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How trends in IT force Security to behave as an Immune System
RED TEAM, BLUE TEAM OR WHITE CELLS?
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Image: Yersinia pestis (bubonic plague) a CC NC ND image by Philip Moyer -
https://www.flickr.com/photos/59039691@N00/2539168777/
Frank Breedijk
• Security Officer at Schuberg Philis
• (Official) Security dude since 2000
• Author of Seccubus
Coordinates:
• https://www.linkedin.com/in/seccubus
• @Seccubus on Twitter
• fbreedijk@schubergphilis.com
WHO AM I?
Barriers – First line of defense
• Skin
• Stomach acid
• Acidic oil on skin
Sort of our firewalls, IPS, Anti-virus
IMMUNE SYSTEM 101 – NONSPECIFIC
Image: boom barrier a CC NC SA image by miez!
https://www.flickr.com/photos/41449558@N06/6941463985/
Hard shell, soft
center…
OLD STYLE
SECURITY
APPROACH
Image: Egg with glowing eyes a CC NC SA image by Keith Marshall
https://www.flickr.com/photos/69877992@N00/304559359/
THE EGG HAS HATCHED…
SaaS
PaaS
The ugly truth has been revealed
We still suck at making good eggshells…
THE EGG HAS HATCHED
Image: P1010649 a CC SA image by Rick Kimpel
https://www.flickr.com/photos/18606128@N00/201198827/ Image: @akaasjager’s top by Frank Breedijk
No matter how well you secure an
infrastructure, there is always somebody who
can break into it.
JOIN THE RED TEAM, WE HAVE COOKIES…
Image:
http://devopsreactions.tumblr.com/post/4916808
Humans are not wrapped in bubble wrap
(mostly)
Humans ingest parts of their environment
Humans interact in funny ways
While we do get sick,
we don’t die often…
THE IMMUNE SYSTEM IS AWESOME!
Image: Bubble mummy a CC NC SA image by Katie Laird
https://www.flickr.com/photos/48889057845@N01/8583055777/
Not just barriers
Inflamation
• Getting materials where they need to be
• Making life a bit harder for the attacker
Phagocytes
• Know what a bacterium/virus looks like
• Eat it
Comparable to
incident response…
IMMUNE SYSTEM 101 – NONSPECIFIC
Video source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWItglvTiLc
Mist, schon Vormittags Brand! a CC NC SA image by André
https://www.flickr.com/photos/30982194@N05/3700447633/
When a white cell eats an antigen it represents
its receptor on its outside
The immune system ( the T and B
Lymphocytes) create anti-bodies and effector T-
Cells
Antibodies fit the antigen receptors and kill
antigens
Effector T-Cells kill infected body cells
Antibodies make you immune
IMMUNE SYSTEM 102 – SPECIFIC / ADAPTIVE
Preferably before they can do harm
ANTIBODIES KILLANTIGENS
A CC NC SA image by Alex
https://www.flickr.com/photos/95222260@N00/5190067591/
The body has several feedback loops like this
Fast
• Pain, bad taste
• ‘Must not continue’
• ‘Must not do that again’
Moderate
• Generation of antibodies
Slow
• Evolutionary
• ‘Survival isn’t mandatory’
FEEDBACK LOOPS
Image: Lightning Loop a CC image by Dakota Ray
https://www.flickr.com/photos/54782241@N05/5855339649/
Sometimes the body cannot create enough
anti-bodies
Sometimes it cannot do it fast enough
A treatment with anti-biotics will help
Anti-biotics just kill any bacteria
Good bacteria suffer as well
ANTI-BIOTICS
Image: Radioactive Injection a CC NC SA image by Taran Rampersad
https://www.flickr.com/photos/35468158048@N01/2102121338/
Firewalls
• What is not exposed cannot be attacked
Web Application Firewall
• OWASP Common Rule Set
Intrusion Prevention Systems
Minimize you exposure
Keep out people that are
clearly up to no good
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
NONSPECIFIC IMMUNITY - BARRIERS
Source: http://devopsreactions.tumblr.com/post /46061575774/surviving-a-
ddos-attack
Current feedback loops are too slow
• Developer writes/tests code on own laptop
• Developer checks in code
• Code gets picked up by build system
• Is (maybe) unit tested
• Is manually tested for functionality
• Many changes are accumulated in a release
