SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 25
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Applying Intelligent Deception
to Detect Sophisticated
Cyber Attacks
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Today’sSpeaker
Tom Clare
Product/Technical Marketing, Fidelis
Background: Deception, UEBA/SIEM,
Web Proxies, Vulnerability Assessments,
Firewalls, and Endpoint (EPP/EDR)
Companies: Fidelis, Gurucul, Websense,
Check Point Technologies, and McAfee
LinkedIn – www.linkedin.com/in/tomclare/
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Before the Allies stormed the beaches of
Normandy in history’s largest amphibious
assault, they staged one of history’s
greatest military deceptions.
The top-secret ruse — complete with rubber
tanks, body doubles, fake radio chatter and
double agents — successfully duped Adolf
Hitler and Nazi commanders and laid the
groundwork for D-Day success on
June 6, 1944.
WWII - OperationBodyguard
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
SavingSeaTurtles
PROBLEM
140 Million Years on Earth
Top Endangered Species
Poachers Steal/Sell Eggs
Consistent/Pervasive Problem
SOLUTION
3D Printed Fake GPS Eggs
Decoy Eggs Look Real
Poachers Cannot Detect
Enables Tracking/Mapping
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
OpportunityforCyberDeception
Knowing what attackers desire creates
an opportunity for an active defense;
to lure, detect, and defend.
Global Average
Dwell Time
99 Days
Preventive
Defenses
Deception
Layer Lures
Attack
Lures
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
CaptureTheFlag(CTF)
Cyber CTF Games
Jeopardy-Style
Different challenges
Broad range of categories
Earn points per challenge
Quality vs time/race
Attack-Defense
Blue team defends network
Goal to detect attacks
Red team attacks network
Goal to capture flag(s)
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
BluevsRedTeams
Blue Team focus includes:
Defending networks and systems
Monitoring security defenses
Security control effectiveness
Hardening systems and controls
Identifying security flaws
Incident response
Red Team focus includes:
White-hat hacker role as threat actors
Adversarial assessments (or pen-testing)
Real-world attack simulations w/o damage
Assess vulnerabilities to improve defenses
Challenge preconceived notions
In 1932, Rear Admiral Yarnell demonstrated how the Japanese could
attack Pearl Harbor to wipe out the Pacific fleet almost exactly as it
occurred nine years later. The attack simulation was deemed a
success, however not in the final report. Japanese radio deception
was effective on US intelligence for the offensive strike.
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
DeceptionElements
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
DeceptionAlerts
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
CTFRealNetwork
Real-world network complete with assets, users, services and data.
29 Users
1,491 Documents
5,532 Emails
31 Applications installed
3 Full browser profiles (Chrome, IE, FF)
2 Corporate web applications
2 Databases
1 Domain Controller (DC)
1 DNS Server
1 Private cloud service
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
CTFDeceptionLayer
The decoys were defined with a variation of
interactive capabilities.
Some decoy services appeared only as open ports,
while others were full-blown services, appearing to run
real applications.
Among the services made available were TCP, UDP,
SMB, HTTP, ICMP, RDP, FTP, MYSQL, SMTP and
SSH.
10 decoys
• 7 Workstations (user and development machines
running Windows 7)
• 2 Windows Servers (running Windows 2012 and
Windows 2008)
• 1 Ubuntu Linux server
95 decoy services
Breadcrumbs or traps include:
61 files
39 beacon traps
27 emails
26 credentials
12 applications
10 IoT devices
2 network traps
Breadcrumbs make deception deterministic by
leading attackers to decoys, versus static
honeypots waiting to be found.
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
ExampleTraps
Email Trap
(unstructured data)
Chrome Browser Trap
(structured data)
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
CTFDeceptionChallenge
CTF challenge to find 5 file hashes for information spread across assets
Participants provided access to one asset via RAT (Remote Access Trojan)
The first file hash containing key information resides on this infected asset
