1. INT310 Eric Tallant
Mod 3, Assignment 2
Analyzing Potential Russian Goals in Eastern Ukraine
Class 042015 eric.tallant@us.army.mil 06/13/2015

2. The annexation of the Crimea into the Russian Federation has caused a large amount of
turmoil in the eastern region of the Ukraine. Reports of continued violence between pro-Russian
separatists and Ukrainian nationalists are ongoing. Although it is believed that the recent protests
in Kiev and ouster of a pro-Russian Ukrainian president sparked Russia’s need to annex the
Crimea, analyzing Russian intentions in the region, and in Ukraine are important to determining
if conflict will remain frozen in the eastern region, or if it will spread further west into the
Ukraine. To determine Russian goals in this region, it is important to view the conflict from
several different hypotheses. Russian President Vladimir Putin feels that Russian annexation of
the Crimea is a protection of native Russians in the region. Another way of hypothesizing
Russian goals in the region is to view advancement of Russian borders, and forces into the region
as a way of holding back western/EU influence in the region. Simply put, re-growing Russian
influence in former Soviet Bloc countries. The following analysis of open source intelligence
(OSINT) measured by competing hypotheses will hope to determine the likely goals of Russia in
Eastern Ukraine.
Late in 2013, large amounts of protestors filled the streets of Kiev, Ukraine’s capitol city.
The protests were sparked by the failure of the now ousted Ukrainian president Viktor
Yanukovych to reach a free trade deal with the Euro-Zone (Taylor, 2013). Yanukovych instead
moved towards a trade partnership with the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). The ECU is a
Russian led trade cooperative between the former Warsaw Pact countries of Belarus, Russia, and
Kazakhstan (Taylor, 2013). Ukraine is a former Soviet state, and has struggled to maintain
independence from Russia since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Viktor Yanukovych was
previously ousted as the president of Ukraine in 2004 during a two month period of protest called
the “Orange Revolution” (Karpayak, 2013). Ukrainian citizens elected a pro-Western president,

3. Viktor Yushchenko, during the “Orange Revolution”. Viktor Yushchenko was defeated in 2010
by Viktor Yanukovych, once again returning Ukraine’s political and economic direction towards
Russia (Karpayak, 2013).
As discussed in the opening paragraph, analyzing Russia’s, or to be more precise, Vladimir
Putin’s objectives in Eastern Ukraine falls under several different competing hypotheses. The
hypothesis that Russia’s interest in Eastern Ukraine is preserving Russian lives and values in the
region are stated in the following when address by Putin to the Russian Duma about the
annexation of Crimea in 2014, “…Now, many years later, I heard residents of Crimea say that
back in 1991 they were handed over like a sack of potatoes. This is hard to disagree with.
And what about the Russian state? What about Russia? It humbly accepted the situation.
(kremlin.ru, 2014)”. Taking this line from Putin’s address to the Duma, and putting it into
historical perspective does lend some credence to the hypothesis that Russia really is interested
in preserving the lives and culture of ethnic Russians living in Eastern Ukraine.
Crimea, which until recently was part of Ukraine, has had a long history of both conflict and
settlement with Russia. Russian influence in the Crimea dates back many centuries. The Crimea
was forcefully annexed once before by Russia in 1783 (smithsonian.com, 2014). Then Russian
Empress Catherine the Great wished to re-exert Russian influence in the region. This led to a
number of wars, and regional conflicts between ethnic-Slavic Ukrainians, and Russians over the
past three centuries. Tensions between the Ukraine and Russia came to an awful head in 1928.
Then General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Josef Stalin demanded that Ukrainian
Communists formally submit to Russian influence (author unknown, 1993). Ukraine, being one
of the largest wheat producers in Europe, was able to support themselves without external aide.

4. Knowing this, and needing to teach Ukrainian peasants a painful lesson, Stalin ordered the
seizure of all grain from the Ukraine for transportation to either Russia, for use or trade by the
Russian government (author unknown, 1993). The effects of this policy did not take full effect
for about a year. Ukrainian peasants had a grain and wheat surplus. Stalin ordered the further
seizure of grain stores, and ordered the execution of peasants caught stealing grain (author
unknown, 1993). The mass starvation of Ukrainians by Stalin became known as the Holodormor
Holocaust (author unknown, 1993). During 1933, it is estimated that 25,000 Ukrainians died a
day, with a final total of Ukrainians killed by Stalin’s forced starvation policy being around 10
million (Cairns, 1989).
The events of World War II transformed Ukraine’s geographical boundaries and ethnic make-
up (Cairns, 1989). Initially, Russian forces were expelled from the Ukraine after Nazi forces
seized Poland, and expanded their military occupation eastward (Cairns, 1989). Occupying Nazi
forces executed gypsies and native Slavic peoples in Ukraine. A pro-Ukrainian insurgency,
coupled with advancing Soviet forces repelled Nazi forces within Ukraine and Poland. The
genocide of native Ukrainians, and eventual post war settlement of Russians in the Ukraine
transformed the population demographic of the Ukraine. Post-war resettlements of Russians in
Eastern Ukraine, shared communist ideologies/governance, and the formal annexation of the
Ukraine into the Soviet Union via The Warsaw Pact placed the Ukraine firmly under the control
of Moscow.
The economic/political crash and dismantling of the USSR in 1991/1992 appeared to do very
little in regards to changing population demographics in the Ukraine. Ukrainians living in the
Eastern and Crimean region of the Ukraine appear to largely identify with Russia either