• Release is deployed in acceptance
• Pentest is conducted on acceptance
• Issues are discovered
The shorter the feedback loop
the greater the learning effect
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
FAST FEEDBACK LOOP
Source: http://www.gifbay.com/gif/description-141598
Integrate security tools into your build street
Plenty of code quality tools out there:
• Commercial: HP, IBM, Veracode, WhiteHat Security,
Qualys, Checkmarkx, Trustwave, Apptherity, Contrast
Security, Pradco, Acunetix, N-Stalker, Virtual Forge, Trend
Micro, Burp Suite
• Open Source: Skipfish, Nikto, ZAP, Seccubus, Gauntlt
Include checking for
vulnerable
sub-components
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
FASTER FEEDBACK LOOPS
Train developers
• Good patterns prevent injuries
• Learns developers to spot potential security issues early
Do (peer) code review
• Don’t commit directly, use pull requests
Include security in your scrum
• Standups
• Sprint planning
• Backlog grooming
• Acceptance by product owner
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
LEARN FROM OTHERS
Source: http://devopsreactions.tumblr.com/post/48511362536
/i-dont-need-to-test-that-what-can-possibly-go-wrong
Having Security review all changes simply
doesn’t scale
PEER REVIEW IS KEY
Source: http://securityreactions.tumblr.com/post/
67562914945/java-source-code-review
Learn from the failures of others
• Including ‘Darwin Award winners’
Learn from good examples
• Share your successes
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
FAST FEEDBACK LOOP
Source: http://testerreactions.tumblr.com/post/50489315537
/new-implementation-first-verification
Heartbleed affected 2/3 of all SSL servers
A small mistake implementing a ping
“We can’t even add Ping, how the heck are we
going to fix everything else?”
– Dan Kaminsky
Vulnerability introduced in code in
December 2011
Vulnerability in production code since March
2012
Publicly known in August 2014
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
NONSPECIFIC IMMUNITY – INFLAMATION
Finding and fixing incidents
But, also representing these incidents
to the feedback loops
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
NONSPECIFIC IMMUNITY - PHAGOCYTES
Source: http://securityreactions.tumblr.com/post/59198452899/crypto-
implementation-in-whistle-im
Feed back security findings
Feed back as WAF signatures
• Anti-bodies / Band-aid
Feed back as Unit Tests
• Anti-bodies
• Shortens feedback loop to developers
Feed back al lessons learned
• Learn from those that have had (major) incidents
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
FASTER FEEDBACK LOOPS
Image: TV Vortex a CC image by Alexis O’Connor
https://www.flickr.com/photos/10088577@N00/707845930/
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
$HTTP_PORTS (msg:”Volex – Possible CVE-2014-6271 bash
Vulnerability Requested (header) “; flow:established,to_server;
content:”() {“; http_header; threshold:type limit, track by_src,
count 1, seconds 120; sid:2014092401;)
Of course it is not a permanent solution
But, it makes life a little bit harder for the
attacker
It buys you system so time to come up with a
fix
WAF SIGNATURES FOR VULNERABILITIES
Bleeding Kitty a CC image by Daniel Lobo
https://www.flickr.com/photos/62518311@N00/13900006125/
If a security issue has been discovered
Or, if you are building a sensitive function
Make sure you write a security unit test
EXAMPLE 1
FEED BACK SECURITY UNIT TESTS
If a security issue has been discovered
Or, if you are building a sensitive function
Make sure you write a security unit test
EXAMPLE 2
FEED BACK SECURITY UNIT TESTS
17 class ApiRbacTest(ResourceTestCaseWithHelpers):
18 fixtures = (
19 'auth_user',
20 'team',
21 )
22
23 def test_candidate_resource(self):
24 bundle = self.create_bundle_for_resource_test(models.Candidate)
25
26 def test_list_endpoints(url):
27 # As an anonymous user.
