Child marriage and social norms: UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to End Child Marriage
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A presentation by Dr Nicola Jones to the UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to End Child Marriage, August 2019
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Child marriage and social norms: UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to End Child Marriage
- 1. Child marriage and social norms UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to End Child Marriage Webinar Dr Nicola Jones, August 28 2019
- 2. Outline of Presentation 1 • What are social norms? 2 •GAGE findings regarding social norms and child marriage in Ethiopia and Jordan 3 •Change strategies addressing norms and child marriage in Ethiopia and Jordan 4 • Ways forward
- 3. 1 • What are social norms? Please note that the photographs of adolescents DO NOT capture GAGE research participants and consent was gained from their guardians for the photographs to be used for GAGE communications purposes. Syrian girl in ITS near Amman, Jordan @ Natalie Bertrams / GAGE 2019
- 4. Social norms are invisible rules that shape behavior Mackie et al. (2015) analysed 16 different definitions of social norms. They found convergence around three main elements: • Social norms are constructed by individuals’ beliefs about what others do and what others expect them to do. Social expectations • The “relevant” other in question—group members hold expectations of one another. Reference groups can be geographical, such as a village, but can be based on other characteristics, such as caste, religion, or ethnicity. Reference groups • Positive and negative sanctions meted out for conformity or non- conformity. Social influence
- 5. Child marriage as a social norm Using the example of child marriage—girls are married before adulthood because their caregivers (and/ or sometimes themselves) believe that: Most girls in their community marry before adulthood. The community expects girls to marry before adulthood. If marriage does not take place before adulthood, then the daughter may fail to find a suitable partner or the family may be dishonoured.
- 6. Social norms have two essential components What people actually do What people believe should happen Descriptive norm Empirical expectation Injunctive norm Normative expectation 80% of households in my town participate in recycling. People in my town believe that everyone is responsible for recycling their waste.
- 7. Social norm change requires social solutions Social norms personal beliefs. Some parents believe that FGM/C is wrong but cut their daughters anyway simply because they are expected to do so. Changing norms requires changing social expectations—not personal beliefs. Radio dramas in Rwanda did not lead people to believe that ethnic intermarriage creates peace, but they did lead people to believe that ethnic intermarriage should be allowed. ≠
- 8. Descriptive norms tend to change before injunctive norms. Why? Actions typically change first Bangladesh’s Female Secondary School Stipend helped grow girls’ enrolment from 14% in 1990 to 50% in 2000. Today most parents agree that girls’ education is important.
- 9. Gender norms are especially ‘sticky’ Gender norms dictate how girls and boys and women and men are expected to behave. Around the world, expectations are broadly similar: Girls and women are expected to be docile, chaste caregivers. Boys and men are expected to be strong, stoic providers. Boudet et al. (2013) concluded that gender norms are the hardest to shift because they are simultaneously: Invisible Pervasive and interwoven Girl with a child, Afar Region, Ethiopia © Nathalie Bertrams / GAGE 2019
- 10. Lack of opportunities for women and girls in society • Economic systems that place greater economic value on males than females • Inheritance systems that pass on land via marriage • Crisis contexts where bride price is significantly higher than market opportunities or social assistance Legal systems that do not set or enforce or allow exceptions for a minimum marriage age of 18 Broad influencing factors Beliefs influencing norms Norms influencing child marriage Norms about child marriage Injunctivenorm: Agirlshould marryyoung Descriptivenorm: Mostgirlsmarryby 18years Beliefsabout women’srole in societyas wivesand mothers Beliefsthat parentsand eldershave primeauthority overchildren’s lifetrajectories Beliefsabout the importanceof femalesexual purity Beliefsabout marriageaskey routetosocial andeconomic protection Girls should bevirgins before marriage Agirlshould obeyher parentsover timing+choice ofmarriage partnerAresponsible parentshould ensure their daughter is marriedbyearly adulthood Tobecomea woman,agirl shouldmarry andhave children Childmarriageisheldinplace byawebofgendernorms Beliefsabout earlyfertility beingintegral tomarriage Peerpressure togetmarried byadolescent girlsand boys Sexshould onlytake placewithin heterosexual marriage
- 11. Empowerment as a change strategy Recent work on social norms has emerged from behavioral economics (especially C. Bicchieri and her team) and is largely “power agnostic”– it does not ask “who benefits”. In these contexts, emphasizing females’ disempowerment is unlikely to create change— growing agency and emphasizing options is likely more fruitful. However, Mackie et al. (2015) note that norms are often upheld by those whom they disadvantage. For example: In some locations, it is mothers (and not fathers) who prefer their daughters to marry as children. In some locations, it is girls themselves that insist on child marriage. Gender theorists have expressed concern, as gender norms in general--and child marriage in particular– disempower girls more than boys and women more than.
