Derek Dow Senior Thesis

Dow 1
THE POWER OF A QUEER EU
An examination on the effects of European Union conditionality in regards to LGBT anti-
discrimination laws in the candidate states of Turkey, Serbia, and Albania
Written by Derek Dow
Contact: ddow1@fordham.edu
Advisor: Professor Sarah Lockhart
Contact: slockhart3@fordham.edu

Dow 2
Table of Contents
Abstract.…………………………………………………………………………………………...3
Introduction..………………………………………………………………………………………4
Literature Review/Historiography..……………………………………………………………….6
Theory ………………………………………………………………...…………………………18
Methodology……………………………………………………………………………..………20
Case 1 – Turkey………………………………………………………………………………….26
Case 2 – Serbia…………………………………………………………………………………...36
Case 3 – Albania…………………………………………………………………………………48
Discussion…………………………………………………………………………………….…58
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….61
Figure 1…………………………………………………………………………………………..64
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..65

Dow 3
ABSTRACT
Despite large amounts of homophobia, some European Union candidate states are
dramatically changing their law codes to accommodate the protection of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) persons. This thesis examines the extent to which conditionality, or the
demands candidate states must meet in order to become part of the European Union, influences
Turkey, Serbia, and Albania in passing new anti-discrimination legislation for LGBT persons. To
accomplish this, I examine how these laws have been implemented over recent years while each
country has held candidacy status. Notably, these legal modifications and the impact of
conditionality vary in different countries. To understand the inconsistencies, I assess how the
roles of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), parliament, and the religious community
influence the ability for such EU demands to pass through legislation and see implementation.
Conclusions from this research show that Turkey adheres to a conservative parliament and
religion, ignores its LGBT-related NGOs, and disregards conditionality by refusing to pass new
legislation. Meanwhile, both Serbia and Albania ignore homophobia in parliament and their
religious communities, encourage the participation of LGBT-related NGOs, and obey
conditionality by passing new legislation (consult Figure 1 for a table of these results).

Dow 4
INTRODUCTION
Screams of pain and anger filled his ears. His eyes were blinded from tear gas. The neo-
Nazi furiously glared in disgust. He turned, picked up his arm, and hurled a stone as hard as he
could at the nearby group of parade marchers dressed from head to toe in rainbow outfits.1
The
2010 Belgrade Pride Parade was a warzone. Yet, just four years later, the same celebration was a
completely difference scene. Neo-Nazis and hooligans were nowhere in sight. Thousands of
policemen dotted the streets, keeping tension at bay. Lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgenders, and
their allies proudly marched through the streets of Belgrade, happy and respected.2
What brought
about this sudden turnaround?
In this four-year span, Serbia had joined the ranks of other countries like Turkey and
Albania as an official candidate state for the European Union. As such, each of these countries
has been asked to adjust its laws and policies on a number of issues in order to align its core
principles to those of the EU. Out of these thousands of requirements, this study is concerned
only with those pertaining to sexual orientation. It explores the question of to what extent does
conditionality, or the demands candidate states must meet in order to become part of the
European Union, influence Turkey, Serbia, and Albania in passing new anti-discrimination
legislation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons? Specifically, what are the
greatest factors that contribute to the variation in both the creation of new legislation and its
implementation? To answer this question, the influences of local non-governmental
organizations, parliament, and religion are examined and evaluated. I argue that more often than

1
Jim Burroway, "Serbian Police Clash With Anti-Gay Rioters at Belgrade Pride," Box Turtle Bulletin RSS, October
10, 2010, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/2010/10/10/27126.
2
Tanjug, "Pride Parade Held In Belgrade (Video / Photo)," InSerbia News, September 28, 2014, accessed
November 22, 2015, http://inserbia.info/today/2014/09/belgrade-pride-parade-live/.

Dow 5
not, EU conditionality and the desire for EU membership have the power to override a heavy
anti-gay sentiment in candidate states for the creation of LGBT-focused anti-discrimination laws.
Although implementation is occasionally questionable, it is important to better
understand how EU conditionality has, in some part, dramatically changed some of the policies
in these traditionally homophobic countries. As shown in the comparison of the Belgrade Pride
images previously described, there is a tangible impact to this that is bettering thousands of lives.
Understanding the varying factors contributing to the passage and implementation of these new
laws in each country helps to uncover the situational differences that either aid or hinder the
power of EU conditionality. Moreover, because EU conditionality is not a flawless system,
studying such factors allows for the formulation of the most helpful suggestions. On a broader
scale, these changes reveal more about the growing power of international organizations such as
the EU in global interactions. No longer are states seeking success through a nationalistic
approach, but they are instead searching for prosperity by associating themselves with outside,
global institutions. Effectively, the power of sovereignty, and the voices that compose it
(particularly parliament and the religious community) are slowly weakening. Notably, my thesis
evaluates this weakening at a micro level.
In order to convey my argument, I will first provide a literature review and
historiography of conditionality, both in a general EU context and in relevance to LGBT rights in
past candidate states. Next, I will outline the theories I propose before conducting research. After
that, I will describe a methodology outlining how I will argue my case studies. This will then be
followed by the case studies for Turkey, Serbia, and Albania. Each case is outlined in the same
manner: explanation of change in polices, implementation of new policies, role of NGO, role of
parliament, role of religion, and finally, a short conclusion. After my argumentation, I will

Dow 6
provide a discussion and comparison of the variances of the three countries. Finally, I will end
my work with a brief conclusion and suggestions for EU policymakers.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
History of the Carrot and Stick
The concept of the “carrot and stick” approach stems back to the beginnings of human
interaction. It signifies a policy of combined rewards and punishments by an imposing figure in
order to produce desired actions. English philosopher Jeremy Bentham conceptualizes the term
as human action based on the evasion of pain and pursuit of pleasure.3
In a modern context,
certain governments have employed the carrot and stick approach to levy change in other
countries. The carrot has come to symbolize an active and cooperative scheme that can inject
motivation into a society; while the stick can be seen as the belief that maintaining new civil and
political policies will succeed only through a coercive arrangement. This contemporary use of
the idea in international relations came into play with humanitarian aid during the 1970s.
Researcher Elena Fierro, for example, discusses this topic in detail throughout her book,
European Union's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. According to Fierro,
the United States introduced conditionality in its development of bilateral negotiations with other
nations. Existing literature on the carrot and stick approach at this time examines how the United
States would threaten to cut off or reduce aid to recipient countries that committed either civil or
political rights violations.4
In this context, conditionality came to represent both incentives (the
carrot) and negative repercussions (the stick).5

3
Merriam-Webster, s.v. "Carrot-and-stick," accessed October 04, 2015, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/carrot-and-stick.
4
Elena Fierro, European Union's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2003), p. 99.
5
Ibid.

Dow 7
The concept of the carrot and stick approach eventually made its way into the European
Union system and its methodology for expansion. The carrot became known as an offer of
European Union membership, which includes perks like political legitimacy and economic
integration. The European Union states that any European country may apply for membership so
long as meets a certain series of conditions. First, it must respect the democratic values that the
EU has committed to promoting. Many of these principles were defined during the 1993
European Council in Copenhagen and have since become known as the Copenhagen criteria.6
The Madrid European Council eventually confirmed these accession criteria in 1995.
Accordingly, the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of all current EU rules (called the
acquis communautaire) must occur in any candidate country. These regulations, divided into 35
different requirements, are non-negotiable.7
Of significant importance, a number of these rules
concern human rights. Specifically, Requirement 23 of the conditions for membership states,
“Member States must ensure respect for fundamental rights and EU citizens’ rights, as
guaranteed by the acquis and by the Fundamental Rights Charter.”8
Established Thoughts of Carrot and Stick in the EU
The new acquis communautaire took effect when the Luxembourg European Council
first began negotiations with six new member countries, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia, and Cyprus.9
The likelihood of the basic norms being adopted by candidate
countries, as well as the distinctive mechanisms used by the EU to do so, have been analyzed
repeatedly at a general level by multiple experts. For example, European Union political expert

6
European Commission Staff, "European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations," European
Commission, November 19, 2014, What is Negotiated?, accessed October 04, 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid., Chapters of the acquis.
9
Valentina Volpe, "The EU’s Enlargement Policy and the Promotion of Democracy: The Case of Turkey,"GLOBAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE CASEBOOK, September 2012, p. 23, accessed October 4, 2015,
http://www.irpa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/The-Casebook-Chapter-7.pdf.

Dow 8
Eli Gateva investigates the changes and strength EU conditionality in each wave of European
Union enlargement (the two Eastern expansions in 2004 and 2007, Croatia in 2013, and the
ongoing enlargement process with the Western Balkans and Turkey). He employs the stage-
structured conditionality model to provide one of the first comparative analyses to track the
evolution of the tactic.10
However, the greatest amount of literature appointed to this topic
analyzes the first European Union expansion to the east in 2004. Authors Frank Schimmelfennig
and Ulrich Sedelmeier, for example, do so in their book, The Europeanization of Central and
Eastern Europe, and they conclude that, “Generally, given the high credibility of threats
(exclusion) and promises (membership), the size of governmental adoption costs mattered
most.”11
In addition, however, they mention that the desire to make liberal-democratic reforms is
contingent upon the reward (i.e. the carrot) actually being credible. This might explain why a
country such as Turkey, where the promise of EU membership seems less credible, is not as
willing to alter its political policies.12
This overall appraisal of policy reforms is contrasted by a
literature of opposing opinions. Many researchers, again at a more general level, find fault with
the system of carrot and stick, for once the carrot is eaten, the incentive is gone. A 2008 issue of
The Economist states, “In every one of the eight central and east European countries that joined
the EU on May 1st, 2004, reforms have since stuttered or halted…A common feature in all these
tales is the limited leverage of ‘Brussels.’”13
It seems then that the stick, or enforced
punishments, is missing in the EU utilization of the ideology.