Each subsequent file hash was technically harder to find requiring more expertise
Each attacker or team worked solo on a fresh instance of the environment
Tasks include gathering intelligence, collecting information, and moving laterally
Public invitation to:
• Red teams
• Pen-testers
• Security researchers
Best applicants selected
Written mission brief & goals
Challenge ran for 1+ month
52 participants w/global profile
6-7 hours of time/participant
Dozen+ malware types also
tested in parallel
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
TheKnowledgeGap
Mission brief provided key intel
on first challenge
• Read the brief, averaged ~100
commands
• Did not read, used spray and
pray efforts
Knowledge before and during
phases reduces knowledge
gap/commands
Over time hackers become
quieter and harder to detect
Early detection is critical
Deception layers need to be
automatically kept current and
dynamic
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
TrapConsumption
Attacker Profiles
• 52 Humans
• 12 Malware
dynamic
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
Traps:ManvsMachine
Average human triggered 10.5 traps
Humans target files, email &
unstructured data
Malware targets apps and structured
data
Passwords/credentials:
• Found 2 on average
• Utilized 2.5 times/avg
• Max reuse: 11 times in 11
places
Password traps near decoys are very
effective
Trap variety is important to cover
attack types
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
DecoyAccess
On average, each attacker
interacted with nearly 10
decoy services
No decoy had more than
47% activity, signaling variety
is important
Sloppy attacks used
scanners with pings and
SYNs, non-interactive noise,
easy for decoys to detect
Sophisticated attacks were
focused on specific decoys
with high interaction
Decoy variety is important
with live services to engage
attackers
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
CTFDeceptionSummary
Sophisticated attacks are more targeted and
highly interactive than careless and noisy low
interaction scanning
Deception needs to be diverse to be effective
against malware and human attackers
Deception layers should as realistic as possible,
kept current, and dynamic to increase the
knowledge gap against attackers
Augment deception layers with network and
traffic analysis for increased visibility and
accuracy
Deception lures, detects and consumes attacker
time, thus diverting and slowing attacks
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
LearnMore –CTFWhitePaper
In-depth Research White Paper
More details on Traps/Breadcrumbs
More depth on Decoy Services
Online at - www.fidelissecurity.com
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
LeaderinAutomatedDetection&Response
Global Presence
• Established 2002
• Headquartered in Washington, DC
• Fortune 100 & DoD enterprise proven
• Proactive, MDR, and, IR service expertise
Comprehensive visibility across network to endpoints
Real-time and historical forensics analysis
Extensible patented deep session inspection platform
On-premise and/or cloud deployable form factors
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
AutomatedDetection&Response(ADR)
22
Breach
Detection
Endpoint
Detection &
Response
Intelligent
Deception
Highlights
• Automatically do what experienced
security analysts would do.
• Leverage native visibility across
enterprise to detect threats using a wide
variety of techniques.
• Enable investigation, containment, and
remediation process by validating alerts.
• Lure, detect and defend against
attackers in your network.
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
FidelisElevate Platform
23
Fidelis
Network
Fidelis
Endpoint
Fidelis
Deception
Improve Security Operations’
Efficiency and Effectiveness
• Shift from clues to conclusions by
combining similar alerts with context for
quick action
• Pre-validate network alerts at the
endpoint
• Reduce the time to respond
• Gain visibility across the entire kill chain
• Employ an active post-breach defense
that lures attackers to decoys and
adapts to your network as it changes
© Fidelis Cybersecurity
QuestionsandNextSteps
Key Resources
Fidelis Deception Datasheet
https://www.fidelissecurity.com/resources/
fidelis-deception-module
Case Study on How First MidWest Bank
Uses Fidelis Deception
https://www.fidelissecurity.com/case-
study-first-midwest-bank
Thank You!