28 TeamGroupPermission.objects.all().delete()
29 self.logout()
30
31 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.get(url))
32 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.put(url))
33 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.post(url))
34 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.patch(url, data=bundle.data_list))
35 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.delete(url))
36
37 # As a user with read-only permissions.
38 self.add_permission_for_user('admin', 'comp_sbp', settings.PERMISSIONS.SHOW_ATS)
39 self.logout()
40 self.login('admin', 'admin')
41
42 self.assertHttpOK(self.api_client.get(url))
43 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.put(url, data=bundle.data_list))
44 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.post(url, data=bundle.data_detail))
45 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.patch(url, data=bundle.data_list))
46 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.delete(url))
47
48 # As a user with read-write permissions.
49 self.add_permission_for_user('admin', 'comp_sbp', settings.PERMISSIONS.EDIT_ATS)
If a security issue has been discovered
Or, if you are building a sensitive function
Make sure you write a security unit test
EXAMPLE 3
FEED BACK SECURITY UNIT TESTS
The negative space is just as interesting
DON’T JUST TEST THE HAPPY FLOW
Sometimes you just
have to say NO.
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
ANTI-BIOTICS
Sometimes you just
have to say NO.
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
ANTI-BIOTICS
So parts of your code
really need to be
protected
CROWN JUWELS
Crown of King Christian IV a CC NC ND image by Ville Misaki
https://www.flickr.com/photos/75595126@N00/7432041286/
INFOSEC IMMUNITY
SIGNATURES ON CRITICAL CODE
New/changed
code is checked in
Critical code does
NOT match
signature
Build fails
Security team
reviews critical
code and signs it
Build ok!
Life (in Infosec) is full of little surprises
Attacks only get better,
they never get worse
DON’T EXPECT TO BE PERFECT
Source: http://imgur.com/c9pCa18
The days of InfoSec Island/Castle have ended
If you didn’t realize this this, don’t worry:
“Survival isn’t mandatory”
Security needs to align to the tools used by
developers
Acting as immune system means
• Help stopping blatantly offensive elements
• Provide early feedback
• Cleaning up infections and
• Help build resistance against new vulnerabilities
• Providing a shot of anti-biotics if needed
SUMMARY
Image: Fortress Lérins a CC SA image by Mark Fischer
https://www.flickr.com/photos/80854685@N08/8730781472/
SECURITY IS PART OF
ALL THE WAYS OF DEVOP
System thinking
• Code not in production isn’t code
• Code that isn’t secure isn’t code
Stop treating security as a silo…
Image: 2010 a CC NC ND image by Annais Ferreira,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/79083322@N00/4453826217/
ALLOW SECURITY TO PROVIDE
A STRONG FEEDBACK SIGNAL
The shorter the feedback loops are, the
better the learning effect
• Automated security testing
• Unit tests for security
• Signed code
• Allow security to pull the Andon cord
• Have Nagios tests for security?
ALLOW FOR EXPERIMENTATION???
DevOps is THE chance
for security to finally get it right
Image: Rainbolt a CC NC ND image by Brian Auer,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/29814800@N00/1480408255/
Doctor Jack
• Registered EDP auditor
• Licensed MD
• Good friend
• ‘Dirty mind is a joy forever…’
THANK YOU…
Frank Breedijk
• Security Officer at Schuberg Philis
• (Official) Security dude since 2000
• Author of Seccubus
Coordinates:
• https://www.linkedin.com/in/seccubus
• @Seccubus on Twitter
• fbreedijk@schubergphilis.com
WHO AM I?