10
Eli Gateva, European Union Enlargement Conditionality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 3.
11
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 213.
12
Ibid.
13
The Economist Staff, "Europe's Marxist Dilemma," The Economist, April 26, 2008, par. 4, accessed October 04,
2015, http://www.economist.com/node/11089474.

Dow 9
Much recent literature is also dedicated to exploring the effectiveness of the European
Union’s conditionality when pertaining to human rights reforms in past and current candidate
countries. The changing and implementation of human rights standards is largely monitored by
the Council of Europe and reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs).14
Overall, a
large majority of existing literature criticizes the European Union’s implementation and
maintenance of human rights in candidate countries. This sprouts from the fact that the EU has
seemingly failed in developing a proper stick to accompany the carrot. As reiterated by many,
political scientist Dr. Henry F. Carey concludes, “the EU has been most effective in changing de
jure norms in pre-accession countries, but less effective in de facto compliance, especially after
those countries become EU members.”15
Of note, the comparison between de jure and de facto,
particularly in light of this overwhelming criticism, will be important in this paper when
analyzing policy changes for LGBT persons in Turkey, Serbia, and Albania. Moreover, others
experts, such as European Union Law Professor Bruno de Witte, offer additional opinioned
criticisms to human rights reforms throughout candidate countries. In his research, de Witte
boldly concludes, “accession will lead to a reduction of the European human rights standards for
the candidate countries, and could therefore lead to a reduction of their actual respect for human
rights.”16
While countries within the European Union can certainly criticize those who do not
uphold indisputable principles, the greatest reward has already been achieved. Simply put, post-
accession conditionality does not exist. It seems then that the carrot, or promise of membership,
is quite strong, as countries are willing to make sizeable policy changes in order to join the EU.

14
Henry F. Carey, European Institutions, Democratization, and Human Rights Protection in the European
Periphery (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), p. 389.
15
Ibid., p. 391.
16
Bruno De Witte, "The Impact of Enlargement on the Constitution of the European Union," Impact of Enlargement
on the Constitution of the European Union, March 2012, p. 240, accessed October 04, 2015,
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260942.001.0001/acprof-9780199260942-
chapter-8.

Dow 10
The problem then lies with the deficiency of enforcement techniques to ensure successful
implementation, effectively highlighting the weakness of the stick.
This existing literature also mentions that use of the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP), which only developed after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union but can now be
seen as an important dynamic to EU expansionism and conditionality. With the principle of
conditionality at its core, the ENP was established in order to provide the EU with additional
strength when supporting economic, political, trade, and human rights reform without
automatically promising the “golden carrot” of membership. The program functions primarily by
giving out financial assistance to primarily developing countries that hope to either increase
relations with the European Union or one day become member nations themselves.17
This too,
both on a general level, as well as in the specific context of human rights, has been deeply
analyzed by current literature.
Many more political scientists have taken to criticizing this branch of EU expansionism.
For example, in their book European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges for the EU-policy
Towards the New Neighbours, authors Johannes Varwick, Kai-Olaf Lang, and Barbara Budrich
come to the conclusion that the EU “overestimates its ability to project stability across the whole
continent” and has created a contradictory program that acts as a substitute to further
enlargement.18
As researchers Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig point out, there is a
great danger in this. If the EU does not offer membership for democratic cooperation, and if the
“golden carrot” lacks credibility, the leverage power of the ENP and the EU itself by using

17
Johannes Varwick and Kai-Olaf Lang, European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges for the EU-policy towards
the New Neighbours(Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2007), p. 15.
18
Ibid., p. 69.

Dow 11
conditionality will eventually reach its limit.19
In the field of human rights, various outcomes in
partner countries bring question to the effectiveness of the ENP. However, other scholars, such
as Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl, would debate this simplified conclusion. They admit
that the EU and the ENP do not utilize negative conditionality in this case, and the incentive of
membership is not always strong enough to prompt change. However, countries that push for
reform themselves on an internal level are compensated with more attention from the EU and
joint dialogue rather than coercion.20
This explanation would clarify the criticized varying levels
of progress in neighboring countries. Mahncke and Gstöhl also applaud the ENP’s strengthened
human rights policies over previous policies of the EU. The two note that the action plans of the
ENP individually designed for each country have put a much greater focus on human rights than
previous plans, which emphasized an economic agenda, before the program’s existence.21
Missing Literature
Although literature surrounding the European Union’s carrot and stick approach to
candidate countries, especially in the context of human rights, clearly exists in great detail, there
is a lack of writing pertaining specifically to LGBT persons. LGBT human rights have been
widely discussed within the European Union itself, but rarely outside of its official borders. In
addition, the small amount of existing literature tends to look at singular or regionally
comparative past cases and does not attempt to create a non-regional comparative analysis of
current (as of this writing) candidate countries as this paper will. While the exact population of
LGBT persons living in EU candidate countries, particularly Turkey, Serbia, and Albania, is
impossible to calculate, one might use the United States as a comparative reference, which in

19
Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, Democracy Promotion in the EU's Neighbourhood: From Leverage
to Governance? (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 19.
20
Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl, Europe's near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the EU's
Neighbourhood Policy (Bruxelles: PIE-Peter Lang, 2008), p. 93.
21
Ibid, p. 88.

Dow 12
2011 estimated approximately 3.5 percent of its adult population to identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender.22
3.5 percent, or even potentially higher as some theorists believe,
arguably represents a large portion of any candidate country’s population. Thus, discussing the
treatment of these persons and how this conduct impacts a country’s chance of acceptance into
the European Union is of undeniable relative importance.
Established LGBT Rights in the EU
Of note, the European Union itself, at least internally, has demanded respect towards
LGBT persons for many years. After an amendment in 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam became
the first international treaty to explicitly mention and protect sexual orientation by stating, “‘the
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’"23
In 2000, the European
Council declared equal treatment of employees within the EU, regardless of sexual orientation,
to be a binding agreement for member states.24
The European Parliament has had perhaps the
strongest history of defending the queer community. It began advocating for the protection of
LGBT persons in 1984, when members passed a non-binding resolution calling for the end of
workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation.25
In 1998, it formally adopted a resolution
proclaiming that it would “‘not give its consent to the accession of any country that, through its
legislation or policies, violates the human rights of lesbians and gay men.’"26
Of perhaps most

22
Gary J. Gates, "How Many People Are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender?," Williams Institute, April 01,
2011, par. 1, accessed October 04, 2015, http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-demographics-
studies/how-many-people-are-lesbian-gay-bisexual-and-transgender/.
23
Human Rights Education Associates, "Sexual Orientation and Human Rights," University of Minnesota Human
Rights Library, 2003, European Union, accessed October 04, 2015,
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/studyguides/sexualorientation.html.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.

Dow 13
unique interest, European Union law has considered discrimination against transgender persons
to be a form of sex discrimination since 1996 after a case put before the Court of Justice.27
However, true concern of treatment towards LGBT persons in candidate states arguably
began in 2000 with the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. Title III of the Charter discusses the principle of equality in detail. Beyond simply
emphasizing that everyone is equal before the law, Article 21 clearly states, “Any discrimination
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property,
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”28
While the Copenhagen criteria
of 1993 failed to mention sexual orientation, the 2000 Charter did. Its established policies, which
must be guaranteed according to one of the 23 requirements for EU membership, would forever
associate treatment of LGBT persons and chances of membership acceptance.29
Also of
pertinence, by 2003, all European Union states were required to implement the Employment
Equality Directive, which included prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation.30
As this was occurring, the EU demanded that candidate states of the 2004/2007
enlargement must bring legislation in line with the binding guidelines by the time of their
accession.31
As these new provisions only came into effect in the twenty-first century, one can argue
that examining past cases of candidate countries acceptance in the European Union and their
treatment towards LGBT persons should begin with the Eastern expansion in 2004 and 2007 (i.e.

27
Human Rights Education Associates, "Sexual Orientation and Human Rights."
28
European Union, "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union," EUR-Lex, December 2000, Article 21,
accessed October 04, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012P%2FTXT.
29
European Commission Staff, What is Negotiated?
30
European Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity Staff, "European Anti-Discrimination
Law Review,"European Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity 12 (July 2011): p. 11,
accessed October 4, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/antidiscrimination_law_review_12_en.pdf.
31
Ibid.