- 12. 2 •GAGE findings on social norms and child marriage 13-years-old girl from Dire Dawa, Ethiopia © Nathalie Bertrams / GAGE 2019
- 13. Gondar,Amhara,Ethiopia Most child marriages are arranged--and the youngest girls are forced. Girls are raised to be compliant and do as they are told by their parents. Girls have fewer options for independent livelihoods— meaning that marriage is still equated with security. Girls have fewer options for continued schooling--as they fail exams due to lack of study time and repeated parent-driven absences.Boys' and young men's access to land (and adult status) is often through marriage. Parents feel pressured to host a wedding for the community to demonstrate social status. Unmarried post- pubescent girls are the subject of gossip, sexual harassment, and sexual violence-- and girls marry to make it stop. ‘My families asked me if I want to get married, I say yes and they got me married to him.’ (Married mid-adolescent girl) ‘I had no idea that I was going to get married. And then the day approached and they told me... I said no way. I was even tempted to flee. But I had nowhere to go.’ (12-year-old)
- 14. Hararghe,Oromia,Ethiopia Many child marriages are "child driven"-- though most are parent approved. Parents object to free choice partners- -not marriage timing- -and provide young couples with housing and land. Girls are pulled out of school in early adolescence to help their mothers at home. Sexual debut leads to pressures for marriage—for girls and boys—so that children will be born in wedlock. Marriage and motherhood is seen as THE path to womanhood--leading to peer pressure to marry. Girls are flattered/pressured by older boys and brokers into sex and marriage. Girls are afraid of being "left over/ haftu" and forced to marry an older man. ‘If a girl is able to carry a 20 litre jerry can, they (the parents) think as if she is ready for marriage. They assume she can also manage a man if she is capable of lifting and carrying a 20 litre jerry that she can handle a man’. (Key informant) ‘They get married because it is in their interest. You can’t enforce them not to marry if they want to marry.’ (12-year-old girl) Land inheritance is more limited – young couples get access but property legally remains within the main family reducing parental influence Because of cramped living conditions parents are open to early marriages in order to regain privacy
- 15. Zone5,Afar,Ethiopia Child marriages are arranged— and forced if necessary – under absuma system. Girls are married to cousins to solidify family ties. Boys are allowed input into which cousin they prefer—girls are not. Parents deliberately remove girls from school before they are old enough to understand their rights. Girls have limited access to independent livelihoods. Communities have banded together to prevent girls’ secondary schooling in some cases because of threats to absuma system Boys and young men’s access to adult status and livestock assets is solely through marriage. ‘If my daughter married to someone outside of our kinship, our family line would discontinue.’ (Father) ‘If we do not die, it is our abu that we are going to marry.’ (Adolescent girl) Religious justification is used to further reinforce value of absuma system Under the absuma system no one is unmarriageable, although divorce may ensue (e.g. in cases of disability, illness)
- 16. SyrianandPalestinianrefugeesinJordan Most child marriages are arranged--and the youngest girls are forced. Girls are raised to be compliant. Girls have extremely limited access to assets and employment. Mobility constraints leave post-pubertal girls desperate for independence. And company. Family honour hangs on girls' sexual purity. Fathers make decisions about marriage. Girls are married to relatives to solidify family ties. Bride price is significant and a significant temptation to impoverished families shut out of labour market Marriage is also a means to secure citizenship to Jordanian citizens, and a means of attaining greater security for the family ‘I said that I didn’t want to marry him…. they forced me to marry him.’ (17-year-old girl, ITS) ‘Families want to marry their daughters quickly because they are worried about them. They worry about their exposure to drugs and violence.’ (Palestinian mother, Gaza Camp)