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How IT Security Can Behave Like an Immune System

  • 1. How trends in IT force Security to behave as an Immune System RED TEAM, BLUE TEAM OR WHITE CELLS? This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Image: Yersinia pestis (bubonic plague) a CC NC ND image by Philip Moyer - https://www.flickr.com/photos/59039691@N00/2539168777/
  • 2. Frank Breedijk • Security Officer at Schuberg Philis • (Official) Security dude since 2000 • Author of Seccubus Coordinates: • https://www.linkedin.com/in/seccubus • @Seccubus on Twitter • fbreedijk@schubergphilis.com WHO AM I?
  • 3. Barriers – First line of defense • Skin • Stomach acid • Acidic oil on skin Sort of our firewalls, IPS, Anti-virus IMMUNE SYSTEM 101 – NONSPECIFIC Image: boom barrier a CC NC SA image by miez! https://www.flickr.com/photos/41449558@N06/6941463985/
  • 4. Hard shell, soft center… OLD STYLE SECURITY APPROACH Image: Egg with glowing eyes a CC NC SA image by Keith Marshall https://www.flickr.com/photos/69877992@N00/304559359/
  • 5. THE EGG HAS HATCHED… SaaS PaaS
  • 6. The ugly truth has been revealed We still suck at making good eggshells… THE EGG HAS HATCHED Image: P1010649 a CC SA image by Rick Kimpel https://www.flickr.com/photos/18606128@N00/201198827/ Image: @akaasjager’s top by Frank Breedijk
  • 7. No matter how well you secure an infrastructure, there is always somebody who can break into it. JOIN THE RED TEAM, WE HAVE COOKIES… Image: http://devopsreactions.tumblr.com/post/4916808
  • 8. Humans are not wrapped in bubble wrap (mostly) Humans ingest parts of their environment Humans interact in funny ways While we do get sick, we don’t die often… THE IMMUNE SYSTEM IS AWESOME! Image: Bubble mummy a CC NC SA image by Katie Laird https://www.flickr.com/photos/48889057845@N01/8583055777/
  • 9. Not just barriers Inflamation • Getting materials where they need to be • Making life a bit harder for the attacker Phagocytes • Know what a bacterium/virus looks like • Eat it Comparable to incident response… IMMUNE SYSTEM 101 – NONSPECIFIC Video source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWItglvTiLc Mist, schon Vormittags Brand! a CC NC SA image by André https://www.flickr.com/photos/30982194@N05/3700447633/
  • 10. When a white cell eats an antigen it represents its receptor on its outside The immune system ( the T and B Lymphocytes) create anti-bodies and effector T- Cells Antibodies fit the antigen receptors and kill antigens Effector T-Cells kill infected body cells Antibodies make you immune IMMUNE SYSTEM 102 – SPECIFIC / ADAPTIVE
  • 11. Preferably before they can do harm ANTIBODIES KILLANTIGENS A CC NC SA image by Alex https://www.flickr.com/photos/95222260@N00/5190067591/
  • 12. The body has several feedback loops like this Fast • Pain, bad taste • ‘Must not continue’ • ‘Must not do that again’ Moderate • Generation of antibodies Slow • Evolutionary • ‘Survival isn’t mandatory’ FEEDBACK LOOPS Image: Lightning Loop a CC image by Dakota Ray https://www.flickr.com/photos/54782241@N05/5855339649/
  • 13. Sometimes the body cannot create enough anti-bodies Sometimes it cannot do it fast enough A treatment with anti-biotics will help Anti-biotics just kill any bacteria Good bacteria suffer as well ANTI-BIOTICS Image: Radioactive Injection a CC NC SA image by Taran Rampersad https://www.flickr.com/photos/35468158048@N01/2102121338/
  • 14. Firewalls • What is not exposed cannot be attacked Web Application Firewall • OWASP Common Rule Set Intrusion Prevention Systems Minimize you exposure Keep out people that are clearly up to no good INFOSEC IMMUNITY NONSPECIFIC IMMUNITY - BARRIERS Source: http://devopsreactions.tumblr.com/post /46061575774/surviving-a- ddos-attack