Dow 14
the acceptance of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia in 2004 and the acceptance of Bulgaria and Romania
in 2007). All countries in this fifth enlargement were required to adopt a series of human rights
policies, including LGBT rights. Overall though, this set of laws, developed from the
Copenhagen Criteria, the Employment Equality Directive, and the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, gave more focus to general human rights, ethnic minority rights, and the Romani.
The Copenhagen Criteria were largely used to ensure the decriminalization of
homosexuality and an equal age of consent, of which all candidate countries quickly
accomplished. Unfortunately, legal force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union was not clear after its ratification in 2000 and did not officially begin until the Lisbon
Treaty of 2007.32
As the Charter was officially non-binding, its provision concerning sexual
orientation held no power or influence over the 2004 and 2007 states. This meant that countries
like Latvia and Poland only had to adopt the minimum requirements without facing scathing
criticism from the EU. Other countries, such as Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and
Slovenia chose to adopt extra legislation, surpass the requirements, and therefore increase their
chances of acceptance within the European Union.33
All of these countries, for example, signed
hate/crime speech laws against LGBT persons into law, while Poland and Latvia did not.34
Not
only would it better solidify their chances, but also, by including more “European Union-
incentivized” legislation, such candidate nations would look much more willing to assimilate

32
Jesús Carmona and Francesca Ferraro, "Fundamental Rights in the European Union," European Parliamentary
Research Service, March 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, doi:10.1023/a:1016015521625.
33
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Staff, "Hate Speech and Hate Crimes against LGBT
Persons," European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, March 2009, p. 1, accessed October 4, 2015,
doi:10.7748/ns2011.04.25.33.6.p5123.
34
Ibid.

Dow 15
than the others. This, in turn, would help to increase positive relations, particularly in interactions
where money and economic success could be found.
Yet, despite these legal changes, regardless of how many, it seems that little
improvement has come to these countries for LGBT persons. For example, despite a hate crime
law in place, forty-seven percent of Bulgarian respondents to a 2012 European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights survey felt “expressions of hatred and aversion towards lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and/or transgender in public” to be very widespread.35
Thirty-three percent of Poles,
who have no hate crime laws for LGBT responded similarly. These numbers compare to just six
percent in Germany and four percent in Belgium.36
Furthermore, in 2009, in the face of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights and its LGBT-friendly laws, Lithuania drafted new legislation
that forbade the propaganda of homosexuality and bisexuality to minors.37
This suggests a great
weakness to the carrot and stick approach at the time when pertaining to LGBT persons – and
certainly for more than one reason. Homophobia and transphobia did not disappear after new
legislation was enacted and the countries became partners with the EU. Perhaps, to some credit,
this is because there was no intensive educational training before leaders passed mandatory
legislation. Neither the European Union nor European Union-supported NGOs taught eastern
leaders about homosexuality. EU representatives did not work to dispel myths that
homosexuality damages nationalism, is a sickness, and threatens the family structure, which
often dominated mindsets in nations like Poland during the 1990s and 2000s.38
The lack of
determined overhaul to a common negative concept also helps to explain why the government,

35
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, LGBT Survey 2012, 2012, raw data, European Union.
36
Ibid.
37
European Parliament, The European Parliament's Intergroup on LGBT Rights, "Lithuanian Law on the
‘protection’ of Minors Enters the Statute Book," news release, March 1, 2010, The European Parliament's Intergroup
on LGBT Rights, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/press-releases/lithuanian-law-enters-the-statute-
book/.
38
Srđan Sremac and Reinder Ruard Ganzevoort, Religious and Sexual Nationalisms in Central and Eastern Europe:
Gods, Gays, and Governments (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 41-42.

Dow 16
judges, and lawyers had not been promoting and implementing the use of these LGBT-friendly
policies. Conclusively, the fifth wave of European Union enlargement in 2004 and 2007 displays
an adaptation of human rights policies only as a result of external pressure and desire for EU
membership rather than internal incentive for progress. Furthermore, the lack of a stick and a
system to encourage implementation has rendered many of these laws useless.
Before discussing the three current candidate countries of Serbia, Albania, and Turkey, it
is first important to examine Croatia’s acceptance into the EU in 2013 to mark improvements
made by the European Union concerning LGBT rights. First, after the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights finally became applicable and a non-negotiable step to EU
accession. In the case of Croatia, there was a much larger emphasis on the fundamental rights
established in Chapter 23 of the Charter. In fact, in terms of human rights protection, the Charter
was made the supreme legal source over Croatia’s own constitution.39
To discuss this Charter, as
well as others, with adequate time for negotiation, the benchmark process was established. The
process was designed to help in the “transition, reform and adoption and implementation of the
acquis communautaire.”40
Interim benchmarks were intended to focus on the legislative aspects
and initial implementation, while closing benchmarks would show that new policy changes could
indeed be sustained.41
Theoretically, this extended period for discussion would give time to help
change the minds of Croatian politicians, allowing them to adjust to the idea of LGBT human
rights while providing the opportunity for lengthy, challenging discussions on the subject.
Unfortunately, in the case of Croatia, problems with cooperation alongside the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) postponed negotiations until 2005 (they had

39
Giuseppe Palmisano, Making the Charter of Fundamental Rights a Living Instrument (Leiden: Hotei Publishing,
2015), p.363.
40
European Union Staff, "The Accession Process for a New Member State," EUR-Lex, February 28, 2007, par. 1,
accessed October 04, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al14536.
41
Ibid.

Dow 17
originally begun in 2004), thus eliminating much of the well-planned spacing. Notably, while
this plan did not quite occur as intended in Croatia, it plays a role in the legislative changes
concerning LGBT rights throughout Turkey, Serbia, and Albania.
After witnessing the struggles with LGBT policies in countries from the previous
enlargement, the new focus for the EU became successful implementation. This was spearheaded
in two parts. First, an action plan (this term was discussed above in relation to the European
Neighbourhood Policy) was designed to guide the creation and implementation of human rights
policies in Croatia. Second, through interim reports on the negotiations of Chapter 23 and the
benchmarking process, the EU increased the importance of local non-governmental
organizations. Such groups were hardly consulted in the 2004/2007 enlargements, and their lack
of involvement had since been a significant criticism of the accession process.
Although still too early to create an in-depth analysis of implementation, one might
compare the 2011 and 2014 Pride Parades of Split in order to recognize and applaud Croatia in
its treatment of LGBT persons after European Union accession. The first Pride Parade took place
in Split during the summer of 2011. With only approximately three hundred marchers, the crowd
was violently attacked by over ten thousand anti-gay protestors. Police were present but were
accused of not doing enough to protect the marchers. 42
Yet, after heavy criticism from various
factions of the EU, the 2012 and 2013 parades in Split were quite successful. Most shockingly to
the city, and to the appraisal of NGOs and the European Union, at the 2013 pride, the Mayor of
Split called the violence of 2011 a mistake and promised to defend the fundamental human rights
of his LGBT citizens in the future.43
It is arguable that beginning with this event, social learning
and a governmental shift in opinion had perhaps begun. This can imaginably be accredited to the

42
Sylvana Habdank-Kolaczkowska and Zselyke Csaky, Nations in Transit 2014: Democratization from Central
Europe to Eurasia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 190.
43
Ibid.

Dow 18
additional conditionality programs added on in the sixth expansion to the European Union. The
continued progress of implementation in current candidate states will be an important aspect of
my argumentation.
THEORY
Conditionality can clearly be seen as a vital tool for the European Union in its
interactions with countries abroad, particularly candidate states. This paper raises the question of
what circumstances among candidate states impact the effect of such conditionality in the
specific context of anti-discrimination laws for LGBT persons. Notably, the effect of
conditionality is predicated on the expectation that a state will eventually be accepted into the
European Union. Furthermore, the historiography shows an increase not only in conditionality,
but also in concern for implementation of EU-inspired laws. This paper thus additionally
examines the variations in application of these new laws among the countries of Turkey, Serbia,
and Albania. I will argue that the effectiveness of EU conditionality is enhanced or mitigated by
three sets of factors: the presence and influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
promote gay rights, the level of homophobia in the parliament, and the role of religion in society
and politics.
The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
Measuring the power of local NGOs is vital because NGOs arguably act as a translator of
EU policies by working with a country’s parliament to advocate for the establishment and
implementation of such requirements. NGOs work in both directions by educating local leaders
about the importance of these EU policies while reporting back to the EU about their general
reception by the population. Consequentially, this increases the apparent importance and
legitimacy of new LGBT-friendly guidelines.

Dow 19
(H1A) Due to this connection, it is therefore theorized that the greater number of LGBT-
related NGOs that exist and the more powerful they are, the more likely Turkey, Serbia,
and Albania are to pass legislation to protect LGBT persons from discrimination.
(H1B) On the same note, the number and power of LGBT-related NGOs will also
positively correlate to the extent of new legislation’s implementation.
The Role of Parliament
Normally, one might expect a positive correlation between homophobia in parliament and
the ability for anti-discrimination laws concerning LGBT persons to pass.
(H2A) Yet, I hypothesize that due to power of conditionality, homophobia in the Turkish,
Serbian, and Albanian parliaments does not impact the passage of any LGBT-friendly
laws.
Such a theory helps explain whether the laws were passed due to an internal desire for
progression or from external pressure brought on by the European Union and its promise of
membership. Logically, a non-homophobic government hints at an internally based desire for
progression. However, if a heavily homophobic government is passing multiple LGBT-friendly
laws, then some overriding outside power is certainly influencing its decision-making process.
(H2B) Once LGBT-friendly laws have been passed, I posit that homophobia within
parliament impacts the successful promotion of the law and therefore reduces the effect
of implementation.
A lack of application best proves a shelled intent to appear like an accepting country in order to
appease EU onlookers and not a true, internally based aim to actually protect LGBT citizens.
The Role of Religion
In many countries, the voice of the religious community has been known to help define
political policies.44
Its opinion is normally heavily considered when proposing new laws and
therefore has a great pull on the national identity of a country. There has thus often been a
positive correlation between the position of a country’s dominant religion(s) and the ability for

44
Christopher Callaway, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Religion and Politics," accessed November 22,
2015, http://www.iep.utm.edu/rel-poli/.

