Orchestrating Least Privilege by Diogo Monica
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Docker Distributed System Presentation by Diogo Monica
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Orchestrating Least Privilege by Diogo Monica
- 9. SWAR M
- 10. Job of a Conductor - Casting - Assign sheet music - Unify performers - Set the tempo
- 11. Job of an Orchestrator - Node management - Task assignment - Cluster state reconciliation - Resource Management
- 12. What is a Least Privilege Orchestrator?
- 15. A process must be able to access only the information and resources that are necessary for its legitimate purpose.Principle of Least Privilege
- 27. What do we need to achieve Least Privilege Orchestration?
- 28. Mitigating External Attacker - Externally accessible service ports are explicitly defined - Administration endpoints are authenticated and authorized
- 29. Mitigating Internal Network Attacker - Authentication of both network and cluster control-plane communication - Service to service communication is authorized, with orchestrator managed ACLs
- 30. Mitigating MiTM Attacker - All control and data-plane traffic is encrypted.
- 31. Mitigating Malicious Worker ‣Should only have access to resources currently in use ‣Push VS Pull ‣No ability to modify or access any cluster state except their own. ‣Identity is assigned, never requested
- 32. Mitigating Malicious Manager ‣Can’t run arbitrary code on workers ‣No access to secret material ‣No ability to spin up unauthorized nodes/impersonate existing nodes. ‣No ability to read service-to-service communication
- 35. SWAR M
- 36. Mutual TLS by default • First node generates a new self-signed CA.
- 37. Mutual TLS by default • First node generates a new self-signed CA. • New nodes can get a certificate issued w/ a token.
- 38. Mutual TLS by default • First node generates a new self-signed CA. • New nodes can get a certificate issued w/ a token. • Workers and managers identified by their certificate.
- 39. Mutual TLS by default • First node generates a new self-signed CA. • New nodes can get a certificate issued w/ a token. • Workers and managers identified by their certificate. • Communications secured with Mutual TLS.
- 40. The Token SWMTKN-1-mx8susrv1etsmc8omaom825bet6-cm6zts22rl4hly2 Prefix to allow VCS searches for leaked Tokens Token Version Cryptographic Hash of the CA Root Certificate for bootstrap Randomly generated Secret
- 41. Bootstrap 1. Retrieve and validate Root CA Public key material. 2. Submit new CSR along with secret token. 3. Retrieve the signed certificate.
- 42. Automatic Certificate Rotation 1. Submit new CSR using old key-pair. 2. Retrieve the new signed certificate.
- 43. Support for External CAs • Managers support BYO CA. • Forwards CSRs to external CA.
- 44. Dem o
- 47. Thank you
Hinweis der Redaktion
- Group of musicians, with different roles, that play a specific pre-arranged tune in synchronicity One interesting thing about Classical arts such as Plays, Ballets, and even Symphonies is that they all follow a script A writer, or composer writes a script that is performed by the creative people under the direction of a director or conductor Even though Directors and conductors have some latitude to arrange things according to their liking, but they must completely follow certain wishes of the original author In classical music, the notes performed must be the exact notes that the composer wrote
- In plays, the exact wording of the script must be followed even though casting and certain details about the set can change
- In ballets, the exact movements of the dancers must be followed.
- In each of the examples of the examples that we’ve mentioned: symphonies, ballet and plays, there is a declarative syntax that the authors can represent their intentions in. These intentions must be strictly followed this is BALLET NOTATION
- Composer (Bach), Conductor and a musician
- Now that we know what is an orchestrator? What is a least privilege orchestrator then”
- Least privilege is the concept of specialization. For example, if you have a Tuba player, she has to follow strictly the sheet music, and can’t, for example, start playing the drums. It shouldn’t have access to either the drums or the drums sheet music.
- - And therefore a least-privilege orchestrator is a an orchestrator that follows this principle in the strictest manner possible.