- 17. 3 •Change strategies addressing child marriage and social norms in Ethiopia and Jordan Wintarization programme in Zaatari camp:© Herwig/UNICEF/2016
- 18. Policy and legal change Ethiopia Marriage before 18 is illegal. Most people are aware of the law. Some girls (especially in Amhara) use the law to protect themselves. BUT Prosecution is rare. In some cases, the law has simply pushed marriages under ground. In other cases, people simply ignore the law. Jordan 18 is the minimum age for marriage. Marriages to girls under 16 cannot be registered. Health insurance is not available to children born to mothers under 16. BUT Child marriage is legal with permission from religious courts. The youngest brides—and their children—have the least protection.
- 19. Top down messaging Ethiopia The risks of child marriage—and the advantages of girls’ education and contraception—are constantly disseminated through government channels. BUT UPTAKE VARIES Higher where girls (and their families) have actionable options. Limited where messages emphasize worst-case scenarios. Jordan UNICEF’s Makani programme offers parent education classes aimed at growing support for adolescent education over child marriage and child labour. BUT Fathers—the main decision-makers—are rarely included. Parents dislike feeling as if their cultural traditions are backwards.
- 20. Reporting mechanisms Ethiopia In Amhara, adolescents can report planned marriages to their teachers— who then work with justice officials to have them canceled. BUT In Oromia, fewer girls are in school and more marriages are ‘free choice’. In Afar, teachers are often afraid to intervene—given the strength of support for the absuma system. Jordan In Jordan, some girls report planned marriages to their Makani facilitators—who then reach out one-on-one to parents to encourage them to delay. BUT Few girls report. Many parents (fathers) cannot be persuaded to delay.
- 21. Economic incentives Ethiopia Finot Hiwot offered households in-kind incentives and loans to keep their daughters in school rather than marry them. The Population Council’s RCT found that in-kind incentives improved girls’ enrolment and reduced child marriage. GAGE is evaluating ACT with Her—which is testing economic incentives alongside safe spaces for girls and gender education classes for girls and boys. Jordan UNICEF’s Hajati CT is aimed at encouraging education over child marriage and child labour. BUT Amounts are low ($28/mo)—especially compared to bride price ($1500-5000). The number of beneficiaries has been slashed due to budget cuts.
- 22. Trend setters and mass media approaches Ethiopia Widespread efforts—spearheaded by national and international religious and secular organisations—to include religious leaders in the fight against child marriage. Results have thus far been stronger in the Ethiopian Orthodox community compared to the Muslim community. Efforts to create and support local role models to lead communities to abandonment. Ethiopia YEGNA uses radio and TV dramas and music to grow support for girls’ potential—and eliminate child marriage. Boys who listen report near universal commitment to protecting girls from child marriage. Listening, watching, and discussing in groups improves message uptake.
- 23. Bottom-up community conversations Ethiopia NGOs and some regional governments support communities to come together to discuss child marriage—building consensus about risks and alternatives over time. BUT Local ownership is key—esp. given the prevalence of top-down approaches. Meeting fatigue is a danger. Change is slow. Care must be taken to include all stakeholders. Jordan In Mafraq, parents banded together to refuse to marry their daughters to men from the Gulf, as too many girls were quickly abandoned.