Dow 20
legislation to pass. However, I argue that EU conditionality abolishes this positive correlation.
Disputably, the desire to become part of the EU overrides the desire to obey religious influence.
Inspecting the often morally conservative beliefs of a country’s religious representation and
seeing how impactful such thoughts are on the government’s passing or denial of LGBT-friendly
legislation can further show whether parliament is more influenced by internal, nationalistic
factors, or the greater external factor of the European Union.
(H3A) I hypothesize that the voice of the religious communities in Turkey, Serbia, and
Albania do not impact the passage of new legislation protecting LGBT persons.
(H3B) Furthermore, I also posit that religion has no obvious impact on the
implementation of these policies.
METHODOLOGY
Time period:
Turkey was admitted as an EU candidate state in 1999, Serbia in 2012, and Albania in
2014. Due to these dates, discussion in this text will primarily refer to events occurring in 1999
and after. Historical information provided above in the historiography supplies the necessary
context for the history of European Union demands pertaining to LGBT persons before 1999.
However, the mentioning of EU expansions before the 2004/2007 wave is unnecessary because
up until then, there were no requirements for the protection of LGBT persons before accession.
The primary focus of this study is between the mid-2000s and mid-2015. As these cases are still
ongoing, it is vital to mention as many recent developments in 2015 as possible. However, most
information, which often stems from European Union reports, only extends through the end of
2014.
Cases Used:
This paper explores the extent to which European Union candidacy incentivizes lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender rights in Serbia, Albania, and Turkey. In order to create a well-

Dow 21
rounded report, I decided that three case studies would be adequate. Turkey, Serbia, and Albania
were selected for a number of reasons. First, there are only a few countries categorized as EU
candidate states at the time of this writing: Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. Older candidate states, such as those permitted into
the European Union during the 2004/2007 expansion, are not viable options because fewer
LGBT-related requirements existed at their time of accession.
An examination of Turkey is interesting because it has been a candidate state longer than
any of the other five nations. This means that, unlike the other states, Turkey has been
continuously asked to expand its policies for LGBT persons as the requirements expanded before
and after the accession of the 2004/2007 states. It is also unique in that the country is
predominately Muslim and is often cited as having a much more Middle Eastern core than a
European core. Examining a country with these qualities is important in order to help predict
how other potential candidate states farther away from the proper European continent might fare
when struggling to coincide with European principles on the treatment of queer persons.
It is important to also study Serbia in this thesis because it is neither the newest candidate
state, nor the oldest. Time-wise, Serbia offers an interesting juxtaposition to Turkey and Albania
(the newest candidate state). It helps to track how progress has been made in terms of EU
communications and tactics of conditionality with candidate states. Serbia is also unique in that it
has an extremely high number of LGBT-related NGOs active in the country. Furthermore,
similar to Turkey, it has one dominating religion (Eastern Orthodoxy), whereas all other
candidate states have a mixed religious demography. These factors make the role of local NGOs
and the influence of religion far more noticeable and easier to study.

Dow 22
Lastly, Albania stands out above Macedonia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia because of its rapid willingness to adapt new LGBT-related policies more so than any
other country. It is important to study this quick enthusiasm and what new tactics employed by
the EU are aiding in the process. The specific combination of Turkey, Serbia, and Albania offers
a diverse comparison on the impact of candidacy status due to a wide variation in circumstances.
Not only did each state become an EU candidate at a different time, but each also offers a
difference in the number of LGBT-related NGOs, governmental system, and religious makeup.
This variation on the independent variable is vital in order to most accurately identify and
describe the factors supporting or acting against EU conditionality.
Dependent Variables:
In this study, two dependent variables are required. This project establishes the passing of
required legislation for EU accession as its first dependent variable. The specific legislation
mandated for candidate states is established in the historiography/literature review of this paper.
The second dependent variable pertains to the nature of the legal change and level of
implementation (or lack thereof) by examining a few recent legal cases carried out both in court
and in existing equality bodies. Of note, one case country does not pass new anti-discrimination
policies, and so I instead discuss how current policies are used either to defend or discriminate
against LGBT persons.
Independent Variables:
To study the effectiveness of EU conditionality for LGBT-related policies, it is important
to examine the factors that contribute to either the welcome or discouragement of such demands.
To accomplish this, there are three independent variables utilized for the purpose of this study:
the role of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the role of parliament, and the role of

Dow 23
the religious community. These roles are arguably three of the most important factors
contributing to either the suggestion of LGBT-friendly legislation, the passing of such
legislation, or its implementation (or lack thereof). This study aims to evaluate how influenced or
friendly these groups are with the European Union and how their consequential desire to
integrate impacts their influence.
Investigating the role of local LGBT NGOs is additionally vital when studying the
influence and effect of EU requirements. The ways in which these organizations impact the
parliamentary dynamic, if at all, provides a measurement for how willing a government is to
change its policies and mindsets for the sake of EU membership. I gauge NGOs’ power of
influence by measuring how many are actively involved with parliament, if their organization is
accepted or not accepted by the government, and how active they are in educating and training
government members, police officials, and educators (a factor which depends upon how accepted
the NGOs are by the government).
Measuring the appeal of EU conditionality in parliament is accomplished by first
establishing the type of government at hand. Noting how much power a leader or specific
political party has is important when discussing whether or not parliament wants to pass new
LGBT-friendly legislation. It is also important to discuss the nature of the leading political
parties and members and determine whether they are morally conservative or progressive. This is
established by monitoring political leaders’ public statements (as recorded by news sources)
pertaining to homosexuality, as well as by how accepting each government is of local LGBT-
related NGOs. As most public debates concerning LGBT rights occur in relation to a local Pride
festival, many of these statements are taken from this context. I also relate the homophobia in

Dow 24
parliament to surveyed levels of homophobia among the general population in order to measure
if parliament members are passing laws against the desires of their constituencies.
Lastly, examining the influence of the religious community in each EU candidate state
can help provide greater insight into the impact of conditionality. Notably, the term community
implies both a religion’s leaders and organizations. Such persons are groups are, in comparison to
unorganized followers, most likely to have an impact on a law’s passage and implementation.
The religious influence of regular followers impacts the public data about homosexuality
mentioned in discussion with the role of parliament. It is important to establish the extent to
which the dominating religious community, particularly its leaders or noticeable organizations,
stands for or against the legal protection of LGBT persons. I measure this primarily by noting the
publically made statements (as recorded by news sources) from predominant religious leaders
within the country. I also examine via news reports how they, as well as their followers, react to
increases in LGBT rights, most visibly seen in local Pride Parades (where the majority of public
discourse about LGBT concerns arise).
I access a number a various sources in order to establish and discuss both my dependent
and independent variables. In my historiography and literature review, I employ a number of
books by political scientists and experts on the European Union to discuss the history and
existing thoughts on conditionality in an EU context. Such books are also utilized to discuss the
impact of conditionality for LGBT-related polices in the 2004/2007 expansion, as well as the EU
expansion to Croatia in 2013. Importantly, I describe a number of vital European Union
documents, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which set the precedent for expected treatment
towards LGBT persons in countries attempting to become part of the EU.

Dow 25
In my case studies of Turkey, Serbia, and Albania, I also use a diverse range of resources.
However, many of my sources are documents produced by the European Union. These are
principally annual progress reports created for each candidate country. Strategy reports from the
European Commission are also helpful when discussing each case. To gather more recent
information about LGBT-related occurrences and acts of discrimination in each country over the
past seven years or so, as well as information on the roles of the parliament, local NGOs, and the
religious community, I employ material found in recently published books, articles from
journals, as well as articles from magazines and newspapers. The websites of international
human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, are also resourceful. To examine the
case studies from the equality bodies in Serbia and Albania, I cite information directly from each
body’s personal website, which publishes all of the necessary information.
There are of course limitations to this study that may impede the ability to accurately
establish a causal relation between the passing of LGBT-friendly legislation and its
implementation, and the three influencing factors. First, it is impossible to fully know whether
top government persons voted on LGBT-friendly policies for the purpose of EU accession or for
the pure cause of equal rights to all. Second, there are other unexamined factors that potentially
contribute to either the acceptance or denial of laws protecting LGBT persons. Specifically,
pressure from other global forces, such as the United States, the United Nations, or international
NGOs, might also play a role. However, based from my independent observations and research,
it seems the roles of these and other forces are far less noted than parliament, local NGOs, and
the religious community. Therefore, although there are undeniably potential impediments to my
thesis, the factors I employ are arguably the three strongest possible to establish a connection
between the described dependent and independent factors.

