Ex. 131

1
IN THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER
THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES,
PCA NO. 2009-23
BETWEEN
_____________________________________
CHEVRON CORPORATION AND TEXACO PETROLEUM COMPANY,
Claimants,
-and-
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN LAW DECLARATION OF FABIÁN ANDRADE
NARVÁEZ
I, Fabián Andrade Narváez, declare that what I express here is true and correct.
1. Scope of the statement
1. I submit this supplemental declaration on Ecuadorian Law at the Republic’s
request to respond to different aspects of the various reports submitted by Claimants’ experts in
support of Claimants’ submissions of June 5, 2013 and May 9, 2014.1
2. Summary of the conclusions
2. My conclusions are summarized below, and supplement those of my earlier report
of February 18, 2013 (“First Declaration”), which I hereby ratify and refer to as appropriate.
1
Specifically, this declaration addresses several aspects of the following reports:
(i) Dr. Enrique Barros’ Fifth Report (June 3, 2013)
(ii) Dr. César Coronel’s Fifth Report (June 3, 2013)
(iii) Dr. Santiago Velazquez’ Report (June 3, 2013)
(iv) Dr. Jorge Wright’s Report (June 3, 2013)
(v) Dr. César Coronel’s Sixth Report (May 7, 2014)

2
a. Piercing of the Corporate Veil
In his fifth report, Dr. Coronel reaffirms his disagreement with the way the Provincial
Court of Sucumbíos (the “Provincial Court”) addressed the issue of corporate separateness in the
first-instance judgment (the “Judgment”).
He does not, however, offer any substantive opinion on the principles governing the
piercing of the corporate veil in Ecuador that may differ from what I expressed in my First
Declaration. Dr. Coronel does, however, advance a new proposition: both TexPet and Texaco
should have been heard in the litigations against Chevron (hereinafter, the “Lago Agrio
Litigation”) because, in his view, “In a claim requesting the piercing of the corporate veil, all of
the companies or persons involved in the alleged abuse of the corporate structure must be joined
as parties to the proceedings.”
This contention finds no basis in Ecuadorian procedural law. Where an action is sought
upon sufficient evidence that a party has abused of the corporate structure of another, it is the
former, and no one else, who is called to defend itself at trial. The legal entity whose corporate
structure the defendant has abused of is not a necessary participant in the proceeding against
such defendant. There is no statute or case precedent that states otherwise.
b. Causation
Dr. Coronel and Dr. Barros argue that the Provincial Court erred by failing to establish
causation between the actions attributed to TexPet (and through it, to Chevron) and the damages
alleged in the complaint. Both experts omit, however, reference to two fundamental principles of
Ecuadorian law governing tort claims arising from inherently hazardous activities.
First, Ecuadorian jurisprudence has fashioned a presumption of liability in cases where
the alleged harm arises from a hazardous activity (a category that includes hydrocarbon
activities). In those cases, liability attaches by the mere performance of the hazardous activity,
not by particular acts. To overcome the presumption, one of the following statutory exemptions
from liability must apply: (i) force majeure or unforeseeable circumstances; (ii) the exclusive act
of a third party; or (iii) the exclusive fault of the victim. Accordingly, in tort claims involving
hydrocarbons operations, the victim is relieved of the burden of affirmatively proving the
defendant’s fault; instead, it is upon the latter to show that it is not liable at all.
Second, the law of torts in Ecuador mandates that all those who have acted in the
commission of a tortious act are jointly and severally liable for the resulting harm. It is the
plaintiff’s prerogative to seek damages from one, some or all of the joint tortfeasors.
Accordingly, any liability that could possibly attach to PetroEcuador concerning the facts alleged
in the complaint here does not prevent the entry of a judgment against Chevron. Chevron is
entitled to seek reimbursement or indemnification from PetroEcuador for the latter’s share of the
damages as a joint and severally liable tortfeasor.
c. Alleged prevalence of expert evidence in the assessment of the evidentiary record
Dr. Coronel and Dr. Barros argue that the Provincial Court was required to rely primarily
on expert testimony while assessing the evidentiary record. Although a review of the Judgment

3
reveals that the Court did rely on voluminous expert evidence, the Court was entitled to weigh
the evidence in accordance with his best judgment. Procedural law in Ecuador does not admit
prevalence of any type of evidence over another; it has abandoned the system known as tarifa
legal (prevalence of certain evidence of other forms) and instead affords the litigants the freedom
to support their case through whichever evidence they deem most appropriate. Claimants’
experts’ contrary opinion has no basis in law.
d. Award of extra petita damages in the Judgment
Dr. Coronel insists on his view that the following categories of damages in the Judgment
are extra petita: (i) [funding for] a community reconstruction and ethnic reaffirmation program;
and (ii) creation of a potable water system. Both of these two categories of damages, however,
fall directly within the scope of the requested relief.
Ecuadorian law adopted the principle of integral reparation (restitutio in integrum),
defining the extent of reparation in cases involving environmental harm as the “return of an
ecosystem or the affected population to its prior condition.” On the basis of the harm alleged
therein, the Lago Agrio Complaint seeks the following relief (i) “the elimination or removal of
the contaminant elements that still threaten the environment and health of the residents”, and
(ii) “[t]he remediation of the environmental harm caused, in accordance with art. 43 of the
[EMA].” These two categories of damages in question are (i) consistent with the requested
relief, and (ii) intended to remedy the harm alleged in the complaint.
e. Undue joinder of claims
Dr. Coronel again states that civil actions under the Civil Code tort provisions, even if the
cause of action arises from harm on the environment, cannot be heard jointly in the same
proceeding with claims under Article 43 of the Environmental Management Act (“EMA”). But
as explained in my First Declaration, EMA Article 43 mandates that all tort civil actions arising
from environmental harm, whether seeking to redress actual harm or prevent contingent harm
from materializing, be heard in oral summary proceedings. This provision admits no exceptions
and is confirmed by the actual court practice in Ecuador.
f. Setting the bond to stay enforcement of a judgment
Dr. Coronel asserts that the possible amount of a bond to stay enforcement of the Lago
Agrio Judgment would, if Chevron had requested it, have ranged between US$ 1.9 billion and
US$ 14.6 billion. Dr. Coronel agrees, however, that no legal parameters exist in Ecuador to
guide Courts in setting the amount of such bond.
In fact, a review of actual court practice in Ecuador reveals that the value of bonds set to
stay enforcement of judgments challenged on cassation tends to be a small fraction of the amount
in dispute, ranging from less than one percent to five percent of said amount.
g. Waiver of judicial inspections
Dr. Wright elaborates on Claimants’ contention that the Provincial Court approved and
was thus bound by a protocol that the parties adopted by mutual agreement in connection with

4
the performance of the judicial inspections ordered by the Court.2
Dr. Wright specifically argues
that (i) the judicial inspections were the product of a contractual agreement, and (ii) the court
acted illegally when it accepted the Plaintiffs’ renunciation to the performance of a number of
judicial inspections which had been previously ordered at Plaintiffs’ request. These contentions
have no basis in Ecuadorian law.
First, the judicial inspections are regulated by applicable rules and are not the product of
a contractual agreement between the litigant parties. In the Lago Agrio Litigation, during the
evidentiary period each party requested, and the Court then ordered, the production of judicial
inspections. The so-called Protocol was executed approximately one year later for the sole
purpose of streamlining the process of conducting the judicial inspections.
Second, the production of evidence is a procedural right of a litigant, which can be
waived so long as the waiver is effected before the evidence in question is actually produced.
This waiver (i) affects only the rights of the moving party, and (ii) is allowed by applicable law.
h. Assessment of the evidence of procedural fraud presented by Chevron
Dr. Coronel argues that the National Court erred by declining to examine Chevron’s
purported evidence of fraud, and also by upholding a similar decision by the Provincial Court on
appeal. The fact is that neither the Provincial Court nor the National Court had the requisite
competence to examine and rule upon such purported evidence, so both courts correctly declined
to do so in accordance with applicable rules of procedure.
Rules of appellate procedure in respect of judgments issued in oral summary proceedings
do not admit the production of any evidence. Rather, the appellate court must rule on the basis
of the trial record, so the purported evidence of fraud that Chevron submitted to the Provincial
Court on appeal was inadmissible. Identical restrictions apply at the cassation appeal level,
where the National Court’s review is limited to legal matters, and applicable rules of procedure
expressly rule out any possibility of submitting new evidence.
Accordingly, neither court is an available proper forum for Chevron to air its allegations
of fraud and proffer new evidence. As elaborated below, Ecuadorian law provides for an action
under the Collusive Prosecution Act specifically designed to address cases of judicial fraud such
as the one Chevron alleges here.
i. The Ecuadorian State is not liable for the conduct of an expert witness
Court-appointed experts in Ecuador are not officers of the court or otherwise public
servants under Ecuadorian law. Accordingly, the acts of a court-appointed expert are not, and
cannot be, imputed to the Judiciary or otherwise trigger any liability for the State. Any liability
for the acts of a court-appointed expert, be it civil, administrative and/or criminal, attaches only
to the expert at a personal level.
2
The protocol that the parties executed was styled “Terms of Reference for the Role of Experts” (hereinafter,
“Protocol” or “Terms of Reference”).