- 24. Working with boys Ethiopia Some schools and NGOs run gender clubs, rather than girls’ clubs, to sensitise boys to gender issues. While this approach can work—it is comparatively rare. ACT with Her is providing classes to young adolescent boys as well as girls— albeit less intensively. Jordan Due to gender segregation, UNICEF’s Social Innovation Labs are one of the only places where boys can interact with girls as people—rather than marriage targets.
- 25. Empowering girls Ethiopia Safe spaces and mentors through: • School-based girls’ clubs • Girls’ tutorials • NGO-led classes Wide array of skills: • Literacy and numeracy • Lifeskills and SRH • Livelihood and savings BUT • Gender norms can preclude girls’ participation—as they have no time and travel can be unsafe. • School-based options often non-participatory. • Community-based options often ad-hoc. Jordan UNICEF’s Makani progamme provides girls with a safe space, time with peers, and access to role models and mentors—and a curriculum focused on learning and communication. Some girls negotiate with their parents to stay in school and delay marriage. BUT Very few adolescent girls have access to programming—due to mobility restrictions. Few girls are able to overcome age-and gender-related constraints on their voice.
- 26. PRESENTATION NAME AND DATE Ways forward 4 © Nathalie Bertrams / GAGE 2019
- 27. Implications for programme design and MEL 1 • Tailor messages to child marriage in specific—as well as gender equality more generally. 2 • Tailor messages and interventions to context. 3 • Ongoing monitoring-- of the resonance of messaging—and adaptive programming. 4 • Expand messaging to extend past marriage—and include married and divorced girls.
- 28. Contact Us WEBSITE www.gage.odi.org TWITTER @GAGE_programme FACEBOOK GenderandAdolescence About GAGE: Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence (GAGE) is a nine-year (2015-2024) mixed- methods longitudinal research programme focused on what works to support adolescent girls’ and boys’ capabilities in the second decade of life and beyond. We are following the lives of 18,000 adolescents in six focal countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
Hinweis der Redaktion
- Social norms are the informal rules that govern behaviour in any given group of people. They are influenced by religious and other belief systems as well as by economic context. While attention to social norms has exploded in recent years, the concept dates to the birth of social science (Durkiem) and the language is still evolving. This continued evolution sometimes makes dialog difficult—as different theorists and different researchers use the phrase “social norms” in slightly different ways.
- There two broad categories of social norms—different theorists use different terminology. The terms “descriptive” and “injunctive” norms are decades old (Cialdini et al. 1990) and enjoy the widest use. The terms “empirical expectations” and “normative expectations” are those used by Christina Bicchieri, who has done more to move social norms theory forward in the last decade than anyone else.
- Mackie et al. (2015) highlight that: 1) Social norms are different from personal beliefs and attitudes—because people can and do believe one thing and do another simply because of social expectations. 2) Changing a social norm depends less on changing individual beliefs than it does on changing social expectations.
- In general, descriptive norms tend to change before injunctive norms—because it can be easier to incentivise behaviour change rather than to shape beliefs about what is or is not desirable. For example, Bangladesh’s Female Secondary School Stipend helped the country catapult girls’ enrolment in secondary school from under 14% in 1990 to nearly 50% only one decade later. Once girls began attending school en masse, injunctive norms also began to shift. Although families still tend to prioritise boys’ education over girls’, today nearly ¾ of secondary age girls are enrolled in school and most families agree that education for girls is important. ----------------------- Noting that in Malawi they found that 80% of people agree that most girls marry as chidlren but that only 50% of people believe that girls are expected to marry early. They conclude that this means that child marriage is NOT a norm--and is driven not by social expectations per se, but by lack of options. I think this is REALLY important--and resonates tremendously with our wor
- Gender norms are only one subset of social norms. Boudet et al. (2013) found that around the world gender norms are broadly similar—and are especially resistant to change. This is because gender norms are: 1) largely invisible—as we’re socialised into them from birth 2) pervasive—and held in place by a web of behaviours, beliefs, and formal and informal institutions As a case in point, while most Bangladeshi parents now agree that education is important for girls, a sizeable proportion believe that schooling girls is valuable only in so far as it helps girls to become better mothers.