Dow 26
ARGUMENTATION/CASE REVIEW
Case 1: Turkey
Some scholars pinpoint Turkey’s beginning to accession with its 1959 application for
membership to the European Community and its later acceptance as an associate member of the
European Economic Community (EEC) under the Ankara Agreement in 1963.45
Following the
European Union’s December 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was officially declared an EU
candidate state and would henceforth benefit from a pre-accession strategy with a focus on
democracy problems and political issues.46
Since 1998, the European Council has published a yearly progress report on Turkey’s
harmonization of the acquis communautaire and the implementation of these policies.47
The first
mention of sexual orientation is initially seen in the 2002 report (already two years after the
proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). One should note the
European Union’s lack of, or minimal, attention towards LGBT rights in Turkey during the late
1990s and into the mid-2000s. It perhaps signifies that at this time, issues pertaining to sexual
orientation were of trivial thought to even the EU and therefore played only a minute role in
delegations and discussions concerning anti-discrimination. Other facets of discrimination, such
as religion (which was mentioned eleven times in the 2002 report) or social class (which was
mentioned four times in the same writing), were of more significant concern.48
Therefore, their
integration into new laws was seemingly of higher importance.
The 2002 EU report states, “As regards discrimination, measures are still required to
align with the relevant acquis to combat discrimination on the ground of racial or ethnic origin,

45
Belgin Akçay and Bahri Yilmaz, Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Political and Economic
Challenges (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), p. 4.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., p. 53.
48
Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession.

Dow 27
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. In addition, steps should be taken to
establish an equality body as provided for in the acquis.”49
Turkey chose not to listen to these
demands. By 2003, Turkey had adopted a new Labour Law, which recognized the principle of
equal treatment in employment. Yet, this legislation, as criticized by the Commission of the
European Communities in its 2004 annual report, still failed to protect discrimination on the
basis of all prohibited grounds – including sexual orientation.50
In more recent years, particularly after a spike of attention from the EU in 2007,
discrimination based on sexual orientation had still failed to be of noticeable importance in the
Turkish legislature. This avoidance existed in light of the fact that other minorities, such as
religious and social class minorities, were finally receiving protection after nudges from the EU.
In 2007, Turkey signed onto the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and
introduced new legislation focusing on discrimination based on gender in the labor market.51
EU
reports for the same year applauded this, but still requested that Turkey make some movement to
protect its LGBT citizens.52
Turkey did the opposite. In 2011, the government even went so far
as to remove all references to discrimination on the grounds of sexual identity or orientation in a
draft law establishing anti-discrimination.53
In 2013, it amended its Criminal Code to include
hatred and discrimination. The new clause increased the penalties for hate offenses based on
language, race, ethnicity, color, gender, disability, political view, philosophical belief, religion,

49
Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,
publication no. 5 (Brussels: European Union, 2002), p. 95.
50
Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,
publication no. 7 (Brussels: European Union, 2004), p. 33.
51
Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2007 Progress Report, publication no. 10 (Brussels: European
Union, 2007), p. 61.
52
Ibid.
53
European Commission, Turkey 2011 Progress Report, publication no. 14 (Brussels: European Union, 2011), p.
35.

Dow 28
sect, but not sexual orientation.54
The principle of anti-discrimination is guaranteed in Turkey’s
constitution and upheld in several of its laws.55
Additionally, under Turkish law, homosexual
relations between two consenting adults in private have been legal since 1858.56
Yet, despite
these two factors, and despite yearly advocacy from the European Commission, Turkey still
lacks anti-discrimination laws in regards to sexual orientation or any form of an equality body
that would aid in cases pertaining to discrimination. Today, this lack of protection is most
heavily abused in the judicial system. No laws on anti-discrimination for LGBT persons exist,
meaning that there is no implementation to examine. However, despite this, it is vital to see how
the courts use current laws to either discriminate against or protect LGBT persons.
Implementation
When discriminating against LGBT persons, the court typically chooses to employ the
Turkish Criminal Code and cite the law against “public exhibitionism,” as well as its law
forbidding “offences against public morality.”57
The European Union first began to note this
pattern when in 2005, the registration of Kaos GL Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research and
Solidarity Organisation was temporary blocked by Ankara’s Deputy Governor on this claim of
immorality.58
The code for public morality was again used in 2008 by the Third Civil Court of
First Instance in Istanbul after a complaint from the Istanbul Governor’s Office to close down
Lambda Istanbul, an NGO advocating for LGBT people’s human rights.59
The Court of

54
Union, 2013), p. 60.
55
Union, 2008), p. 23.
56
Lucas Paoli Itaborahy and Jingshu Zhu, "State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Laws:
Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition of Same-sex Love," International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans and
Intersex Association, no. 8 (May 2013): p. 21, accessed October 12, 2015,
http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2013.pdf.
57
Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p. 70.
58
European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report, publication no. 8 (Brussels: European Union, 2005), p. 28.
59

Dow 29
Cassation overruled this decision later that year (neither the judge not the Governor’s Office
were able to pinpoint any moral deficiencies in the organization). However, the ruling statement
said that the association of such organizations could not be permitted if they encouraged "lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transvestite and transsexual behaviour with the aim of spreading such sexual
orientations" – a firm statement of rebellion against the European Union’s rejection of
homophobia and standards of anti-discrimination.60
Additionally, discrimination based on sexual orientation in Turkey’s judicial system also
works to favor the discriminator. Courts apply the principle of “unjust provocation” in favor of
attackers in crimes against queer people.61
In 2013, for example, twelve LGBT hate murders
were reported countrywide. In addition, there were several lynching attempts, as well as
occurrences of “torture, rape, ill-treatment, domestic violence, harassment, and cyber-attacks.”62
Court cases generated as a result of these incidents consistently employed “unjust provocation”
to excuse the perpetrators. Others received reduced sentences due to “good behavior.”63
A gay
activist in Turkey recently stated in an interview that there is no reason to report hate crimes
against LGBT persons. He writes: “‘We know that there will be another version of events and
that the attackers will never be punished.’”64
These decisions of impunity are a direct result of
homophobic judiciaries and weak investigations from similarly homophobic police forces.
However, on a hopeful note, some judges have used this free space for ruling without the
restriction of proper anti-discrimination laws to defend the rights of LGBT persons. In May of
2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that hate speech on the ground of sexual orientation

60
Union, 2009), p. 19.
61
62
63
Ibid.
64
par. 15 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2013/08/08/Gay-Muslims-in-turkey-torn-between-
religion-and-sexuality.html

Dow 30
constituted a criminal offense.65
Additionally, in 2015, a court in Istanbul ruled a person who had
refused a lesbian woman entry into the women’s section of a Turkish bath to be guilty of
discrimination. Since no anti-discrimination law existed, the judge simply chose to provide a
verdict without specifying the ground that was violated.66
Decisions like these are vital to combat
against the typically discriminatory rulings in Turkey. Most importantly, they set a new
precedent that even without legislative approval; legal protection for LGBT persons from
discrimination is indeed possible. These types of rulings only occur few and far between, but
they provide some hope for a judicial push to bring about legal change. Overall though,
discriminatory judicial decisions further demonstrate that Turkey is not in line with the EU
acquis. This in itself is a satisfactory explanation for the country’s continuous delay to accession.
Role of NGOs
Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are of course involved in the struggle for
equal rights towards LGBT persons. Specifically, much of this information has been coming
from the six legal LGBT associations in Turkey. Lambda Istanbul, Kaos GL, Istanbul LGBTT,
Pembe Hayat, Siyah Pembe Üçgen, and SPoD. Kaos GL, Pembe Hayat, and SPoD have all
actively worked directly with the Turkish Parliament. During the formation of the new
constitution, they advocated relentlessly to be included in non-discrimination policies and for the
exclusion of articles such as “public morality” that had formerly been used to discriminate
against LGBT persons and organizations.67
The groups spoke individually with different

65
Union, 2014), p. 52.
66
European network of legal experts in gender equality and nondiscrimination,
"Local Court Finds Discrimination in Access to Services in a Case Brought by a LGBT individual,"
news release, February 18, 2015, Equality Law, accessed October 13, 2015,
http://www.equalitylaw.eu/index.php?option=com_edocman&task=document.viewdoc&id=832&Itemid=295.
67
Volkan Yilmaz, "The New Constitution of Turkey: A Blessing or a Curse for LGBT Citizens?, Winter 2013 -
Turkish Policy Quarterly," Turkish Policy Quarterly, February 5, 2015, p. 138, accessed October 12, 2015,

Dow 31
Parliament members from different parties and even submitted a report on LGBT individuals’
demands for the new constitution.68
Unfortunately, representatives from both the AKP and the
Nationalist Movement Party have remained against any constitutional changes that might imply
the recognition of LGBT citizens, and advocating has not been quite effective on legislation.69
This denial of respect, as well as government-led attempts to disband such organizations,
signifies a dominating unwillingness to accommodate EU demands for LGBT persons.
Although local NGOs have been largely excluded from the Turkish government, their
voice has only increased in the European Union. They play a key role in advocating and
collecting “on the ground” information. This information is then compiled into the reports of
larger organizations, most notably the European Commission, in their annual report on Turkey.
The more advocacy work and information that is collected, the more the European Commission
has to assemble an accurate local analysis. Annual reports in the 2013 expansion to Croatia
proved to be very effective when persuading a government to introduce reforms. According to
LGBT advocates and scholars Maxim Anmeghlichaen and Aija Salo, “The Commission’s
progress reports are the most important tools at hand for the EU in influencing the human rights
situation in the candidate countries.”70
Their research conclusions also state that when LGBT
people are not explicitly mentioned, they are nearly always excluded from follow-up debates.71
Thus, an increase of LGBT concern in recent reports can largely be attributed to organizations
such as Lambda Istanbul and Kaos GL. While there was only one mention of the term sexual

http://turkishpolicy.com/article/601/the-new-constitution-of-turkey-a-blessing-or-a-curse-for-lgbt-citizens-winter-
2013.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid., p. 139.
70
Maxim Anmeghichean and Aija Salo, "EU Support for LGBT People in Neighbouring Countries: Is It (good)
Enough?," International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association - Europe, 2007, p. 275, accessed
October 12, 2015, file:///Users/Derek/Downloads/UR%20EU%20Support%20for%20LGBT%20People%20-
%20Maxim%20Anmeghichean%20and%20Aija%20Salo.pdf.
71
Ibid.