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal AuditorsION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
mdagrossa
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Part 1: Identifying Insider Threats with Fidelis EDR Technology
Part 1: Identifying  Insider Threats with Fidelis EDR Technology Part 1: Identifying  Insider Threats with Fidelis EDR Technology
Part 1: Identifying Insider Threats with Fidelis EDR Technology
 
Putting Cyber Attackers on the Defensive
Putting Cyber Attackers on the DefensivePutting Cyber Attackers on the Defensive
Putting Cyber Attackers on the Defensive
 
Extend Network Visibility and Secure Applications and Data in Azure
Extend Network Visibility and Secure Applications and Data in AzureExtend Network Visibility and Secure Applications and Data in Azure
Extend Network Visibility and Secure Applications and Data in Azure
 
Hunting for cyber threats targeting weapon systems
Hunting for cyber threats targeting weapon systemsHunting for cyber threats targeting weapon systems
Hunting for cyber threats targeting weapon systems
 
Critical Capabilities for MDR Services - What to Know Before You Buy
Critical Capabilities for MDR Services - What to Know Before You BuyCritical Capabilities for MDR Services - What to Know Before You Buy
Critical Capabilities for MDR Services - What to Know Before You Buy
 
TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
 
The Cost of Doing Nothing: A Ransomware Backup Story
The Cost of Doing Nothing: A Ransomware Backup StoryThe Cost of Doing Nothing: A Ransomware Backup Story
The Cost of Doing Nothing: A Ransomware Backup Story
 
Ransomware: Why Are Backup Vendors Trying To Scare You?
Ransomware: Why Are Backup Vendors Trying To Scare You?Ransomware: Why Are Backup Vendors Trying To Scare You?
Ransomware: Why Are Backup Vendors Trying To Scare You?
 
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
 
Gavin Hill - Lessons From the Human Immune System
Gavin Hill - Lessons From the Human Immune SystemGavin Hill - Lessons From the Human Immune System
Gavin Hill - Lessons From the Human Immune System
 
Ransomware Detection: Don’t Pay Up. Backup.
Ransomware Detection:  Don’t Pay Up. Backup.Ransomware Detection:  Don’t Pay Up. Backup.
Ransomware Detection: Don’t Pay Up. Backup.
 
Dragos year in review (yir) 2018
Dragos year in review (yir) 2018Dragos year in review (yir) 2018
Dragos year in review (yir) 2018
 
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum SecurityWhy Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
 
Debunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread Blackouts
Debunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread BlackoutsDebunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread Blackouts
Debunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread Blackouts
 
Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response
Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response
Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response
 
Moving Beyond Zero Trust
Moving Beyond Zero TrustMoving Beyond Zero Trust
Moving Beyond Zero Trust
 
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal AuditorsION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
 
Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain
Dressing up the ICS Kill ChainDressing up the ICS Kill Chain
Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain
 
Jason Harrell - Compliance and Security: Building a Cybersecurity Risk Manage...
Jason Harrell - Compliance and Security: Building a Cybersecurity Risk Manage...Jason Harrell - Compliance and Security: Building a Cybersecurity Risk Manage...
Jason Harrell - Compliance and Security: Building a Cybersecurity Risk Manage...
 
Webinar: Backup vs. Ransomware - 5 Requirements for Backup Success
Webinar: Backup vs. Ransomware - 5 Requirements for Backup SuccessWebinar: Backup vs. Ransomware - 5 Requirements for Backup Success
Webinar: Backup vs. Ransomware - 5 Requirements for Backup Success
 

Ähnlich wie Applying intelligent deception to detect sophisticated cyber attacks

Information Systems.pptx
Information Systems.pptxInformation Systems.pptx
Information Systems.pptx
KnownId
 

Ähnlich wie Applying intelligent deception to detect sophisticated cyber attacks (20)

Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception DefenseCapture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
 
Fidelis - Live Demonstration of Deception Solution
Fidelis - Live Demonstration of Deception SolutionFidelis - Live Demonstration of Deception Solution
Fidelis - Live Demonstration of Deception Solution
 
Efficiency, effectiveness, productivity: Dell Connected Security in action
Efficiency, effectiveness, productivity: Dell Connected Security in actionEfficiency, effectiveness, productivity: Dell Connected Security in action
Efficiency, effectiveness, productivity: Dell Connected Security in action
 
Cyber security event
Cyber security eventCyber security event
Cyber security event
 
Operational Security Intelligence
Operational Security IntelligenceOperational Security Intelligence
Operational Security Intelligence
 
Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...
Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...
Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...
 
Offensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defenseOffensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defense
 
La sécurité de l'emploi : protégez votre SI
La sécurité de l'emploi : protégez votre SILa sécurité de l'emploi : protégez votre SI
La sécurité de l'emploi : protégez votre SI
 
MT17_Building Integrated and Secure Networks with limited IT Support
MT17_Building Integrated and Secure Networks with limited IT SupportMT17_Building Integrated and Secure Networks with limited IT Support
MT17_Building Integrated and Secure Networks with limited IT Support
 
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
 
From SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
From SIEM to SA: The Path ForwardFrom SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
From SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
 
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About ItToday's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
 
MT50 Data is the new currency: Protect it!
MT50 Data is the new currency: Protect it!MT50 Data is the new currency: Protect it!
MT50 Data is the new currency: Protect it!
 