- Norms about child marriage, for example, are held in place by a web of other proximate and distal gender norms, many of which are reflected in broader social institutions such as labour markets and legal systems. This diagram is from Advancing Learning and Innovation on Gender Norms (ALIGN)—which, like GAGE, is hosted at ODI. As thinking is still evolving, it is not meant to be exhaustive, merely indicative of how complex it is to even identify the factors supporting child marriage.
- Recent advances in how to conceptualise and measure social norms have largely grown out of behavioural economics (esp C. Bicchieri and her team). While this body of work has been criticised, especially by gender theorists, for taking too little account of power dynamics (Marcus and Harper, 2014 ), Mackie et al. (2015) observe that because of the way in which social norms are often upheld by those whom they disadvantage, efforts to empower people to become agents in their own lives can be important to norm change. That is, while conceptual advances and new tools might be highly technocratic--—solutions are not necessarily so.
- GAGE findings highlight diversity and the importance of context in understanding how gender norms perpetuate child marriage.
- In Gondar Amhara, most marriages are still arranged—with girls capitulating to their parents’ requests, because they feel they have few options, rather than choosing when or to whom they will marry. The youngest girls, who are the most likely to be removed from school specifically to marry, are generally forced. Threats of violence are not uncommon. An array of gender norms help hold child marriage in place in Amhara. Girls are raised to be compliant—and to do as their parents tell them. Girls access to employment—or the assets that they need in order to generate their own livelihoods—is more restricted than of boys, meaning that marriage is still equated with economic (and social) security. Girls have fewer options than boys for continued education. They are far more likely to fail exams—because they are not allowed to do homework or study until after they have completed their chores and because their parents force them to miss hours and days of school to care for younger siblings and work around the home. Once girls are out of school the pressure on them to marry increases exponentially. Older boys and young men agree to arranged marriages—even to younger girls whom they have never met—because their own access to land and adult status comes through marriage. Girls from families with the most land are in some locations the most at risk of child marriage—as they are particularly desirable partners given regional land shortages. Parents are under considerable pressure to host elaborate wedding ceremonies to demonstrate to their communities that they are successful and able to host such ceremonies. After puberty, girls in many communities are assumed to be consumed by “fire” and have a high need for sex—this leads to constant gossip and sexual harassment which is only extinguished by marriage. Pressures are highest on out-of-school girls. Because children must be born to married couples, or families risk dishonor, parents are afraid that their daughters will become pregnant out of wedlock—either because of the “fire” by which they are consumed or because they are raped. This leads parents to marry their daughters as children to ensure that any pregnancy is within marriage.
- In Hararghe Oromia child marriage is quite different. A growing number of girls “choose” their own husbands—and “choose” to marry as children—sometimes in early adolescence. While parents and adolescents often insist that marriage is chosen by girls—sometimes over parents’ strenuous objections—in most cases it seems clear that parents are not objecting to the timing of marriage so much as their own lack of control over who girls marry. Key informants reported that girls in Oromia have always married as adolescents. Girls’ education does not yet have the import in Oromia that it has in Amhara. Girls are quite often removed from school entirely in early adolescence—to support their mothers’ domestic work. In some communities, adolescents experience early sexual debut during cultural dances. Once girls and boys have become sexually active, they face pressure to marry so that a resultant pregnancy would be within marriage. Marriage—and early motherhood—are THE way that girls demonstrate that they are growing up and that they have worth. This leads some girls to “choose” early marriage to assert agency over their own lives—and leave their natal homes—and leads to peer pressure as girls compete with one another marry and become adults. Girls are not socialized to have the tools they need to resist the flattery and pressure of older boys and men. This leaves them vulnerable to both sex and marriage. Girls are afraid of being “left over”—and forced to marry older men. Younger girls are more likely to attract older boys and young men. Older girls are often left to marry widowers who already have several children and need a partner old enough and physically large enough to handle the demands of running a household.