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j. Chevron’s allegation of collusion through Ecuador’s purported “promotion” of the
Judgment
Claimants allege that certain acts of the State must be construed as collusion with the
Lago Agrio Plaintiffs and overt acts in furtherance of enforcement of the Judgment. However,
the examples offered by Claimants either (i) are foreign to the legal regime of Ecuador (such is
the case of the alleged issuance of a so-called “certificate of enforceability”), or (ii) refer to
private acts between private parties not involving the State (such as the case of issuance of a
power of attorney before a notary public), or (iii) constitute lawful acts of the State. None of
these examples fits the definition of collusive or fraudulent act under Ecuadorian law or could
otherwise support allegations of collusion between the Republic and the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.
k. Cassation appeals are extraordinary, inherently technical, and formalistic
The cassation appeal is inherently technical and highly formalistic. For example,
Ecuadorian jurisprudence has repeatedly held that “[t]he reasoning and support [of a cassation
appeal] is the most demanding procedural burden imposed on the appellant” and an essential
requirement of admissibility. The Supreme Court (now National Court) has warned that:
[I]t must be carried out in a clear and precise fashion, without lapsing into
vague accusations, linking the content of the allegedly infringed
provisions with the fact and circumstances of the violation. In other
words, the infringement must be shown not simply be indicating that the
judgment violated a certain legal provision but by demonstrating how,
when and in what sense the infringement occurred.
Failure to comply with any of these formalities will likely result in the dismissal
of the appeal.
l. De novo review at the appellate level
The scope of review at the appellate level extends to a comprehensive analysis of the
record in respect of the matters of fact and law that are subject to appeal. The appellate courts
must accordingly conduct an integral review of the factual and legal aspects of the judgment and
render a decision on the basis of that record (meritos del proceso) and the allegations of the
appellant. Cassation appeals cannot be filed against a trial court judgment, but only in respect of
an appellate decision, as required by applicable law.
m. The Collusive Prosecution Act
Ecuador’s Collusive Prosecution Act (“CPA”) was enacted as a remedy to combat
collusive agreements to inflict harm upon a third party. The CPA confers upon the affected
person an action to obtain, inter alia, the anullment of the collusive act or judicial proceeding,
full reparation of the harm suffered as a result of the collusion, and as far as possible, the
restoration of things to the status quo ante.
In this case, the CPA provides the only proper remedy in Ecuador for Chevron to air its
allegations of fraud and to adduce evidence purportedly in support of those allegations. Neither

6
the Court of Appeal, nor the National Court nor the Constitutional Court, had competence to
examine and rule upon evidence not admitted in the Provincial Court. In fact, applicable rules of
procedure expressly rule out the possibility of submitting any evidence beyond the trial level,
and render Chevron's purported evidence inadmissible as a matter of law. Claimants’ contention
that the CPA is available only in respect of collusive transactions affecting real property rights is
also error. Such contention is not only belied by the express language of the CPA statute, but
also refuted expressly by their expert, Dr. Coronel. As several decades of CPA jurisprudence
confirm, the CPA action is an effective mechanism to nullify fraudulent judicial proceedings
infringing upon any kind of right of a party.
3. Analysis
Piercing of the corporate veil
3. In his supplemental report, Dr. Coronel states that “the [Lago Agrio] Judgment
has violated the principle of asset separation [separación patrimonial] of legal persons when it
incorrectly applies the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.”3
Dr. Coronel renders his opinion
on the basis of: (i) the exceptional nature of this doctrine; (ii) his personal assessment of the
relevant facts; and (iii) the procedure that he considers should have been followed to protect the
right of defense.
4. On a substantive level, Dr. Coronel does not raise any conceptual difference with
what I expressed in my First Declaration in respect of the doctrine of piercing of the corporate
veil. We both agree that under Ecuadorian Law, courts in Ecuador can avail themselves of this
mechanism in exceptional circumstances, to prevent fraud or abuse of the corporate structure to
the detriment of third parties.4
5. The differences raised by Dr. Coronel’s report in respect to mine are limited
mainly to his assessment of the facts. In what resembles an appellate brief (alegato), he argues
the reasons for which he believes that the application of this doctrine in this particular case was
in error.
6. I understand that my role in this matter is limited to providing a description of the
Ecuadorian Law applicable to the matters on which my opinion was requested, for the benefit of
the Tribunal. As such, there is little to add to what I already explained in my First Declaration
concerning the law applicable to this particular subject. I will, however, clarify certain aspects of
Dr. Coronel’s additional report that are relevant to the correct understanding of the Ecuadorian
legal system.
7. First, Dr. Coronel states that “[i]n a claim requesting the piercing of the corporate
veil, all of the companies or persons involved in the alleged abuse of the corporate structure
must be joined as parties to the proceeding.”5
That contention is incorrect. Where an action is
3
Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶ 8
4
Id. ¶¶ 8, 18, 20; Foreign Law Declaration of Fabián Andrade Narváez (“RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb.
18, 2013)”) ¶¶ 94-95, 97.
5
Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶ 21.

7
brought against a party who has abused of the corporate structure of another, it is the former, and
no one else, who is called to defend itself at trial. The legal entity whose corporate structure has
been abused is not a necessary participant in the proceeding because no liability can attach to it.
There is no legal provision or case precedent stating otherwise. Indeed, one of the prerequisites
of a successful complaint is that it be brought against the party who is legally obligated to
challenge the plaintiff’s allegations, that is, the party whose liability is sought in the complaint
(here, only the party who abused of the corporate structure of another to the detriment of third
parties).6
8. The only support that Dr. Coronel offers for his statement is an excerpt, taken out
of context, of the judgment issued in the case of Morán vs. Onofre.7
That case concerns a suit
for moral damages against two members of a union, whom the plaintiff claimed were liable for
having encouraged the General Assembly of Stakeholders to pass an illegal resolution expelling
the plaintiff from the union. The then-Supreme Court found that the plaintiff lacked a cause of
action against the union’s stakeholders and should have filed suit instead against the union, as the
party who issued the resolution in question.8
The court declined to pierce the union’s corporate
veil to reach the private parties based on the factual record, but for reasons that had nothing to do
with (as Dr. Coronel argues) any alleged legal rule requiring a plaintiff to name as an additional
defendant the entity whose veil it intended to pierce.9
9. Second, Dr. Coronel maintains that “it is untrue that [Article 17 of the Law on
Companies] provides a legal basis for piercing the corporate veil.”10
In fact I have not stated that
this provision is the legal basis for piercing the corporate veil in Ecuador, only that the doctrine
and case law that led to the development of this doctrine have expressly referred to Article 17 of
the Law of Companies as its antecedent.11
Dr. Santiago Andrade, who currently is part of
Chevron’s legal team in the Lago Agrio case and was a member of the former First Civil and
6
See, e.g., RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013), Annex 36, Angel Puma v. Importadora Terreros
Serrano S.A. (In this case, the claim is directed only against the party whom the Plaintiff considered liable for the
obligation.).
7
Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶ 21 n.9, quoting Morán v. Onofre and Morán. See Coronel
Annex 268, Supreme Court, First Civil and Mercantile Division, July 8, 1999, published in O.R. No. 273, Sept. 9,
1999 (“Morán v. Onofre”).
8
Dr. Coronel asserts that in this case “the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, in an attempt to harm him
with expulsion from the Union to which he belonged, abused its legal personality, which called for the piercing of
the corporate veil to make the defendants personally responsible.” Report of Dr. Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶ 21
n.9. This contention, however, finds no basis in the language of the decision.
9
The court found the factual predicate necessary to pierce the corporate veil lacking. Coronel Annex 268,
Morán v. Onofre, third whereas consideration (“In this case, the General Union of Professional Drivers of the
Province of Guayas, formed years prior to happenings in the present case, cannot be qualified as a fake entity with
the intention of violating the law or with the intent of defrauding the interests of third parties, and of the collective
decision to expel one of its members, all which could all be a violation of the law, or of the defrauding of the
interests of third parties, in which case the legal status may be bypassed and the consequences of the actions of the
union may be attributed to its members.”).
10
11
See, e.g., RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013), Annex 36, Angel Puma v. Importadora Terreros
Serrano S.A., Supreme Court, First Civil and Mercantile Division, File No. 20-03, January 28, 2003 (“Puma vs.
Terreros”).

8
Mercantile Division of the Supreme Court that issued the judgments in Diners v. Chupamar case
and Puma vs. Terreros, among others, has explained:
In our statutory law, the doctrine [of piercing the corporate veil] basically
proceeds in light of the provisions of Article 1562 of the Civil Code and
Article 17 of the Law on Companies.12
10. I therefore fail to see the basis or the purpose of Dr. Coronel’s criticism against
this aspect of my First Declaration.13
11. Finally, at paragraphs 33 and 40 of his report, Dr. Coronel attributes certain
subjective opinions to me regarding the appropriateness (or lack thereof) of the Provincial
Court’s application of the theory of piercing the corporate veil. I have neither “tacitly approved”
nor expressly or tacitly rejected any of the factual aspects of the case. That is not the role of the
expert who is called to report on the law applicable in Ecuador to certain matters relevant to the
case.
Causation
12. Chevron’s experts assert that the Judgment (i) does not establish a causal
connection between the actions that are attributed to TexPet (and through it, to Chevron) and the
damages claimed; (ii) is not based on the technically applicable evidence for determining the
causation between an event and a particular harm; and (iii) does not analyze third parties’
participation in the occurrence of the harm, particularly that of PetroEcuador.14
Both experts
commit legal error, and seem to reduce their reports to a piece of advocacy rather than a
statement of Ecuadorian Law.
12
R-1300, Santiago Andrade Ubidia, Lifting the Corporate Veil in Ecuadorian Legal Theory and Case Law,
in Foro Revista de Derecho (Forum Law Review), No. 11, UASB-Ecuador / CEN, Quito, 2009 at 17-18. Case law
also cites to Article 18, Numeral 7 of the Ecuadorian Civil Code as a basis for this doctrine, establishing that lifting
the corporate veil is a universal principle of law. See RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013), Annex 35, Diners
Club del Ecuador S. A. Sociedad Financiera v. Compañía Mariscos de Chupadores, CHUPAMAR S.A. and Leonel
Baquerizo Luque, Supreme Court, First Civil and Mercantile Division (March 21, 2001), O.R. No. 350 (June 19,
2001) at 5 (“Diners v. Chupamar”).
13
Moreover, Dr. Coronel’s statement is not correct in regard to piercing the corporate veil having been
applied in only one case in Ecuador. Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶ 20 n.7. This statement is
contradicted by Chevron’s own counsel in the Lago Agrio cassation proceedings. See R-1300, Santiago Andrade
Ubidia, Lifting the Corporate Veil in Ecuadorian Legal Theory and Case Law at 20 (“The principle of lifting the
corporate veil was first applied in judgments No. 12—2001, dated 21.03.2000 (Diners Club del Ecuador vs.
Mariscos de Chupadores CHUPAMAR S.A.), and No. 20-03 dated 28.01.2003 (Angel Puma Vs. Importadora
Terremos Serrano Cia. Ltda.), both issued by the First Civil and Commercial Chamber.”). Santiago Andrade also
cites in his book certain authors who have stated that there have been three consecutive rulings upholding the
identical standard in this matter and thus it has become binding case law. See id. at 24 (“There is binding cassation
case law in Ecuador that accepts the applicability of the Theory of Dismissal.”) (citing Eduardo Carmigniani
Valencia and Ortiz García).
14
Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶¶ 9, 49-65. See also Report of Enrique Barros (June 3,
2013) ¶¶ 17, 31, 36-51.