Dow 32
orientation in the EU’s 2002 Progress Report, there are eleven references in the 2014 report. This
comes in addition to the term LGBTI (I representing intersex) being used seven times and the
term gay being used four times in the same publication. Conclusively, one might argue that local
NGOs in Turkey have had little or no direct impact on government figures and legislation
concerning the discrimination of LGBT persons. However, their ability to coordinate with the
European Commission’s annual report on Turkey’s progress and effectively make Turkey more
accountable for its actions has both helped to increase the importance and voice (at least on
paper) of equality, as well as provide these organizations with some sense of influence (despite
no major legal change as of yet).
Role of Parliament
Regardless of its importance for the European Union, many of Turkey’s main politicians
are still considered too homophobic to fully include LGBT persons into an equally treated
society. Of note, this conservative output from parliament seems to match quite contently with
opinions from the general population of Turkey. Recent research demonstrates that
approximately eighty-nine percent of the population is in favor of criminalizing homosexuality.72
Governmentally, the country is largely led by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party),
which is socially conservative in nature and is developed from an Islamic tradition (despite
Turkey being a secular nation). It has held a majority of seats since 2002.73
Its reign of power is
perhaps a contributing reason as to why LGBT-friendly legislation is not being pushed through
parliament to comply with EU demands. A number of high profile government figures have
publicly come out against homosexuality. As recently as the summer of 2015, Prime Minister

72
Turkish Policy Quarterly," p. 134.
73
Encyclopedia Britannica Online Staff, "Justice and Development Party | Political Party, Turkey," Encyclopedia
Britannica Online, 2015, accessed October 18, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Justice-and-Development-
Party-political-party-Turkey.

Dow 33
Ahmet Davutoğlu was quoted stating, “gays caused the destruction of the Tribe of Lot.”74
President Erdoğan cannot be seen as any more tolerant after his recent comparison of gays to
“terrorists and marginals.”75
Such a statement helps to clarify why protection of LGBT persons
was not included in Turkey’s newly developing constitution, even after Erdoğan promised that it
would “meet the demands of each and every citizen for liberty, democracy, justice, and peace.”76
Turkish political expert and Assistant Professor Louis Fishman believes, “The AK Party’s
silence on the issue is arguably because many of its leading echelon see it as a topic too taboo to
address.”77
Bearing this in mind, if LGBT-friendly policies do pass in the future, one might
assume that inventive is coming from EU external pressure and not a true desire from the leading
political party.
Role of Religion
Lastly, it appears that the influence of religion in Turkey has had no positive impact on
LGBT protectionism. According to the Turkish organization Muslims and Gay, many religious
clerics in Turkey follow a similar principle. They frequently see homosexuality as a test in the
Muslim faith. If one falls weak to its temptation, he or she is destined for hell. However, if one
can resist and follow a heterosexual lifestyle, he or she will go to heaven.78
In this light, it is
interesting to note that Islam, particularly in Turkey, does not view homosexuality as a
permanent disease, but rather as a temporal test than one can easily and willingly pass. This

74
William Armstrong, "LGBT Crackdown in Turkey: The Perils of Visiblity | Balkanist," Balkanist, July 28, 2015,
par. 11, accessed October 12, 2015, http://balkanist.net/lgbt-crackdown-turkey/.
75
Ibid.
76
Turkish Policy Quarterly," p. 137.
77
Louis A. Fishman, "Turkey and LGBT Rights: A Historical and Global Perspective," Turkish Policy Quarterly 1,
no. 4 (2012): p. 157, accessed October 12, 2015, http://turkishpolicy.com/Files/ArticlePDF/turkey-and-lgbt-rights-a-
historical-and-global-perspective-winter-2013-en.pdf.
78
Associated Press, "Gay Muslims in Turkey: Torn between Religion and Sexuality," Al Arabiya, August 8, 2013,
par. 4, accessed October 17, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2013/08/08/Gay-Muslims-in-
turkey-torn-between-religion-and-sexuality.html.

Dow 34
temporal belief might help explain why Parliament will not pass LGBT-focused legislation.
Furthermore, Islam has been used by many groups to encourage violence against LGBT persons.
As recently as the summer of 2015, a group by the name of the Young Islamic Defense canvased
the city of Ankara with posters encouraging people to kill homosexuals.79
Religious leaders also
spoke up against Istanbul’s Pride Parade in June of 2015, as it coincided with the Muslim holy
month of Ramadan. LGBT activists who marched anyway were violently attacked by police with
tear gas, plastic bullets, and water cannons.80
European Parliament members noted that this event
would have a consequence on the country’s membership candidacy status. Isabella Adinolfi,
Vice-President of the European Parliament Intergroup on LGBTI Rights, indicated, “This should
play a large role in the accession negotiations, and I am certain that both the Commission and the
Parliament will take this up in their work with Turkey.”81
Regardless, religious conservatives,
including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (who believes that Islam and homosexuality are
contrary to one another), supported the shutdown.82
These statements do not only show that the
religious community in Turkey has acted as a hindrance to LGBT protection, but as a force
attempting to reverse previously set precedents. It is therefore clear that in the case of Turkey,
religion does have some controlling power over Parliament and legislation. This, of course,
signifies that Turkey is still adhering to a major internal force rather than the external force of the
EU. It is here that EU conditionality has apparently failed.
Conclusion

79
Jake Folsom, "Islamic Group Calls for Massacre Against LGBT People in Turkey - Towleroad," Towleroad, July
12, 2015, accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.towleroad.com/2015/07/islamic-group-calls-massacre-lgbt-people-
turkey/.
80
Ibid., par. 8.
81
Ibid., par. 11.
82
John Beck, "Turkey’s Violent Homophobia," The Daily Beast, January 7, 2013, par. 6, accessed October 17,
2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/01/turkey-s-violent-homophobia.html.

Dow 35
While the European Union stresses certain policy changes in its conditionality approach
more so than others, it seems that protection in the form of non-discrimination for LGBT persons
in Turkey has taken a backseat. In the European Union’s 2013-2014 strategy outline for Turkey,
it does admit that homophobia, discrimination, and hate crimes on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity are still prevalent in Turkey. However, it blames much of this on
“incomplete legislative frameworks, but also to the inconsistent implementation of the legal
provisions in place.”83
Furthermore, the European Union calls on strong leadership from the
government, local authorities, and law enforcement, and states, “The authorities in the
enlargement countries can play a key role in bringing about a change in mind-set across society
as a whole towards LGBTI persons.”84
This statement, to put it bluntly, is useless. The EU is
fully aware of the conservative government and its unwillingness to budge on issues concerning
the protection of LGBT persons. This strategy plan fails to provide any helpful, useful, or
practical advice for the challenge at hand. The 2014-2015 strategy paper does improve slightly
by mentioning, “Countries need to take measures to counter stereotypes and misinformation,”
and “Religious or cultural values cannot be invoked to justify any form of discrimination.”85
However, such suggestions still lack realistic advice for implementation. The European Union, it
seems, has given up on this fight in Turkey. This can be supported by the fact that no recent
strategy plans coordinated with Turkey even mention the term sexual orientation. All adopted in
2014, Turkey’s European Union Strategy, its National Action Plan for the EU Accession, the

83
European Commission, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014," Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, October 16, 2013, p. 11, accessed October 12, 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/strategy_paper_2013_en.pdf.
84
Ibid.
85
European Commission, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15," Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the
Committee of the Regions, October 8, 2014, p. 15, accessed October 12, 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/strategy_paper_2013_en.pdf.

Dow 36
Turkish National Programme for the adoption of the acquis, as well as its “Action Plan on
Prevention of ECHR Violations,” all neglect LGBT persons.
One might point out the EU’s hypocrisy in this lack of action. As noted earlier, the
emphasis on queer persons has increased in recent EU annual reports, and yet, it still does not
underline this condition in any of its action plans. At the same time, as discussed in the literature
review, Turkey is slowly turning away from the EU as its candidacy status stretches on and the
carrot of membership looks more and more like an empty promise. With a weak carrot, Turkey is
less willing to align itself with EU principles. To reintroduce incentive for LGBT-related change,
the EU must first reinforce its promise for accession. Alongside its promise, the EU must also
become more insistent and concrete in its demand for respect towards LGBT persons in order to
improve Turkey’s situation.
Case 2: Serbia
While Turkey has spent close to two decades developing a deep relationship to the
European Union and altering its laws as a candidate state, Serbia’s connection is comparably
shorter. After first applying for EU membership in 2009, the nation of Serbia was accepted as an
official candidate state in March of 2012.86
However, it was not until January of 2014 that
official accession negotiations began.87
In light of recent struggles with Turkey and its consistent
refusal to adopt many of the required acquis, the European Union emphasized even in this first
conference the vitality of “ensuring its full implementations and enforcement.”88
The initial
accession negotiations stated, “The development of sufficient administrative and judicial

86
European Commission, "Serbia," European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, January 21,
2014, par. 2, accessed October 17, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information/serbia/index_en.htm.
87
Ibid.
88
Council of the European Union, "First Accession Conference with Serbia," European Union, January 21, 2014, p.
2, accessed October 17, 2015,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/140676.pdf.

