1. REDEFINING AGGRESSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY
Derrick J. Gonzales
INTL498
Professor Jimenez
August 26, 2014

2. 2
Setting The Stage
The American military invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks
of September 11, 2001 set a precedent in which an entire terrorist organization was targeted. The
United States decreed that any and all supporters of Al Qaeda, including various other
international terrorist organizations, would become targets as well. Not only did the United
States prioritize the capture or killing of Osama Bin Laden, it also focused on destabilizing Al
Qaeda by eliminating its support structure.1 This new strategy would force military planners to
utilize operational measures which would not only destroy the Taliban’s capacity to conduct
military operations, but also its own systemic support apparatus by turning the Afghan people
against them. However, once routed, the Taliban still maintained a significant presence in
southern Afghanistan, and – with help from Pakistan – continued to attack American and NATO
forces. The subsequent insurgency required a comprehensive response, which the United States
haphazardly employed with varying degrees of success. Unfortunately, the outcome of the
counterinsurgency campaign suffered from a glaring misunderstanding of a local necessity: to
convince the Afghan people to prefer American forces over the Taliban. Ultimately, this
viewpoint persevered for several years and made very little headway. Instead, the United States
should have prioritized their assistance toward alienating the insurgents rather than piecemeal
gestures intended to highlight democratic values and American superiority.
The battle for Afghanistan was never going to be an easy one for America. Once the
reality of the Al Qaeda attacks set in, the United States declared its intention to invade
Afghanistan, search for Bin Laden, and remove the Taliban. However, the presidential
1 George Friedman, America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies
(New York: Anchor Books, 2004),133.

3. 3
administration (and for all intents and purposes the public as well) felt it necessary to conduct
military operations as soon as possible. This left very little time to collect intelligence, analyze
circumstances, forecast outcomes, and then respond accordingly. For the most part, much of the
American intelligence community had very little knowledge of the area since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Even its topographical analyses were hampered by substandard maps that had not
seen the light of day since the Soviet invasion.2 The fact that the United States was able to
liberate Afghanistan in such a short time-frame is hard to believe, considering the lack of
conventional military forces and a newfound reliance on information technology.
Once substantial combat ended, however, the new objective revolved around building up
critical infrastructure in Afghanistan, imparting democratic values, and fortifying its national
security apparatus. Before an insurgency ever began, America was implementing
counterinsurgency tactics. The problem was, however, that the United States tried to do this from
a top-down approach, rather than a bottom-up one that included liaising with the local warlords
and tribal chiefs. Instead of taking the approach of T.E. Lawrence, the United States incorrectly
compared the Afghan people to that of a Western nation.3
Operation Iraqi Freedom followed a similar post-combat model. The difference, however,
was less about tribal allegiances than it was about religious fundamentalism. The Sunni and
Shi’a sects of Islam are about as disparate as Arabs, Persians, and Afghans. Finding a way to
collaborate with all of them without enhancing historic rivalries was the true test of the American
military in Iraq and it should have utilized counterinsurgency tactics from the outset, not several
2 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 369-70.
3 More commonly referred to as Lawrence of Arabia, T.E. Lawrence was a Middle East archeologist who understood
traditional Arabian and Islamic idiosyncrasies, which became invaluable to preventing the Ottomans from
overrunning the Levant and Mesopotamia during World War I [Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S.
Covert Action & Counterintelligence 6th Edition (New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers,2008), 169.]