  • 15. Current feedback loops are too slow • Developer writes/tests code on own laptop • Developer checks in code • Code gets picked up by build system • Is (maybe) unit tested • Is manually tested for functionality • Many changes are accumulated in a release • Release is deployed in acceptance • Pentest is conducted on acceptance • Issues are discovered The shorter the feedback loop the greater the learning effect INFOSEC IMMUNITY FAST FEEDBACK LOOP Source: http://www.gifbay.com/gif/description-141598
  • 16. Integrate security tools into your build street Plenty of code quality tools out there: • Commercial: HP, IBM, Veracode, WhiteHat Security, Qualys, Checkmarkx, Trustwave, Apptherity, Contrast Security, Pradco, Acunetix, N-Stalker, Virtual Forge, Trend Micro, Burp Suite • Open Source: Skipfish, Nikto, ZAP, Seccubus, Gauntlt Include checking for vulnerable sub-components INFOSEC IMMUNITY FASTER FEEDBACK LOOPS
  • 17. Train developers • Good patterns prevent injuries • Learns developers to spot potential security issues early Do (peer) code review • Don’t commit directly, use pull requests Include security in your scrum • Standups • Sprint planning • Backlog grooming • Acceptance by product owner INFOSEC IMMUNITY LEARN FROM OTHERS Source: http://devopsreactions.tumblr.com/post/48511362536 /i-dont-need-to-test-that-what-can-possibly-go-wrong
  • 18. Having Security review all changes simply doesn’t scale PEER REVIEW IS KEY Source: http://securityreactions.tumblr.com/post/ 67562914945/java-source-code-review
  • 19. Learn from the failures of others • Including ‘Darwin Award winners’ Learn from good examples • Share your successes INFOSEC IMMUNITY FAST FEEDBACK LOOP Source: http://testerreactions.tumblr.com/post/50489315537 /new-implementation-first-verification
  • 20. Heartbleed affected 2/3 of all SSL servers A small mistake implementing a ping “We can’t even add Ping, how the heck are we going to fix everything else?” – Dan Kaminsky Vulnerability introduced in code in December 2011 Vulnerability in production code since March 2012 Publicly known in August 2014 INFOSEC IMMUNITY NONSPECIFIC IMMUNITY – INFLAMATION
  • 21. Finding and fixing incidents But, also representing these incidents to the feedback loops INFOSEC IMMUNITY NONSPECIFIC IMMUNITY - PHAGOCYTES Source: http://securityreactions.tumblr.com/post/59198452899/crypto- implementation-in-whistle-im
  • 22. Feed back security findings Feed back as WAF signatures • Anti-bodies / Band-aid Feed back as Unit Tests • Anti-bodies • Shortens feedback loop to developers Feed back al lessons learned • Learn from those that have had (major) incidents INFOSEC IMMUNITY FASTER FEEDBACK LOOPS Image: TV Vortex a CC image by Alexis O’Connor https://www.flickr.com/photos/10088577@N00/707845930/
  • 23. alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”Volex – Possible CVE-2014-6271 bash Vulnerability Requested (header) “; flow:established,to_server; content:”() {“; http_header; threshold:type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 120; sid:2014092401;)
  • 24. Of course it is not a permanent solution But, it makes life a little bit harder for the attacker It buys you system so time to come up with a fix WAF SIGNATURES FOR VULNERABILITIES Bleeding Kitty a CC image by Daniel Lobo https://www.flickr.com/photos/62518311@N00/13900006125/
  • 25. If a security issue has been discovered Or, if you are building a sensitive function Make sure you write a security unit test EXAMPLE 1 FEED BACK SECURITY UNIT TESTS
  • 26.
