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The Truth About Viruses on IBM i

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HelpSystems
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Protecting your data from viruses or malicious code is not an unfamiliar concept, but understanding how these threats can affect your Power Systems server may not be as easy to grasp. There are many myths about viruses and IBM i—including the belief that the system is immune. Many Power Systems managers still don’t see viruses as a risk because they see them as a Windows threat. While this was once true, today’s connected environments operate under different rules. It’s time to take action and protect IBM i and the network that connects to it. Check out this presentation to gain an understanding of the relationships between: • Viruses and the integrated file system (IFS) • Power Systems and Windows viruses • PC-based anti-virus scanning vs native IBM i scanning There are a number of ways you can minimize your exposure to viruses. Learn the facts to ensure you are fully-protected.

Software
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The Truth About Viruses on IBM i
2 Your Presenters ROBIN TATAM Director of Security Technologies robin.tatam@helpsystems.com SANDI MOORE Senior Technical Consultant sandi.moore@helpsystems.com
3 Today’s Objectives • Viruses and the Integrated File System • Power System and Windows Viruses • Prevention and Protection • PC-Based Scanning vs. Native IBM i Scanning • Some Myths and Facts
4 What Is the Integrated File System?
5 Integrated File System Relating to Viruses • QDLS • Root (/) • QOpenSys • UDFS • QNTC
6 How Viruses Get into the IFS
7 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
8 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
9 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
10 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
11 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
12 How Viruses Get into the IFS • FTP
13 How Viruses Get into the IFS • FTP
14 How Viruses Get into the IFS • FTP
15 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Image catalogs • NFS mounts • UDFS mounts
16 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Client access
17 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Web servers
18 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Internet downloads • Removable media • Internet browsing • Laptops or wireless devices • Email • VPNs • File sharing
19 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? Fact: Viruses cannot hide inside RPG and CL programs. Fact: Viruses cannot hide inside physical and logical files. Fact: IBM i cannot run .exe files that contain viruses. Fact: Viruses can hide inside Java and Unix stream files. Fact: IBM i can run Java and UNIX executables.
20 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Malicious programs
21 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Malicious programs
22 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Malicious programs
23 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Denial of Service (DOS) attack
24 What’s at Risk? • Operating System
25 What’s at Risk? • Operating System
26 What’s at Risk? • Operating System
27 Virus Protection on the Power System TCP/IP Websphere IBM i Client Access Operations Navigator Growing Number of IBM i Applications Domino MQ Series
28 Security Measures That Won’t Protect • Mail scanning • Virus scanning on clients • Firewalls
29 Virus Protection on the Power System • Implement and enforce security policies • Shut down unused services • Avoid oversharing • Scan for viruses regularly • Use exit programs to restrict access to servers • Enable auditing • Monitor so you will know right away • Get good backups
30 Virus Scanning from a PC • Dedicate a PC for scanning • Map a drive to Root with *ALLOBJ • Physically secure the PC • Ensure PC has internet access • Scan the PC daily • Automate monitoring of the PC • Follow IBM’s procedures
31 Virus Scanning from a PC IBM’s Recommendations Step 1: To end all Netserver and File Server jobs, run the following commands: ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSO) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSS) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVS2) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP0) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP1) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP2) OPTION(*IMMED) Step 2: Change the QZLSFILE prestart job description to allow only one Netserver job to start and then start that job: CHGPJE SBSD(QSERVER) + PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) INLJOBS(1) THRESHOLD(1) ADLJOBS(0) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE)
32 Virus Scanning from a PC Step 3: Perform the Scan. The user who will be doing the scan should map a network drive to the Power System. Step 4: Change the NetServer prestart job back: CHGPJE SBSD(QSERVER) + PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) INLJOBS(1) THRESHOLD(1) ADLJOBS(5) Step 5: Restart the Netserver and File Server Host Server jobs by running the following commands: STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSO) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSS) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVS2) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP0) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP1) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP2)
33 Virus Scanning from a PC • Security concerns • Leaving a PC signed on with full authority • Confidential data is visible • PC can infect the IFS
34 Virus Scanning from a PC • Reliabilty/Stability concerns • Parts of IFS cannot be scanned • Scanning process can stop entirely • PC scanning is manual process
35 Virus Scanning from a PC • Performance concerns • Increased network load • Unable to use SAVCHGOBJ after scanning • Backups take longer • Very slow
36 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Secure • Reliable • Stable • Optimized performance
37 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Security enabled • Does not require *ALLOBJ • No data is transferred • Not Windows-based!
38 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Reliable/Stable • Automated • No additional hardware • Easily monitored • Can scan all files • Can detect and remove threats
39 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Performance optimized • Does not increase network load • Does not reset a file’s “Last Access Time” • Allows scanning more frequently • Very fast!
40 Myths and Facts Myth: We don’t use the IFS. Fact: Most modern applications and protocols use the IFS extensively. Myth: The Power System cannot get a virus. Fact: Viruses can hide inside Java and Unix files and IBM i can execute them. Myth: Viruses can’t attack the IBM i architecture. Fact: Anything an administrator can do, a virus can do.
41 Myths and Facts Myth: Our Power System isn’t connected to the internet. Fact: The cable doesn’t have to be physically connected. The Power System isn’t an island if it’s on the network. Myth: Our firewall protects us from viruses. Fact: There is no single solution on any platform that gives you protection, including firewalls. Myth: I can scan the Power System with my PC virus scanner. Fact: PC-based solutions can be used but they may miss files, require a manual process, and open many security holes.
42 Questions?
43 Thanks for your time! 800-328-1000 info.powertech@helpsystems.com www.helpsystems.com/powertech

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The Truth About Viruses on IBM i