- In Zone 5, Afar, child marriage is perpetuated by the absuma marriage system. Girls are married to a cousin chosen by their parents—on a date chosen by their parents. In Zone 5, all girls and boys are married under this system, which ensures that everyone gets a partner and that the kinship ties on which security depends are continually reinforced. Other gender norms are also at play—though largely reflected through the absuma system. Boys are allowed in many cases to choose which cousin they marry. Girls have no input at all. Boys choose girls who are their own age or younger—and pretty. Girls are sometimes forced to marry men decades older than they are. Parents are so committed to the absuma system that in some communities they have banded together to agree that no girls are allowed to attend secondary school—as girls who attend secondary school develop the knowledge and skills to resist. Zone 5 remains pastoralist and girls have few options—especially given their lack of education—to pursue independent livelihoods. For boys and men, livestock, adult status, and marriage are intertwined. They are not granted the livestock that they need for their own independence until a marriage has been agreed to.
- Refugee girls living in Jordan are at much higher risk of child marriage than Jordanian girls. Syrian girls are at especially high risk—not only of child marriage more generally—but of being married in early and middle adolescence. Girls living in Jordan are socialized to be compliant—with both gender- and age norms dictating that girls must do as their parents tell them. Girls in Jordan have extremely limited access to independent livelihoods. Jordan has one of the world’s lowest rates of female labour force participation. Amongst refugee communities, it is often seen as simply unacceptable for women to work. Girls are often removed from school and kept cloistered at home after puberty—to protect their purity and family honour. Girls chafe at this isolation and sometimes see marriage as a way to escape. Marriage decisions are made by fathers—with no input from girls and little from mothers. Many refugee girls are married to cousins to cement family ties—these marriages are often the least flexible, as paternal demands are amplified by demands from the extended family.
- Because social norms are inherently social and held in place by beliefs about the collective, they require coordinated collective action at many different levels to shift. Most efforts are aimed at preventing child marriage. They are not aimed at shifting norms per se. Where they shift norms, most programmes do so by changing behaviour at scale—altering empirical expectations that over time alter normative expectations. Programmes aimed at injunctive norms, and altering beliefs about what OUGHT to be, are primarily located in Africa and are far rarer .
- While social norms are informal—and law and policy are formal—legal and policy change can be important to shifting social norms. In Ethiopia, marriage before 18 is illegal. While prosecution is rare, most people are aware of the law and in Amhara some girls use legal mechanisms to refuse child marriages. In some communities, enforcement has driven child marriage underground and in other places people simply do not care about the law as it contravenes custom. In Jordan, 18 is the legal minimum age for marriage—though with permission from religious courts, girls may marry as children. Marriages before 16 cannot be registered—meaning that the youngest girls have no legal recourse if their marriages are bad-- because they are not legally married. Changes to health insurance policy are also working—in some cases—to discourage the earliest marriages. Babies are not eligible for insurance if their mothers are under the age of 16.
- Top down messaging is especially common in Ethiopia—where it is used by the government as a development tool. Government run 1:5 groups and messages promulgated through health care workers, women’s associations, and girls’ clubs have exposed nearly everyone to the health and economic risks of child marriage—and the advantages of girls’ education and contraception. Uptake of messages has been extremely variable. It is highest in locations where girls—and their families—have actionable options. Where risks are over-played, and emphasise relatively rare worst-case scenarios, communities are more likely to “tune out”. In Jordan, there appears to be no messaging by the government aimed at child marriage. UNCICEF’S Makani programme, however, offers parent education classes that emphasize the importance of adolescent education and the risks of child marriage and child labour. Uptake of messages is often limited—as parents do not want to be told how to raise their children or to feel as if their cultural traditions are as seen as backwards.