4. 4
years after the insurgency was in full swing. Beyond the search for weapons of mass destruction
(which involves a propensity of intelligence operatives and specialized tactical units), there was
very little population interaction taking place. In hindsight, several special operations officers
viewed such an oversight as a grave mistake. Without being involved with groups that were
resistant to Islamic fundamentalism, terrorists, or remnants of the Iraqi Army, the generals
conclude, it was impossible to understand and meet the needs of the locals.4
Eventually, the American occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq started to show more signs
of counterinsurgency – both on the ground and in the Intelligence Community. Several new
commanders began to emphasize the use of forward operating bases to facilitate cooperation
between allied forces and the population. Additionally, during the search for Bin Laden in
Afghanistan, military commanders realized their glowing lack of credible human intelligence and
restructured how information was gathered, analyzed, and disseminated. This allowed troops to
be more interactive while on patrols, and gave ground commanders virtual real-time intelligence.
As a result, technical collection assets became more user-friendly and combatant commanders
became more confident in the Army’s ability to counteract Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or the
Sunni/Shi’a insurgents.
The results of this new approach were immediate. Local villagers found that they could
exist without relying on the Taliban or Al Qaeda, the new Iraqi and Afghan governments gained
more confidence, and allied casualties dropped dramatically. Overall, the switch from a
conventional occupation to counterinsurgency became a determining factor for the outcome of
each war. In the end, through the bravery and sacrifice of American and NATO soldiers, as well
4 Or rather, “to firstunderstand them within the context of the operational environment, and then to take
meaningful action to effectively influencehuman behavior toward a desired outcome” [Charles T. Cleveland &
Stuart L. Farris,“Toward Strategic Landpower,” The Journal of International Security Affairs no. 25 (2013),97.]

5. 5
as Afghan and Iraqi community leaders and police, the denizens of both nations began a new
decade with an incredible sense of control and responsibility. Counterinsurgency, then, suddenly
became “the most discussed, lauded, and influential military doctrine in generations.”5
One crucial factor is missing from this equation, however, and that is just how effective
United States and NATO forces were in overcoming the opposition. As history has shown, most
conflicts end in large body counts or occupations, whereas the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had
small body counts, followed by ad hoc occupations. In essence, such successes are more tactical
than strategic; they accomplished their initial goals (toppling the fundamentalist and dictatorial
regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively), but have yet to do so with the more long-term
objectives (regional stability through governments willing to hunt terrorists). The reason why is
simple. The United States maintains superiority in tactical military force, but it fails to sustain a
sliver of parity strategically. That is, America can rout the Taliban and Iraqi armies, but it cannot
create change in Islamic countries without the tacit support of local populations. Hence, the
success of the counterinsurgency campaigns conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan were because of
the local populations’ efforts, and not because of America’s might.
A British Boggle
In understanding the value that indigenous mindsets and morale plays during an active
counterinsurgency campaign, it makes sense to analyze historical examples and determine the
true influence of military assistance in countering foes. During the American Revolution, the
British Empire followed the same conceptual framework as did the United States with the
occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. And much like America, the British had tertiary tactical
5 Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency (New York: The New Press,2013),2.

6. 6
objectives that were more easily defined and attainable than its overall strategic goal. In other
words, Britain considered its American colonies as a source of vast raw materials, full of
Englishmen who would gladly toil endlessly in their fields just to have the fruits of their labors
shipped overseas to be enjoyed by the King and his subjects.6 Much like America using the
Afghan people in hunting Al Qaeda, the British used the American colonists to help expand their
empire. And just like the United States adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would take several
years before London was obligated to introduce a strategic counterinsurgency campaign.
One might think that seeking to seduce a group of people who are similar in virtually
every regard was simple, but it is important to recognize the disconnection between those in the
colonies and in Britain. The imposition of taxes carried with it varying degrees of resentment,
combined with the disposition of London elites versus American socialites, had the effect of
alienating a constituency of fellows – regardless of their familial, genealogic, or historical
lineages. The British Empire was struggling, and the ruling classes in London thought it fair to
have the colonists pay for much of the war debt incurred against the French and Native
Americans. Unfortunately for Britain, by this time cries for independence were fervently making
their rounds. It would seem that the American elites understood the immense value of their
natural resources and wanted to trade internationally. To some degree, then, we can view the
American Revolution as a conflict between British royals who wanted to take advantage of what
the colonies had to offer, and American academics who understood the immense geopolitical
influence their position attributed to them. For sure, it would seem that the average colonist was
stuck in the middle. Much like the Afghans and Iraqis who just tried to survive day-to-day, and
6 Dave R. Palmer, George Washington’s Military Genius (Washington,D.C.: Regnery Publishing,Inc.,2012),31.