9
1. In inherently hazardous activities such as the exploitation of hydrocarbons,
liability is presumed and the actor’s “fault” need not be proven by the
Plaintiff.
13. The opinions of Dr. Coronel and Dr. Barros ignore fundamental principles of
Ecuadorian Law in matters of tort liability arising from inherently hazardous activities.
Ecuadorian jurisprudence has fashioned a presumption of liability in respect of harm resulting
from such activities; this presumption rests on two factors that distinguish it from the general
rule: (i) a presumption of liability on the party performing the activity; and (ii) the rule by which
this presumption can be rebutted only through evidence that exonerates that party from
liability.15
The elements of this doctrine, as applied to the case at hand, can be summarized as
follows:
i. The activity of hydrocarbon exploitation has been deemed a hazardous
activity.16
In this respect, the presumption of liability attaches as a result of
the mere performance of the hazardous activity, not by particular acts.17
To
establish liability in this case, a Plaintiff need only prove the adverse
environmental impact, and it is for the defendant to refute the causation link
between the hazardous activity (here, hydrocarbons exploitation) and said
environmental harm.18
ii. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, to be exempted from liability the
defendant who conducted the hazardous activity must allege and prove a
statutory exemption from liability, to wit, (i) force majeure or unforeseeable
circumstances, (ii) the exclusive act of a third party, or (iii) the exclusive fault
of the victim. If none of these exceptions is proven, the presumption of
liability is upheld. In this context, it is understood that the victim is relieved
of the burden of affirmatively proving the defendant’s fault, which, again, is
presumed due to the mere performance of the hazardous activity.19
14. The presumption of liability applies in all cases involving the extraction of
hydrocarbons. Accordingly, Dr. Coronel and Dr. Barros’s analyses start from the false premise
15
C-1586, Delfina Torres (Oct. 29, 2002).
16
See id. at 24 (“since the production, manufacture, transport and operation of hydrocarbon substances
undoubtedly constitute dangerous and risky activities”).
17
See id. at 23-24 (“[The] risk theory, according to which one who uses and benefits from any technique or
method that is profitable, which also causes risks, must for this reason assume liability for damages that these risks
entail, since the counterpart to the benefits brought about by such activities is the compensation for harms which
said activity cause to persons or their property.”).
18
See id. at 24 (“Negligence and malice are not prerequisites to the existence of tort liability; all that is
required is that the harm be a direct result of the event. Liability is an objective concept.”).
19
See id. at 21 (“Article 2256 of the Civil Code [current Art. 2229] considers, as we will see below, tort
liability for high risk or dangerous activities, in which negligence is inferred, and which saves victims of a harm
from having to show evidence of negligence, lack of care, or incompetence, and where it falls to the defendant to
show that the harm occurred due to force majeure, or to an accident or the intervention of something is beyond the
control of the party causing the harm or due solely to the fault of the victim.”).

10
that under Ecuadorian Law the victims carry the burden of affirmatively proving causation
between TexPet’s hydrocarbon’s operations and the environmental harm resulting from those
operations.
15. One cannot assume, as Dr. Barros seems to have done, that Chilean doctrine on
the subject matter is applicable mutatis mutandi to Ecuador’s legal regime. Whatever Dr. Barros
opines with respect to Chilean law, the Ecuadorian regime on liability for environmental damage
is not confined entirely to the Articles of the Civil Code. Quite to the contrary, the principles
governing liability for environmental harm in Ecuador have had developed in the Constitution,
specialized legislation and jurisprudence, independent of the purely subjective liability concepts
incorporated as the general rule in the Civil Code.20
Thus, Dr. Barros’ theoretical discussion of
Chilean Law is irrelevant.
16. Nor is it possible to state, as Dr. Barros has done, that “[w]hen there are two or
more dangerous activities which could have caused the damage (in this case, TexPet’s and
Petroecuador’s activity)” it is not “possible to apply such a causation presumption,” because in
this case “the general rule applies, and the plaintiff must prove causation.”21
This conclusion is
manifestly contrary to Ecuadorian practice and to modern trends in Environmental Law,22
which
have shifted the rules on the burden of proof precisely for the purpose of protecting the victims
of the harm.23
It is not by accident that Chevron’s experts do not offer any foundation in
Ecuadorian Law or doctrine in support of their assertion.
17. Dr. Barros states that the Lago Agrio Judgment suffers from two serious
problems, i.e., “(a) the description of the theory [of adequate cause] is incorrect because it does
not authorize the judge to act with discretion and (b) its application is irrelevant to matters of
factual causation.”24
Once again Dr. Barros’s criticism lacks support in Ecuador’s legal system
and runs counter to Ecuadorian case-law.
18. First, the theory of adequate cause gives the judge the discretion to either
establish or negate the causal link between the allegedly injurious act and the harm complained
of. The Lago Agrio Judgment cites the Delfina Torres case as a precedent to the application of
20
The Delfina Torres case identified by Chevron’s experts and cited in the Lago Agrio Judgment discusses
the subject extensively. See C-1586, Delfina Torres (Oct. 29, 2002) at 21-26.
21
Report of Enrique Barros (June 3, 2013) ¶ 58.
22
See R-1301, Evidence of Causation in Environmental Harm, Bonorino y Leal, ACT 1, 39-52, Dec. 2010 at
39, 44-50 (explaining that environmental damage is considered a type of harm that is usually caused by a plurality of
agents and generally not the consequence of a single activity or a single actor, and recognizing that objective
liability principles apply in lieu of requiring proof of factual causation).
23
See, e.g., C-1586, Delfina Torres (Oct. 29, 2002) at 24 (“But since in most cases it is very difficult or
nearly impossible for the victim to meet the burden of proof, it became necessary to reverse the concept of burden of
proof and it is the responsibility of those who participate or profit from risky activities to demonstrate that the
harmful event occurred as a result of a force majeur, chance, the actions of a third party, or solely as a consequence
of the victim’s actions”).
24

11
this theory of causation.25
In that case, the then Supreme Court described the theory of adequate
cause in the following terms (emphasis added):
Theory of adequate cause. This theory, which we agree with, is the one
favored by most legal theorists and the jurisprudence of courts of other
countries. In this theory, it is left up to the Court to analyze whether a
harmful action is capable of supporting a finding of liability for the party
responsible for the action. It does away therefore with any generally
applicable rule and entrusts the decision to the discretional power of the
Court.”26
19. Second, contrary to what Dr. Barros incorrectly asserts, the Supreme Court (the
current National Court) makes no distinction in its decisions between causation in fact and
causation in law when applying the theory of adequate cause.27
Therefore, according to
Ecuadorian jurisprudence, it is not necessary for the judge to make any such (purely academic)
distinction.
2. Chevron’s “third-party action” objection
20. As to Chevron’s experts’ criticism of the Court’s supposed lack of analysis of
third parties’ participation in the occurrence of the harm, the following legal considerations are
relevant.
21. Article 2217 of the Civil Code specifies that all those who have acted in the
commission of a tortious act are “jointly and severally liable” for the resulting harm.28
In light of
25
See C-931, Lago Agrio Judgment at 154 (citing the Delfina Torres case in support of its application of the
theory of adequate cause, explaining that this theory is the preferred one in Ecuadorian legal practice).
26
C-1586, Delfina Torres (Oct. 29, 2002) at 26. See also C-998, Andrade Medina v. CONELEC at 6 (“The
causal relationship between the illegal act and the damage considered must be classified by the courts on the basis of
reasonableness, in each specific case; this Court believes that the different theories on the classification of the causal
relationship, which have been set forth by doctrine, are an important guide for the judge, but they do not limit his
ability to classify the relevant events on the specific circumstances of the matters place for his consideration.”);
RLA-595, Jesús Rodríguez Moreira v. Empresa Eléctrica de Manabí EMELMANABI S.A., Supreme Court of
Justice, Second Civil and Mercantile Chamber, R.O. Suppl. No. 349 (May 30, 2008) (“Rodriguez Moreira v.
EMELMANABI”); RLA-596, Miguel Fernando Hermida Moreira et. al. v. Municipalidad de Cuenca, Supreme
Court of Justice, Adminitrative Contentious Chamber, Cassation Case N0. 414, O.R. Suppl. 620 (June 25, 2009)
(“Hermida Moreira c. Municipalidad de Cuenca”) at 8; RLA-597, Félix Gonzalo López Yánez v. República de
Ecuador, Supreme Court of Justice, Adminitrative Contentious Chamber, Judicial Gazette Year CVIII, Series
XVIII, No. 5, page 2053 (Nov. 16, 2007) (López Yánez c. Republica de Ecuador”) at 5.
27
Report of Enrique Barros (June 3, 2013) ¶¶ 36-37.
28
RLA-163, Civil Code of Ecuador, art. 2217 (“If an intentional or unintentional tort has been committed by
two or more persons, each of them shall be joint and severally liable for any damage stemming from the same
intentional or unintentional tort, except for the exceptions in Articles 2223 and 2228.”). The joint and several
liability of the tortfeasors of the environmental damage is well supported and explained by doctrine. See, e.g., R-
1291, Nestor A. Cafferatta, Introduction to Environmental Law, United Nations Program for the Environment,
National Institute of Ecology, Mexico, 2004 at 134 (“The consideration and evidence of the causal nexus, difficult
and complex in this field, must reasonably lead to the admission of presumptions of causality. . . . For the hypothesis
of environmental harm with a collective or plural causation, where groups of companies appear to be involved as
possible agents, that makes it materially impossible for the victim or victims to determine the authorship in a reliable

