Muhammad Abbas CHOUDHARY1, Kashif MEHMOOD2 1University of Engineering and Technology, Taxila, Pakistan, Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; 2College of E&ME, National University of Science and Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan

1. 1
IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MOST GRACIOUS, THE MOST MERCIFUL

2. ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE
OF POST DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
IN EARTHQUAKE AFFECTED AREAS OF PAKISTAN
BY
Muhammad Abbas Choudhary & Kashif Mehmood
August 27, 2012
International Disaster and Risk Conference
IDRC 2012, DAVOS, Switzerland.

3. PART – I
• Introduction, Problem Statement and Objectives
PART – II
S • Natural Disaster and its Impacts
• Project Success Criteria and KPIs
E • Critical Success and Failure Factors
Q • Post-disaster Housing Reconstruction
PART – III
U • Case Study of the Earthquake October, 2005
E PART – IV
• Project Data Collection and Analysis
N • Questionnaire Surveys and Statistical Analysis
C • KPIs of ERRA Building Projects, Earned Value
Analysis of Under Construction Projects
E PART – V
• Proposed Framework
• Recommendations and Conclusions

4. INTRODUCTION
• A significant part of development assistance is spent on the
construction of infrastructure in Pakistan but these
investments can be lost in seconds in the event of a natural
hazard
• Post-disaster reconstruction in Pakistan rely either on external
assistance or by reallocation of resources from existing
developmental projects to meet reconstruction needs
• After the destruction of 2005 Earthquake in North Pakistan,
government has assigned the task of reconstruction and
rehabilitation of quake-hit areas to newly formed Earthquake
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA)
• ERRA is the central body for reconstruction of 13,312 projects
& for 600,000 private housing units in quake affected areas of
Pakistan
Source: ERRA,2011, Annual review 2010-11

5. Cont’d
• There are some factors responsible for success or
failure of multidisciplinary reconstruction projects and
these factors, if not handled properly may be
detrimental for the success of the project
• Failure will affect
– Unmet development goals
– loss to economy
– loss of donor confidence
– loss of funding for disaster relief
– loss to rehabilitation of victims
– loss to construction related organizations

6. PROBLEM STATEMENT
• The ERRA post-disaster reconstruction programme in
earthquake affected areas of Pakistan is not meeting the
success criteria because of many factors. Roads, hospitals &
schools planned with money given by foreign governments &
international aid groups remain unbuilt almost five years after
the earthquake
• The initial relief operation is successful in its aim. However,
despite the extensive resources, the subsequent
reconstruction is not meeting its objectives
• In disaster prone countries like Pakistan success of
reconstruction & rehabilitation projects are very important for
normalization of life in disaster affected areas

7. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH WORK
• To analyze the post disaster reconstruction projects
• To identify success and failure factors in construction
process and to identify their relative importance
• To establish success criteria for measuring the performance
of post disaster construction projects
• To analyze the key performance indicators for cost and time
of different building projects
• To carry out earned value analysis of the ongoing projects
• To analyze the causes of success of post disaster housing
reconstruction and rehabilitation project, with respect to the
World Bank funded projects

8. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
• Main source of data is ERM database of ERRA & MIS
database of PPAF(Pakistan Poverty Elevation Fund)
• Literature review - exhaustive list of critical success and
failure
• From studies mention above 68 project success/failure
factors for ERRA reconstruction programme was concluded
• A 68 factors survey questionnaire was used where the
respondents were asked to assess the critical success and
failure factors, both on their perceived importance and on the
extent of their presence in the reconstruction project.
• A total of 74 completed responses were received, giving a
response rate of 40%.
• Framework & strategy for reconstruction projects success is
proposed
• Recommendations for improvement and conclusion

