthe wholesale price reflectswholesale datafromthe UnitedStates,
wholesaletransactionsare likelytooccurbetweenMexicanDTO’sandDTO’sbasedinthe U.S., creating
the most incentiveforMexicanorganizationstoreflecttheiractionsoff of thisprice.Thoughthisprice
likelyfluctuatesfrombothasupply and demandside,itislikelytochange foranincreasinglylarge
numberof factors.However,the “whatcan you get”ideaof DTO’s fetchingthe highestpossibleprice for
a kiloof cocaine lendsitself todisregardthesefluctuationsinprice andrelyonthe price alone for
response inthe formof violence.
Literature Review
Responseto Authority
This school of thoughtholdsthatincreasesinsystemicdrug-relatedviolenceoccurwhensecurity
forcescrack downon the illicitdrugtrade.One place inwhichthisdynamicwasparticularlyevidentwas
Mexicobetween2007 and 2008. Mexico’sdeclared“Waron Drugs”ultimatelyincreasedviolence.One
waythat systemicviolence canbe explainedisbygangand cartel leadershipturnover.Forexample,in
2007 the U.S. Departmentof State reportedthat83 individualsconnectedwithdrugtraffickingin

4. Mexicowere extraditedtothe U.S.for trial.Since cartel agreementsare usuallypersonal innature,
changesinadministrationdonoteffectivelytransferinstitutional agreementsandinstitutional
knowledge.Furthermore,killingorcapturingdrugcartel leadershipcausesterritory-seekingbehavior
amongrivals.For example,inColumbiainthe 1990s, the destructionof the MedellinandCali cartels
was followedbyasignificantsurge inshootingdeaths,asa largernumberof organizationsbecame
violenttoprotecttheirmarginalizedmarketshare.Anotherimportanteffectis“targethardening,”
wherebygroupsmilitarizeinthe face of an outside threat.
Secondly,policecrackdownsonusersanddealersinthe U.S.has spurreda general decrease in
consumptionof cocaine and heroinsince 1988, and a furtherdecrease inconsumptionof cocaine from
2000-2010. Thismeansthat the Mexicancartelsmarketshare of theirmostprofitable drug,cocaine,has
beensteadilydecreasing,leavingmanycartel memberslookingforsomethingto do;violence istheir
outlet.
Third,crackdownson corrupt officialshave the potentialtoincrease drugviolence.FormerMexican
PresidentFelipéCalderón’s“WaronDrugs” targetedcorruptgovernmentofficialsthatturna blindeye
to trafficking.This inturndrove cartelstotarget new honestpolice asa wayto terrorize other
policemenandtoeliminate police chiefsthatobstructtheiroperation
RationalChoice Theory
Thisschool of thoughtindicatesthatdrugviolence hasadirectand linearrelationshipwhencompared
to drug prices,specificallyheroine price atboththe wholesale andretail levels.Thisrelationshipis
explainedbythe rational choice theory,whichexplainsthatactorsbehave insucha wayas to maximize
positive outcomesandminimize lossornegativeoutcomes.Whenrelatedtodrugviolence,rational
choice theoryexplainsthatactorsresort to violence atamuch higherrate whenthe price ishigher
because the riskassociatedwiththe consequencesof violentactionsare outweighedbythe potential

