4. Biographies
Chris Marsden is
◦ Professor of Law,
◦ author of
Net Neutrality:
Towards a Co-Regulatory
Solution (2010),
Internet Co-regulation (2011)
and three other books.
5. Ian Brown is
◦ Senior Research Fellow at
◦ Oxford University's Oxford Internet
Institute.
◦ Computer scientist with public policy focus
◦ editor of 'Research Handbook on Internet
Governance„ (Elgar 2013)
6. Holistic regulation of the Internet
Interdisciplinary approach written by
◦ socio-legal scholar (Marsden)
◦ computer scientist (Brown)
Core idea: develop a „prosumer law‟
◦ Must work with innovation and socio-
economic incentives
◦ Human rights continual focus
7. Regulation and governance
Internet use now ubiquitous
◦ but governments, legislators and regulatory
agencies
◦ falling further behind rapidly changing Internet
technologies and uses.
Regulatory lawyer Marsden and computer
scientist Brown critically analyze regulatory
shaping of “code”
◦ Technological environment of the Internet
„code is law‟ and coders operate within normative
framework
◦ more economically efficient and socially just
regulation
◦ Critical socio-technical and socio-legal approach
8. Literature
Previous legal focus on elephant‟s trunk?
◦ Benkler, Wu, Lessig, Zittrain, Van Schewick
◦ Wikipedia + Apache + Firefox + GPL
◦ But fatally flawed by lack of trust in federal
government
More „worldly‟ view Mueller (2010) De Nardis
(2009)
◦ Institutional economic and political science
literature
◦ Note new Mansell book…
Fascinating but limited view
◦ World uses Facebook on Windows...on mobile
(and not the Jesus-phone and Fondle-slab)
Ohm‟s Myth of the Super-User? Code V2.0?
9. „Governments of the
Industrial World, you weary
giants of flesh and steel, I
come from Cyberspace,
the new home of the Mind.
On behalf of the future, I
ask you of the past to
leave us alone. You are not John Perry Barlow
welcome among us. You A Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace (1996)
have no sovereignty where response to Communications Decency
we gather.‟ Act 1996
(partly struck down in Reno v. ACLU
1997)
10. The nation strikes back?
Respect for national borders Governance by
and regulation by nation or? supra-national bodies and
networks
states
11. Complexity and pace of change
Technical variety of different devices and platforms
◦ 4G mobile vs. PC, Kindle vs iPad
Sociological variety in how different platforms and
devices are used
◦ child‟s PC located where it can be monitored, but not
phone
Differing industry standards across different
companies
◦ means technological „fixes‟ hard to implement.
Multiplicity of players; ecology of actors even more
complex in the world of „apps‟ and cloud computing.
Pace of change means that any regulation has to be
„future-proofed‟ if it is to avoid becoming redundant.
12. “…generativity is a system's
capacity to produce
unanticipated change through
unfiltered contributions from
broad and varied audiences”
‘Generativity’
Jonathan Zittrain
2008
13. MODALITIES
OF
REGULATIO
N
Lawrence Lessig
Code 2.0 (2006)
14. Test the existing 'received
truths'
Strawmen:
[1] Self-regulation and minimal state involvement
is most efficient in dynamic innovative industries;
technology is never neutral;
[2] Self-regulation critically lacks constitutional
checks and balances for the private citizen,
including appeal;
network and scale effects drive massive
concentration
[3] Multi-stakeholder co-regulation chance to
reconcile the market failures and constitutional
legitimacy failures in self-regulation
voters will not allow governments to ignore the
Internet.
15. Government and market
failure
Industry capture of regulators and
legislators,
Incumbents protect/introduce new
barriers to entry
Continued exclusion of wider civil society
from the policy discussion – but
◦ tenuous chain of accountability of
participants to voters, shareholders and NGO
stakeholders.
◦ effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy
of these groups in representing the public
interest?
16. 5 Case Study Chapters
1. Data protection
1. Enforcement failures, Privacy by Design
2. Copyright
1. Capture of law by lobbyists, code solutions
outflank
3. Filtering
1. Growth of censorship, surprising degree of
freedom – disappearing?
