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The Global Operating Environment: Strategic Implications
1. BMG, LLC
A presentation to
CGSC Class, Logistics University
Fort Lee, Virginia
by
Douglas Macgregor, PhD
Colonel (ret) U.S. Army
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
15 May 2018
The Global Operating
Environment:
Strategic Implications
The Global
Operating Environment
2. BMG, LLC
Historic Problems with American National Military
Strategy:
1. Failure to recognize that American resources and
American patience are not unlimited;
2. Failure to define attainable political-military goals;
3. Failure to accurately gauge American competence to
execute;
4. Failure to identify America’s competitive military
advantage;
5. Failure to understand the opposing forces.
“I cannot help wondering why none of us realized what
the modern rifle, the machine gun, motorization, the
airplane, and wireless telegraphy would bring about.”
Sir John French, Commander of the 1914 British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France
Strategic
Considerations:
3. BMG, LLC
Northeast Asia: China, the
Koreas and Japan
“If North Korea takes bold action to quickly
denuclearize, the U.S. is prepared to work with
North Korea to achieve prosperity on par with our
South Korean friends.”
U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo, Korean Herald, 12 May 2018
Ichiro Fujisaki, former Japanese ambassador to
Washington, noted: “The U.S. [Army] presence is
more symbolic than really there to fight against
North Korea.”
“U.S. Troop Presence Not on Agenda of N. Korea-U.S. Summit,”
Chosunilbo, 11 May 2018.
During their meeting in Tokyo, Abe and Li agreed
that China will expand imports of farm products
from Japan… two more Japanese mills for polishing
rice for shipments to China, including one in
Hokkaido.
The Japan News, 13 May 2018
4. BMG, LLC
Russia,
Israel and Iran:
Iran has tried to increase the permanent Iranian
presence in Syria by adding a naval port, but Assad
refused due to Russian objections;
Putin has consistently demonstrated his
willingness to tolerate Israeli attacks against
activities in Syria that support the Iranians or
Hezbollah;
Iran and Hezbollah were useful allies in the Syrian
civil war, but Russia has no interest in prolonging
conflict in Syria that will consume more resources
and cause more Russian casualties;
Israel will likely press until a pro-Israeli
government (like the Shah’s) exists in Tehran.
5. BMG, LLC
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and
the Near East
Turkish President Erdogan is playing a clever hand;
If Turkey can dominate Kurdistan [with the rationale
of eliminating terrorist threats], Washington will
complain, but is unlikely to stop Turkey from regaining
control of large oil fields lost in 1919 at Versailles;
American assumptions that a weak, Shi’ite-majority-
ruled Iraq would be hospitable to Sunni Arabs or
Kurds were, and still are ridiculous;
Bottom Line: The challenge posed to US national
security, to the health and safety of Americans on
U.S. soil, has overwhelmingly been from Sunni
Islamists, not Shi’a Islamists [a.k.a. Khomeini’ists].
6. BMG, LLC
Germany, France and
NATO
“Merkel will increase defense spending to 1.3% of
GDP next year, but then it will fall back… As a result
Germany will continue to take advantage of the
military spending undertaken by others, including
Britain but also, of course, America.”
“Who is the West’s real rogue elephant?” Sunday
Times, UK, 13 May 2018
The German Military is “not equipped to meet the
tasks before it.”
Hans-Peter Bartels, Parliamentary Commissioner for the
Armed Forces, 20 February 2018, The Telegraph
President Macron: "I regret the decision [JCPOA] of
the American President. I think it's an error.“
Quoted in the Associated Press, 9 May 2018
7. BMG, LLC
Time, Space, Lethality
Implications
Range + Precision increases Lethality, Expands
the Battlespace (ISR-STRIKE);
One salvo from 5 BM-30 Smerch (MLRS
launchers) can devastate an area the size of
NYC’s Central Park (3.2 square miles) in a few
minutes.
Dispersion plus Mobility Reduces Exposure to
Enemy C2, ISR and WMD;
Dispersion demands thinking Soldiers (self-
organizing and self-contained formations);
Time to Decide: Future Warfare demands real-
time decisions based on incomplete data sets.
8. BMG, LLC
When Armies don’t
change:
In the West, between 1919 and 1939 the
Generals squandered the potential for
revolutionary change.
• After WW I, the Western Armies viewed tanks through the
lens of traditional warfighting. Air Force officers were
divorced from developments on the ground.
• Between 1919 and 1939 the British, French and American
Army Senior leaders focused on single service solutions—
traditional Infantry/cavalry/artillery roles.
• Generals fought for budget share & end-strength, not
capability;
• Generals Experimented with the “familiar,’ preserving the
status quo structure—suppressing innovation.
9. BMG, LLC
• Between 1927 and 1935, the Germans created a
special purpose organization (staffed with captains,
majors, LTCs and a Colonel) to experiment with the
new technologies of war that was not subordinated to
the German Army branch structure.