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were caught between two competing forces: the Americans and the Taliban/Al
Qaeda/fundamentalists, respectively.
The British military strategy against the colonists began similarly to the United States’
strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Taking control of population centers was the overarching
objective, and was intended to decentralize the American resistance and control trade. The
British were obsessed with the cities of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. However, the
colonies were already decentralized, so the capture of one or a number of these cities did not
have the effect that London had hoped for. The de facto federalism employed by the different
colonies did not allow such strategic success. The loss of New York, for example, did little to
degrade the revolutionary zeal of the colonists. Indeed, Philadelphia was a grander target but
because of its isolation it held no significant tactical advantage.7 The control of cities was the
traditional way of waging warfare in Europe, and the British assumed that such tactics would
lead to success in America.
Once the British realized that there was no quick end to the conflict, they began to
consider the validity of population control. Being in possession of New York, the British could
ingratiate themselves with the locals and rely on information gained from loyalists and special
agents. This was a conundrum for Britain, whose military superiority was hardly a result of tricks
and double-dealing; however, they felt it necessary given the unique circumstances of the
colonies.8 For one, the use of espionage was essential to defeating the revolution. Most British
military officers had grown up fighting in Europe, and were disgusted by the colonists’ use of
7 Ibid., 47.
8 Brian Kilmeade& Don Yaeger, George Washington’s Secret Six: The Spy Ring That Saved the American Revolution
(New York: Sentinel, 2013),69.

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unconventional tactics and irregular warfare. It was important that they gain a foothold with the
colonists and seek information regarding arms caches and the location of revolutionary leaders.
This, however, was easier said than done. British occupiers were constantly being
accused of abusing local populations and taking advantage of their positions.9 Instead of
alienating the revolutionaries, the British proved that eroding the public’s trust can have dire
consequences. George Washington’s spy network was integral to the success of the Continental
Army, and a crucial aspect of its effectiveness was the network’s ability to collect intelligence
from British officials. Washington’s knowledge of British intentions explains just how effective
colonial spies were, and how out of touch the British espionage program was. There was a stark
difference between the two armies’ intelligence sources: the British were consistently limited to
information gleamed from the upper echelon, while the Americans took advantage of
information collected from the lesser class.10 This disproportion in the quality of intelligence
would ultimate deceive the British several years later.11
The failure of the British to properly conduct a counterinsurgency campaign against the
American colonists ultimately determined the outcome of the war. For starters, the American
Revolution relied on very few colonists taking up arms. In this regard the British missed a golden
opportunity by not trying to coerce the poor and destitute of the colonies into resisting the calls
for independence. If it had done so, it is very unlikely that the patriots would have been able to
9 Daniel Marston, The American Revolution 1774-1783 (New York: Routledge, 2013), 79.
10 Kilmeade& Yaeger, 135.
11 Needing to keep the British forces from marching south, Washington utilized his spy network by spreading
misinformation about a supposed colonist attack on New York. This information was accepted by Britain’s
leadership who maintained a garrison in the north, allowing a mixed American/French force to march on Yorktown
[Timothy Walton, Challenges In Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010),57-8.]

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sustain any measure of engagement against the British. The lack of a support system would have
been devastating to the patriot cause.
Additionally, British forces failed to take advantage of the Continental Army, who were
no strangers to abusing local populations as well. Much of what the English did to patriot
sympathizers was copied by the Continentals against loyalists and pacifists.12 If the British had
sought to empathize with the abused peoples, instead of replicating the abuses, their intelligence
collection process would have been more refined and effectual. However, they brutalized the
denizens of the cities they occupied, often quartering themselves against the wishes of
homeowners and dolling out public lashings for those who resisted.13
The sad truth concerning Britain’s position in the colonies is that, regardless of which
tactics and strategies were employed to alienate the Patriots, its victory was hardly ever within
reach. For the most part, the British Army was fortunate to face so few partisans and
revolutionaries. Even if it could have turned the population against the Continental Army, the
necessary promises made by Britain would have gone unresolved. Having a coherent
counterinsurgency plan relies on quick turnaround from what is needed to what is provided. On
average, English ships would take six months to travel round-trip between London and New
York.14 This situation was further exacerbated by the British Empire’s worldwide struggle
against other rivals, and in particular France, who redefined the conflict once allying with the
Americans.
12 Marston, 80.
13 Kilmeade& Yaeger, 75.
14 Palmer, 30.