9. LITERATURE REVIEW

10. EARTHQUAK
E

11. WORLDWIDE EARTHQUAKE MORTALITY
Top 10 Earthquakes Globally by Mortality (1970-2009)
Persons Persons
Date Country Richter
killed affected
July 27th, 1976 China 7.8 242,000 164,000
Indian Ocean
Dec 26th, 2004 9 226,000 2,432,000
tsunami
May 12th, 2008 China 7.9 88,000 45,977,000
Pakistan &
October 8th, 2005 7.6 75,000 5,285,000
India,
May 31st, 1970 Peru 7.8 67,000 3,216,000
June 21st, 1990 Iran 7.3 40,000 710,000
Dec 26th, 2003 Iran 6.6 27,000 268,000
Dec 7th, 1988 Armenia 6.9 25,000 1,642,000
Sept 16th, 1978 Iran 7.7 25,000 40,000
Feb 4th, 1976 Guatemala 7.5 23,000 4,993,000
Source: Data extracted from CRED (2010 ) EM-DAT International Disaster Database

12. ECONOMIC DAMAGES & NUMBER OF
EARTHQUAKE
• Earthquakes were responsible for 29% of natural disaster-related
deaths in the last 30 years but accounted for 58% of fatalities in the
last decade
• 56% of all earthquakes happened in Asia, causing 90% of global
earthquake fatalities
Economic Damage
Country Date Magnitude
(Billion US $)
Japan Jan 17, 1995 7.2 140.4
China May 12, 2008 7.9 84.4
United State Jan 17, 1994 6.6 43.3
Japan Oct 23,2004 6.6 31.7
Turkey Aug 17,1999 7.4 25.7
Italy Nov 23, 1980 7.2 51.9
Taiwan Sep 21, 199 7.6 18.1
Russia Dec 7, 1988 6.9 25.3
Japan Jul 16, 2007 6.8 12.9
Iran Jun 21, 1990 7.3 13.1
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

13. SEISMIC ZONES OF
PAKISTAN

14. 7.7 MAGNITUDE EARTHQUAKE IN QUETTA – 1935
Lytton Railway
Road Station
35,000 deaths
Bruce Street, Quetta, before & after the earthquake

15. WORLDWIDE NATURAL DISASTER TRENDS
A particularly high number of disasters occurred recently. Fact is that
almost 270 large natural disasters have appeared since 1955
Source: EM-DAT - International Disaster Database www.emdat.be University catholique de Louvain Brussels –
Belgium

16. TOP TEN NATURAL DISASTER BY ECONOMIC DAMAGES
The disasters with the highest economic impact occur primarily in
highly developed countries
Total damages
Year Country or Region Event Rank
(mill. US $)
2005 USA Hurricane Katrina 125,000 1
1995 Japan/Kobe Earthquake 100,000 2
1994 USA/Northridge Earthquake 44,000 3
1998 China/Yangtze region Flooding 30,700 4
2004 Japan Earthquake 28,000 5
1992 USA/Florida Hurricane Andrew 26,500 6
1996 China/Yangtze region Flooding 24,000 7
2004 USA/Caribbean Hurricane Ivan 23,000 8
1993 USA/Mississippi Flooding 21,000 9
2004 USA/Caribbean Hurricane Charley 18,000 10
Source: Schenker-Wicki et al. (2010) ‘Unmastered risks: From crisis to catastrophe, An economic and
management insight ‘,Journal of Business Research, 63, 337–346.

17. PROJECT SUCCESS CRITERIA
Criteria used for judging Project Ranking
Success
Meets client’s requirements 1
Completed within schedule 2
Completed within budget 3
Meets organizational objectives 4
Yield business & other benefits 5
Causes minimal business disruption 6
Meets quality/safely standards 7
Other criteria 8
Source: Data extracted from White, D. & Fortune J. (2002) ‘Current practice in project management an
empirical study’, International Journal of Project Management, pp.1-11

18. CRITICAL FAILURE FACTORS
A project is considered failed if it falls short in achieving
the planned objectives, goals or is unable to achieve
stated & agreed tasks within given constraints
Critical failure factors extracted from literature are;
conflict among project participants
lack of knowledge
hostile socio economic and climatic condition
reluctance in timely decision
short bid preparation time
bad political influence
bribes etc
The construction industry is the worse affected by
corruptions
Source: K.C. Iyer and K.N. Jha (2005), ‘Factors affecting cost performance: evidence from Indian construction projects’,
International Journal of Project Management, 23; 283–295