• Free of interference, the special purpose organization
created new combined arms formations to cooperate
with Air Force fighter and reconnaissance aircraft.
• In 1935, Germany established the HQTRS for five new
Panzer (armored) Divisions. By 1940, Germany fielded
10 Panzer Divisions.
The special purpose organization produced
revolutionary change in 1940.
When armies
Change:
10. BMG, LLC
Don’t Bet on
Unobtainium
When modernizing, don’t build a better carburetor. Go for fuel injection;
However, betting on a ‘once in a generation’ technological breakthrough is not
a winning strategy. It has failed before;
The hype and expectations of artificial intelligence (AI) are far beyond the
technical reality. (Brooks and Aaronson versus Kurzweil on AI).
11. BMG, LLCConclusions
1. Strategy demands change in how Washington views the world;
2. “If you believe theologians, nothing is innocent; and, if you believe
the military nothing is safe.” Lord Salisbury, UK PM;
3. Without honest, rigorous experimentation, modernization fails;
4. If you prepare for the Super Bowl, you can fight a pickup team;
5. However, if you prepare for a sand lot pickup team and you go to
the Super Bowl, you lose.
“… just by creating the Futures Command, is that going to solve your problem? The
answer is no." Raymond DuBois, former undersecretary of the Army during the
FCS effort. Quoted in Military.Com, 28 April 2018
Hinweis der Redaktion
National Strategy: The art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives. Also called national security strategy or grand strategy.
National Security Strategy: The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. See also military strategy; national military strategy; strategy; theater strategy.
Iran was always at risk of being invaded by the USSR — and Stalin almost pulled it off towards the end of WWII. Moscow ultimately was frustrated there, and its agents, the MeK and Communist Party of Iran, never had a chance. The Soviets tried to get their link to the IO and their sole real ally, India, via Afghanistan and eventually Baluchistan, but that failed, too.
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/01/asia/russia-north-korea-analysis/index.html
Russia's power play in North Korea aimed at both China and US
By Jamie Tarabay, CNN
Updated 8:07 AM ET, Sun September 3, 2017
(CNN) When Russia sent its bombers flying over the Korean Peninsula las week, it was as much a signal to Beijing, as it was a telegraph to Washington that Moscow too, was pivoting to Asia.
Field a Special Purpose Organization to experiment, honestly. Include aerospace and naval officers;
Design for contested (non-Permissive) battle space;
Focus on exploiting what works now differently (create new Joint capabilities);
Emphasize high lethality, low density solutions that are inherently Joint capable from bottom to top.
When the NRL completed their study on High Energy Lasers (HEL 100 kW) the researchers discovered serious limitations on the propagation efficiency of a beam emitted through the Earth’s atmosphere. We cannot erase these physical limitations regardless of how much money we invest.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/5/4/support-growing-for-directed-energy-weapons
Support Growing for Directed Energy Weapons
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
The Army Generals see plastic frame quadcopters being shot down by lasers on small arms range and think that there is a glimmer of hope. It's really an act of desperation fed by delusions and ignorance of science and technology.
Indisputable trends in technology that influence land warfare:
1) Longwave radars, IR, and computer processing power have altered the warfighting environment for stealth aircraft (manned and unmanned).
2) EW aircraft designed to emit jamming signals is itself a beacon that tells enemy ADA, “Here I am, shoot me.” This outcome is deal for passive targeting ADA missiles.
3) Decoy jammers can be countered by variations in the emitted radar signal that require these decoys to copy and emit exactly the predicted return signature of that errant signal. Decoys are not difficult to identify.
4) With multi spectral filters missiles can filter out real vs decoy heat signatures. IR counter measures will not work as they once did.
5) The only place where an airborne network is safe is over areas that are not covered by enemy ADA.
Everyone on Capitol Hill will tell you the same thing if you care to listen. The last 16 years of conflict with weak insurgent (opponents without armies, air forces or air defenses) severely eroded the United States’ military-technological edge and operational flexibility—particularly those of the U.S. Army. But few members bother to explore just how the billions of dollars they provide to the Army are invested. This is dangerous. There is nothing more terrible than active ignorance.
In the 26 years since Desert Storm, the U.S. Army has cancelled dozens of major acquisition programs including armored fighting vehicles, helicopters, artillery systems, infantry weapons, munitions and communications systems (most recently the $9 Billion WIN-T fiasco). Precisely how many billions of dollars have been lost is hard to know given the U.S. Government’s inability to audit the Department of the Army.
Preparing Soldiers to fight a new and different war in the distant future is a tertiary consideration.
In response to the consistent failure of the Army’s existing Four Star Training and Doctrine Command to modernize the Army (the purpose for which TRADOC was originally created in 1973), the Army stands up yet another Four Star Army Command charged with overseeing modernization. Why the Senate and the House would reward the consistent failure of the Army’s senior leaders to think outside of the proverbial box for at least two decades with another Four Star bureaucratic Headquarters is baffling, if not ludicrous. But that’s the plan.