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Conclusively, the British Army missed several instances which could have shaped the
outcome in its favor. Britain’s ultimate goal was not to destroy the population, but to subjugate
the revolutionaries and keep trade flowing. It required its vast resources and needed to maintain a
foothold in North America to prevent further Spanish and French incursions. But its predicament
was impossible to change. Any insurgency in this situation would have been successful as long
as it had the support of the local population. The only distinct chance the British had for success
would have been to turn the population against the revolutionaries. In turn, this could have
influenced France’s decision to ally itself with the Patriots. In doing so, Britain could have
prevented the threat of a comparable naval force allied with an indigenous (and constantly
recruiting) land force.
A Setback In South Asia
For two decades the United States and its allies sought to pacify the French Indochina
region of communist insurgents, often killing innocent civilians in the process. What was
initially a shadow war fought between intelligence operatives and guerrillas slowly developed
into open conflict in which tens of thousands of troops deployed. In keeping with traditional
American military doctrine (whose foundation lies with the European brand of warfare), the
American response was blatantly conventional. General William Westmoreland believed that
overwhelming firepower would limit the enemy’s ability to fight and sap the will of the North
Vietnamese.15 Westmoreland would be proven wrong, and not because his approach was not
effective, but because the concept of counterinsurgency took place much too late and much too
constrained. If the American military initiated conflict with the purpose of turning the population
15 Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, no. 2 (March/April 2013),110.

11. 11
against the communists, then it would have been much easier to effectively conduct the search-
and-destroy missions it became infamous for. Ultimately, more civilian lives would have been
saved and the outcome of the war could have had a different result.
Any objective analysis of American intelligence use in Vietnam should emphasize the
lack, thereof, of intelligence that was intended to convince the population that the communists
were the true enemy. Indeed, before official United States military operations commenced there
was very little intelligence success within Vietnam. One glaring example looks humane and
courageous on the surface, but with further investigation is riddled with flaws. The Central
Intelligence Agency was tasked with transporting Vietnamese citizens from the North to the
South, which it did very well. Overall, over six-hundred thousand people were relocated to South
Vietnam. This huge humanitarian exploit should be enough to count as a success; however, the
operation failed to recognize the tens of thousands of enemy intelligence operatives located
within the refugee group.16 Needless to say, any such counterinsurgency campaign would have
been difficult to achieve with even a marginal amount of success when the population is littered
with communist operatives.
An unfortunate side-effect of the lack of cohesion between the American forces and the
civilian population was the large casualty numbers of both entities. Fighting a guerrilla war
undoubtedly has a negative impact on the surrounding populous, and similarly, competently
fighting an insurgency against a people that are dissimilar to American forces is near impossible.
Which is why the locals should always be considered force multipliers in any counterinsurgency.
They know the local cultural sensitivities, they know the most likely ambush areas, and they
16 Joseph J. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA (New York: MJF Books, 2001), 330.

