Gods and Kings-Authoritarianism in the Middle East
1. Daniel Lutz Lutz 1
Professor Petrovic
Political Science 157
26 February 2014
Gods and Kings:
Authoritarianism in the Middle East
Daniel Lutz (Email: danielplutz@gmail.com and UID#:304210470)
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2011 was a year of hope in the Middle East. Many, both in the region and
internationally, believed that 2011 was the beginning of a new era for the Arab world, an era of
democracy and freedom. Starting with Tunisia’s revolt against its authoritarian leadership,
country after country, including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, among others, all rose up
against oppression and corruption (Blight). The goals of many of these movements were not
always clear and articulated, but hope and change was in the air. Nearly three years later,
however, that hope has been largely deflated and that thirst for change has not translated to
substantive reform. Tunisia is struggling to assert itself as a democracy (Gumuchian), Egypt has
lapsed back into the hands of the military (Fahim), Libya is dealing with internal security threats
(Hassan), Yemen is undergoing riots (“Yemen Military Officials Join Anti-Government
Protests”), and Syria is mired in a deadly civil war (“Syria’s Civil War: Key Facts, Important
Players”). 2014 is a year of pessimistic uncertainty.
The experiences and events over the last three years have left many asking the question
of why, why does democracy seem to fail in the Middle East? Why does authoritarianism have
such a stranglehold on the region? Many theories have been offered in an attempt to answer
these questions not only in the last three years, but for the last couple of decades as the Middle
East has been one of the least democratized regions of the globe and, though it has made
progress in recent years, it still maintains that status (Davidson). Though many of these theories
are valid and deserve consideration, two factors, in particular, explain the Middle East’s history
of authoritarianism and its perseverance in the region. These factors are the prominence of Islam
and patrimonial leadership in the Middle East and their implications on political culture. These
aspects of culture are evident and seen throughout the history of Middle East as a whole but, in
particular, they are specifically evident in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
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As religion is one of the most defining features of the Middle East, it is natural and
expected that Islam bears partial responsibility for the persistence of authoritarianism in the
Middle East (Bellin). The history of Islam in the Arab world dates back to the 600’s when the
prophet Muhammad founded the religion and began a military conquest of the region. One of
the chief tenants of Islam is the rule of law, as is dictated by the Sharia, the law of Allah. No
entity, including authority figure or state, is ever supposed to be above the law of Allah and,
thus, all states are to be subject to Sharia law. In addition, the Prophet Muhammad claimed
authority to rule based on divine right, not political right. After the Prophet Muhammad’s death,
this tradition continued with the creation of the Caliphate. Though no ruler after Muhammad
claimed the same divine authority, namely the power and gift of revelation, the Caliph was
regarded as the head of state and Islam, concurrently. This tradition of a union between religion
and state continued throughout the years into the Ottoman Empire. As long as supporting the
state was believed to be synonymous with supporting Islam and to be in Islam’s best interest, the
state maintained legitimacy. This was especially the case if the Caliph was in line with and
supported by the Ulama. Though the caliphate has no longer existed for nearly a century,
individual Arab countries have attempted to assert this same legitimacy from divine right. Even
secular states often acknowledge Islam or try to use it for legitimacy in an attempt to win the
support of their largely Muslim population.
Though Islam is perhaps the most influential and unique aspect of Arab political culture,
it is not the sole defining aspect of Arab political culture as the tradition of patrimonial
leadership, which stems back to tribalism, is even more deeply rooted in Arab history than Islam
and it has an impact that rivals Islam (Bellin). Prior to the establishment of the Caliphate, and
even during that period, tribal power was the prominent source of influence and control, at least
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on a local level. This tribalism operated under a patrimonial system in which the head of the
tribe served as the source of power and power in the tribe stemmed from him, meaning family
and individuals closer to the tribal leader held more power. This hierarchy of power continued
into the nation state system, even after the tribes lost their prominence in many nations. As in
the tribal system, the head of state became the source of power and the principal decision maker.
Those close to him, such as family, close allies, and consultants became powerful by association
and, as such, patronage became prominent, with positions often being appointed because of
loyalty, not merit. Finally, in this system, the administration and the army answers only to the
head of state and the positions in bureaucracy are not powerful in of themselves, but rather only
have power if they are occupied by individuals who are in close alliance with the leader
(Petrovic, Lecture).