12
this joint and several liability rule, it is the plaintiff’s exclusive prerogative to file suit against
any one, some, or all of the possible parties jointly liable for the tortious act.29
According to the
provisions of Article 1538 of the Civil Code, upon payment of any damages award, the party
who has been held legally liable for a joint and several obligation becomes subrogated to the
judgment creditor’s claim against each of his co-tortfeasors for their respective share of the
debt.30
22. Thus, the existence of potential joint tortfeasors who may be jointly and severally
liable with the defendant does not alter the presumption of liability against said defendant nor
does it eliminate or mitigates his/her joint and several liability to the plaintiff.31
Dr. Barros’s
testimony is thus baseless under Ecuadorian Law.32
23. When there is a multiplicity of agents jointly contributing to the harm (as Chevron
asserts in this case), a plaintiff does not have the burden of quantifying the defendant’s share of
overall liability or that which corresponds to the other tortfeasors.33
While Dr. Barros attributes
such a burden to the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs as a “basic requirement of the causal relationship in
civil law,”34
the Ecuadorian legal system harbors no such doctrine; to the contrary, it adopts the
principle of joint and several liability.
manner, the theory of alternative causality or collective harm enshrining the joint and several liability of the
intervening parties must be admitted.”).
29
According to art. 1530 of the Civil Code, the creditor of a joint and several debt (as in the case of the victim
of a tort resulting from the activity of various agents) is in a position to file a complaint against all of them, some of
them, or just one, at his discretion. RLA-163, Civil Code of Ecuador, art. 1530 (“The creditor can act against all the
joint and several debtors jointly, or against any of them, at his discretion, without the latter being able to oppose the
benefit of division”).
30
Id. art. 1538 (“The joint and several debtor who has paid the debt, or has canceled it through any of the
means equivalent to payment, remains subrogated in the creditor’s legal action with all his privileges and securities,
but is limited, vis-a-vis each of the co-debtors, to this co-debtor’s part or share of the debt.”).
31
See RLA-454, Iván Viñán Vásquez v. Federación Médica Ecuatoriana et. al., Supreme Court of Justice,
First Civil and Commercial Chamber, Cassation decision (March 19, 2003) (Viñán v. Federación Médica), where
the Court declared the joint tortfeasors severally and jointly liable for the damages caused to the plaintiff, since their
actions - despite having occurred independently and at different times, contributed to the harmful result. See also C-
1586, Delfina Torres (Oct. 29, 2002) at 36-37.
32
Report of Enrique Barros (June 3, 2013) ¶ 49 (“When there is a variety of possible causes (as in this case),
it is essential that the reasoning take into account technical evidence that each harm is a consequence of the activity
of one of the parties and not the other.”).
33
In fact, in cases of joint and several liability for environmental damage, it is very difficult — if not
impossible — to apportion the liability among the actors jointly contributing to the damages. See R-1291, Nestor A.
Cafferatta, Introduction to Environmental Law, United Nations Program for the Environment, National Institute for
the Ecology, Mexico, 2004 at 13, 63, 72, 105-06. See also C-1586, Delfina Torres (Oct. 29, 2002) at 36-37
(“Therefore to a greater or lesser extent, each one of the three cited companies is liable in tort for the damages
suffered by the neighborhood ‘Delfina Torres viuda de Concha, Propicia No 1,’ and its residents, which the previous
clauses [in this ruling] refer to. For this reason, and in accordance with article 2244 of the Civil Code [current art.
2217], each [of the defendants] is jointly and severally liable for those damages.”).
34

13
24. Dr. Coronel, on the other hand, maintains that the Judgment attributes liability to
Chevron for damages imputable to third parties.35
However, this is not the conclusion that may
be reached from the language of the Judgment. On the contrary, the Judge expressly states that
he will not consider any damages that could be attributable exclusively to third parties (in
particular, to PetroEcuador).36
In his report, Dr. Coronel even cites to some fragments of the
Judgment which confirm the Court’s assertion.37
However, he then concludes that the Court has
in fact attributed liability to Chevron for damage imputable to third parties. It is, therefore,
another subjective statement on the basis of allegations unsupported by the Judgment itself.
25. Claimants further object to the oral summary proceedings as inappropriate for the
resolution of the Lago Agrio Litigation because this kind of proceeding does not allow for the
joinder of third parties and therefore precluded Chevron from joining PetroEcuador as a third-
party defendant.38
This claim has no basis in Ecuadorian Law; in fact, joinder of third parties as
a party defendant is precluded as a general rule in every civil proceeding, even ordinary
proceedings. Oral summary proceedings are not the exception. The law does allow for the
joinder of third parties in few exceptional circumstances not present here.39
26. The hypothetical liability on the part of PetroEcuador would not prevent
Chevron’s liability or affect its obligations to the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs. Instead, Chevron retains
the prerogative of instituting an action against PetroEcuador to seek reimbursement of
PetroEcuador’s alleged share of the damages as a joint and severally liable tortfeasor,40
in
accordance with the general rules set forth above. As a joint and severally liable co-torfeasor,
Chevron cannot foist upon plaintiffs the burden of proving any share of liability purportedly
pertaining to another joint tortfeasor.
Alleged prevalence of expert evidence in the assessment of the evidentiary record
27. Dr. Coronel and Dr. Barros develop their respective reports on the basis of their
personal views about how the Provincial Court should have assessed the evidence to establish
whether a causal link exists between the alleged environmental harm and the party found liable.
Both experts suggest that the Court should have relied primarily on the expert testimony over
35
Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶¶ 51-56.
36
C-931, Lago Agrio Judgment at 122-24.
37
38
Claimants’ Track 2 Supp. Merits Memorial ¶ 135.
39
See, e.g., RLA-163, Civil Code of Ecuador, art. 1783 (allowing joinder of the seller of a thing so the court
can determine his/her liability for the hidden defects of the thing sold existing at the time of the purchase and sale
transaction); RLA-303, Organic Law of the Judiciary, art. 33 (mandating joinder of those public servants who
participated in the relevant actions at issue in cases concerning the State’s liability arising from inadequate
administration of justice, so that the court can determine the extent of their liability for purposes of subsequent
indemnification proceedings by the State against them).
40
RLA-516, Ecuadorian State Modernization Law, art. 38. See also RLA-164, 2008 Ecuadorean
Constitution, art. 11(9); RLA-163, Civil Code of Ecuador, art. 1538; RLA-218, Law of Contentious Administrative
Jurisdiction, art. 65 (“In cases that are subject to contractual matters and to other jurisdiction of Contentious-
Administrative District Courts, the claim may be filed within a term up to five years.”); C-34, Civil Code of
Ecuador, art. 2414; RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 296.

14
other forms of evidence.41
Notably, contrary to Dr. Coronel’s and Dr. Barros’ opinion, Dr. Jorge
Wright, another expert presented by Chevron, believes that the most relevant evidence in the
case would be not the expert testimony but the judicial inspections.42
28. In addition to contradicting each other, the opinions of Dr. Coronel and Dr. Barros
as well as that of Dr. Wright have no legal basis.
29. Procedural law in Ecuador does not admit prevalence of one type of evidence
over another. The prevalence of one kind of evidence over another is known as the principle of
statutory scale for evidentiary weight (tarifa legal), which subjects “the judge to pre-established
abstract rules that tell him the conclusion that he must accept because of the presence or absence
of specific types of evidence.”43
Ecuador’s legal order abandoned the principle of evidentiary
weight (prueba tasada) in 1978, with the entry into force of Supreme Decree No. 3070.44
Ever
since, the principle of assessing evidence as a whole according to the rules of sound judgment
has prevailed in Ecuador.
30. The first paragraph of Article 115 of the 2005 Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”)
recognizes this principle, expressly providing that:
The evidence must be weighed as a whole, according to the rules of sound
judgment, notwithstanding the formalities prescribed in substantive law
for the existence or validity of certain acts.45
41
Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶ 58. See also Report of Enrique Barros (June 3, 2013) ¶ 31.
42
Report of Jorge Wright-Ycaza (June 3, 2013) at 4. Dr. Wright emphasizes the importance of this evidence
for the purpose of justifying his observations regarding the judicial inspections requested by the plaintiffs in the
case, and the Sucumbíos Court’s decision to accept the later partial waiver filed by the same party.
43
R-1296, Hernando Devis Echandia, General Theory of Judicial Evidence, Vol. I, Ed. Víctor de Zavalía,
Buenos Aires, 1974 at 84.
44
RLA-611, Supreme Decree No. 3070, O.R. No. 735 (Dec. 20, 1978). Article 116 of the 1960 Code of Civil
Procedure stated:
Art. 116 - Evidence is conclusive or semi-conclusive. (Legal weight) Conclusive
[evidence] is that which shows, beyond any doubt, the truth of the disputed fact; and semi-
conclusive, is that which does not by itself clearly prove the fact, but rather leaves a doubt
about its truth.
Article 116 was replaced by the following text:
Art. 116 (Reform of 1978). - The evidence must be weighed as a whole, according to the
rules of sound judgment, notwithstanding the formalities prescribed in substantive law for
the existence or validity of certain acts.
The judge shall not be obliged to express in his decision the assessment of all the
evidence produced, but only that of the evidence that was decisive in the outcome of the
case.
45
RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 115.

15
31. Therefore, none of the opinions that Chevron’s experts offer about the primacy of
evidence is supported in the Ecuadorian legal system. The judge in any case is obligated to
assess the evidence as a whole and according to the rules of sound judgment.
32. From reading the Judgment, one sees the application of Article 115 of the 2005
CPC. For example, with respect to the scientific evidence regarding the presence or lack of
contaminating elements in the environment, the Court observes that:
An exhaustive and complicated analysis of the results of the laboratory
analyses presented as valid evidence during this lawsuit had to be
performed, and the magnitude of this work is underlined in regards to
which the experts nominated by Chevron have provided 50,939 results
from 2,371 samples, the experts nominated by the plaintiffs have provided
the case file with a total of 6,239 results from 466 valid samples; while the
experts named by the Court, without nomination by either party, have
provided 178 samples and 2,166 results (without considering the sampling
done by the expert Cabrera); resulting in a total of 2,311 samples. To this
we must add the 608 results presented by expert Jorge Bermeo, and 939
results presented on 109 samples collected by expert Gerardo Barros,
which have also been taken into consideration, but with considerations
annotated for each case. ... Considering the facts shown in the record, such
as the existence of a certain number of wells, stations and pits that were
designed, built and operated by Texpet, in conjunction with the quantity or
sample of sites inspected, and the results of those inspections, it is
considered that the valid samples in the record are representative of the
state of the concession area. Thus, with considerations noted, analysis of
the results of the samples taken in the field by the different experts who
have participated in this lawsuit begins with an overall assessment of the
results presented for Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPHs).”46
33. Other passages in the judgment also refer to the assessment of the expert
evidence:
For the complex task of assessing the presence of environmental damage,
the first consideration is that there are more than 100 expert reports in the
case file, which constitute an important documented source of evidence,
provided by experts nominated by both parties and also provided by
experts of the Court not nominated by either party, such that as a whole
their information is reliable and allows the Judge to come to the
conclusion that there are different levels of contaminant elements that are
from the hydrocarbons industry in the area of the Concession.47
46
C-931, Lago Agrio Judgment at 99-100.
47
Id. at 95-96.