4. Social Networks
1. Dominance, network effects, corporate social
irresponsibility
5. Smart Pipes
◦ Net neutrality argument, DPI deployment
17. Lessons from 5 case studies
Lessons for better future regulation from the
◦ regulatory and interoperability failures illustrated.
Conclusion:
governments, users/citizens and functioning
markets
need a smarter "prosumer law" approach.
Prosumer law would be designed to
◦ enhance the competitive production of public
goods,
◦ including innovation, public safety, and
◦ fundamental democratic rights.
18. Empirical Investigation
Five case studies and one „prior art‟
(encryption, anonymity, security: a „case
apart‟)
◦ Multi-year empirical investigation
◦ Builds on various EC/other studies including
„Self-regulation.info‟ (2001-4), „Co-regulation‟ (2006-8),
„Towards a Future Internet‟ (2008-10), „Privacy Value
Networks‟ (2008-11), „Network neutrality‟ (2007-10)
„Internet science‟ (2012-15)
Timeline important as partly historical studies
Reassesses prior art in view of „hard cases‟
◦ Topics with no organised regulation/self-regulation
◦ Due to lack of consensus over solutions
◦ Clash between market outcomes and human
19. Example: Smart Pipes
Legislation and regulation in place
◦ 10 year evidence base of discrimination by
protocol/user
◦ Merger reviews ex ante regulation
◦ EC Directives and Netherlands law
Political will to act on freedom of expression
◦ Especially in view of broadband universal service
◦ Reinforced by competition problems in
video/voice
Enforcement? Problems Canada,
Netherlands, UK
◦ Co-regulatory solution? BITAG (US), Berners Lee
(UK)
◦ Innovation in the core? Mobile true test case
20. Recent net neutrality work
„‟Three Wise Monkeys‟ 2011
◦ www.globalpolicyjournal.com/
„Mobile Net Neutrality‟ 2011
◦ ejlt.org//article/view/32
„Net Neutrality: A Research Guide‟ 2013
◦ ssrn.com/author=220925
21. Approach embraces
complexity
No easy examples that demonstrate the
'truth' of
◦ technical, political, legal or economic
solutions
◦ based on self-, co- or state regulatory
approaches.
◦ Cf. Mansell (2012) Imagining the Internet
Examine the deficiencies and benefits
◦ Match market and social developments
◦ With human rights concerns
◦ E.g. In fields of privacy and freedom of
expression
Note: analysis based on Article 19 UDHR not 1st
Amendment
Most of world uses variants of Article 19
22. Not just a book - epilogue
We assess the environmental
preconditions for prosumer law to
operate in Europe.
The multi-stakeholder environment for
Internet governance and regulation,
in which user groups lobbied along
with business and governments,
insights of new institutionalism.
23. Towards Interoperability as
Prosumer Law
We note the failures and capture of government
by „information giants‟
Many (not all) problems caused by giants‟
perceived need to maintain proprietary lock-in via
code
◦ Microsoft/Google/Facebook/ad industry
◦ Favoured by big government as big solution
◦ Aiding in control of networks for government interest
Solution in favour of prosumers and competition:
Interoperability
◦ (Note: this is detailed software interoperability, not the
general description offered by Gasser/Paltrey 2012)
24. Prosumer law suggests a more
directed intervention
Example:
proposed solution to the problems of
dominant social networking sites,
to prevent Facebook, Google+ or any
other network
from erecting a fence around its piece
of the information commons:
to ensure interoperability with open
standards.
25. 50 Ways to Leave Facebook
Not sufficient to permit data deletion
◦ as that only covers the user‟s tracks.
Interconnection and interoperability,
◦ more than transparency and
◦ theoretical possibility to switch.
Ability for prosumers to interoperate to
permit exit.
26. Standards wars continued
Exit and competition for standards
increasingly critical in the information
economy;
◦ Textbook examples:
3G (Qalcomm/Ericsson)
VHS/V2000/BetaMax
◦ New example: patent pooling/trolling inc.