Dow 37
capacity is key in fulfilling all obligations stemming from this membership.”89
Unlike the
opening negotiations with Turkey, the discussion on the acquis made specific mention of
tackling discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation of gender identity.90
There was also a
demand for reporting on such issues during forthcoming benchmark meetings – a process
established after the 2004 and 2007 expansions.
Yet, even before these statements were emphasized by the European Union, Serbia had
already begun to change its discrimination-related policies towards LGBT persons. In 2007 and
2008, official European Union Progress Reports criticized Serbia for its lack of any
“comprehensive anti-discrimination law,” which might protect those of a different sexual
orientation.91
2008 reports from the EU stated, “a number of people were exposed to hate speech
and discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation and gender identity and that the
authorities had failed to provide adequate protection against such treatment.”92
In 2009, the EU
again raised heavy criticism when the government withdrew a draft anti-discrimination law that
would protect the LGBT population after pressure and threats exerted by Serbia’s religious
community.93
This criticism seemed to have some impact, as the draft anti-discrimination law
was resubmitted – this time with a clause for sexual orientation.94
Article 21 of the Serbian
Constitution presently declares, “Everyone shall have the right to declare his/her sexual

89
Council of the European Union, "First Accession Conference with Serbia," p. 5.
90
Ibid., p. 6.
91
Commission of the European Communities, Serbia 2007 Progress Report, publication no. 3 (Brussels: European
Union, 2007), p. 14.
92
Union, 2008), p. 18.
93
Union, 2009), p. 14.
94
OutRight Action International Staff, "Serbia: Anti-Discrimination Law Is Adopted," OutRight Action
International, April 29, 2009, par. 1, accessed October 17, 2015,
https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/serbia-anti-discrimination-law-adopted.

Dow 38
orientation, and discriminatory treatment on account of such a declaration shall be forbidden.”95
Importantly, this stipulation also carried over to employees in the workplace under Article 18 of
Serbia’s law on work.96
These first adjustments to Serbian law were just the beginning of a
snowball effect and continual response to EU requests for more respect towards LGBT persons.
This criticism of 2009 continued to impact Serbia and its lawmakers. In 2010, the
government took the advice that Turkey has continuously refused: establishing an equality body.
The Commissioner for Protection of Equality was formally founded by the Serbian Parliament as
an independent, autonomous and specialized state authority designed to prevent all forms of
discrimination and ensure an equal status of citizens.97
Helping with Serbia’s integration into
Europe, it quickly became a member of Equinet (the European network of equality bodies) in the
same year. Parliament even gave the body authority to file charges and misdemeanors to the
courts, as well as to initial mediation processes.98
Most importantly, the body put a heavy
emphasis on ensuring anti-discrimination for LGBT people.
Yet, in 2012, reports from the European Union still called for a greater protection of
LGBT persons. The EU noted continued widespread discrimination based on sexual orientation
and requested “a proactive approach towards better inclusion of the LGBT population, as a
greater understanding across society was needed.”99
Serbia responded. In December of 2012, it
amended its criminal code to prohibit hate speech on the grounds of sexual orientation and
gender identity, and was also edited to include hate motivation against LGBT people as an

95
OutRight Action International Staff, "Serbia: Anti-Discrimination Law Is Adopted," par. 5.
96
Serbian Parliament, "The Law on Work," Paragraf, 2014, Article 18, accessed October 17, 2015,
http://paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_radu.html.
97
Commissioner for Protection of Equality, "Basic Information," Commissioner for Protection of Equality,
November 27, 2012, section goes here, accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/en/about-
us/basic-information.
98
Equinet European Network of Equality Bodies, "The Serbian Commission for the Protection of Equality in the
Spotlight," Equinet, September 1, 2011, accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.equineteurope.org/The-Serbian-
Commission-for-the.
99
European Commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report, publication no. 8 (Brussels: European Union, 2012), p. 52.

Dow 39
aggravated circumstance in sentencing.100
In 2013, a Strategy Plan for the prevention and
protection against discrimination, with a specific focus on LGBT persons, was adopted by
Serbia. To ensure implementation, this was accompanied by a detailed action plan that included
the support of the Commissioner for Protection of Equality, the Office for Human and Minority
Rights, as well as the Council for National Minorities.101
The decision to create such a plan
resulted from a new pilot program designed by the Council of Europe entitled The Council of
Europe LGBT Project. The program ran from 2011 until 2013 with Albania, Italy, Latvia,
Montenegro, Poland and Serbia. Outcomes varied from country to country - the Strategy Plan
being Serbia’s main result.102
Moreover, Serbia not only focused on the written law, but the
actual implementation of it as well. This came perhaps in particular reaction to the European
Union’s use of the term “proactive approach.” In the same year, it began police training
programs, enforcing more tolerant court practices, and improved cooperation with LGBT
persons as witnesses.103
Relentlessly, 2013 reports from the EU called for more attention to the discrimination
against LGBT persons.104
Again, Serbia positively responded by expanding its training programs
to legal practitioners and social workers on the rights of the LGBT population.105
The need for
such education programs was emphasized in an action plan for the implementation of the anti-

100
Human Rights Watch Staff, "World Report 2014: Serbia," Human Rights Watch, January 21, 2014, Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, accessed October 17, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-
chapters/serbia.
101
European Commission, "Chapter 23 – Judiciary and Fundamental Rights," Screening Report Serbia, May 15,
2014, p. 14, accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.europa.rs/upload/2014/Screening-report-chapter-23-serbia.pdf.
102
Council of Europe, "The Council of Europe LGBT Project," Council of Europe, 2013, accessed October 29,
2015, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/lgbt/Project/Description1_en.asp.
103
Ibid., p. 34.
104
European Commission, Serbia 2013 Progress Report, publication no. 9 (Brussels: European Union, 2013).
105
European Commission, "Serbia Progress Report," European Union, October 2014, p. 45, accessed October 17,
2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140108-serbia-progress-report_en.pdf.

Dow 40
discrimination strategy in October of 2014.106
The European Commission’s Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance 2014-2020 strategy paper vowed to assist in the process by agreeing to
support further training, monitoring, and evaluation systems for this fundamental right.107
Criticism from the EU in 2013 also arose from the lack of political commitment with respect to
the LGBT minority group. Serbia chose in 2014 to recognize this by establishing a liaison officer
from the Ministry of Interior to the LGBT community in order to improve dialogue and show
true political assurance. As the position is still new at the time of this writing, its effectiveness
has yet to be studied.108
However, perhaps most remarkable of 2014 was Serbia’s decision to re-
allow Belgrade’s Pride Parade. In 2010, Pride festivities were banned in Belgrade, Serbia’s
capital city, after football “hooligans” and nationalists attacked participants, leaving more than
100 people injured.109
Yet, in 2014, Pride festivities were again permitted by government
officials, keeping in mind that the European Union would heavily criticize them if they
continued to deny LGBT persons the basic freedom of expression. Making the wrong decision
might endanger the country’s potential of being accepted into the EU. In the European
Parliament’s 2015 review progress report on LGBT rights in Serbia, members commended the
Serbian government for supporting Belgrade Pride, as well as local police efforts to maintain a
peaceful celebration.
Implementation
Concretely, the implementation and effectiveness of these new institutions, policies, and
training programs can best be seen in the judicial system. In 2010, the Commissioner for

106
European Commission, "Serbia Progress Report," p. 51.
107
European Commission, "Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance," Indicative Strategy Paper for Serbia (2014-
2020), August 19, 2014, p. 21, accessed October 17, 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140919-csp-serbia.pdf.
108
Ibid., p. 48.
109
Reuters, "Serbia To Host First Gay Pride March Since 2010," The Huffington Post, September 26, 2014, par. 2-
3, accessed September 20, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/26/serbia-gay-pride-march-
_n_5887270.html.