5. profitstobe gained.AsFabriziowrites,“systemicviolencewillbe committedonlywhenthe utility,in
monetaryterms,will rewardthe riskandcostsof suchcrime.”Thus,as price increasessotoodoesthe
likelihoodof violence inorder “tosolve disputesoverdrugs,toconquermore marketshares,todefend
ones[sic] ownmarketshare...”
Data coveringboththe US andEurope supportthisindication,leadingtothe conclusionthatrational
choice theorydoesapplytothe large scale drug/violencerelationship.However,thisdataisspecificonly
to heroin,asthe relationshipbetweenprice of cocaine anddrugrelatedhomicidesdidnotsupport
Fabrizio’shypothesis.Thiscanbe assumedthatbecause the theoryisbeingappliedtodrugusersaswell
as the those to be consideredmore rational businessmeninvolvedinthe trade,thatdata wouldbe
skewed.Itcannotbe countedonfor drug usersand addictsto behave asa rational actor, thusrendering
the theoryimpotentasa stand alone lense throughwhichtoview the relationshipbetweenprice and
violence.
Furthermore,itismisleadingtolimitthe quantificationof drugviolence asa simple monetaryvalue
versusriskanalysisbecause manyotherfactorsoutside of simple monetaryrewardanalysisgoesinto
makingthe decisiontocommita violentact,especiallyatthe institutionallevelconcerninggangsand
drug cartels.These organizationshave otherfactorstoconsiderbeyondsimple marketvalue,andthisis
not takenintoaccountin the rational choice theoryschool of thought.However,thatisnotto say that
the school of thoughtisnot useful,justthatitmustbe usedintandemwithotherschoolsof thoughtso
as to fullyexplainthe relationshipbetweendrugprofitsanddrugrelated violence.
Drug Violence is Terrorism
Anotherschool of thoughtfocusesonthe ideathatdrug cartelsdo not use violence solelyinrelationship
to price fluctuationsof illegal narcotics,butratherasa meansto a wide varietyof ends.Thisschool of
thoughtregardsMexicandrug cartelsas terroristorganizations,withpolitical goalsaswell asmonetary

6. goals.Thus,theywill use violence inconjunctionwiththesenon-monetarygoalsinordertomake
political statementsorenforce theircontrol overvariousterritories.Itassumesthatdrugcartelsuse
violence tosendmessages,todissuade opposition,andtoenforce theirauthorityoverthe peoplethat
live intheirterritories.Inessence,violence isusedforpower,notjustprofit.
It isfurtherarguedthat inadditiontofightingforcontrol overthe drug market,the Cartelsfightfor
regional political control.Thiselevatesthembeyondthe level of asimple profitmaximization
organizationandintothe realmof an anti-governmental,orevenquasi- governmental,organization.
Additionally,Cartelsasorganizationsdonotplanandcommitviolentactsforarbitraryor simple
reasons.The acts committedare thoughtoutand meantto senda powerful message,asdifferentacts
have come to meandifferentthings.Cartel leadersare “strategistswhoviewnarco-terrorasa tactic in
powerstruggles,notmerelythe bloodyresultof streetfights,atavistichatreds,orpersonal vendettas.”
Thisis notto say, however,thatCartelsdonotuse violence forpurelyeconomicmeansalso.Incursions
of Cartel membersintoterritoryheldbyarival will oftentimesresultinhorrificdisplaysof violence,
whichcan be categorizedasprotectionof shippingroutes,andbyextensionthe protectionof profits.
Thus,while violence isusedasameanswithwhichto ensure profitabilityforacartel,it isalsousedwith
great care andplanningasa tool withwhichtogain andconsolidate political authorityoverphysical
territories.
MarketMaturation Model
The marketmaturationmodel suggeststhatviolence withinnarco-traffickingisbasedona numberof
factors,but largelyinthe relative “age”of a drugmarket.As drugmarketsage an equilibriumis reached
whichprovideslawenforcementwithagivenamountof activitymetwithagivenamountof drug usage,
and that marketsmustmerely“mature”tosuch a point.Thoughthere will alwaysbe levelsof systemic
violence,rapidandsevereviolence isonly metinmarketswhichhave yettotrulymature.