19. PART – III
CASE STUDY OF THE OCTOBER 2005
EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS

20. POPULATION AFFECTED: 3.5 M
Gilgit
Kalam M-7.6
Fault Line 100
KM Long Pattan
Mingora
Batgram Kaghan
•Human Loss - 73,338
Balakot •Injured - 1,28,309
GHB •Families Affected - 500,000
Muzaffarabad
Mardan Mansehra
Peshawar Abbotabad
Bagh
Arja
Rwkt
Islamabad
Rawalpindi
AREA AFFECTED - 30,000 SQ KM 20

21. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 2005 EARTHQUAKE
• Overall cost associated with the earthquake is estimated at
approximately US$5.198 billion
• Direct total damage sustained due to the earthquake was Rs. 135.1
billion (US$2.3 billion)
• The largest component of this damage is private housing, which
amounts to Rs. 61.2 billion (US$1.03 billion), followed by damage to
the transport sector totaling Rs. 20.2 billion (US$340 million)
• Cost of reconstruction of lost assets and of the restoration of public
services is estimated to be Rs. 208 billion (US$3.5 billion)
Source: The Asian Development Bank and World Bank (2005) Pakistan 2005 Earthquake: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, Islamabad

22. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
• After the earthquake Government quickly established the Federal Relief
Commission (FRC) on October 10, 2005, to supervise and coordinate
relief efforts
• Later stages of recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation were left to
the ERRA which was formed in January 2006. The key actors in the
new organizational structure for reconstruction of quake-hit areas
include:
− ERRA as a central agency responsible for coordinating, macro
planning, financing, project approval and monitoring
− Secretariats servicing governments in KPK & in AJK is responsible
for provincial/state strategy formulation; the secretariats are known as
the Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority
(PERRA) in the province & the State Earthquake Reconstruction &
Rehabilitation Authority (SERRA) in AJK. The basic mandate of
implementation of all reconstruction projects rest with these forums
− District reconstruction units in each district to execute all
reconstruction and rehabilitation projects
Source: ERRA, Annual review 2006-2007

23. ERRA RECONSTRUCTION & REHABILATION
PROGRAMME
ERRA programme is divided into two parts:
1.Owner-driven housing programme, which was for
600,000 homes
2.The other part of the programme consists of about
13,312 projects in 11 different sectors and three cross-
cutting programmes at a cost of over US$ 5 billion
Projects construction summery of all Projects
Owner-driven Housing as on 10 Aug, 2011
Programme
Source: Developed from data provided by ERRA

24. PHYSICAL PROGRESS ANALYSIS OF ERRA PROJECTS
• Monthly progress reports of ERM database was collected from all
District Reconstruction Units for last one year
Number of Projects Percentage
Total Projects: 13,312
Allocated: 13,312 100.00 %
Unallocated 0 0.00 %
Stages
Completed 7357 55.27 %
Under Construction 3868 29.06 %
Tendering 1677 12.60 %
Designing 393 2.95 %
Planning 17 0.05 %
Source: Developed from data provided by ERRA

25. PHYSICAL PROGRESS ANALYSIS OF PROJECTS IN
TERM OF FUNDING SOURCE
• In term of funding sources, all projects can be divided into 3 separate
groups, GOP funded projects, donor funded projects and sponsor
funded projects
• Physical progress of Sponsor funded projects is highest and GOP
funding projects are lowest
• Combination of fielding inexperienced staff or incompetent contractors
to manage very complex projects in a shifting policy and cost escalation
environment is leading to significant failure in term of delivery timing
and cost drift
Designing &
Completed Under construction Tendering
Planning
Funding Total
Total Number of Projects
Source Projects
No. % No. % No. %
No % 76-95% 51-75% 26-50% 0-25%
GOP 8,713 3,290 37.76 3,505 40.23 547 738 911 1,309 1,575 18.08 330 3.79
Donors 1,130 881 77.96 197 17.43 30 62 68 37 33 2.92 19 1.68
Sponsors 3,469 3,186 91.84 166 4.79 49 40 31 46 69 1.99 44 1.27
All 13,312 7,357 55.27 3,868 29.06 626 840 1,010 1,392 1,677 12.60 393 2.95
Source: Developed from data provided by ERRA