Apple/Samsung/Google-Motorola, MSFT
We focus on interoperability,
◦ lower entry barriers, increased consumer
welfare
27. Prosumers not super-users
United States administrative and
academic arguments (Wu 2010,
Zittrain 2008, Lessig 2006) for self-
regulation to have demonstrably
failed,
I focus on the European regulatory
space as a more fertile ground
to explore prosumerism as both a
market-based and citizen-oriented
regulatory tool
28. „Islands in the Bitstream‟
(Borrus, Bar 1995)
“Inquiring into interconnection and interoperability
is a bit like the search for justice.
Everyone avows its virtue; but....”
“peculiar economic character of interface
standards raises real questions about
whether market mechanisms will be sufficient to
create a highly interoperable [Internet]”
29.
30. Gasser et al (2007)
Breaking Down Digital Barriers
There is no one-size-fits-all way to achieve
interoperability in the ICT context.
Our conclusion: interoperability generally
supports innovation in ICT context,
but that the relationship between the two is
highly complex and fact-specific.
We conclude also that the best path to
interoperability
◦ depends greatly upon context and which
subsidiary goals matter most
cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2007/Breaking_Down_Digital
_Barriers
31. “Not surprisingly, European attitudes
toward the mode of accomplishing
interoperability are quite different from
American inclinations.”
32. Range of approaches have
relative merits in circumstances
Efforts within a single firm to
interconnect products or within firms;
collaboration between or among two
or more firms;
standards processes, including open
fora and ad hoc cooperation;
and a wide range of roles for
governments,
most are ex post not ex ante modes of
regulation.
33. European Moves in 2013?
Public Consultation on the
Access to Interoperability Information
of
Digital Products and Services
◦ http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/di
spatch?form=Interoperability&lang=EN
34. What regulation teaches about
code
Ex ante and ex post intervention -
regulation
Interoperability and open code/data -
procurement
A biased policy towards open code –
◦ Data open to mash-ups (govt)
◦ Systems interoperable (procurement)
◦ Use of alternatives to market leader (e.g.
Linux)
◦ But not to exclusion of average users
35. Economics and Human
Rights
Interoperability linked to open data, open code, and
arguably though technologically deterministically
to free speech.
Blizzard of Internet governance principles in 2011
have
◦ origins in law and economics,
◦ or human rights, but
◦ apparently do not translate one to the other.
This apparent dialogue of the deaf is a
competition policy (Brown and Waelde 2005),
and corporate governance problem.
Urgent task: dialogue between previous discrete expert
fields
◦ ICT growth driver and transformative technology
◦ equally transformative role in human communication
and dialogue.
36. Recent scholarship
Intellectual Property, Human Rights
And Competition:
◦ Access to Essential Innovation and
Technology
◦ Abbe E.L. Brown
◦ Elgar 2012
37. Developing study of regulating
code
Similarities and cross-over with
◦ complexity science,
◦ network science and
◦ web science/graph theory
Match Internet regulation to complexity
theory
Longstaff (2003) Cherry (2008) Schneider/Bauer (2007)
Network science fusion of scientific/
fundamental elements from various
components
38. Euro-Interoperability
Framework
Response to gigantic (billion-euro) anti-
trust cases:
Microsoft saga (to 2009), Intel (2009),
Apple (2010), Rambus (2009)
◦ Google (2013?) perhaps Facebook....
◦ Coates (2011: Chapters 5-6).
Announced by Commissioner Kroes in
2009-2010
Bias in favour of interoperability in policy
Concerns are broader than competition
◦ Include privacy, IPR, security, fundamental
rights
39. Kroes‟ five-part EIF agenda
1. new standard setting framework;
2. new horizontal agreement guidelines to
establish more transparency in licensing
standards;
3. common framework for ICT
procurement;
4. new „European Interoperability
Framework‟;
5. intervention in competition cases to
establish a principle of interoperability,
◦ including via ex ante requirements.
40. New standard-setting end-
2010
Fast-track approval of [Internet] standards
through:
process hosted by traditional Euro standards
body
◦ such as ETSI
through assessment of compliance with certain
criteria
◦ openness, consensus, balance and
transparency.
[FRAND] New guidelines on the application of
antitrust rules to horizontal agreements.
41. “We don‟t want uniform
rules everywhere”
“Standard-setting for software interoperability
is not the same as setting a new standard for,
say,
◦ digital television or mobile telephony.
We should have right rules in the right
contexts...