  • 27. If a security issue has been discovered Or, if you are building a sensitive function Make sure you write a security unit test EXAMPLE 2 FEED BACK SECURITY UNIT TESTS
  • 28. 17 class ApiRbacTest(ResourceTestCaseWithHelpers): 18 fixtures = ( 19 'auth_user', 20 'team', 21 ) 22 23 def test_candidate_resource(self): 24 bundle = self.create_bundle_for_resource_test(models.Candidate) 25 26 def test_list_endpoints(url): 27 # As an anonymous user. 28 TeamGroupPermission.objects.all().delete() 29 self.logout() 30 31 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.get(url)) 32 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.put(url)) 33 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.post(url)) 34 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.patch(url, data=bundle.data_list)) 35 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.delete(url)) 36 37 # As a user with read-only permissions. 38 self.add_permission_for_user('admin', 'comp_sbp', settings.PERMISSIONS.SHOW_ATS) 39 self.logout() 40 self.login('admin', 'admin') 41 42 self.assertHttpOK(self.api_client.get(url)) 43 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.put(url, data=bundle.data_list)) 44 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.post(url, data=bundle.data_detail)) 45 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.patch(url, data=bundle.data_list)) 46 self.assertHttpUnauthorized(self.api_client.delete(url)) 47 48 # As a user with read-write permissions. 49 self.add_permission_for_user('admin', 'comp_sbp', settings.PERMISSIONS.EDIT_ATS)
  • 29. If a security issue has been discovered Or, if you are building a sensitive function Make sure you write a security unit test EXAMPLE 3 FEED BACK SECURITY UNIT TESTS
  • 30.
  • 31.
  • 32. The negative space is just as interesting DON’T JUST TEST THE HAPPY FLOW
  • 33. Sometimes you just have to say NO. INFOSEC IMMUNITY ANTI-BIOTICS
  • 34. Sometimes you just have to say NO. INFOSEC IMMUNITY ANTI-BIOTICS
  • 35. So parts of your code really need to be protected CROWN JUWELS Crown of King Christian IV a CC NC ND image by Ville Misaki https://www.flickr.com/photos/75595126@N00/7432041286/
  • 36. INFOSEC IMMUNITY SIGNATURES ON CRITICAL CODE New/changed code is checked in Critical code does NOT match signature Build fails Security team reviews critical code and signs it Build ok!
  • 37. Life (in Infosec) is full of little surprises Attacks only get better, they never get worse DON’T EXPECT TO BE PERFECT Source: http://imgur.com/c9pCa18
  • 38. The days of InfoSec Island/Castle have ended If you didn’t realize this this, don’t worry: “Survival isn’t mandatory” Security needs to align to the tools used by developers Acting as immune system means • Help stopping blatantly offensive elements • Provide early feedback • Cleaning up infections and • Help build resistance against new vulnerabilities • Providing a shot of anti-biotics if needed SUMMARY Image: Fortress Lérins a CC SA image by Mark Fischer https://www.flickr.com/photos/80854685@N08/8730781472/
  • 39. SECURITY IS PART OF ALL THE WAYS OF DEVOP System thinking • Code not in production isn’t code • Code that isn’t secure isn’t code Stop treating security as a silo… Image: 2010 a CC NC ND image by Annais Ferreira, http://www.flickr.com/photos/79083322@N00/4453826217/
  • 40. ALLOW SECURITY TO PROVIDE A STRONG FEEDBACK SIGNAL The shorter the feedback loops are, the better the learning effect • Automated security testing • Unit tests for security • Signed code • Allow security to pull the Andon cord • Have Nagios tests for security?
  • 41. ALLOW FOR EXPERIMENTATION??? DevOps is THE chance for security to finally get it right Image: Rainbolt a CC NC ND image by Brian Auer, http://www.flickr.com/photos/29814800@N00/1480408255/
  • 42. Doctor Jack • Registered EDP auditor • Licensed MD • Good friend • ‘Dirty mind is a joy forever…’ THANK YOU…
  • 43. Frank Breedijk • Security Officer at Schuberg Philis • (Official) Security dude since 2000 • Author of Seccubus Coordinates: • https://www.linkedin.com/in/seccubus • @Seccubus on Twitter • fbreedijk@schubergphilis.com WHO AM I?

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Apologies upfront to my friends who are in a red team