26. CURRENT STATUS OF ALL ERRA’s PROJECTS
7343 projects are completed before August 10, 2011, total under construction
projects are 3868 while 1877 projects are still at designing and tendering stages.
The physical progress of Social Sector projects is the lowest (13.33%) and
Livelihood Sector projects are the second lowest (18.96%). These projects are
government funded and inadequate availability of resources and lack of money
is the main reason for slow progress in above two sector buildings.
Total Designing &
Completed Under Construction Tendering
District Projects Planning
No. No. % No. % No. % No. %
Grand Total 13312 7357 55.27% 3,868 29.06% 1,677 12.60% 410 3.08%
Education 5,751 2,055 35.73% 2,151 37.40% 1,334 23.20 212 3.67%
Environment 466 160 34.33% 293 62.88% 13 2.79 0 0.00%
Governance 697 392 56.24% 258 37.02% 47 6.74 0 0.00%
Health 306 162 52.94% 97 31.70% 41 13.40 6 1.96%
Livelihood 1,076 204 18.96% 489 45.45% 205 19.05 178 16.54%
Medical
6 6 100.0% 0 0.00% 0 0.00 0 0.00%
Rehabilitation
Power 15 10 66.67% 2 13.33% 0 0.00 3 20.00%
Social Protection 15 2 13.33% 7 46.67% 6 40.00 0 0.00%
Telecommunicatio
1 1 100.0% 0 0.00% 0 0.00 0 0.00%
n
Transport 233 137 58.80% 84 36.05% 11 4.72 1 0.43%
WatSan 4,746 4,228 89.09% 487 10.26% 20 0.42 11 0.23%

27. RECONSTRUCTION PROGRESS AS ON 10 August, 2O11
Reconstruction Project Progress Yearly-wise
Reconstruction Summary

28. ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION

29. DATA COLLECTION
• Main source of data is ERM database of ERRA and MIS
database of Pakistan Poverty Elevation Fund
• Data is also collected from different NGOs, United Nation
agencies, NESPAK, contractors, C&W Mansehra, PWD
Neelum, District Reconstruction Units etc.
• Different nature of reconstruction projects in earthquake
affected areas of Pakistan are selected, which have been
executed in the last five years with at least Rs. 1 Millions
worth
• The financial and scheduling data of all the ERRA 13,312
small and large projects have been collected and it has
been analyzed by using the some performance indicators,
earn value analysis and in light of executers opinions
• Project success & failure factors are extracted from this
process

30. Cont’d
• 185 questionnaires were send to construction professionals
of Pakistan, selected randomly from across the quake-hit
areas
• A total of 74 completed responses were received
Project Classification of Respondents’
Nature of
Organization
Respondents

31. DATA EVALUTION
• A four-point Likert scale was used to measure the factor influence
on overall performance of reconstruction projects
• The individual numerical ratings of each of the identified factors
were transformed to relative importance indices to assess the
relative ranking of factor by using the following formula
• RII= ∑X/(A*N) , (O < RII < 1)
Where
− RII = relative importance index.
− X = rating given to each factor by the respondent; ranging from 1
to 4 where '1’ is not effective at all and '4' is extremely effective
− A = highest rating (i.e. 4 in this case)
− N = total number of respondents responding to that factor
• The biggest value of RII of a factors indicates the most important
success factors with rank one and the smallest value of RII
indicates the most critical failure factors with rank one & so on
• Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to
find correlation in ranking among different responding groups
Source: Daniel W.M. Chan , Mohan M. Kurnaraswarny (2002) International Journal of Project Management, vol.20, pp. 23-35

32. Analysis of Success Criteria from Questionnaire’s
Feedback
Discussion
− Ranking of all success criterions was obtained by computing RII for
overall sample as well as separately for all responding groups
− Respondents are conscious about the popular ‘Iron Triangle’ of
construction industry, that is “completion on time, under budget &
according to specifications”
Result:
• Top ranked success criteria are completion ‘within schedule’, ‘within
budget’, ‘stakeholders satisfaction’, ‘meet specifications’ and ‘high
quality of workmanship’ Cont’d