Issa jason dablow
Issa jason dablowIssa jason dablow
Issa jason dablow
 
Cyber Security
Cyber SecurityCyber Security
Cyber Security
 
Information Systems.pptx
Information Systems.pptxInformation Systems.pptx
Information Systems.pptx
 
PaloAlto Enterprise Security Solution
PaloAlto Enterprise Security SolutionPaloAlto Enterprise Security Solution
PaloAlto Enterprise Security Solution
 
Security Breakout Session
Security Breakout Session Security Breakout Session
Security Breakout Session
 
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
 
Cyber security for business
Cyber security for businessCyber security for business
Cyber security for business
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Victor Rentea
 
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsArchitecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
WSO2
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
?#DUbAI#??##{{(☎️+971_581248768%)**%*]'#abortion pills for sale in dubai@
 
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Victor Rentea
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
panagenda
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
 
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
 
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
 
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsArchitecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
 
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
 
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
 
Polkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin Wood
Polkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin WoodPolkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin Wood
Polkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin Wood
 
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
 
Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...
Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...
Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
 

Applying intelligent deception to detect sophisticated cyber attacks

  • 1. Applying Intelligent Deception to Detect Sophisticated Cyber Attacks
  • 2. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Today’sSpeaker Tom Clare Product/Technical Marketing, Fidelis Background: Deception, UEBA/SIEM, Web Proxies, Vulnerability Assessments, Firewalls, and Endpoint (EPP/EDR) Companies: Fidelis, Gurucul, Websense, Check Point Technologies, and McAfee LinkedIn – www.linkedin.com/in/tomclare/
  • 4. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Before the Allies stormed the beaches of Normandy in history’s largest amphibious assault, they staged one of history’s greatest military deceptions. The top-secret ruse — complete with rubber tanks, body doubles, fake radio chatter and double agents — successfully duped Adolf Hitler and Nazi commanders and laid the groundwork for D-Day success on June 6, 1944. WWII - OperationBodyguard
  • 5. © Fidelis Cybersecurity SavingSeaTurtles PROBLEM 140 Million Years on Earth Top Endangered Species Poachers Steal/Sell Eggs Consistent/Pervasive Problem SOLUTION 3D Printed Fake GPS Eggs Decoy Eggs Look Real Poachers Cannot Detect Enables Tracking/Mapping
  • 6. © Fidelis Cybersecurity OpportunityforCyberDeception Knowing what attackers desire creates an opportunity for an active defense; to lure, detect, and defend. Global Average Dwell Time 99 Days Preventive Defenses Deception Layer Lures Attack Lures
  • 7. © Fidelis Cybersecurity CaptureTheFlag(CTF) Cyber CTF Games Jeopardy-Style Different challenges Broad range of categories Earn points per challenge Quality vs time/race Attack-Defense Blue team defends network Goal to detect attacks Red team attacks network Goal to capture flag(s)
  • 8. © Fidelis Cybersecurity BluevsRedTeams Blue Team focus includes: Defending networks and systems Monitoring security defenses Security control effectiveness Hardening systems and controls Identifying security flaws Incident response Red Team focus includes: White-hat hacker role as threat actors Adversarial assessments (or pen-testing) Real-world attack simulations w/o damage Assess vulnerabilities to improve defenses Challenge preconceived notions In 1932, Rear Admiral Yarnell demonstrated how the Japanese could attack Pearl Harbor to wipe out the Pacific fleet almost exactly as it occurred nine years later. The attack simulation was deemed a success, however not in the final report. Japanese radio deception was effective on US intelligence for the offensive strike.
  • 11. © Fidelis Cybersecurity CTFRealNetwork Real-world network complete with assets, users, services and data. 29 Users 1,491 Documents 5,532 Emails 31 Applications installed 3 Full browser profiles (Chrome, IE, FF) 2 Corporate web applications 2 Databases 1 Domain Controller (DC) 1 DNS Server 1 Private cloud service