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speak the language and understand how the insurgents think. Furthermore, if convinced to
actively take up arms against the insurgents, indigenous forces can often create a stunningly
large military advantage for the military. Such was true of the Montagnard tribes of Vietnam
who were so effective at countering the Viet Cong.
To its credit, the United States did attempt to offer incentives for the local populace to
turn against the communists. Most notably, financial and agricultural aid was provided to the
government of South Vietnam to assist with developments intended to project its power.17 The
problem with this approach was how the money was spent and who truly was served by it. A
proper counterinsurgency campaign deploys special advisors or military personnel to small
villages or towns were insurgent doctrine is most likely to be influential. However, the assistance
supplied was being used to shore up the political clout of the South Vietnamese presidency. As a
result, the communists continued to make progress with the poorest Vietnamese, and American
casualties continued to climb.
Over several years, however, American forces would learn to adjust their operations so
they would be more conducive to influencing the locals. They realized their lack of awareness
with historic Vietnamese tradition, and focused on understanding their language and their
culture. Special operations units would move into villages, train the locals to fight the insurgents,
teach them advanced agricultural techniques, and lay the foundation for civic responsibility and
service.18 Such an approach had the characteristics of a genuine counterinsurgency campaign,
and the results were much more accommodating to the American Congress and a public who
were fed up with the deaths of young draftees and the lack of tangible progress.
17 Gentile, 115.
18 Walton,150.

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Fighting the Vietnamese in Vietnam with a conventional force built to fight on the open
plains of Europe was a strategic failure that affected every tactical maneuver and operation
throughout the course of the war. Even when counterinsurgency did take hold, it was being
conducted through conventional means. Like trying to sew with a sword, the American military
in Vietnam was too big, too bulky, and too destructive. Instead of conducting counterinsurgency
operations in the aftermath of death and despair, the cause of democracy would have been better
served by, at the very least, including Vietnamese groups in the decision processes leading up to
military action.
Additionally, from an intelligence standpoint, the Vietnamese were ill-served by an
American intelligence community that failed to do is research before committing itself. Initially,
the main objective was to fight secular communism with proselytizing capitalism. Washington,
D.C. invoked the will of the Vatican over a country in which the majority of its inhabitants were
practicing Buddhists.19 The United States flaked on a golden opportunity to alienate the
insurgency who were already discriminating and abusing Buddhist adherents. If it had coopted
such a large group, it would have been able to conduct humanitarian assistance and military
action with a higher degree of efficacy. Unfortunately, America was unable to do so and fought a
disastrous war against an entrenched enemy that held advantages of terrain and population
control. The United States would have been better served by taking a lesson from the Soviet
invasion of Finland during World War II.20
19 Trento, 332.
20 Another haphazardly conducted invasion by conventional forces against an enemy with the advantage of
unconventional terrain and skirmishing, when all was said and done – though victorious – the Soviet Army
casualties equated to over 400,000 killed and wounded. This lesson, though ignored by the Americans in Vietnam,
was used to remarkable effect by Germany during its invasion of the Soviet Union [Alexander Swanston & Malcolm
Swanston, The Historical Atlas of World War II (New York: Chartwell Books, Inc., 2008),43.]

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An Afghan Accident
The previously used examples are intended to showcase the difficulty of conducting
counterinsurgency that focuses only on the advantages of supporting government forces. In both
the American colonies and Vietnam the indigenous populations had virtually no prior structure
that would independently influence support for or against either party. In response, the British
and Americans focused on shoring up central governmental control, focusing on large population
centers and emanating out from there. More recently, however, the insurgency in Afghanistan,
and to a lesser degree in Iraq, was not concentrated in the larger cities. It was built around the
tribal nature of disparate Afghan ethnicities and their traditional frontier lifestyles. It was such
historical legacy that allowed the Taliban to take control of the south; eventually pushing
resistance forces to the north. But Afghan military tradition has never focused on occupations or
the control of cities; it has always revolved around the mobile warfare that accompanies such
arduous terrain. Hence, battling the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan became inherently
reliant on America’s cooperation with the local population who could offer insight and
intelligence to enemy positions.
The beginning of military operations in Afghanistan could not have gone any better for
the United States. A massive aerial bombardment and cooptation of Tajik and Pashtun resistance
movements was too much for the Taliban to handle. In response, they retreated from their cities
and took up defensive positions in the countryside and villages. Based upon a network of tribal
relations, Taliban forces were able to disrupt several American and NATO attempts to eradicate
them. However, it would only be a matter of time before the Taliban was pushed out of the
country. Unfortunately, the United States did not have a plan in place for this eventuality. It
never came to Afghanistan with a plan for occupation, but it did realize the potential of using