33. SOLICITATION OF RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT
SUCCESS & FAILURE FACTORS
• Depending upon mean scores of responses for various factors,
the factors were segregated in three groups: the first group (with
µ≥ 3.0) that showed positive contribution; the second group (with
3.0 < µ < 2.35) which was neutral, having no significant impact on
the project success and the third group (with µ≤ 2.35) indicating
negative impacts
• Factors of first group (µ≥ 3.0) were arranged on their descending
order of RII values and ranked
• Factors of the third group (with µ≤ 2.35) were arranged in
ascending order of the RII and ranked. The lowest RII indicates
the most critical failure factor with rank 1 and so on
Ranges of mean values
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
µ≥ 3.0 3.0 < µ < 2.35 µ≤ 2.35
14 factors 24 factors 17 factors
Success Neither positively contributing nor Adversely
factors adversely affecting affecting

34. Post-disaster Reconstruction Project Success
Factors

35. Post-disaster Reconstruction Project Failure
Factors

36. Post-disaster Reconstruction Project Success
Factors
S. No Critical project success factors (µ≥ 3.0) RII Mean Rank
1 Clarity of goals and directions of the project 0.889 3.554 1
2 Detailed planning of project 0.855 3.419 2
3 A full-time and experienced project manager 0.834 3.338 3
4 Clear & detailed written contracts 0.814 3.257 4
5 Effective monitoring and feedback 0.801 3.203 5
6 Projects management skills 0.794 3.176 6
7 Frequent meetings among various stakeholders 0.780 3.122 7
Project team members possess adequate capabilities &
8 0.774 3.095 8
experience
9 Extent of rewarding high performing staff and motivation 0.767 3.068 9
10 Sufficient capacity of contractors 0.764 3.054 10
11 PM ability to handle contingencies & deviations from plan 0.760 3.041 11
12 Adequate communication among related parties 0.756 3.021 12
13 Training human resources in the skill demanded by the project 0.752 3.011 13
14 Client’s clear and precise definition of project scope & objectives 0.750 3.000 14

37. Post-disaster Reconstruction Project Failure
Factors
S.No Critical Failure Factors for Construction Projects (µ≤ 2.35) RII Mean Rank
1 Inadequate availability of resources (funds, material etc.) 0.443 1.77 1
2 Finance problems and payments of completed work 0.449 1.797 2
3 Lengthy decision taking process & reluctance in timely decision by stakeholders 0.483 1.932 3
4 Excessive subletting 0.517 2.068 4
5 Centralized system by ERRA 0.531 2.123 5
6 Inappropriate cost and time estimation 0.530 2.122 6
7 Shortages of skilled man-power, experienced professionals 0.536 2.148 7
8 Increasing energy, material, labor prices & their shortages 0.537 2.149 8
9 Vulnerability of roads and difficult access to site 0.540 2.161 9
10 Political support 0.541 2.162 10
11 Mistakes/ delays in producing design documents & drawings 0.551 2.203 11
12 Complexity and large size of reconstruction project 0.554 2.216 12
13 Work suspensions owing to conflicts 0.557 2.23 13
14 X-Factor (fraudulent practices, corruption, favoritism etc.) 0.574 2.297 14
15 High cost of skilled labor & high transportation costs 0.578 2.311 15
16 Capacity of line departments 0.5810 2.323 16
17 Harsh climatic condition 0.5811 2.324 17

38. SOLICITATION OF ERRA’S RECONSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FOR MONITORING & MANAGING PURPOSE
The "normal" pace of project implementation is simply not
good enough to address the urgent needs of the people
affected by the earthquakes
ICT tools (wireless communication, webmail, database bank)
are keys to identify the gaps in reconstruction delivery
The online database may provide a tool to track the physical
progress of implementing agencies
ERRA need to classifying delayed projects into 4 categories,
based on the partner’s frequency of updating their data on the
online databank. Concepts related to managing and
monitoring of the reconstruction programme of ERRA
− Halted Projects
− Delayed Projects
− Snailing Progress (Time Overrun Projects)
− Awaiting Progress