  • 12. © Fidelis Cybersecurity CTFDeceptionLayer The decoys were defined with a variation of interactive capabilities. Some decoy services appeared only as open ports, while others were full-blown services, appearing to run real applications. Among the services made available were TCP, UDP, SMB, HTTP, ICMP, RDP, FTP, MYSQL, SMTP and SSH. 10 decoys • 7 Workstations (user and development machines running Windows 7) • 2 Windows Servers (running Windows 2012 and Windows 2008) • 1 Ubuntu Linux server 95 decoy services Breadcrumbs or traps include: 61 files 39 beacon traps 27 emails 26 credentials 12 applications 10 IoT devices 2 network traps Breadcrumbs make deception deterministic by leading attackers to decoys, versus static honeypots waiting to be found.
  • 13. © Fidelis Cybersecurity ExampleTraps Email Trap (unstructured data) Chrome Browser Trap (structured data)
  • 14. © Fidelis Cybersecurity CTFDeceptionChallenge CTF challenge to find 5 file hashes for information spread across assets Participants provided access to one asset via RAT (Remote Access Trojan) The first file hash containing key information resides on this infected asset Each subsequent file hash was technically harder to find requiring more expertise Each attacker or team worked solo on a fresh instance of the environment Tasks include gathering intelligence, collecting information, and moving laterally Public invitation to: • Red teams • Pen-testers • Security researchers Best applicants selected Written mission brief & goals Challenge ran for 1+ month 52 participants w/global profile 6-7 hours of time/participant Dozen+ malware types also tested in parallel
  • 15. © Fidelis Cybersecurity TheKnowledgeGap Mission brief provided key intel on first challenge • Read the brief, averaged ~100 commands • Did not read, used spray and pray efforts Knowledge before and during phases reduces knowledge gap/commands Over time hackers become quieter and harder to detect Early detection is critical Deception layers need to be automatically kept current and dynamic
  • 16. © Fidelis Cybersecurity TrapConsumption Attacker Profiles • 52 Humans • 12 Malware dynamic
  • 17. © Fidelis Cybersecurity Traps:ManvsMachine Average human triggered 10.5 traps Humans target files, email & unstructured data Malware targets apps and structured data Passwords/credentials: • Found 2 on average • Utilized 2.5 times/avg • Max reuse: 11 times in 11 places Password traps near decoys are very effective Trap variety is important to cover attack types
  • 18. © Fidelis Cybersecurity DecoyAccess On average, each attacker interacted with nearly 10 decoy services No decoy had more than 47% activity, signaling variety is important Sloppy attacks used scanners with pings and SYNs, non-interactive noise, easy for decoys to detect Sophisticated attacks were focused on specific decoys with high interaction Decoy variety is important with live services to engage attackers
  • 19. © Fidelis Cybersecurity CTFDeceptionSummary Sophisticated attacks are more targeted and highly interactive than careless and noisy low interaction scanning Deception needs to be diverse to be effective against malware and human attackers Deception layers should as realistic as possible, kept current, and dynamic to increase the knowledge gap against attackers Augment deception layers with network and traffic analysis for increased visibility and accuracy Deception lures, detects and consumes attacker time, thus diverting and slowing attacks
  • 20. © Fidelis Cybersecurity LearnMore –CTFWhitePaper In-depth Research White Paper More details on Traps/Breadcrumbs More depth on Decoy Services Online at - www.fidelissecurity.com
  • 21. © Fidelis Cybersecurity LeaderinAutomatedDetection&Response Global Presence • Established 2002 • Headquartered in Washington, DC • Fortune 100 & DoD enterprise proven • Proactive, MDR, and, IR service expertise Comprehensive visibility across network to endpoints Real-time and historical forensics analysis Extensible patented deep session inspection platform On-premise and/or cloud deployable form factors
  • 22. © Fidelis Cybersecurity AutomatedDetection&Response(ADR) 22 Breach Detection Endpoint Detection & Response Intelligent Deception Highlights • Automatically do what experienced security analysts would do. • Leverage native visibility across enterprise to detect threats using a wide variety of techniques. • Enable investigation, containment, and remediation process by validating alerts. • Lure, detect and defend against attackers in your network.
  • 23. © Fidelis Cybersecurity FidelisElevate Platform 23 Fidelis Network Fidelis Endpoint Fidelis Deception Improve Security Operations’ Efficiency and Effectiveness • Shift from clues to conclusions by combining similar alerts with context for quick action • Pre-validate network alerts at the endpoint • Reduce the time to respond • Gain visibility across the entire kill chain • Employ an active post-breach defense that lures attackers to decoys and adapts to your network as it changes
  • 24. © Fidelis Cybersecurity QuestionsandNextSteps Key Resources Fidelis Deception Datasheet https://www.fidelissecurity.com/resources/ fidelis-deception-module Case Study on How First MidWest Bank Uses Fidelis Deception https://www.fidelissecurity.com/case- study-first-midwest-bank