Privacy & Security Aspects in Mobile Networks
•Als PPTX, PDF herunterladen•
0 gefällt mir•260 views
This document summarizes a presentation on privacy and security aspects in mobile networks from 1G to 5G. It discusses how mobile network architectures and security have evolved with each generation, from basic access control and authentication in 2G to longer encryption keys, mutual authentication, and new key hierarchies in 4G and 5G. It provides examples of past attacks on mobile networks and how they have become easier to carry out as tools have become more widely available. Specifically, it discusses how subscriber identification methods have changed from sending IMSI in cleartext in 2G to concealed SUPI in 5G. The presentation emphasizes that securing systems is difficult and that we must learn from past mistakes as new technologies are developed.
Empfohlen
Weitere ähnliche Inhalte
Was ist angesagt?
Was ist angesagt? (20)
Ähnlich wie Privacy & Security Aspects in Mobile Networks
Ähnlich wie Privacy & Security Aspects in Mobile Networks (20)
Mehr von DefCamp
Mehr von DefCamp (20)
Kürzlich hochgeladen
Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)
Privacy & Security Aspects in Mobile Networks
- 1. University of Bucharest, Romania Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway Ruxandra F. Olimid Privacy & Security Aspects in Mobile Networks March 21st, 2019 Ladies in Cybersecurity, Bucharest
- 2. I will take you … … in a brief journey from 1G to 5G … … with focus on privacy & security aspects
- 3. Who am I
- 4. I know… I have… I am…
- 5. I am … ... a former employee (almost 10 years) *This presentation is facilitated by Orange Romania Thanksforthistalk!
- 6. I have … ... background in Math & CS and Telecom
- 7. 2008 2009 2010 2013 2006 2015 Orange BSc. Maths & CS BSc. Telecom MSc. Distr.Systems Phd. Crypto PostDoc Crypto PostDoc Mobile Security Academic Position 2018 Academic Position
- 8. Cryptanalysis of Public Key Encryption Systems BSc. (Maths & CS)2008 Security of GSM and UMTS Networks BSc. (Telecom)2009 Secret Sharing Schemes 2010 MSc. Group Key Establishment based on Secret Sharing 2013 Phd. Secret Sharing Schemes and their Applications to Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols 2015 PostDoc Mobile Communication Security 2018 PostDoc
- 10. I know …
- 11. From 1G to 5G
- 14. … and looking forward 5G [Source:http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-129_en.htm]
- 15. Mobile Networks General Architecture [Source: http://emfguide.itu.int/emfguide.html ] • User equipment • Access network • Radio link • Core network
- 17. Privacy & Security in Mobile Networks Security Requirements Security Principles Security Architecture Vulnerabilities Attacks
- 18. Wireless vs. Wired Goal: GSM should be as secure as the wired network (PSTN) … …but, security mechanisms should not have a negative impact on the usability of the system Sounds familiar? ... Wired Equivalence Privacy (WEP) Wireless: Easy / direct access to the medium (radio) – MitM, jamming Difficulty to detect passive attacks (privacy concerns) Broadcast communication Dynamicity (roaming, mobility, etc.) Constraint devices and capabilities (computational power, energy consumption)
- 19. Security Improvements 2G 3G 4G 5G + Access control to the MS (PIN) + Anonymity of subscribers (TMSI) + Authentication of subscribers (SIM) + Confidentiality (encryption) Secret algorithms, short keys, limited encryption Unilateral authentication
- 20. Security Improvements 2G 3G 4G 5G + Access control to the MS (PIN) + Anonymity of subscribers (TMSI) + Authentication of subscribers (SIM) + Confidentiality (encryption) + New facilities (USIM) + Longer crypto keys (128 bits) + Expand the encrypted communication (until RNC) + SQN no. (for freshness and mitigate replay attacks) + Integrity (MACs) + Mutual authentication Weaknesses (MitM) End-to-end security?