- Where girls (and their peers) have options for protecting themselves—by reporting planned marriages in time to have them cancelled—this can drive shifts in empirical norms. In Ethiopia, especially in Amhara, schools are serving as reporting venues for child marriages. Girls and boys can report marriages planned (or conducted—though few married girls are in school) for themselves, their siblings, or their peers and teachers reach out to relevant local authorities to have them cancelled. Chains are not working as well in Oromia, where fewer girls are in school in adolescence, or in Afar, where teachers note that they are genuinely afraid to contravene local norms. In Jordan, some soon-to-be-married girls report wedding plans to Makani facilitators, who reach out to parents one-on-one to try to persuade them to delay the marriage. In some cases, this works.
- Economic incentives to prevent child marriage are relatively common in Ethiopia (and throughout Africa)—where they are most often paired with other interventions. There is some evidence of impact—and GAGE will be looking for more. Finot Hiwot offered families in-kind incentives (school supplies, sanitary supplies, and a loan to invest in income generating activities) to send their daughters to school and eschew child marriage. There is some evidence that they contributed to increased enrolment in food insecure communities (Jones et al., 2016)—though the final evaluation notes that evidence is largely anecdotal and that social factors are a more important driver of child marriage than economic factors (GYA, 2017). The Population Council ran a multi-armed RCT aimed at keeping girls in school and reducing child marriage and found that offering younger adolescent girls school supplies—and older adolescent girls a conditional asset (two chickens)—improved enrolment and reduced the odds of marriage (Erulkar et al., 2017). GAGE is evaluating Act with Her, which is trialling 3 different asset transfer packages (school supplies, hygiene supplies, and both) in combination with safe spaces and gender transformative programming for young adolescent girls and boys. Programming started earlier this year and midline evaluation will take place towards the end of the year. In Jordan, UNICEF’s labelled cash transfer is supporting poor households to prioritise education over child marriage and child labour. However, the transfer amount is very low (20 JOD/$28/month)—especially compared to average bride price (1500-5000 JOD). In addition, the number of beneficiaries has been slashed due to budget cuts.
- In Ethiopia, there are widespread efforts to involve religious figures to shift social expectations regarding child marriage. EGLDAM and the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association have conducted advocacy workshops with religious leaders from Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant faiths (PRB, 2011). Norwegian Church Aid has also worked with Ethiopian faith-based organisations and the Inter-Religious Council (comprised of eight diverse religious groups, covering 97% of the population) on the issue. Their approach has been deliberately top-down to allow religious institutions to cascade messages in their own way and through their own channels (le Roux and Palm, 2018). The Center for Interfaith Action on Global Poverty has produced training manuals for educating religious leaders about child marriage (and FGM) and how to start dialogs with their congregants (CfIA, 2012). NGOs are also working with religious figures to end child marriage. NGOs often also support local groups—usually of women—to become roles models and change agents supporting gender equality more generally and the fight against child marriage and FGM/C more specifically. ActionAid’s Women’s Watch Group groups helped grow the incomes—and social standing—of the poorest women so that they could be better protectors of girls. Assessment found that one reason the programme was so effective is that it empowered the most marginalised and set them up as role models for transformation (Jones et al., 2016). There appear to be no significant efforts in Jordan to use religious or social leaders to drive the fight against child marriage. Mass media is also being used to shift expectations for Ethiopian girls. YEGNA is a branded social communications platform developed as an initiative to encourage behavioural change among girls and the wider community. It includes radio and TV dramas, a talk show and music-- all of which champion girls and aim to create a national conversation about their potential. The programme has reached nearly 9 million people and is changing expectations about gender more generally and child marriage specifically (Girl Effect, 2019). The platform has been found to be the most effective when girls and their parents listen to programming in groups—and talk about what they have learned (Jones, 2016). While girls in Jordan have more access to mass media than girls in Ethiopia, there appear to be no efforts to harness it to create change.