7. On hisessaypertainingtosystemicviolence indrugmarkets,PeterReuteralludestothisideawhen
discussingthe U.S.crack cocaine marketin the late 1980’s. ThoughReuternotesthatthismay be due to
the agingof the actual participantsinthe drugmarket,thisis directlylinkedwiththe waysthose who
participate inthe marketbuy,sell,andconsume drugs.ThisideaisalsoalludedtoinLetiziaPaoli’swork
on the drug marketsinpost-SovietRussia.These markets,firstboundbytravel restrictionsand
repressive governance,openedupinthe wake of the fall of the SovietUnionandPaoli describesthe
Russiandrugmarketas “shocked.”Thissuggeststhatthe Russiandrugmarketexperiencedrapid
changesand hadto reach a newequilibriuminorderto“remature.”
Analysis
Our researcheventuallyledustodetermine thatasthe price of cocaine increasedinthe US, for
whateverreason,sotoodidcartel relatedhomicidesinMexico.However,thisof course waslimitedto
statesthat exhibitheavycartel activity,whichinturnare alongthe majortraffickingandsmuggling
routes.Asour researchconfirmed,theseroutescanbe tracedthrough certainstatesbythe homicide
levelsof eachstate.Furthermore,there are onlyalimitedamountof citiesonthe northernMexican
borderthat are able tosustainlarge amountsof landbasedsmugglingintothe US,such as Matamoros,
Tamaulipas;Juarez,Chihuahua;andTijuana,BajaCalifornia.
These cities are significantbecause asthe mostimportantlandentrypointsfromMexicotothe US in
termsof trade these citiesare obviousstrategicsitesfromrival drugcartels,andcompetitionoverthe
routescan be fierce.Therefore,asprice of cocaine increaseswholesale inthe UnitedStates,itislogical
to assume thatcartel bosseswill pushtomove more contrabandwhile the price ishigh.Thus,
competitionbecomesall the fiercer,leadingtohigherlevelsof violence andcartel relatedmurders.This
isthe drivingfactorbehindourdata,as the statesof Chihuahua,Tamaulipas,BajaCalifornia,aswell as

8. stateswithabnormallyhighcartel presencesuchasSinaloaandMichoacan are constantlyamongst
those withthe highestcartel relatedmurderrates,especiallyduringperiodsof highercocaine price.Itis
therefore possibletopredictbothhighlevelsof violence andmurderwhenwe see anincrease inthe
price of cocaine here inthe US, as well aswhere the spikesinviolence will occur.
It isalso importanttonote that there maybe a spillovereffecttosurroundingstates,especiallythose
borderingstatessuchas Chihuahua,SinaloaandMichoacandue to the spreadof cartel membersinan
efforttodrive outrivalsand secure theirshipmentroutes.Because ahighportionof cocaine isshipped
by landintrucks, these routes(highways)are highlycontested,makingaspillovereffectlikely,especially
intohighdensityshippingplazas.Furthermore,thisspillovereffectiscausedbythe abilityof cartelsto
charge whatcan be termedasrentto rival cartelsin orderto use shippingroutesthattheyhave
cornered.Thus,whomevercontrolsthese routesandshipmentplazasgainsrevenuenotonlyfromthe
cocaine that theysell withintheircartel,butalsofrom the rentschargedso that othercartelscan move
narcoticsas well.Thus,spilloverviolence intoneighboringstates islikely,especiallyalongstatesthat
have majorhighwaysinthemthat leadintoor outof cartel controlledterritory.
Because these spikesinviolence onlyoccurinareasthat have heavycartel activity,andinsome cases
are evenlargelycontrolledbythe cartels,itallowsustounderstandthatthe relationshipbetween
cocaine price and violence inMexicoisnotcoincidental,nordoes ithave todo withthe varietyof other
factors thatusuallyapplytorisingviolence rates.While inmanycasesinmanydifferentpartsof the
worldviolence andmurderratescanbe linkedtopoverty,education,ormanyotherfactors,innorthern
Mexicoespeciallyitisclearthata spike inthe price of cocaine isthe causal force behindarisingrate of
murdersas well.
Most interesting,however,isthe rate at whichhomicidesincreasedasprice of cocaine also
increased.Ascanbe seenin thisgraph,at a price of about$25,200 homicide ratesbegintodramatically

9. increase.Thisismostlikelydue tothe intense competitionthathigherpricesnaturallyfoster,butthe
reasonfor sucha dramaticspike atthat exactprice is unknown.
Thoughour firstdata pointremainssomewhatof anoutlier,ourmodel summaryshowsbythe
R Square measure thatnearly60% of the pointsshow correlationbetweenthe price andhomicides,with
a statistical significance of .009,well below a.05 confidence.WhengeospatiallymappedusingArcGIS
our data continue toshowsignificantshiftsinviolence associatedwithprice,butwhenthisviolence is
brokendownbystate it ismore evidentthatthe drugrelatedviolence isalongtraffickingroutes.
PolicyImplications