39. HALTED PRJECTS
• A project becomes halted if more than 3 months
have passed and no physical progress is received.
Halted Projects are further categorized into the
following categories:
− Halted - No Work Started: Commencement order is
issued but work has not started since 3 months or
more. The project should have zero % physical
progress
− Halted - Sick Projects: Construction is stopped
between 1% and 80% since 3 months or more
− Halted - Stuck Projects: Construction is stopped
between 81% and 95% since 3 months or more

40. Cont’d
Detail of Sector wise Halted Projects as on 10 August, 2011
Sector Under Total Halted No Work Started Sick Stuck
Construction NO. % NO. % NO. % NO. %
Grand Total: 3868 2322 60.03 194 5.02 1950 50.41 178 4.60
Education 2,151 1,301 60.48 117 5.44 1,101 51.19 83 3.86
Environment 293 163 55.63 8 2.73 138 47.10 17 5.80
Governance 258 172 66.67 6 2.33 149 57.75 17 6.59
Health 97 4 4.12 0 0.00 2 2.06 2 2.06
Livelihood 489 243 49.69 29 5.93 206 42.13 8 1.64
Power 100.0
2 2 100.00 0 0.00 2 0 0.00
0
Social Protection 7 5 71.43 0 0.00 5 71.43 0 0.00
Transport 84 28 33.33 1 1.19 22 26.19 5 5.95
WatSan 487 404 82.96 33 6.78 325 66.74 46 9.45
Result
• Lack of funding, increase in taxes because of August 2010 flood,
remote hilly areas, location of some sites directly below the high
voltage power line and shortage of technical persons is the main
reasons for stopping of work at these projects

41. DELAYED PROJECTS
• When a project fails to achieve the planned progress
and lags behind the schedule, it is declared delayed
whether the time is over run or not. Difference between
planned & actual progress should be 30% or more for
delayed projects. The delayed projects are further
categorized into the following categories
− Delayed - Slow Progress: Difference between planned
and actual progress is between 30% and 49%
− Delayed - Sick Projects: Difference between planned
and actual progress is between 50% and 74%
− Delayed - Critical Projects: Difference between planned
and actual progress is equal to or greater than 75%

42. Cont’d
2944 number of projects is declared Delayed at 10 August, 2011
Delayed Projects
Under Slow
Total construction Total Progress Sick Critical
Sector Projects No % No % No % No % No %
Grand Total: 13312 3868 29.06 2746 70.99 641 16.57 962 24.87 1143 29.55
Education 5,751 2,151 37.40 1,692 78.66 388 18.04 541 25.15 763 35.47
Environment 466 293 62.88 200 68.26 49 16.72 50 17.06 101 34.47
Governance 697 258 37.02 175 67.83 44 17.05 61 23.64 70 27.13
Health 306 97 31.70 24 24.74 12 12.37 10 10.31 2 2.06
Livelihood 1,076 489 45.45 275 56.24 52 10.63 106 21.68 117 23.93
MR & Telecom 6 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Power 15 2 13.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Social Protection 15 7 46.67 7 100.00 6 85.71 1 14.29 0 0.00
Transport 1 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
WatSan 233 84 36.05 42 50.00 17 20.24 17 20.24 8 9.52
Result
• Generally government of Pakistan faces shortage of funds in financial
allocation to ERRA’s projects and projects more than the available
finances are started which later on causing delay in payment to
contractors. When the contractors do not receive their payments then they
also stop paying to their supplier and labour. These scarcities of cash flow
cause the project delay