16
34. The Judgment also notes the Court’s evaluation of the field-test results.48
An
objective analysis of the Judgment allows one to see an exercise of overall assessment of the
evidence, in accordance with the rules of sound judgment, as required by applicable law.49
In
Ecuador, one type of evidence does not prevail over another.
Purported award of extra petita damages in the judgment
35. Dr. Coronel’s report, while attributing to me statements that I have not made,
maintains that the Judgment is incongruent for extra petita in that it awards the following
categories of damages to remedy environmental harm: (i) a community reconstruction and ethnic
reaffirmation program (valued at US$ 100 million); and (ii) a potable water system (valued at
US$ 150 million).50
36. No part of my First Declaration can be construed as suggesting (as Dr. Coronel
states) that “the analysis for congruency must be based on these two general headings [of
removal and remediation], such that the Judgment will be consistent if the remedy that it orders
has a vague ‘functional’ or ‘logical relationship’ with such headings.”51
On the contrary, what I
explained therein is that the damages Dr. Coronel objects to fall directly within the realm of the
prayer for relief contained in Chapter VI.2 of the Lago Agrio Complaint.52
37. The relief requested by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs generally consists of (i) “the
elimination or removal of the contaminant elements that still threaten the environment and health
of the residents” and (ii) “[t]he remediation of the environmental harm caused, in accordance
with Section 43 of the EMA.”53
38. The Lago Agrio Complaint explains that:
[T]he consequences of the application of the methods and proceedings
described above were particularly devastating for the five indigenous
human groups of the area, who additionally suffered the violent
destruction of their natural habitat and, consequently, of their subsistence
48
Id. at 100 (“Thus, with considerations noted, analysis of the results of the samples taken in the field by the
different experts who have participated in this lawsuit begins with an overall assessment of the results presented for
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPHs).”).
49
Ecuadorian law provides that the judge’s assessment of evidence shall be in accordance with the rules on
sound judgment. Other attributions granted to the judges that demonstrate the broad capacities attributed to them
regarding the assessment of evidence include the possibility to dismiss the conclusions of an expert against his
conviction, and the discretion to carry interviews of the people who know the place or thing examined during a
judicial inspection, in search of uncovering the truth. See RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 249,
262, 244, 245.
50
Report of César Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶¶ 84-85.
51
Id. ¶ 81.
52
RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013) ¶¶ 89-92
53
C-71, Lago Agrio Complaint at 17-18.

17
means, their way of life and customs, and have even faced a serious threat
to their future and identity as a people.54
39. In my opinion, it is clear that the damages awarded by the Lago Agrio Judgment
are intended to provide the Plaintiffs with remedies to overcome the harm alleged,” and are
therefore consistent with (i) the general reparation requested in the Complaint, and (ii) the rule of
integral reparation (restitutio in integrum) prevailing in Ecuadorian law, and also reflected in the
EMA’s definition of “Restoration” as the “return of an ecosystem or the affected population to
its prior condition.”55
Alleged undue joinder of claims
40. Dr. Coronel again states that the actions based on the Civil Code cannot be joined
with those based on the EMA to be heard jointly in the same proceeding.56
From this postulate
he again insists on his argument that the Provincial Court acted in violation of Ecuadorian Law
by having heard legal actions based on Articles 2214, 2229, and 2236 of the Civil Code through
oral summary proceedings.57
41. As I have explained in my First Declaration, Article 43 of the EMA established
the summary verbal proceeding as a special means for processing all legal actions stemming
from environmental harm.58
Article 43 offers no exceptions to this rule. Therefore, as of the
entry into force of this provision, and without making any distinction, every civil action seeking
compensation for harm resulting from environmental contamination (Articles 2214 and 2229 of
the Civil Code), or to prevent possible future harm (Article 2236 of the Civil Code), must be
tried in oral summary proceedings.59
42. Dr. Coronel’s arguments lack support in Ecuador’s legal order and court practice
in this subject. In fact, as of the enactment of the EMA, the Ecuadorian courts have tried claims
for damages originating from environmental contamination through oral summary proceedings,60
including those based on Articles 2214, 2229, and 2236 of the Civil Code.61
54
C-71, Lago Agrio Complaint, at 9-10.
55
C-73, 1999 Environmental Management Act, Glossary of Definitions (emphasis added).
56
Report of Dr. Coronel Jones (June 3, 2013) ¶ 88.
57
Id. ¶¶ 88, 92, 94.
58
RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013) ¶ 26.
59
Id. ¶¶ 20-28.
60
In light of Article 43 of the EMA, “[c]laims for damages originating from harm to the environment shall
be heard in verbal summary proceedings.”
61
See, e.g., RLA-512, Calva v. PETROPRODUCCIÓN, Supreme Court, First Civil and Commercial
Division, Decision No. 67--2007, O.R. No. 486 (Dec. 11, 2008) (“Calva v. Petroproducción”). See also RLA-512,
Eliécer Cruz Bedón, Director of the Galápagos National Park v. ACOTRAMAR, Guayas Provincial Court, Case No.
06-2001 (Dec. 27, 2011) (“Parque Nacional Galápagos v. ACOTRAMAR”); RLA-612, Virgilio Medina v.
TECPECUADOR S.A. at 6, 7 (“Medina v. TECPECUADOR S.A”).

18
43. For example, in the Calva v. Petroproducción case, the then-Supreme Court
examined a legal action for environmental harm based on, among others, Articles 2214, 2215,
and 2229 of the Civil Code and processed through oral summary proceedings. With regard to
the application of Article 43 of the EMA, the Court stated the following:
With respect to the application of the Environmental Management Act,
although this law was issued in Official Register No. 245 dated 30 July
1999, in other words, after the date of the last oil spill referenced by the
complaint (February 1999), under Article 7, Item 20 of the Civil Code:
“The laws concerning the procedures and formalities of the cases prevail
over the previous ones as of the moment they start to govern”; and
Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Environmental Management Law contain
rules governing the procedures of the cases on environmental rights.62
44. This has also been the practice of the provincial courts, where legal actions for
damages arising from environmental contamination have been processed through oral summary
proceedings. For example, in the Virgilio Medina v. TECPECUADOR case, the Supreme Court
heard a claim for environmental damage based on Articles 2214 and 2229 of the Civil Code
through oral summary proceedings, despite the express objection raised by the respondent.63
45. Dr. Coronel also maintains that Articles 2214 and 2229 of the Civil Code do not
establish the right to claim remedy for collective damages of any kind, including environmental
damage, since they refer exclusively to individual harm. He further asserts that Article 2236 of
the Civil Code only provides a precautionary action and thus, the remediation of collective
environmental damages cannot be claimed based on this rule either.64
46. Dr. Coronel again states his personal views, which was the subject of opinion of
another expert of the Republic.65
At any rate, I shall flag a number of errors in the thesis
advanced by Claimants’ expert.
47. First, the Ecuadorian Civil Code’s extra-contractual liability regime does not
make any distinction regarding whether the legally protected right is an individual right or a
collective one. The most basic principle of liability lies in the notion that anyone who causes
harm must remedy it.66
As a counterpart, he who has suffered harm at the hands of another has
the right to seek reparation from the party responsible for having caused such harm.
62
RLA-512, Calva v. Petroproducción at 38 (emphasis added).
63
RLA-612, Medina v. TECPECUADOR S.A. at 6-7 (The respondent expressly alleged a violation of his
due process and the lack of court competence, arguing that civil claims must be heard in an ordinary trial and not
oral summary proceedings, and before a civil trial court. The Court rejected these objections, confirming that the
appropriate channel was the oral summary proceeding).
64
65
See RE-3, Genaro Eguiguren’s Second Statement on Foreign Law ¶¶ 21-29.
66
RLA-163, Civil Code of Ecuador, art. 2214 (“Whoever commits an offense or tort resulting in harm to
another shall indemnify the affected party, without detriment to the penalty provided by law for such offense or
tort.”).

19
48. Article 2229 of the Civil Code generally states that “any harm that can be
attributed to malice or negligence of another party must be remedied by that party” (emphasis
added).67
As the plain language of this provision reveals, this general rule encompasses any type
of harm; it does not make any distinction as to the type of harm or the nature of the right
infringed upon. Nor does it limit a party’s ability to seek reparation for the harm suffered on the
basis of whether the harm affects an individual or multiple persons.
49. Dr. Coronel’s assertion that “[t]hese provisions refer exclusively to individual
damages”68
has no basis in Ecuadorian Law and is wrong. In fact, the extra-contractual liability
regime provided for in the Civil Code has been invoked and applied to resolve cases in
environmental matters (Delfina Torres)69
and as part of a general theory of liability that includes
the extra-contractual liability of the State, its concessionaires and delegates (Andrade Medina v.
CONELEC),70
and its strictures have evolved from subjective liability to theories of objective
liability.
50. Second, Dr. Coronel also errs in his interpretation of Article 2236 of the Civil
Code.71
Specifically, his contention that this provision cannot be invoked in cases where the
threat of contingent harm arises from environmental contamination is unfounded and incorrect.
On the contrary, if the existence of contamination in the environment poses a threat of harm to
those exposed to such contamination, Article 2236 of the Civil Code confers upon them a
popular action (also called “collective action”) precisely to prevent the occurrence of such
harm.72
In this particular case, the Lago Agrio Complaint legitimately requests the removal “of
the contaminant elements that still threaten the environment and the health of the residents”
based on this provision.73
51. Third, Dr. Coronel also maintains that, “[i]t is also erroneous to state that the
EMA is limited to establishing procedural rules.”74
My statement was not so broad. I stated in
my First Declaration only that Article 43 of the EMA (the only provision that is relevant to this
case) is a provision of a procedural nature. In case there is any doubt, the Supreme Court made
this clear in 2008, five years before it heard the cassation appeal of the Lago Agrio case:
67
Id. art. 2229 (“As a general rule, all damages that can be attributed to malice or negligence by another
person must be compensated for by that person.”).
68
69
C-1586, Delfina Torres (Oct. 29, 2002) at 23-38
70
C-998, Andrade Medina v. Conelec at 5-10.
71
72
RLA-163, Civil Code of Ecuador, art. 2236 (“As a general rule, a popular action is granted in all cases of
contingent harm which, due to recklessness or negligence of a party threatens undetermined persons. But if the harm
threatened only determined persons, only one of these may pursue the action.”).
73
The second claim of the Lago Agrio complaint seeks the remedy of damages that have already occurred —
as a result of the contaminant elements which removal has been requested — founded on the general regimen of
extra-contractual liability established by Articles 2214 and 2229 of the Civil Code.
74

