Social equity matters in Payments for Ecosystem Services. A presentation by Unai Pascual, Basque Centre for Climate Change. This presentation was given at the Expert Workshop on Equity, Justice and Well-being in Ecosystem Governance, held at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in London, March, 2015.

1. Social equity matters in
Payments for Ecosystem Services
Unai Pascual
unai.pascual@BC3research.org
Equity, Justice and Well-being in Ecosystem Governance
IIED, March 26-27th, 2015

2. outline
 Why does equity matters in PES?
 Can auctions based PES be equitable and cost-
effective?
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3. Equity in PES, REDD+… matters
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4.  Environmental governance must account for landscapes of institutional
conflicts (confronted values and interests), also in PES.
 Widespread concern that PES programs are likely to change/reinforce
existing power structures and inequalities in access to resources
 PES typically envisioned und under an aura of economic efficiency
 Growing body of evidence suggests that equity considerations should be
integrated into PES. But the debate remains hot.
• E.g., if equity not accounted for properly, PES may crowd out intrinsic motivations for
conservation
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5. Multiple dimensions of equity
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6.  Economic efficiency of PES is rarely evaluated as it requires diverse
valuation$
cost-effective targeting approach & min. transaction costs
 if there exist legitimacy and developmental concerns, then negotiated
re-targeting occurs
  muddling cost effectiveness & equity criteria tends to be the norm in
public PES.
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7. Fairness criteria: equity vs efficiency concerns in PES
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Egalitarian
Compensation/opportunity cost
Maxi-min
Expected provision
Status quo
PES design favoring efficiency concerns
PES
design
favoring
distributi
onal
equity
concerns
Pascual et al 2010, Ecological Economics

8.  Some argue that environmental goals must not be conflated with
social objectives  At most conservation schemes should either
adopt:
 A ‘do not harm’ approach that seeks to attain conservation without
worsening equity (safeguards approach) or/and
 externalise equity considerations to be addressed through separate policy
instruments (one goal, one policy instrument) (Kingzig et al 2011)
 Others argue that interdependencies exist between economic
efficiency and social equity in PES
• 1. PES creates equity impacts which can feedback into env. outcomes.
• Equity blind PES is more likely to create negative feedbacks that would
require ex-post enforcement, mitigation and compensation.  increased
operational costs.  Erode sought after efficiency  Undermine the
robustness/sustainability of PES
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9. Equity as instrumental to conservation
Pascual et al (2014), BioScience 9

10. Examples (positive feedbacks)
 Greater autonomy over monitoring and enforcement enhances project
legitimacy (Kanowski et al., 2011), stronger accountability and improved
compliance
 Deliberative conflict management strategies improve ecological outcomes
(Redpath et al., 2013; Raymond et al. 2013)
 Respecting local perceptions of fairness linked to greater scheme credibility
and effectiveness, sometimes more important to scheme success than the
amount paid (Gross-Camp et al., 2012)
 Rule-breaking (inc. corruption and manipulation of conservation rules),
sabotage and protest (Brockington and Igoe, 2006),
 Cancellation of PES contracts (Ibarra et al. 2011),
 Delayed project implementation, required mitigation, and local resistance
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Examples (negative feedbacks)

11. Can auction-based PES be fair?
 Agrobiodiversity conservation auctions
in 2010 based on farmer groups in
Bolivia (18) and Peru (20)
 Bids ranked based on effectiveness in
terms of (i) conservation area, (ii)
number of farmers and (iii) number of
groups (40-40-20 weighs)
 8000 US$ Budget
 Discriminatory vs. Uniform payment
rules
 In kind rewards (e.g., productive
assets)
 Monitoring ex post.
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12.  In Bolivia (12 groups) 55 bids and in Peru (13 groups) 45 bids were received
given 5 priority landraces to be conserved
 relatively poorer farmers (richer) in Bolivia (Peru) were among those selected
for payments
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Bolivia
(discriminatory)
13 ha 8 ha 8 ha
Gini: 0.4 Gini: 0.6 Gini: 0.7
Peru
(conditional)
1 ha 1 ha 1 ha
Gini: 0.6 Gini: 0.6 Gini: 0.6

13. Some concluding remarks about rescuing equity in PES
 Equity blind PES schemes run the risk of failure as a result of applying
single-objective tools to complex social ecological phenomena
 Beyond moral arguments, the available evidence suggests that equity
matters for ecological effectiveness.
 Need to capitalize on positive equity feedbacks to achieve more robust
outcomes that can be sustained over time.
 Research priority: We need to move from individual case studies to a
systematic data mining or meta-analysis of equity risk/opportunities on
cost-effectiveness in PES schemes
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14. Some recent research papers
 Pascual, U., Phelps, J., Garmendia, E., Brown, K., Corbera, E., Martin, A., Gomez-Baggethun, E.,
Muradian, R. (2014). Social Equity matters in Payments for Ecosystem Services. Bioscience
64(11): 1027-1036
 Narloch, U., Pascual, U., Drucker, (2013). How to achieve fairness in payments for ecosystem
services? Empirical insights from agrobiodiversity conservation auctions. Land Use Policy 35:
107-118.
 Garmendia, E. and Pascual, U. (2013) A justice critique of environmental valuation for
ecosystem governance. Chapter 8 in Sikor, T. “Justices and Injustices of Ecosystem Services”
Routledge. London, UK
 Corbera, E., and Pascual, U., (2012). Ecosystem services: heed social goals, Science, 335(6069):
655-656.
 Narloch, U., Pascual, U., Drucker, A.G. (2011) Cost-effectiveness targeting under multiple
conservation goals and equity considerations in the Andes. Environmental Conservation. 38(4):
417-425
 Pascual, U., Muradian, R., Rodríguez, L.C, Duraiappah, A. (2010) Exploring the links between
equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services: a conceptual approach.
Ecological Economics. 69(6):1237-1244.
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15. Thank you
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