I am convinced that a more visible role for fora
and consortia standardisation in Europe
will already lead to many improvements here.”
42. EIF V2.0
“Higher status and importance than
EIF version 1”
◦ was more guidance than
instruction.
„Comply or explain‟ requirement
when governments do not adopt an
available open standard,
◦ as already applies in the
Netherlands.
Resolvedvia legislation if
necessary.
43. Kroes‟ promise post-Microsoft
Will “seriously explore all options to
ensure that
significant market players cannot
just choose to deny interoperability.
“The Commission should not need to
run
an epic antitrust case
every time software lacks
interoperability.”
44. Commission (2010)
adopted the
Communication
“Common approach for public
administrations”
EC four prong strategy, with:
1. Common frameworks in support of
interoperability
2. “Reusable generic tools”
3. “Common services”
1. (operational applications and infrastructures
of a generic nature to meet user requirements
across policy areas), and
4. “Analysis of the ICT side in new EU
legislation”
45. Interoperability prevents
abuse of vertical
integration
We argue that proprietorial long-term lock-in
may
◦ tend to limit future competition
◦ by creating lock-in
◦ leading to what has been stated in mid-2011
as
◦ „ICT vendor cartel‟ dealing with
governments.
46. Such an outcome could have been
avoided with dedication to choosing
interoperable solutions.
Ganslandt (2010) argues for effective
enforcement strategy, a „hard wired‟
interoperability proposal.
We agree!
Devil remains in the detail…
48. Dolmans (2010) offers „open‟ definition
of common standard
To qualify as “open” a standard must meet a number
of open conditions:
• access to the decision-making process
• transparent and undistorted procedures
• published, pro-competitive goals
• published, objective, relevant criteria for
technology selection
• No over-standardization
Access to the standard:
Open information on blocking patents;
No unjustified refusal to license;
Fair (FRAND) pricing
49. Some broad definitions
Government: formal and institutional processes (usually
national or local) which maintain public order and take policy
decisions on behalf of citizens.
Governance: the act or process of governing (not necessarily
by government)
◦ Is governance possible without outcomes?
Regulation: application of laws, policies, rules, codes of
conduct…
◦ Legal assumption of enforcement even if only by exclusion
◦ Even if self-enforcement by habitual obedience
Self-regulation: operation according to a voluntary code of
conduct or set of principles independent of government
Co-regulation: State involved with industry in jointly
developing rules and regulations with procedures for
oversight.
Hinweis der Redaktion
Context – do we have automatic right not to have our content regulated and filtered?Rights to freedom of expression (and information in many cases) – not just a North American tradition, are regional and international standards.African Charter more limited (receive info and express opinions within bounds of law)
The new stand-setting framework was to be established by end-2010: “In Europe only ETSI allows these actors to directly participate in the making of standards. One negative result is that the standards underpinning the emerging universal communication platform: the internet and the world wide web - including standards for content formats - are made elsewhere. This puts these standards, many of which are truly open - that is to say they do not come with any constraints for implementers - at a disadvantage vis-à-vis European standards when in legislation or public procurement...[Solving] This could be done via a fast-track approval of their standards through a process hosted by a traditional European standards body such as ETSI, or through the assessment of these bodies' compliance with certain criteria regarding notably openness, consensus, balance and transparency.”On licensing standards she states: “let's face it, establishing FRAND (Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) prices is a hard task over which reasonable people often disagree. Transparency is therefore in everyone's interest - the alternatives are not... The Commission has already taken an important step by drafting new guidelines on the application of the Treaty's antitrust rules to horizontal agreements... The draft, which is currently available for public comment, relies on the well-established concepts of non-discrimination, transparency and availability and specifies minimum requirements that distinguish standard-setting from a cartel.” She continues: “when the Commission mandates standards bodies to draw up a standard it should have the right to be more demanding on the standardisation process, to ensure that standards are less demanding when it comes to their adoption. We could also think about enticing other standards bodies to adopt such rules, for example by giving their outputs preferential treatment when approving them as European standards. Finally, why not tie the public financing of standards bodies to the existence of good ex-ante rules?” This suggests an additional legislative requirement that government support for standards must rely on best practice in licensing including royalty terms. The development of her thinking on this subject through the course of the Microsoft, Intel and Rambus