20
Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Environmental Management Law contain
rules governing the procedures of the cases on environmental rights.75
52. Fourth, and finally, Dr. Coronel suggests that there is a contradiction between
what was stated by Drs. Eguiguren and Albán, and my First Declaration on this matter.76
There
is no such contradiction; in fact, Dr. Coronel neglects to transcribe a substantial part of the
experts’ statement in his report, joining two independent statements to create a statement
different from the one expressed in the report in question.
53. At paragraphs 103 to 107 of their Statement, Dr. Eguiguren and Dr. Albán explain
the legal nature and background of (i) the popular action prescribed in Article 2236 of the Civil
Code, on the one hand, and (ii) the action provided in Article 43 of the EMA, on the other, as
follows:
Note that in addition to the popular action of Article 2236 the Civil Code,
a civil action for monetary damages in case of harm arising from tortious
acts is always available pursuant to Article 2214 of the Civil Code. See
supra n.77, Exhibit 36. The civil action prescribed in Article 43 of the
1999 Law also draws from this longstanding action to provide for “actions
for monetary damages.” Note further that a claim for damages pursuant to
Article 2214 can be brought in addition, and without detriment to the
action provided for in Article 2236 if the person or group of persons
bringing the claim have already suffered injury or harm and the threat of
future injury persists. The same result can be achieved, albeit more
expeditiously, through Article 43 of the 1999 Law.77
54. This explanation is consistent with that expressed in my First Declaration. The
language quoted by Dr. Coronel to suggest otherwise is taken out of context from the paragraph
where Dr. Eguiguren and Dr. Albán summarize their conclusions.78
There is thus no
75
RLA-512, Calva v. Petroproducción. My opinion on the procedural nature of Article 43 of the EMA
coincides with that expressed by the Supreme Court.
76
77
RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013), Annex 1, Declaration on Foreign Law from Genaro Eguiguren
and Ernesto Albán (Dec. 20, 2006) ¶ 106 n.79.
78
The complete text of the respective paragraph reads (emphasis added):
In brief, the popular action granted by Article 2236 of the Civil Code provides for judicial
recourse to seek compulsory remediation of environmental harm - completely
independent of and apart from the civil action prescribed in Article 43 of the 1999 Law.
The popular action in the Civil Code is intended to protect individuals from
contingent harm to their person and/or assets by allowing a collective action to seek
the removal of whatever poses a threat of contingent damage (i. e., existing
environmental harm that threatens the lives or property of undetermined or
determined persons). The civil action in Article 43 draws from each citizen's
constitutional right to a safe and clean environment to justify a procedure that,
should the facts be proven, compels the remediation of environmental harm. The
popular action would proceed as an “ordinary action,” while the latter would be heard
through summary oral proceedings.

21
contradiction whatsoever between what Dr. Eguiguren and Dr. Albán explain and what I have
stated previously. In sum, the three of us have explained that (i) when the cause of action
prescribed in Article 2236 of the Civil Code stems from harm to the environment that threatens
to cause contingent (ulterior) harm, the applicable proceeding is the oral summary proceeding, as
provided in Article 43 of the EMA, and (ii) in any other case not involving environmental harm,
the popular action shall be heard through ordinary proceedings, in accordance with the general
rule.79
Setting the bond to stay enforcement of a judgment
55. Dr. Coronel states that “given that the main obligation established in the
Judgment [of the Lago Agrio case] consists of paying an amount of money, the reasonable thing
to do would have been for the bond to be established in the amount of the interest for the term
that the Court had deemed that it would take to issue a decision on the cassation appeal.”80
Dr.
Coronel considers that such time could range between 14 months and 9.4 years, approximately,
and then concludes that the possible amount of the bond in this case would therefore range
between US$ 1.9 billion and US$ 14.6 billion.81
56. Dr. Coronel does not offer any legal foundation to support his statement; on the
contrary, he correctly points out that the law provides no parameters to set the amount of the
bond and that the subject has been barely addressed by commentators.82
Thus, the only support
he resorts to is an excerpt from an article he himself wrote more than 20 years ago and which
does not reflect the current state of the issue in Ecuadorian legal practice.83
57. An analysis of the decisions of the Ecuadorian courts that rule on this matter
reveals two recurring patterns of behavior. First, the courts currently apply various calculation
methodologies on the basis of the subject matter and the prejudice that delay might cause to the
non-moving party. Second, and even more important, the value of the bond set by the courts in
recent decisions tends to be a small fraction of the amount in dispute (even equivalent to one
percent or less of the value of the judgment on cassation appeal).84
The thesis proposed by Dr.
Coronel thus not only lacks legal support, but also is contrary to legal practice in Ecuador.
Id. Dr. Coronel omitted the boldface text in his citation.
79
RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013) ¶¶ 22-26.
80
81
Id. ¶ 113.
82
Id. ¶ 111.
83
The article written and citied by the expert Coronel and published in 1994, could not be based on the
practical application of the rule, since the Law of Cassation was enacted only one year earlier (May 18, 1993),
which is the reason why the author only offers an abstract analysis of the issue, without any support from legal
practice.
84
See, e.g., RLA-450, PROPHAR S.A. v. Merck Sharp and Dohme (Interamerican) Corp., First Civil,
Mercantile, Tenant, and Miscellaneous Subjects Division of the Provincial Court of Pichincha, Case No. 421 of
2008 (in a judgment for $150 million, the bond set by the Court in a ruling dated October 24, 2011, was for
$23,500); RLA- 451, Miguel García Costa v. PacifiCard S.A., Second Civil, Mercantile, Tenant, and Miscellaneous
Subjects Division of the Provincial Court of Pichincha, Case No. 825 of 2010 (in a ruling dated October 17, 2012,

22
58. The reality is that, to learn about the amount of the bond, one must first timely
request a stay of enforcement of the judgment on appeal and move the court to set the amount of
the requisite bond. Chevron chose not to. Even then, once the amount of the bond is set, the
amount of the bond ordered by the judge can be challenged before the same judge by way of
reconsideration and amendment of the decision.85
Cancellation of judicial inspections
59. Dr. Wright contends that “the parties originally agreed to carry out 123 judicial
inspections by means of a contract that was approved by the court.” He further asserts that, upon
receiving plaintiffs’ motion to cancel inspections they had previously requested, and which
request the court had granted, “the judge illegally revoked the decision which had ordered
them.”86
The thesis proposed by Dr. Wright suffers from multiple substantive errors.
60. First, the expert has confused (i) the procedural term for each party to request
judicial inspections and (ii) the purported agreement of the parties to which he refers. The
judicial inspections in the case were requested by each party within the evidentiary period,87
and
could not be the result of an agreement between the litigant parties. The document called “Terms
of Reference” was executed approximately one year after the closure of the evidentiary period.
As evinced by its own terms, the object and purpose of such document is “to agree upon certain
basic parameters to serve as a framework for the judicial inspections, allowing them to be
performed in an organized manner and to use scientific procedures to obtain reliable and credible
expert reports about the facts being investigated in the inspections.”88
for a judgment of $100,000, the Division set a bond of $1,000, which represents 1%). See also RLA-633, Correa v.
Banco de Pichincha (in a judgment for US$ 5 million in the lower court, and US$ 300,000 at the appellate level, the
Court set a bond for US$ 4,000); R-1298, Chart showing 70 cases in which a bond was posted by the First and
Second Chamber of the Provincial Court of Pichincha. This chart shows that in the case with the largest amount in
dispute is US$ 660,000.00, corresponding to case number 080-08, the court set a bond in the amount of
US$ 3,000.00 which represents 0.45% of the total amount in dispute. Among these 70 cases, 12 show a bond
equivalent to 1% of the total amount in dispute, or less; 14 show a bond equivalent to or lower than 5%; and only 2
show a bond equivalent to 10% or more of the total amount in dispute. In case No. 850-10, involving President
Correa, a bond of US$ 1,000.00 was posted, which represents only 1% of the total amount.
85
RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 289 (“Interlocutory and procedural orders can be
clarified, amplified, amended or revoked by the judge who issued them if any of the parties so moves within the
time limit established in Article 281”).
86
Report of Jorge Wright-Ycaza (June 3, 2013) at 3.
87
C-494B, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Evidence (Oct. 29, 2003), requesting the execution of judicial inspections.
The evidentiary period on oral summary proceedings is a brief, six-day period during which each party must identify
all the evidence that it intends to produce and have the court order during the remainder of the proceedings.
Pursuant to Article 836 and in observance of Articles 117 and 119 of the 2005 CPC, the judge must open the
evidentiary period for a term of 6 days at the conciliation hearing. RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure,
art. 836 (“[I]f facts have been alleged that must be proven the judge, in the same conciliation hearing, shall open the
cause to evidence for a term of six days.”). Only the evidence requested by the parties during the evidentiary period
can be considered as duly requested evidence. According to Article 117 of the 2005 CPC: “Only properly produced
evidence, i.e., evidence requested, presented and examined according to legal requirements, is admissible in court.”
In turn, Article 119 of the same Code determines that “The judge, within the respective term, shall order that all
evidence submitted or requested within the same term, be examined prior notice to the opposing party.”
88
C-177, Terms of Reference at 1.