Dow 41
Protection of Equality noted that up until then, cases of violence and discrimination against
LGBT persons “did not have adequate reaction by the authorized institutions of the system.”110
Its report cited a lack of adequate process (in the form of extreme slowness and inefficiency from
the courts) to be the root of this problem.111
Yet, the Commission, largely due to its own efforts,
marked a change in this by 2014 after a number of court cases ruled in favor of the queer victim.
For example, in 2014, a facility owner refused to rent her space for a party of LGBT people in
the claim that “she would not want her facility to be promoted ‘in that way.’”112
After a weighty
opinion from the Commissioner for Protection of Equality, it was decided in the case that the
company did indeed discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation and was instructed to
provide their services to the LGBT group.113
In another case, the Appellate Court in Belgrade
made a final judgment against Member of Parliament and President of United Serbia, Dragan
Marković Palma for severe discrimination against the LGBT population.114
The Appellate Court
in Novi Sad also made a final judgment in a private lawsuit concerning the physical assault of an
LGBT activist in 2010. The perpetrator was ordered to pay 138 thousand dinars in damages for
suffered fear, physical, and emotional pain suffered.115
Notably, this upswing in the courts does not imply that the overall sense of discrimination
for LGBT persons has improved in Serbia. A 2015 report by the NGO Gay Straight Alliance
noted “progresses in the relation of political factors and government institutions towards LGBT

110
Nevena Petrušić, "Regular Annual Report for 2010 Commissioner for Protection of Equality,"Commissioner for
Protection of Equality, March 10, 2011, p. 44, accessed October 17, 2015,
http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/jdownloads/files/regular_annual_report_2010.pdf.
111
Ibid.
112
Nevena Petrušić, "Regular Annual Report for 2015 Commissioner for Protection of Equality,"Commissioner for
Protection of Equality, June, 2015, p. 121, accessed October 17, 2015,
http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/jdownloads/files/regular_annual_report_2010.pdf.
113
Ibid.
114
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, "Annual Report on the Status of Human Rights of LGBT Persons
in Serbia for 2014," Gay Straight Alliance, March 25, 2015, p. 4, accessed October 17, 2015, http://en.gsa.org.rs/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/2014-GSA-Annual-Report-Summary.pdf.
115
Ibid.

Dow 42
issues.” 116
Yet, it also claimed that the “LGBT population remains one of the social groups that
are most exposed to violence and intolerance in society.”117
It constantly faces threats and hate
speech, particularly LGBT NGOs.118
Despite this, there is still little political commitment to the
cause – a factor which the EU continues to note and criticize. While accurate statistics on
violence against LGBT persons is largely unavailable (attacks are reported to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs but the majority go unreported due to fear), one might understand the possibility
of such acts by examining the homophobia of the general population. According to a study
conducted by the Commissioner for Protection of Equality in 2014, forty-nine percent of the
Serbian population still believes homosexuality to be a disease that needs to be treated, and
eighty percent still do not want LGBT people in their families.119
Thus, although the
implementation of new policies seems to be finding certain, measurable success at the legal
level, the respect to these new precedents is still largely lost on the regular population. Even with
current training programs in place, a deepened a commitment to education about LGBT persons
is clearly needed among the general population for a more successful implementation.
Role of NGOs
NGOs have acted as a vital player in the advocacy for, passage, and initial
implementations of new policies protecting LGBT persons of Serbia. Of initial recognition is the
recent rise in LGBT-related NGOs throughout Serbia. While there were only three active groups
between 1990 and 1999, there are now fifteen. In recent years, such groups have been
responsible in advocating for an increased protection in the right to peaceful assembly (this
comes in reference to the 2010 banning of Pride in Belgrade, as well as its unbanning in 2014),

116
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, "Annual Report on the Status of Human Rights of LGBT Persons
in Serbia for 2014," p. 1.
117
Ibid., p. 1.
118
Ibid., p. 1.
119
Ibid., p. 55.

Dow 43
stronger and more effective hate crime legislation, and more public education programs and
sensitivity trainings (in light of the high waves of violence and discrimination discussed
above).120
Serbia-based NGO Gay Straight Alliance has been one of the leading organizations
advocating for these causes. Similar to Turkey, these organizations have proven to be very
influential by means of their contributive information to each annual report conducted by the
European Union. As a member of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex
Association and effective consultative body to the European Commission, GSA in particular has
been quite helpful in the gathering and disseminating of ground information to members of EU
government.121
However, the extent of these organizations’ impact can perhaps best be measured in the
implementation process of new policies. Specifically, the government has allowed NGO groups
to take control of the education and training programs demanded by the European Union. For
example, in 2014, the Belgrade lesbian human rights organization Labris organized a two-day
seminar for teachers and education experts on same sex orientation. They also lead five two-day
trainings in twenty-seven police headquarters after being instructed by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.122
With a specific goal-oriented approval in the fall of 2014, the government even
encouraged a two-day conference led by Labris entitled “Future belongs to us – LGBT Rights on
the Road to European Union.”123
It appears that, overall, Parliament has been quite respectful and
attentive towards LGBT NGOs in the country. Unlike Turkey, they do not suffer from any
discrimination or rejection when forming and are given a proper voice in the government.

120
ARC International Staff, "Serbia (2nd Cycle)," ARC International, par. 1, accessed October 18, 2015, http://arc-
international.net/global-advocacy/universal-periodic-review/s/serbia/2nd-cycle/.
121
Gay Straight Alliance Staff, "Gay Straight Alliance | GSA | Activities," Gay Straight Alliance GSA RSS, April
2012, accessed October 18, 2015, http://en.gsa.org.rs/activities/.
122
Labris - Lesbian Human Rights Organization from Belgrade, "Annual Report on the Position of the LGBTIQ
Population in Serbia," Labris - Lesbian Human Rights Organization from Belgrade, 2015, p. 14, accessed October
18, 2015, http://labris.org.rs/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/labris-ENG-WEB.pdf.
123
Ibid., p. 14.

Dow 44
Despite many personal feelings within the government against homosexuality, the employment
of such groups is nonetheless encouraged.
Role of Parliament
The negative opinions on homosexuality from Serbia’s general population largely
coincide with a historically conservative parliament. As a parliamentary republic, the Serbian
Progressive Party, a conservative group grounded in socially traditional beliefs, has led the
country since 2014.124
The party followed ruling by the Socialist Party of Serbia, a Serbian
nationalist party that identifies as democratic socialist and has supported equality for ethnic
minorities and expressed a slight openness to LGBT equality.125
While Parliament has been
responsible for passing new policies in favor of LGBT protectionism despite the move to a more
conservative ruling, many leading members have continued to stand against such legislature, or
at least the meaning behind it. In 2013, then Prime Minister Ivica Dačić gave a speech at
Belgrade’s Pride parade and exclaimed:
Should I go so it could be pro-European? They are equal with other citizens but do not
tell me it is normal, when it is not. If it is normal, why are we the exceptions then? I have
no hatred towards them; I just cannot accept that it is normal because it is not natural.126
Not only does this quote suggest a large, government-led sense of homophobia, but it also
references new policies as “pro-European.” This suggests that the Prime Minister perhaps only
approved new changes so that Serbia might seem more assimilated to the beliefs of Europe and
therefore increase its chances of a speedy acceptance into the European Union. Although unlike
in Turkey, where homophobic remarks from parliamentary leaders have gone unopposed, Prime
Minister Ivica Dačić was forced into meeting with representatives from an LGBT rights

124
European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity Staff, "Serbia Country Update," European Forum for Democracy
and Solidarity, June 3, 2014, par. 2, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.europeanforum.net/country/serbia.
125
Tanjug, "Gay Rights Activist Takes Post in Serbia Socialist Party," Balkan Insight, December 10, 2014, accessed
November 22, 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/gay-rights-activist-takes-post-in-serbia-socialist-party.
126
Ibid., p. 120.

Dow 45
organization to better understand their daily struggles and was also advised by the Commissioner
for Protection of Equality to refrain from such statements that would offend the LGBT populate
and advance stereotypes, the suppression of, and the violence against this minority population.127
The Commissioner has also cited that many of the authoritative representatives are prejudiced
against the LGBT population and view such persons as sick.128
These statements, in their
inherent suggestion that homosexuality is a disease, are fabrications in contrast with the World
Health Organization’s declaration of homosexuality as not an illness.129
To proclaim such a thing
therefore might even be categorized as hate speech.
One could argue that homophobia in top leadership might be subsiding. The government
of Serbia is currently led by Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić of the Serbian Progressive Party.
With regard to Belgrade’s 2014 Pride Parade, Vučić explained, “I respect the constitutional
obligations of the state and it is my obligation to guarantee safety and security to all citizens. It is
my democratic right to choose not to take part in the Pride Parade and I do not have the slightest
intention of attending it.”130
This statement initially proves the Prime Minister’s lack of support
for the LGBT population. Despite this though, he respects the need to uphold new policies
against anti-discrimination, perhaps to prove Serbia’s respect and tolerance to observing
Europeans. This theory can be confirmed by President Tomislav Nikolić’s later statement about
the 2014 parade. He warned parliament and citizens of Serbia that banning LGBT pride events

127
Tanjug, "Gay Rights Activist Takes Post in Serbia Socialist Party," p. 120.
128
Ibid., p. 42.
129
Jenny Kutner, "A Reminder from the World Health Organization: LGBT People Are Not “sick”," Saloncom
RSS, September 5, 2014, accessed October 17, 2015,
http://www.salon.com/2014/09/05/a_reminder_from_the_world_health_organization_lgbt_people_are_not_sick/.
130
European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity Staff, "Peaceful Gay Pride in Belgrade, First Step towards
Structural Social Change?," European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, September 30, 2014, par. 6, accessed
October 18, 2015,
http://www.europeanforum.net/news/2011/peaceful_gay_pride_in_belgrade_first_step_towards_structural_social_c
hange.

Derek Dow Senior Thesis

Empfohlen

Empfohlen

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Was ist angesagt? (8)

Andere mochten auch

Andere mochten auch (7)

Ähnlich wie Derek Dow Senior Thesis

Ähnlich wie Derek Dow Senior Thesis (20)

Derek Dow Senior Thesis