43. SNAILING PROGRESS (TIME OVERRUN PROJECTS)
Construction pace of Snailing Progress Projects is very slow. They can not
be called “Halted (Sick/Stuck)” because they do some progress in 90 days.
They do not fall under the category of delayed projects because the
difference between planned and actual progress is less than 30%
−Non imposition of penalty/liquidity damage by the consultant, subletting of
contracts, critical technical observations, poor condition of road, price hike
in construction material and procedural delays by clients are the some
reasons of time overrun project
Detail of Snailing Progress Projects at 10 August, 2011
Number of Projects
Under Time Over Run
Sector
Construction Total Up to 3 10-12 > 12
4-6 Months 7-9 months
Months Months Months
Grand Total: 3,868 296 5 20 37 20 214
Education 2,151 155 4 12 28 13 98
Environment 293 63 0 8 5 2 48
Governance 258 33 0 0 0 1 32
Health 97 0 0 0 0 0 0
Livelihood 489 19 0 0 0 0 19
Transport 84 15 0 0 3 1 11
WatSan 487 11 1 0 1 3 6

44. AWAITING PROGRESS
• A project is considered member of this group if more than 49 days
have passed and no progress is received
• If there is no improvement in progress on a project of this group than
after 90 days the project will automatically become “Halted (No
Work Started/Sick/Stuck)” and disappear from awaiting progress
report group
• Result:
− This awaiting progress report will give an early warning to managers
that the progress of project is not received since long
− Sector wise detail of Awaiting Projects (Waiting since 50 to 89 days)
Awaiting No Work
Total Awaiting Sick Awaiting Stuck
District Started
No. No. % No. % No. %
Grand Total 527 16 3.04 374 70.97 137 26.00
Education 199 0 0.00 174 87.44 25 12.56
Environment 45 0 0.00 32 71.11 13 28.89
Governance 27 0 0.00 23 85.19 4 14.81
Health 31 1 3.23 24 77.42 6 19.35
Livelihood 189 15 7.94 90 47.62 84 44.44
Transport 19 0 0.00 17 89.47 2 10.53
WatSan 17 0 0.00 14 82.35 3 17.65
Transport 19 0 0.00 17 89.47 2 10.53

45. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUTION

46. Comprehensive Framework for Reconstruction
Project Success

47. Framework for Effective Post-disaster Recovery Process in
Pakistan

48. Organizational Models for Recovery Projects in Pakistan
1) Create new dedicated organization or task force
− Seriously consider this option for large-scale disasters
− Formulate the exit strategy to avoid agency surviving beyond its
mission
2) Dedicated organization drawn from existing line
ministries
− It may undermine ongoing non-disaster programs
− International agencies may not finance backfilling of normal
ministry functions
3) Existing Governmental Agencies Manage Recovery
under National Disaster Plan
− This model needs detailed pre-disaster planning, staff training &
national disaster plan
− It requires existing line ministries to be strengthened with
experienced staff

49. RECOMMENDATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL
• All stages of a disaster response should be handled by the same
dedicated permanent institution
• Development of human resource to cater for global disasters from rescue
to reconstruction
• Establish worldwide linkage between government and NGOs and share
experience with disaster-hit countries
• Government should specify rates periodically based on requirement and
price escalation
• Approach for housing reconstruction after mega disaster should be
owner driven
• Time and cost schedule for site in remote areas should be flexible along
with special incentives to attract NGOs and contractors to far flung areas
• Progress analysis of projects should be carried out by client, consultant
and contractor to know whether the project is successful
• Project success criteria and KPIs should be developed at the initial
stages of project before implementation
• As there are different requirements and special targets of any given
project, success measurement should also be tailored for each project
• The earned value analysis of the projects should be carried out during
execution of projects to control/monitor the project to see whether the
project is on schedule and within budget or not

50. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
− Comprehensive analysis of the causes of success and failure at the end of
reconstruction projects in disaster affected areas of Pakistan
− Project success criteria and key performance indicators for construction
projects in Pakistan
− Assessment of critical success and failure factors in other industries in
Pakistan
− Establishment of a comprehensive benchmarking system to determine the
performance of mega development projects in government sector
− Establishment of a clear link between critical success factors and project
success criteria
− Analysis of cost overrun and delays in post disaster recovery projects in
Pakistan
− Role analysis of consultants, contractors, relief and recovery organization
after mega disaster in Pakistan
− Project success factors and criteria for aid agencies in the World
− Impact assessment of post disaster reconstruction projects to examine
how beneficiaries perceive the performance of reconstructed facilities