- Community conversations aimed directly at altering injunctive norms/normative expectations are fairly common in Africa—though more so for FGM/C than child marriage. They are usually run by NGOs, though some regional governments have also supported them. For example, CARE’s TESFA, Action Aid’s Women’s Watch Groups, Plan’s Because I am a Girl, Finote Hiwot, Pathfinder’s RCT, and Act with Her all include/d components aimed at building community consensus regarding child marriage. Conversations tend to work the best when they account for meeting fatigue, pair careful training with local ownership, and include wide array of stakeholders (Jones et al., 2016). In Jordan, efforts to promote community consensus around child marriage are strictly bottom up. In Mafraq, parents banded together to refuse marriages with men from the Gulf—after many girls were divorced and abandoned after only a few months of marriage.
- Recognizing that boys have more power than girls, and that they usually grow up to be husbands, In some communities in Ethiopia, especially in Amhara where there are more NGOs to provide support, there are gender clubs at school that operate alongside—or sometimes in place of—girls’ clubs. Act with Her has an educational component aimed at boys. It will cover the same topics being offered to girls, just in a less intensive way. In Jordan, Because even schools are gender segregated, UNICEF’s Social Innovation Labs, which target adolescent girls and boys over the age of 15, are one of the only spaces where boys can see girls as people—rather than marriage targets.
- Efforts to empower girls to become active agents in their own lives are central to ending child marriage—and shifting the social norms that constrain girls more generally. Efforts are widespread in Ethiopia. Outside of interventions aimed at helping them stay in school, many schools provide tutorial support, to help them succeed in school, and nearly all schools provide girls’ clubs starting in 5th grade. Where those clubs are supported by local women’s groups or NGOs, and focus messages directly on gender, they can provide girls with the skills and support they need to resist child marriage. Safe space programming run by NGOs—such as Act with Her and TESFA, is also common in Ethiopia. Programmes offer girls time with peers, provide them with access to mentors and role models, teach them life skills, and offer them opportunities to develop and practice agency and voice. Some programmes also teach vocational skills or financial literacy and run savings programmes. Empowering girls has been found to be the most effective way of reducing child marriage (Chae and Ngo, 2017, Malhotra et al., 2011). In Jordan, UNICEF’s Makani programme provides girls with a safe space, time with peers, and access to role models and mentors—as well as a curriculum focused on communication and negotiation. Although age-and gender-related norms limit girls’ voices, some are able to stand up to pressure to marry and stay in school.
- Eliminating child marriage requires targeting not only the broader gender norms that hold it in place—but the particular expectations that surround it. While messages that support girls’ education and women’s right to property ownership are important to setting the scene—ending child marriage, especially in a timely manner and in environments where gender inequality is deeply entrenched in all elements of life—will require focused work on child marriage itself. Messages and interventions that are aimed at child marriage need to be targeted to context. Messages that emphasize the risk of maternal mortality due to early pregnancy, for example, are unlikely to resonate in environments where maternal mortality is uncommon. Similarly, economic incentives, are unlikely to work in environments where poverty is not a driver of child marriage. Because child marriage is an evolving practice—with the arranged child marriages that were common in Oromia only a decade ago now increasingly superseded by “free choice” child marriages—it is important to continuously monitor how messages are resonating. Given that responses can reflect rote learning—or respondents’ desire to please—testing should involve vignettes. Programming should be adapted accordingly. Norms work should not end at the point of marriage. While the elimination of child marriage is a primary goal, supporting girls who are married and/or divorced is also vital—especially in environments where husbands are the sole decision-makers, intimate partner violence is common, and divorce is socially stigmatizing.