- 21. Security Improvements 2G 3G 4G 5G + Access control to the MS (PIN) + Anonymity of subscribers (TMSI) + Authentication of subscribers (SIM) + Confidentiality (encryption) + New facilities (USIM) + Longer crypto keys (128 bits) + Expand the encrypted communication (until RNC) + SQN no. (for freshness and mitigate replay attacks) + Integrity (MACs) + Mutual authentication + Physical security for eNodeB + New key hierarchy + Crypto improvements
- 22. Security Improvements 2G 3G 4G 5G + Access control to the MS (PIN) + Anonymity of subscribers (TMSI) + Authentication of subscribers (SIM) + Confidentiality (encryption) + New facilities (USIM) + Longer crypto keys (128 bits) + Expand the encrypted communication (until RNC) + SQN no. (for freshness and mitigate replay attacks) + Integrity (MACs) + Mutual authentication + Physical security for eNodeB + New key hierarchy + Crypto improvements + Public-key crypto + … (isolation, )
- 23. Security Improvements 2G 3G 4G 5G Security improvements WEP WPA WPA2 WPA3 Breaking is easy! Securing is hard! Sounds familiar?
- 24. [Source: https://www.krackattacks.com/ ] Attacks in the wireless world
- 25. [Source: https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/] Attacks in the wireless world
- 26. [Source: https://rayzone.com/products/piranha-2g-3g-and-4g-imsi-catcher/ ] Attacks (?!) in the wireless world
- 27. [Source: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/annual-report-telecom-security-incidents-2017 ] Attacks in the wireless world Incidents caused by malicious actions are rare: Only a small percentage of reported incidents (2.5% in 2017) was categorized as caused by malicious actions. This percentage reduced by half compared to the previous year (5.1% in 2016).
- 30. Evolution 2G 3G 4G 5G Security improvements Increased technical capabilities for the large public Simpler attacks More difficult to obtain the tools More advanced attacks Easiest to obtain the tools
- 31. Evolution More difficult to obtain the tools Easiest to obtain the tools Increased technical capabilities for the large public
- 32. Low-cost tools available at large scale Easy to obtain the tools Easy to obtain the tools Facilitates attacks Facilitates experimentation
- 33. Evolution 2G 3G 4G 5G Security improvements Simpler attacks More advanced attacks Unilateral authentication Mutual authentication
- 34. Evolution 2G 3G 4G 5G Security improvements Increased technical capabilities for the large public Easy to make the phone accept a fake tower… But difficult to get the tools for it More difficult to make the phone accept a fake tower… But easy to obtain the necessary tools
- 36. Identity Request Identity Request (IMSI) Identity Response (IMSI) [. . . ] requests the user to send its permanent identity. The user's response contains the IMSI in cleartext. This represents a breach in the provision of user identity confidentiality. [Source: ETSI TS 133 401 V14.4.0 (2017-10)] 2G 3G 4G 5G
- 37. Experimental Work UE eNodeB Identity Request (IMSI) Identity Response (IMSI)
- 38. Experimental Work [Source: http://ruxandraolimid.weebly.com/uploads/2/0/1/0/20109229/final_lte.pdf ]
- 39. 5G - Identity Request Identity Request Identity Response (never: SUPI) “In response to the Identifier Request message, the UE never sends the SUPI.” . [Source: ETSI TS 133 501 V15.2.0 (2018-09)] 2G 3G 4G 5G
- 40. 5G – SUPI Concealment [Source: ETSI TS 133 501 V15.2.0 (2018-09) ] Eph. private key 1> Eph. key pair generation 2> Key agreement Eph. shared key 3> Key derivation 4> Symmetric encryption Eph. public key Public key of HN Plaintext block Cipher- text value Eph. enc. key, ICB Final output = Eph. public key || Ciphertext || MAC tag [|| any other parameter] Eph. mac key MAC-tag value 5> MAC function
- 41. Message to take home
- 42. Learn from the mistakes Consider technological evolution Do we really need so much digitalization / automation / …? Speed of development vs. security Still many aspects not referred to in this talk … Breaking is easy! Securing is hard! … but we need to do our best [Source: https://youtu.be/nwPtcqcqz00 ]
- 43. Thank you!