15. 15
Afghan cities as bases to hunt Al Qaeda from.21 This mistake would haunt the American effort to
pacify the Taliban because it prevented counterinsurgency tactics from being effective until
several years later.
The quintessential goal of counterinsurgency is to win the hearts and minds of the people
who support the insurgents. By turning them against an opponent, it becomes extremely difficult
to maintain any semblance of resistance. The Taliban was a repressive regime from its outset, so
the ability of the United States to cooperate with the locals should have been easy. However, the
American intelligence program in Afghanistan had become stillborn since the 1980s. Contacts
and networks developed during the Soviet invasion by the United States were eventually
discarded as the world became more unipolar. By the time of the American invasion, the only
personnel with contacts within the resistance movements had been out of government for years,
and the collection managers had very little human intelligence experience. In a society that
emphasizes community and tradition, the collection of intelligence on the ground was of the
utmost importance, and America was severely lacking in its ability to do so. If it had this
capability at the outset it would have been easier to influence the local population against the
Taliban, as well as convince them that it would be better in the long run to assist the Americans
and liberate Afghanistan from the fundamentalism that had taken over in the past decade.
The true heroes in the Afghan insurgency were not American generals or policies, but the
Afghans themselves. They felt the strain on a personal level: in their villages and mosques.
Success relied more on village elders and communities taking responsibility for their own safety
and security, and less about the humanitarian aid and airstrikes NATO could provide. Unlike the
21 Friedman, 134.

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British who failed to utilize poor and unemployed American colonists, the Afghan Local Police
program instituted a community-based security apparatus in which unemployed Afghans were
given training and a stipend to protect their towns and villages.22 With assistance from American
and NATO troops, the Afghan police began to push back against the Taliban, who had
continuously and brutally murdered community leaders in an attempt to control the population.
This example shows how military support can be used within counterinsurgency to great effect;
however, the actual turn of the population relies more on the ill effects of the insurgents rather
than the piles of cash or specialized training American forces brought to bear.
In the end, the Taliban were defeated by the Afghan people who were fed up with their
brutality. Combined with necessary counterinsurgency operations, such as the focus on civic
duty, the Taliban was losing heart and fearful that the nation was turning against it. Indeed, after
the 2004 elections, many in the Taliban were prepared to surrender due to the lack of public
support.23 The resulting effects of the public denouncement of the Taliban were effective in
allowing the central government in Kabul to solidify its foundation and enhance infrastructure
improvement. The Americans in Vietnam tried to accomplish this in reverse by giving aid to an
ill-prepared government instead of assisting the public directly. The lesson to be learned from
this is that no government can operate without public support, and the counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan only began to show improvements after the public chose to support the government.
Fortifying the Foundation
22 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
Publishing,2014),274.
23 Rumsfeld, 682.

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Throughout the military history of the United States one thing is certain: grand strategy is
ever-changing. What worked in Vietnam may not have worked in Afghanistan. What worked in
the American colonies may not have worked in Iraq. The counterinsurgency tactics used against
the Americans during the revolution was unique to the situation at hand. They could not have
been properly utilized in any of the modern wars. Additionally, the American public is unwilling
to send their young men and women to fight and die in exotic locales for undefined objectives or
goals. The Global War on Terror is yet another example of insurgencies dictating the strategy of
the United States military.
Since the end of World War II insurgencies have had a lifespan of roughly a decade.24
With the lack of nation-versus-nation warfare since the collapse of the Soviet Union, virtually all
conflicts have involved insurgencies. Unfortunately, it would seem that the United States has yet
to learn its lesson, and the proof lies with the current struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The lack
of an emphasis on the importance of connecting with the local populations directly lead to the
power and potency of the insurgencies. The quick military victories in both theaters once again
proved the might of America, but the subsequent occupation and institutionalization has yet to
show lasting improvements.
Before engaging in combat with the colonists, the British were in possession of the
greatest military of the time. However, there were several failings in the years that led up to the
revolution which prevented them from understanding just how crucial population control would
become. First of all, the British hierarchy was ignorant of the mentality that influenced the
colonists to revolt. No British administrator had ever been to the colonies to see first-hand how
24 Boot, 113.