10. Historically,the warondrugs duringthe Calderonadministrationwasprosecutedthrougha
heavilymilitarystrategyof decapitationof the leadershipof cartels.However,asadmittedbyarecently
interviewedmemberof the MexicanMarines,thisstrategydoeslittletoendthe effectivenessof cartels
or curtail theirviolence.Infact,thisstrategyencouragesviolence due tothe highlevelsof infightingit
creates.Asmore cartel leadersare eitherarrestedorkilled,power strugglesbecome more prevalent,
and thusso too doesthe level of violenceandcartel relatedmurders.
Similarly,the policyof simplynottalkingaboutthe cartel violence inMexico,ashasbeenthe
strategyof the PeñaNietoadministration, hasdone littletocurbcartel violenceaswell.The same
strategiesof the Calderonadministrationare still usedandare still largelyineffective,howevertheyare
combinedwithapolicyof tartarde taparel solcon un dedo,or tryingto coverthe sun witha
finger. Thisstrategycentersmostontalkingaboutthe cartelsofficiallyaslittle aspossibleinthe hopes
that the problemwill resolve itself intime,atleastintermsof violence.
However,thisdataindicatesthatneitherrestrainedmediacoverage norapolicyof leadership
decapitationwillleadtoasignificantdecline incartel relatedviolence.Focusinsteadshouldbe placed
on the economicsof the situation,onbothsidesof the border.Beingatrulyinternational problem,
effortsneedtobe takento reduce the profitabilityof drugsmuggling,insteadof mainlyfocusingonthe
smugglersthemselves.Policiesthatwouldresultinalowerprofitmarginfornarcoticssuch as cocaine
would,accordingtothe data,go a long waytowardscurbingDTO relatedviolence,especiallyalongthe
previouslymentionedrouteswhichcoincide withspecificstates.
ConfoundingVariablesand OpportunitiesforFurther Research
Though the data suggesta correlation,itisimportanttonote a few importantconfoundingvariables
that may have changedthe mannerinwhichour data wastrulyrepresented,followedbysome
opportunitiesforfurtherresearch.Firstandforemostgreaterdruginterdictionprogramscouldhave

11. cause a spike inviolence andcertainlyaroundthe same periodof time we studied.A policyshiftin
Mexicoand whathas become knownasMexico’swaron drugstrulycame intoitsfullestbeingbetween
2006 and 2007, creatingmore frictionbetweenthe Mexicangovernment,Mexicanlaw enforcement,
and MexicanDTO’s.The relationshipbetweengovernmentspendingandDTO relatedhomicideswould
be a wise nextstepinresearch,asthatarea is likelyrelatedtohomicidesyetthisresearchdoesnotspan
governmentspending.
Conclusions
Drug-relatedviolence inMexicoremainsamajorissue bothforMexicanauthoritiesandlaw
enforcementinthe UnitedStates.Thisresearchshowsthatinthe yearsstudiedthere isacorrelation
betweendrugprice anddrugrelatedhomicides.Thoughthisdatamaynot denote causation,itis
importantthatfurtherresearchtake place to discoverpossiblerootsof drugviolence,whetherthey
occur in the UnitedStatesor across the borderinMexico.Amongotherfactors,it isimportantto
rememberthatdrugtrafficking organizationsoperate asabusinessandare interestedinagreatdeal of
profit.Inall,more seriousresearchneedstobe done tocontinue tofindlinksbetweenthe consumption
of drugsinthe UnitedStatesandthe traffickingof drugsinMexicoin orderto give policymakersbetter
toolsto execute theirjobscorrectly.

12. Appendix
Figure 1: April 2008: $23,200/ kilo
Figure 2: August2009: $25,100/kilo
Figure 3: April 2010: $25,200/kilo

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