23
61. The document itself refers, as background, to the inspections previously requested
by the parties.89
Thus it does not concern an agreement to request judicial inspections, as
incorrectly stated by Claimants’ expert, but rather a guide document for the orderly and efficient
execution of the judicial inspections previously requested by each party and ordered by the
Court.90
Dr. Wright’s contention that these inspections were the product of a contract (the Terms
of Reference) is baseless.
62. Second, Dr. Wright confuses the nature of the court orders concerning judicial
inspections, and makes statements of law that have no basis in applicable rules of procedure in
Ecuador. As I explained in my previous report,91
both the court order that mandates the
performance of court inspections requested as evidence by the plaintiffs, and that which orders
the incorporation of the Terms of Reference into the record (and instructs the parties to
implement it) are procedural orders (decretos), which are judicial decisions to move the case
along.92
Contrary to what Dr. Wright states, in our legal system there is no provision according
to which procedural orders (decretos) become “res judicata.” Only judgments and rulings
(autos) become final and “res judicata.”93
63. Thus there is no legal basis to support Chevron’s expert’s contention that “when a
judge orders evidence, or any other proceeding, if at least one of the litigants does not request the
revocation of the decision within three business days as of the date of notice, the decision
becomes ejecutoriada (res judicata), and neither the judge nor the parties are excused from
complying with it, nor can it be revoked.”94
Various legal precepts are garbled in this
statement.95
89
The document expressly acknowledged that “the parties have requested judicial inspections at
approximately 122 wells and production installations in the former concession granted by the Ecuadorian
Government to what was called the PETROECUADOR-TEXACO Consortium. In each case, the purpose of the
inspections has been specified by the petitioners in their respective motions for evidence.” C-177, Terms of
Reference at 1.
90
As I explained in my First Declaration, the Terms of Reference were not, and could not be binding on the
Court. It is not possible for the litigant parties to modify the legal framework governing the taking of evidence in
civil proceedings; those rules are of a public nature and thus mandatory. See RLA-613, Banco de Crédito v. Mario
Guevara, Supreme Court, First Civil and Mercantile Chamber, Legal Gazette Volume XCVIII, Series XVI, No. 13,
at 3477, Quito (Nov. 17, 1998). A contract of the nature described by Dr. Wright would be absolutely null and void.
91
RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013) ¶ 32. See also RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure,
arts. 271, 296, 298.
92
RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 271 (“Decree is the ruling that the judge issues to
manage the case, or which orders any procedure.”).
93
Id. arts. 296, 298.
94
95
Under the thesis defended by Dr. Wright, it would not be possible, for example, for Chevron to have been
able to request that an expert translator not be appointed (when such an appointment had been previously requested
and ordered), but the document that Chevron sought to introduce in evidence was already translated. See RE-9,
Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013), Annex 11, Lago Agrio Record at 9056 (Motion dated August 31, 2004,
through which Chevron requested that the appointment of the translator for the testimony of Dr. Green and that the
practice of the corresponding formality not be carried out).

24
64. The production of evidence is a procedural right that can be waived by the party
who carries the burden of proving his or her claims. As I explained in my First Declaration, it is
a litigant party’s prerogative to waive the right to obtain or compel the production of evidence
previously requested during the evidentiary period.96
This is possible as long as such waiver is
made before the evidence is actually produced.97
The waiver can be exercised only by the party
that has requested the evidence, under the terms of Article 66 of the Constitution and Article 11
of the Civil Code.98
There is no provision whatsoever in Ecuadorian law that prohibits the party
who requested the evidence from renouncing his prior request.99
65. In this case, the plaintiffs were free to dispose of their requested for evidence,
since it is only they who bear the burden of proving the facts alleged in the complaint, or the
consequences of its failure to do so.100
If Chevron had considered the production of this
evidence (judicial inspections) necessary to support its own case, it should have requested that
same evidence during the evidentiary period.101
Because it did not, Chevron had no right to
demand the performance of said inspections or to oppose the waiver of the plaintiffs to this
96
RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013) ¶ 34. The principles of unity and joint ownership of the
evidence prevent the waiver of evidence only when the evidence has already been produced but not when there has
been only a request [for the production of such evidence]. See R-1296, Hernando Devis Echandía, General Theory
of Judicial Evidence, Volume I, Third Ed., Alberti 835, Buenos Aires, 1974 at 118. C-1975, National Court
Decision at 84 (“the evidence that may never be waived is the one already produced, recorded or performed in the
proceedings. It is only when evidence has been requested, ordered and actually obtained and it has probative value
that it becomes part of the body of evidence, i.e. a piece of evidence”).
97
The alternative would allow for the withdrawal of evidence by the party who requested the production of
such evidence where the evidence happens to be adverse to it. Once the evidence is submitted, it becomes part of
the record.
98
RLA-164, 2008 Ecuadorean Constitution, art. 66(29); see also RLA-163, Civil Code of Ecuador, art. 11.
99
On this matter, Devis Echandía, teaches when referring to the Fundamental Principles of procedure:
The parties can, in general, waive procedural rights, and such a waiver is
deemed to exist, in many cases, by the mere fact of not using them in due time,
even if this is due to forgetfulness or negligence and in general they will suffer
adverse consequences (if they do not comply with the acts that the various
procedural burdens have imposed upon them)
R-1297, Hernando Devis Echandía, General Notions of Civil Procedure at 54.
In addition to confirming the principle that procedural rights are disposable, the abovementioned quotation refers to
the concept of implied waiver of procedural rights that occurs when they were not promptly exercised. Such is the
case, for example, of a party that fails to request the production of certain evidence during the trial term.
100
RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 114 (“Each party is required to prove the facts alleged,
except those that are presumed under the law. Any of the litigants may submit evidence against the facts alleged by
the opposing party.”).
101
The evidentiary period in summary oral proceedings (such as the Lago Agrio Litigation) is six days long,
and follows the conciliation hearing. RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 836 (“If there are no bases
for liquidation, or when involves the other disputes subject to the proceeding established in this Section, if no
agreement between the parties has been reached, and if the parties claimed facts that must be justified, the judge, in
the same conciliation hearing, shall open the cause to evidence for a term of six days.”).

25
evidence. Naturally, the valid waiver of a procedural right by one of the parties in the case does
not lead to the nullification of the proceedings.102
66. Finally, Dr. Wright’s contention that the judicial inspection constitutes mandatory
evidence is baseless.103
As I have explained before, our procedural Law does not recognize the
principle of weighted evidence and, furthermore, contains the principle of evaluating the
evidence according to the rules of sound judgment. Each party is completely free to prove its
case as it deems appropriate.104
67. To justify his thesis, Dr. Wright cites to Article 840 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.105
However, the cited provision in no way dictates that judicial inspections are
mandatory in this kind of proceeding. Article 840 refers instead to the principle of
concentration, according to which the judge must take the greatest possible number of
procedural steps in a single evidentiary proceeding. In such context, this provision requires that
during the performance of an inspection, the judge also receive the witness statements that may
be relevant to such inspection. This provision does not impose mandatory judicial inspections or
any other form of evidence.
Assessment of the evidence of procedural fraud presented by Chevron
68. In his sixth report, Dr. Coronel asserts that when a party presents allegations of
procedural fraud, (i) any judge is required to consider them and, (ii) should they be proven true,
declare the proceedings null and void, including ex officio, in order to protect the constitutional
rights of the parties.106
Based on these assertions, Dr. Coronel then argues that the National
Court erred in declining to examine and rule on the new evidence (evidence not presented to the
trial court), as well as in confirming a similar decision by the Provincial Court regarding the
same evidence.107
Dr. Coronel maintains that National Court precedents make it clear that:
(i) the Court is empowered as well as obliged to ensure that no constitutional provisions have
been violated and that the required substantial formalities common to all proceedings have been
observed; and (ii) if the Court finds grounds for nullifying the proceedings, it must do so ex
102
Procedural nullification is subject to the principles of tipicidad (facts fitting the statutory definition of the
violation), significance, and validation. The waiver of the right to produce evidence by the party that requested it
and who bears the burden of is not specified as grounds for nullification of a proceeding. See RLA-198, Ecuadorian
Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 346, 1014.
103
104
Article 114 of the 2005 CPC provides that “Each party is required to prove the facts alleged, except those
that are presumed under the law. Any of the litigants may submit evidence against the facts alleged by the opposing
party.” See RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 114. See also id. art. 115 (“Evidence must be
evaluated as a whole, in accordance with the rules of sound judgment [sana crítica], without prejudice to the
solemnities prescribed by substantive law for the existence or validity of certain acts. ”).
105
106
Report of César Coronel Jones (May 7, 2014) ¶¶ 12-14.
107
Id. ¶ 18.

26
officio.108
Dr. Coronel’s argument is fallacious insofar as it (i) omits reference to rules that apply
to the matter under analysis, and (ii) relies on other inapposite rules of procedure.
69. First, Dr. Coronel fails to make reference to rules that govern the competence of
Ecuadorian judges regarding evidence at the appellate and cassation appeal levels,
respectively.109
70. The applicable rules of civil procedure at the appellate level in respect of oral
summary proceedings provide that the provincial courts must rule on the basis of the existing
record (por los méritos del proceso).110
Accordingly, they can only consider and weigh evidence
duly introduced in the trial record, and lack the competence to examine evidence extrinsic to the
proceedings. As I explained in my First Declaration, there is no evidentiary stage during the
appellate review of a judgment rendered in oral summary proceedings. Consequently, the courts
are barred from accepting or ordering the production of new evidence.111
The new documents
submitted by Chevron in its appeal cannot be accepted as duly produced evidence.112
71. The National Court, in its capacity as Cassation Court, is subject to the same
restriction. In fact, the rules that govern cassation appeals expressly rule out any possibility of
presenting new evidence at this level.113
72. In view of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that Dr. Coronel’s argument has no
basis under Ecuadorian Law. It is incorrect to assert that both the Provincial Court and the
National Court had not only the power but also an obligation to examine the documentary
evidence submitted by Chevron in support of its fraud allegations.114
As expressly provided in
108
Id. ¶¶ 22-25.
109
The expert Velázquez makes a similar error in asserting that “[w]hen a judge is aware of fraudulent acts
during the conduct of a proceeding, regardless of its status, he has the legal obligation to consider the evidence.”
See Velázquez Expert Rpt. (June 3, 2013) at 4.
110
RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 838 (“Superior court shall rule on the merits of the case
and, judgment pronounced shall admit the motions allowed under the applicable law.”).
111
RE-9, Andrade Expert Rpt. (Feb. 18, 2013) at 4 & ¶ 77.
112
RLA-164, 2008 Ecuadorean Constitution, art. 76.4. See also RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil
Procedure, art. 117 (“Only properly produced evidence, i.e., evidence requested, presented and examined according
to legal requirements, is admissible in court”); RLA-1296, Hernando Devis Echandía, General Theory of Judicial
Evidence, Vol. I, Ed. Temis S.A., Bogotá, 2002 at 358-359 (“Evidence untimely submitted, even if it is documental,
cannot be considered by a judge, otherwise the judge would be violating the principle that he must adjudge ‘justa
allegata et probata’ according to the concept of Lessona, because what it is proven it is understood with the
formalities and requirements established by law.”).
113
RLA-558, Law on Cassation, art. 15 (“PROCESSING. – During the processing of the cassation recourse,
[the parties] may not request nor order the practice of any evidence, and no incidental process shall be accepted
whatsoever.”). The Supreme Court has relied on this provision when holding that new evidence is “not relevant,
within the recourse that is subject to decision of this Chamber; since, in accordance with art. 13 of the Cassation
Law, “During the processing of a cassation recourse, no evidence can be requested nor the practice of any evidence,
and no incident whatsoever shall be accepted.” which is exactly what the defendant attempts.” RLA-559, Supreme
Court, Cassation Case File No. 244, R.O. 169 (April 14, 1999).
114
The Appellate Court, both in its initial decision and in its clarification, considered the fraud allegations and
explained that it found no evidence to support a declaration of procedural nullity. However, it upheld the rights of