18. 18
the people lived.25 This misunderstanding would eventually influence their operational decisions
and have a disadvantageous effect on British military efficiency and morale. British military
operations were inherently dysfunctional because of the lack of colonial understanding: military
leaders continuously underestimated the strength of the colonists.26 This misunderstanding could
have easily been avoided if the British had attempted to turn the population against the Patriots.
Another historic example of counterinsurgency in action was the Malay Emergency in
which ethnic Chinese conducted a communist insurgency in the British colony of Malay. This
time around, at least, the British came prepared. The inclusion of a specialized military force to
ingratiate themselves with the population turned the tides against the communists, and the
Special Air Service became the seminal counterinsurgency model that the United States would
eventually follow in Vietnam. The lessons learned in Malay should have been properly employed
in every counterinsurgency since then, however, it would seem that the United States would only
utilize them after many years of stalemates and high casualty numbers. It was in Malay that the
British truly understood the advantage of coopting the local population, believing that living with
the locals, recognizing their cultural sensitivities and taking advantage of their innate knowledge
of the surrounding areas was the turning point in the conflict. In essence, by showing the local
population a willingness to endure what it endured – “germs and all”27 – they would, in fact,
have a greater connection with friendly forces than with the insurgents who only wanted to use
them for recruiting, sustenance, and entertainment.
In conclusion, every insurgency that the United States has been a part of has been unique
in its makeup, direction, and ideology; however, the same basic strategy to counterinsurgencies
25 Palmer, 38.
26 Ibid., 49.
27 Peter Dickens,SAS: Secret War in South-East Asia (New York: Ivy Books/BallantineBooks,1983/1992),29.

19. 19
continues to be employed. Unfortunately, this strategy is more reactive than is required when
battling indigenous forces. Additionally, the international support that modern insurgencies
receive make disruption more difficult – which is why it is so important to emphasize to the
locals, not only the advantages of assisting friendly forces, but the disadvantages of continuing to
help the enemy.
During the American Revolution, the colonists received support from the French. The
British should have tried to convince the population that they were more English than French,
and that a Patriot victory will undoubtedly increase France’s influence over them. In Vietnam,
the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong received assistance from Russia and China. The
United States should have used such knowledge to highlight the lack of an indigenous nature of
the insurgency, showing the population just how out of control they really were. This could have
assisted American forces in preventing the use of Laos and Cambodia as supply routes into
South Vietnam by involving those populations as well and discussing the violation of
sovereignty that the communists were perpetrating against them. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was
being supported by Pakistan. In Iraq, the Sunni and Shi’a militant groups would often receive
assistance from the likes of Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. To combat these groups, the United States
should reinforce the idea of a sovereign Iraq and Afghanistan that was free of external meddling.
This means, however, that America will have to set the example by being less involved in the
internal politics of the nation, but it should maintain its intelligence and political contacts with
the hopes of continuing to enhance population control.
The American colonies, Malay, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq all have one thing in
common: the people were the most important factor in counterinsurgency. By employing them
against the insurgents, a friendly force dramatically increases its chances of success, as well as

20. 20
dramatically reducing casualties at the same time. However, coopting a people involves more
than just throwing millions of dollars at the problem. It requires policies that involve the general
public in national decision making, solidifying security in all regards, and providing
infrastructure to those people who are the most oppressed. By utilizing counterinsurgency during
an occupation, a friendly force is inherently willing to maintain such a posture for a substantial
amount of time as no insurgency ends quickly. To do so, these forces must be willing to deploy
forces into the heartlands of nations and attempt to influence its people away from desperation
and cruelty. By highlighting the negative aspects of the insurgents, counterinsurgency becomes
increasingly more effective once additional aid is provided. As journalist Carlotta Gall concludes
about the role that the population plays:
…connect the people to the government by providing security and basic
assistance; and then turn that connection into an enduring relationship so the people see their
future with the government, not with the insurgents.28
28 Gall,115.

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