cases, and the policy approach increasingly shaped by interoperability, is explained in great and penetrating detail by Coates (2011: Chapters 5-6).She does not argue for uniformity however: “We don’t want uniform rules everywhere... Standard-setting for software interoperability is not the same as setting a new standard for, say, digital television or mobile telephony. We should have the right rules in the right contexts...I am convinced that a more visible role for fora and consortia standardisation in Europe will already lead to many improvements here.” Dolmans (2010) suggests that an established ‘common standard’ which is truly open allows the “best of breed” components from different manufacturers to be combined, with maximum efficiency. To qualify as “open” a standard must meet a number of open conditions:• access to the decision-making process• transparent and undistorted procedures• published, pro-competitive goals• published, objective, relevant criteria for technology selection• No over-standardization• access to the standard: Open information on blocking patents; No unjustified refusal to license; Fair (FRAND) pricingDolmans suggests that royalty-free licensing is advisable in the software arena – allowing both open source and proprietary software to compete on quality and functionality. However, he advises that the telecommunications sector uses FRAND licensing, given the price and complexity of standard-setting efforts. He states that: “Mandating royalty-free licensing would likely recreate a tragedy of commons and discourage innovation, while allowing IPR owners to charge at will could create a tragedy of anticommons. To strike the right balance, therefore, a contract of mutual restraint is necessary”. This argues against uniform royalty-free pricing.On IT procurement by European governments, Kroes suggests “detailed guidance on how to analyse a technology buyer's requirements in order to make best use of ICT standards in tender specifications. This is a complex exercise... Many authorities have found themselves unintentionally locked into proprietary technology for decades.” She means lazy procurement or to be more polite, when 'inertia sets in'. Or corruption in IT vending, of course, and it is notable that an IT vendor ‘cartel’ has been alleged by government on both sides of the Atlantic in 2011.The new European Interoperability Framework is a second version, adopted by the College of Commissioners, and “will therefore rightly be perceived as of a higher status and importance than EIF version 1” which was more guidance than instruction. She explains that “It contains a ‘comply or explain’ requirement when governments do not adopt an available open standard, as already applies in the Netherlands.” Most radically, she signals more intervention on interoperability in competition cases: “with my colleagues in the College I will seriously explore all options to ensure that significant market players cannot just choose to deny interoperability with their product.” She argues that the lengthy Microsoft case has lessons for action: “Complex anti-trust investigations followed by court proceedings are perhaps not the only way to increase interoperability. The Commission should not need to run an epic antitrust case every time software lacks interoperability. Wouldn't it be nice to solve all such problems in one go?... I am looking for a way to ensure companies offer the required information for licensing... Whereas in ex-post investigations we have all sorts of case-specific evidence and economic analysis on which to base our decisions, we are forced to look at more general data and arguments when assessing the impact of ex-ante legislation. Just to be clear, while it is still early days, it is certainly possible that I will go for a legislative proposal.”In the first phase, the Commission (2010) adopted the Communication, to “establish a common approach for Member States public administrations, to help citizens and businesses to profit fully from the EU’s Single Market”. It forms the basis of the EC four prong strategy, with Common frameworks in support of interoperability, “Reusable generic tools”, “Common services” (operational applications and infrastructures of a generic nature to meet user requirements across policy areas), and “Analysis of the ICT side in the implementation of new EU legislation”. We will in this chapter focus on the final point, and suggest that the EC and Member States should impose a general duty to require interoperability to be ‘hard wired’ into legislation in all cases where there is not an over-riding public interest in favour of a proprietary solution. In particular, given the modality of interoperability can prevent the types of abusive vertical integration found in the Microsoft case, we argue that financial models intended to create best value for taxpayers may both tend to limit future competition by creating lock-in as well as leading to what has been stated in both the UK and US in mid-2011 to be an ‘ICT vendor cartel’ dealing with governments. Such an outcome could have been foreseen, and would have been avoided with greater dedication to choosing interoperable solutions. As Ganslandt (2010) argues, the four prongs are “they are not likely to be sufficient” without a more effective enforcement strategy, hence our ‘hard wired’ interoperability proposal.