5. culturally, ethnically, or both. While citizens living in Central and Western Ukraine appear to
mostly identify with rooted native Ukrainian/Slavic cultural values.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was left with a large amount of nuclear weapons
from the USSR. The amount of nuclear weapons left on Ukrainian soil were the fourth largest
cache in the world (McLaughlin, 2014). In 1994, Western countries began to pressure Ukraine to
giving up this large stockpile of nuclear armaments. Ukrainian officials conceded to
disarmament with assurances from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom that if the
need arise, these superpowers would provide defense (McLaughlin, 2014).
The defense pact between Russia, United States, and the UK provides the bedrock for the
hypothesis that Russia is interested in limiting Western influence in Eastern Ukraine, and
preserving its economic and physical boundaries in the region by keeping the area in a bit of
turmoil. As was mentioned earlier in the analysis, Russia has worked hard to keep a puppet
president in charge of Kiev, and Ukraine over the last decade and a half. The Ukraine has swung
between having a pro-Western back government, and a Russian controlled government. The
Ukraine is bordered by NATO member countries Poland and Romania. Thus making the Ukraine
a buffer state between Western backed countries and Russia. Seizure of the Crimea, and further
conflict in Eastern Ukraine would cause NATO forces to halt their military advance into the
Ukraine, and give pause to providing weapons to pro-Western forces in the region because it
would be seen as a proxy war against Russia. Proxy wars, or overt war between NATO and
Russia would have large unintended economic, social, and political consequences. Russian
President Vladimir Putin, and his strategists, may understand this and feel the need to keep
turmoil active in the Eastern Ukrainian region. This strategy provides Russia with breathing
room between themselves and NATO, and allows Russia to project national strength.

6. Of the two competing hypotheses presented into this analysis, the evidence that Russia is only
interested in protecting native Russians in Eastern Ukraine seems the lease plausible. Although
annexing the Crimea into the Russian Federation does support this hypothesis on the surface, the
evidence that limiting Western influence on Russia, while putting forth nationalist strength
seems to be the most likely scenario. One could even view the large number of Russians living in
Eastern Ukraine as a political “fifth column” to be used as justification for expanding Russian
territory and limiting Western influence. Russian citizens living in Eastern Ukraine are
Moscow’s justification for their actions. The Ukraine is surrounded by NATO member countries,
and the Western Ukrainian capitol of Kiev seems to want to pull its economic and political
destiny towards these countries. Russia has a vested political and economic interest in mitigating
this. Western influence encroaching on Russia could destabilize Russia. Political and economic
powers within Russia could be weakened by an expanding NATO presence on its borders.
Annexation of the Crimea by Russia, and continued strife in Eastern Ukraine creates a buffer
zone between NATO and Russia. NATO and its member states may be hesitant to overtly
intervene in Ukraine because this may be seen as an act of war by Russia. Instead, NATO builds
its forces along Ukrainian border counties, and hopes of containing Russian expansion further
into the region. Russia’s goals in Eastern Ukraine are to keep the area destabilized through
limited conflict, project nationalist power, and reap strategic economic benefits by controlling
the Crimean region.

7. References:
Taylor. (2014, April 1). Newsbeats Guide To....Ukraine.
Retrieved June 13, 2015,
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/25861038/newsbeats-guide-to-ukraine
Karatynck, A. (2005, March 1). Ukraine's Orange Revolution.
Retrieved June 13, 2015,
from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2005-03-01/ukraines-orange-
revolution
Putin, V. (2014, March 18). Address by President of the Russian Federation.
Retrieved June 13, 2015,
from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

8. Harris, C. (2014). When Catherine the Great Invaded the Crimea and Put the Rest of the World
on Edge.
Retrieved June 13, 2015,
From http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-catherine-great-invaded-crimea-and-
put-rest-world-edge-180949969/?no-ist
McLaughlin, L. (2014, April 15). The Conflict in Ukraine: A Historical Perspective.
Retrieved June 15, 2015,
From http://www.summer.harvard.edu/blog-news-events/conflict-ukraine-historical-
perspective
Nazi collaborator or Ukrainian hero, a historical figure emerges as icon of crisis. (n.d.).
Retrieved June 15, 2015,
from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-ghost-of-world-war-ii-history-haunts-ukraines-
standoff-with-russia/2014/03/25/18d4b1e0-a503-4f73-aaa7-5dd5d6a1c665_story.html

9. Laroslava Mouzytchenko, “ Les vicissitudes du patrimoine ukrainien à partir de la Seconde
Guerre mondiale ”, Ethnologie française 2/2004 (Vol. 34) , p. 303-307
URL : www.cairn.info/revue-ethnologie-francaise-2004-2-page-303.htm.