- It comes down what is your attacker model. And we believe we should architect for the most pessimistic attacker model. Following least privilege allows us to think critically about exactly what access each participant in a system should have. These are the five broad categories of attacker models that we can think about when looking at orchestrator systems
- - A common attacker model, is someone completely outside of your system. An example of this attacker model are external firewalls: their exclusive attacker model is an external attacker, and they are completely bypassed by someone with internal network access
- - A common attacker model, is someone completely outside of your system. An example of this attacker model are external firewalls: their exclusive attacker model is an external attacker, and they are completely bypassed by someone with internal network access
- - A common attacker model, is someone completely outside of your system. An example of this attacker model are external firewalls: their exclusive attacker model is an external attacker, and they are completely bypassed by someone with internal network access
- - NSA cat
- - A common attacker model, is someone completely outside of your system. An example of this attacker model are external firewalls: their exclusive attacker model is an external attacker, and they are completely bypassed by someone with internal network access
- - Malicious Musician AKA malicious worker
- - A common attacker model, is someone completely outside of your system. An example of this attacker model are external firewalls: their exclusive attacker model is an external attacker, and they are completely bypassed by someone with internal network access
- - Malicious Conductor aka Malicious Manager
- - Malicious Conductor aka Malicious Manager And the fact that we should protect against all of these attacker models, is why we need least-privilege architectures. If any node is compromised, an attacker has exactly the access that the node has at that specific moment in time, no more, no less. Eclipse attack
- What do we need? It is super important in security design, let’s design architectures that take into account all the attacker models that we just discussed. From this, we will come up design principles for our idealized least-privilege orchestrator
- If a service did not get explicitly defined as needing an internet accessible port, it is closed by default. Administration endpoints are authenticated, and authorized by default, which means that misconfiguration is unlikely
- Secrets, Configs, Networks, etc Once worker no longer needs resource, remove them to mitigate against future compromise
- Simple and understandable through decomposition and state space reduction. Since any node can trigger an election and terminate the current term at any moment, a Byzantine node can effortlessly starve the whole system by perpetual elections, and consequently subvert Raft’s availability. Tangaroa and Juno
- What do we need? It is super important in security design, let’s design architectures that take into account all the attacker models that we just discussed. From this, we will come up design principles for our idealized least-privilege orchestrator
- User’s should sign all declarative changes, Workers have to enforce them All external dependencies must also be signed, specially if they are time-of-use dependent (alpine:latest) Talk about notary - Bootstrap: where does the trusted user keys come from in a self-signed, automatically generated swarm. TOFU? Manual configuration on nodes? Hardware trust anchor?
- Raft VS Paxos Tangaroa + blockchain (whtaver the name is) implementations aren’t production ready. Don’t want malicious manager to take leadership
- Add diagram that explains how least-privilege secrets distribution is hard - Secrets can’t pass managers unencrypted - Still need the ability of recovering from node failure and rescheduling containers, but can’t add new nodes and self-schedule tasks - Managers can’t control node identities Open questions: Secrets should be accessed through a third-party system or encrypted to each node’s public key? How do you control identities of new nodes, and ensure that malicious managers aren’t intercepting the requests or creating phantom nodes. external certificate authority
- The current state of orchestrators from a security perspective: It’s great, it’s entertaining, it makes you want to put $5 in the donation bucket. But it really isn’t what you want to run in your production environment. We deserve better. We deserve orchestrators that live up to the name.
- Let me tell you about what we’re doing with swarm and how we’re trying to achieve least-privilege orchestrators.
- - The first node Generates a CA, and creates a 1-node
- - One mode of operation: requires a token, tokens are generated by the server. Short of tweeting the token there is very little you can do to screw it up.
- - Everyone has roles. In certificates
- - MiTM attacker and Internal Attacker. We also encrypt gossip membership, and have optional data-plane encryption
- Customizable certificate rotation periods. Occurs automatically. Ensures potentially compromised or leaked certificates are rotated out of use. Whitelist of currently valid certificates.
- - This is the current state of swarm: they are a jazz band. Swarm currently has least-privilege musicians, but we need least-privilege conductors.
- And what we want is a classical music orchestra And we would love your help getting there.