  • 1. The Truth About Viruses on IBM i
  • 2. 2 Your Presenters ROBIN TATAM Director of Security Technologies robin.tatam@helpsystems.com SANDI MOORE Senior Technical Consultant sandi.moore@helpsystems.com
  • 3. 3 Today’s Objectives • Viruses and the Integrated File System • Power System and Windows Viruses • Prevention and Protection • PC-Based Scanning vs. Native IBM i Scanning • Some Myths and Facts
  • 4. 4 What Is the Integrated File System?
  • 5. 5 Integrated File System Relating to Viruses • QDLS • Root (/) • QOpenSys • UDFS • QNTC
  • 6. 6 How Viruses Get into the IFS
  • 7. 7 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
  • 8. 8 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
  • 9. 9 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
  • 10. 10 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
  • 11. 11 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Mapped drives
  • 12. 12 How Viruses Get into the IFS • FTP
  • 13. 13 How Viruses Get into the IFS • FTP
  • 14. 14 How Viruses Get into the IFS • FTP
  • 15. 15 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Image catalogs • NFS mounts • UDFS mounts
  • 16. 16 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Client access
  • 17. 17 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Web servers
  • 18. 18 How Viruses Get into the IFS • Internet downloads • Removable media • Internet browsing • Laptops or wireless devices • Email • VPNs • File sharing
  • 19. 19 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? Fact: Viruses cannot hide inside RPG and CL programs. Fact: Viruses cannot hide inside physical and logical files. Fact: IBM i cannot run .exe files that contain viruses. Fact: Viruses can hide inside Java and Unix stream files. Fact: IBM i can run Java and UNIX executables.
  • 20. 20 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Malicious programs
  • 21. 21 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Malicious programs
  • 22. 22 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Malicious programs
  • 23. 23 Can Windows Viruses Affect IBM i? • Denial of Service (DOS) attack
  • 24. 24 What’s at Risk? • Operating System
  • 25. 25 What’s at Risk? • Operating System
  • 26. 26 What’s at Risk? • Operating System
  • 27. 27 Virus Protection on the Power System TCP/IP Websphere IBM i Client Access Operations Navigator Growing Number of IBM i Applications Domino MQ Series
  • 28. 28 Security Measures That Won’t Protect • Mail scanning • Virus scanning on clients • Firewalls
  • 29. 29 Virus Protection on the Power System • Implement and enforce security policies • Shut down unused services • Avoid oversharing • Scan for viruses regularly • Use exit programs to restrict access to servers • Enable auditing • Monitor so you will know right away • Get good backups
  • 30. 30 Virus Scanning from a PC • Dedicate a PC for scanning • Map a drive to Root with *ALLOBJ • Physically secure the PC • Ensure PC has internet access • Scan the PC daily • Automate monitoring of the PC • Follow IBM’s procedures
  • 31. 31 Virus Scanning from a PC IBM’s Recommendations Step 1: To end all Netserver and File Server jobs, run the following commands: ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSO) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSS) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVS2) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP0) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP1) OPTION(*IMMED) ENDPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP2) OPTION(*IMMED) Step 2: Change the QZLSFILE prestart job description to allow only one Netserver job to start and then start that job: CHGPJE SBSD(QSERVER) + PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) INLJOBS(1) THRESHOLD(1) ADLJOBS(0) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE)
  • 32. 32 Virus Scanning from a PC Step 3: Perform the Scan. The user who will be doing the scan should map a network drive to the Power System. Step 4: Change the NetServer prestart job back: CHGPJE SBSD(QSERVER) + PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) INLJOBS(1) THRESHOLD(1) ADLJOBS(5) Step 5: Restart the Netserver and File Server Host Server jobs by running the following commands: STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QZLSFILE) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSO) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVSS) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSERVS2) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP0) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP1) STRPJ SBS(QSERVER) PGM(QSYS/QPWFSTP2)
  • 33. 33 Virus Scanning from a PC • Security concerns • Leaving a PC signed on with full authority • Confidential data is visible • PC can infect the IFS
  • 34. 34 Virus Scanning from a PC • Reliabilty/Stability concerns • Parts of IFS cannot be scanned • Scanning process can stop entirely • PC scanning is manual process
  • 35. 35 Virus Scanning from a PC • Performance concerns • Increased network load • Unable to use SAVCHGOBJ after scanning • Backups take longer • Very slow
  • 36. 36 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Secure • Reliable • Stable • Optimized performance
  • 37. 37 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Security enabled • Does not require *ALLOBJ • No data is transferred • Not Windows-based!
  • 38. 38 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Reliable/Stable • Automated • No additional hardware • Easily monitored • Can scan all files • Can detect and remove threats
  • 39. 39 Native IBM i Virus Scanning • Performance optimized • Does not increase network load • Does not reset a file’s “Last Access Time” • Allows scanning more frequently • Very fast!
  • 40. 40 Myths and Facts Myth: We don’t use the IFS. Fact: Most modern applications and protocols use the IFS extensively. Myth: The Power System cannot get a virus. Fact: Viruses can hide inside Java and Unix files and IBM i can execute them. Myth: Viruses can’t attack the IBM i architecture. Fact: Anything an administrator can do, a virus can do.
  • 41. 41 Myths and Facts Myth: Our Power System isn’t connected to the internet. Fact: The cable doesn’t have to be physically connected. The Power System isn’t an island if it’s on the network. Myth: Our firewall protects us from viruses. Fact: There is no single solution on any platform that gives you protection, including firewalls. Myth: I can scan the Power System with my PC virus scanner. Fact: PC-based solutions can be used but they may miss files, require a manual process, and open many security holes.
  • 43. 43 Thanks for your time! 800-328-1000 info.powertech@helpsystems.com www.helpsystems.com/powertech