27
the applicable rules of procedure in Ecuador, both courts lack the competence to consider and
weigh such evidence and both would have incurred in a violation of due process had it done
so.115
73. Second, Dr. Coronel’s reference to Code of Civil Procedure provisions regarding
the nullification of civil proceedings is inapposite. The grounds that enable a judge to declare
proceedings null and void are limited by law and do not include the type of fraud allegations
raised by Claimants in these proceedings. Civil proceedings in Ecuador may be nullified on the
following grounds:
(i) When substantive formalities have been omitted from proceedings,116
to the extent
that (1) such omission may influence the Court’s decision, and (2) any of the
parties has argued for nullity at the appropriate time.117
The substantive
formalities in judicial proceedings are the following:
a. Jurisdiction of the judge hearing the case;
b. Competence of the judge or court in respect of the legal action in question;
c. Legal capacity;
d. Service of process on the defendant or defendant’s legal representative;
e. Concession of an evidentiary period when facts have been alleged that must
be proven and the law provides such a period;
f. Notice of the statement of evidence and judgment to the parties; and
g. Formation of a court with the number of judges provided by law.118
(ii) When the appropriate procedure for the matter in dispute has been violated and
such breach has influenced or may influence the decision on the case.119
the parties to file a formal complaint with the criminal prosecution authorities in Ecuador. C-991, Lago Agrio
Appellate Decision at 10; R-299, Clarification Decision on Appeal by the Provincial Court of Sucumbíos at 3-4.
115
The Constitutional Court has made statements to such effect. See, e.g., RLA-560, Extraordinary Action for
Protection 28, R.O. Suppl. 209 (March 21, 2014), art. 76. See also RLA-164, 2008 Ecuadorean Constitution, art. 76.
(“In any proceedings in which rights and obligations of whatever kind are being determined, the right to due process
will be warranted, including the following basic guarantees:. . . 4. Evidence obtained or used in violation of the law
shall not have any validity and shall be devoid of probative effect.”).
116
RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 344 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1014,
the process is void, in whole or in part, when it has missed any one of the substantive formalities provided for in this
Code.”) (Emphasis added). See also Report of Coronel Jones (May 7, 2014) ¶ 14.
117
RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 352 (“In order to declare nullity for the omission of
any other substantial formality, the following two circumstances must concur: 1. That the omission may exert
influence in the decision of the case, and, 2. That nullity was alleged in the respective instance, by one of the
parties.”). Declaring the proceedings null and void due to a failure to serve the complaint on the defendant or its
legal representative requires that (i) the absence of such service of process has prevented the defendant from filing a
defense or enforcing its rights; and (ii) the defendant has complained of such omission at the time of intervening in
the proceedings. Id. art. 351.
118
Id. art. 346.
119
Id. art. 1014 (“The violation of the procedure corresponding to the nature of the matter or the cause being
judged, nullifies the proceeding. The courts shall declare the nullity, ex officio or upon the parties’ request,
provided that the violation had influenced or may have exerted influence in the decision of the case, observing, in

28
74. Not every omission or departure from procedure can result in nullification of the
proceedings. The grounds for nullity are limited by law, and therefore judges may declare
proceedings null and void only in the event that one of the circumstances specifically provided
by law has come to pass (principle of specificity).120
None of these grounds for nullity includes
allegations of fraud regarding the drafting of an expert report during the proceedings, or
allegations at the appellate stage regarding the purported ghostwriting of the judgment. The
contrary contention is baseless.121
75. The National Court in the Lago Agrio Litigation confirmed this upon review of
Chevron’s allegations of nullity and explained that:
Procedural nullities are limited and strictly and restrictively interpreted,
and outside of the material formalities, common to all cases and instances,
expressly determined in Art. 355 (346) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
whose omission in any of them, when it influences or might influence the
decision in the case, leads to nullity of the proceeding, there are no other
ones that invalidate it, as has been held by the case law of the Supreme
Court of Justice from the judgment published in Judicial Gazette Series X
No. 15, pg. 4139.122
76. The jurisprudence offered by Dr. Coronel similarly confirms that courts may
declare procedural nullification only upon the existence of any of the grounds for nullity
provided by law and previously described herein.123
An analysis of each of the aforementioned
addition, the general provisions, particularly Arts. 355, 356 and 357.”); id. art. 344 (“Notwithstanding the provisions
of Article 1014, the process is void, in whole or in part, when it has missed any one of the substantive formalities
provided for in this Code.”) (Emphasis added). See also Report of César Coronel Jones (May 7, 2014) ¶ 14.
120
This principle is known as the “principle of specificity.” See Vera Vera v. Godoy Benitez, Supreme Court,
First Civil and Commercial Chamber (Dec. 4, 2000) at 1 (“According to the principle of specificity that our legal
framework enshrines regarding procedural nullity, the grounds for nullity are stated specifically in the law; thus, no
procedural nullity exists if the law does not note this expressly. In an oral summary proceedings the following are
grounds for procedural nullity: the omission of substantive formalities common to all proceedings and instances
enumerated in article 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the violation of the respective process in light of the
nature of the matter or the case that is being judged under article 1067 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”). See also
Banco Filabanco v. Matute Rodriguez, Supreme Court, First Civil and Commercial Chamber, R.O. 418 (Sept. 24,
2001) at 1-3.
121
As I explain elsewhere in this report, an action of collusion is available under Ecuadorian Law as a means
of seeking the invalidation of a proceeding by submitting evidence that shows, for example, that the judgment
rendered in such proceeding was fraudulently procured through a collusive agreement between the judge and one of
the parties thereto.
122
C-1975, National Court Decision at 52 (emphasis added). For its part, the Appellate Court also specifically
ruled on the allegation of “nullity of the proceedings due to procedural fraud and violation of due process
guarantees,” finding no basis for declaring the proceedings null and void and explaining that the defendant
vigorously exercised its right of defense and that the proceedings were public and transparent. See C-991, Lago
Agrio Appellate Decision at 10 (emphasis added).
123
Report of César Coronel Jones (May 7, 2014) ¶¶ 22-25.

29
cases shows that nullity is alleged and/or declared based on the grounds specifically set forth in
Ecuadorian procedural law.124
The State is not liable for the conduct of an expert witness
77. Under Ecuadorian Law, the State is liable for acts committed by public officials
and employees while performing the duties of their office that may result in violations of third-
party rights.125
Expert witnesses appointed by the court are not considered court officers or
public servants.126
Court-appointed expert witnesses are private individuals tasked with
providing information to the court on disputed issues that require knowledge of a certain science,
art, or trade.127
Consequently, any irregular or fraudulent act committed by a court-appointed
124
For example, in Aucacama v. Bastidas, the Supreme Court of Justice declared the proceedings null and
void because “the fourth substantive formality listed in Article 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure was omitted in
respect of the defendant, and such omission can and must lead to an ex-officio declaration of nullity pursuant to
article 349 of the aforementioned code.” See Coronel Annex 324. In addition, in Tejada v. Pita et al., the Supreme
Court declared the proceedings null and void ex officio for breach of the appropriate procedure for the matter or
case being adjudicated (article 1014 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because the trial court judge failed to allow
one of the parties the time required by law to answer the counterclaim. See id. at 325.
125
RLA-164, Constitution of Ecuador (2008), art. 11(9) (“The enjoyment of rights shall be governed by the
following principles: 9. The State, their delegates, agents and any person acting in the exercise of public authority
shall be obliged to compensate for any violation of an individual’s rights resulting from the lack of or deficiency in
the provision of public services or for the acts or omissions of its officers and public employees in the performance
of their duties.”).
126
RLA-303, Organic Law of the Judiciary, art. 38 (“CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION –
The following comprise the Judicial Branch and are referred to, in general, as officers of the Judiciary: 1. Judges;
associate judges and other officers of the Judicial Branch that provide their services at the National Court of Justice,
provincial courts, tribunals and trial level courts; 2. Temporary judges, while they are in charge of the unit; 3.
Members and other officers of the Judicial Branch that provide their services at the Judicial Council; 4. The State
Prosecutor General, the Public Defender General and other officers of the Judicial Branch who provide their services
at the Office of the State Prosecutor General and the Public Defender’s Office; 5. Public notaries and other officers
of the Judicial Branch who provide their services in the auxiliary bodies of the Judicial Branch; and, 6. Those who
are appointed provisional judicial officers to provide their services at the bodies of the Judicial Branch.”). See also
RLA-635, Organic Law of the Public Service, art. 4 (“Public servants.- All persons that work, in any form or under
any title, provide services or exercise a position, function or authority within the public sector shall be public
servants.”); id. art. 3 (“Scope.-The provisions of this law are binding, in matters of human resources and
compensation, in all the public administration, that covers: 1. The bodies and dependencies of the Executive,
Legislative, Judicial, and Indigenous Justice, Electoral, Transparency and Social Control, Office of the State
Attorney General and the Constitutional Court; 2. The entities that integrate the decentralized autonomous regime
and special regimes; 3. The bodies and entities created by the Constitution or the law for the exercise of the state
powers, for the provision of public services or to develop economic activities assumed by the state; and, 4. The legal
persons created by normative act of the autonomous decentralized bodes and special regimes to provide public
services.”); RLA-164, Constitution of Ecuador (2008), art. 225 (“The public sector is comprised of the following: 1.
The bodies and agencies of the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Electoral and Transparency and Social Control
Branches of Government. 2. The institutions that comprise the decentralized autonomous system of government. 3.
The bodies and institutions created by the Constitution or by law to exercise the powers of the State, to provide
public services or to carry out economic activities entrusted to the State. 4. The legal entities created by regulatory
acts issued by the decentralized autonomous governments for the provision of public services.”).
127
See RLA-198, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 250 (“Expert or experts shall be appointed to the
issues in dispute that demand some knowledge of science, art or craft.”). The requirement for accreditation of
experts before the Judicial Council (which enables them to be appointed in the litigations) does not change the fact
that they are not judicial servants or court employees.

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