TakeDownCon Rocket City: Cyber Security via Technology Fails by Jeremy Conway
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TakeDownCon Rocket City: Cyber Security via Technology Fails by Jeremy Conway
- 1. CYBER SECURITY VIA TECHNOLOGY FAILS Jeremy Conway
- 2. Introduc:ons • Founder and Managing Partner @ SudoSecure • Creden:als: – 16+ Years in Informa:on Security – NASA, DoD, US Army – MS, Informa:on Security – BS, Computer Science and Math – 20+ Industry Cer:fica:ons
- 3. The true sign of intelligence is not knowledge but imagina9on. Albert Einstein
- 4. Demo 1: This is not the A@ack your Looking for!
- 5. IDS/IPS and Correla:on Engines • Evading an IDS/IPS requires understanding the signature (matching paVern) – Most cases it is TRIVIAL at BEST to evade! • Correla:on Engines tend to use simple logic – Evading these complex and expensive devices is EASY when it relies on Insecure Protocols! • Ge[ng it RIGHT! – Understand the limita:ons of Signature Detec:on Engines – Decompose complex rule engines and correla:on logic to iden:fy possible evasion techniques – Consider adding a “TRUSTED” metric value when designing a Secured Architecture
- 6. Demo 2: Can you spot the Imposter?
- 7. SSL MiTM • “YES” SSL can be MiTM’ed • Encryp:on does not imply “No Worries”! • Ge[ng it right! – Never use self-‐signed Cer:ficates – Never allow an Exemp:on – Be OVERLY Paranoid!
- 8. Demo 3: Outsourced Trust, the Domino Effect
- 9. Outsourced Trust • The Web and your Browser are GREAT at CACHING – Even when it is Malicious Injected Badness • Two-‐Factor Authen:ca:on doesn’t solve EVERTHING! • Ge[ng it Right! – Never include content you don’t control on a Secure Site!
- 10. Demo 4: Begging to be Hi-‐Jacked
- 11. WiFi Hi-‐Jacking • By DEFAULT most Wireless Devices Probe and Connect to Preferred Networks • Ge[ng it Right – Disable Automa:c Connec:ons to Preferred Network List – Disable WiFi when NOT in Use
- 12. Demo 5: Passwords – Are you doing it wrong?
- 13. LM Passwords • • • • Used to support the legacy LAN Manager protocol Disabled by default on Windows star:ng with Vista S:ll found enabled everywhere though! Weaknesses: – Password truncated at 14 Chars – Split into 2 halves of 7 Char passwords – Password is converted to UPPERCASE • PROTIPS: – Crack LM hashes then use Cracked password to aVack NTLM password – Free Rainbow Tables (freerainbowtables.com) will crack about 99% of LM hashes using rcracki_mt – John the ripper use: -‐-‐loopback -‐-‐format=nt -‐-‐rules=NT – Hashcat use -‐a to toggle case of LM cracked hashes
- 14. Something to consider! Albert Einstein
- 15. Ques9ons? Jeremy Conway jeremy@sudosecure.com twi@er: cj3r3my Thank You!
- 16. References THC-‐Hydra: h@p://www.thc.org/thc-‐hydra/ Mitmproxy: h@p://mitmproxy.org/ Burp Suite: h@p://portswigger.net/burp/ HTTPS Cache Injec:on AVack (Bad Memories): h@p://elie.im/talks/bad-‐memories • Wifi Pineapple (Karma AVack): h@ps://wifipineapple.com/ • LM Hash: h@p://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LM_hash • • • •