Though the influence of Islam and tribalism is evident throughout the Arab world, they are
particularly influential in the nations of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Saudi Arabia was officially
founded in 1932 by Ibn Saud, but the conquests to unify the majority of the Arab peninsula
began in 1902 with the conquest of Riyadh. Between the years of 1902 and 1932, the unification
of Saudi Arabia was achieved, an accomplishment that would not have been possible without the
support of the Ikhwan, a local tribal army influenced by Wahhabism. This alliance between the
Ikhwan and the House of Saud traces back much earlier than the 20th
century, however, as its
roots lay in the 1744 Pact between the House of Saud and Abd al-Wahhab. The House of Saud
was a prominent tribal family in the region and Wahhab was a religious leader and founder of the
puritanical Islamic movement, Wahhabism, which had attracted much tribal support in the
Peninsula. This pact gave the House of Saud needed support in its ambitions and it gave
Wahhabism a catalyst for growth and expansion. The Saud family tried multiple times before
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the 20th
century to assert its dominance in the region and, though it became an important regional
leader, it could never fully break free from Ottoman control. In the early 1900’s, the House of
Saud attempted to once more assert its power and, with the help of the Ikhwan and the downfall
of the Ottoman Empire as a result of World War 1, they were finally successful in doing so
(“The History of Saudi Arabia”).
As is clear through its history of unification, Saudi Arabia has been greatly influenced by
Islam and tribalism. The House of Saud operated under a system of tribalism with the leader
being at the center of control, with power stemming from him to those closest to him. In
addition to tribal power, the House of Saud also sought to use religion to justify and legitimize its
power, which it successfully accomplished through its pact with Wahhab and the adoption of
Wahhabi principles. Islam and, more specifically, Wahhabism was used as justification for the
expansion of Saud power and it successfully rallied many tribes to the Saud’s cause. The power,
however, rested in the hands of the head of the Saud family, as was made clear when the Ikhwan
revolted against Ibn Saud’s power due to a disagreement over the extent of expansion. The
religious elite, the Ulama, sided with the House of Saud and denounced the revolt and dismissed
the Ikhwan. This marked the beginning of a relationship between the religious elite and the
House of Saud that still exists to this day (“The History of Saudi Arabia”).
Currently, the House of Saud still maintains power in Saudi Arabia and, though
significant power rests in the hands of the Ulama and they can often influence and manipulate
the Royal family, the true power rests in the monarchy as the religious elite only have power as a
result of their close relationship with the Saud family. The Royal family allows the religious
elite to have this much power, even to an extent where it can limit their own power in certain
cases, because the institution of religion provides a strong source of legitimacy for their rule—if
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one challenges the Saudi government, one also challenges Islam and Allah. Through this
patrimonial system with power resting in the hands of the King of Saudi Arabia, stemming down
in turn to his family and closest allies, the monarchy has been able to establish and control
administrations and institutions that are fiercely loyal to the government (Jones). As for the
general public, it justifies its power largely through religion and adherence to Islam. This all is
exemplified clearly through Saudi Arabia’s 1992 constitution which states that the “Rulers of the
country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-
Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants”, codifying its patrimonial style of rule. The constitution
even more clearly establishes Islam as a source of power through Article 7, which states that the
“Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and
the Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and
the other laws of the State” (“The Basic Law of Governance"). This 1992 constitution, though
not proof in of itself, is a result and indication of hundreds of years of history which have shaped
and solidified the authoritarian nature of Saudi rule.
Though prolific and, in many ways, one of the best case studies for examining Islam and
patrimonial leadership in relation to authoritarianism, Saudi Arabia is certainly not the only
nation influenced by these two aspects of culture. Throughout its history, Egypt has been
influenced and shaped by both religion and patrimonial leadership as well. Egypt’s history with
both aspects of culture differs significantly from that of Saudi Arabia. Unlike the Saudi Arabian
Peninsula, Egypt had experienced strong local centralized power far earlier than the 20th
century.
In 3150 BC, King Menes established a unified Egypt but, prior to this, the region would have
been characterized by local tribal rule, much like Saudi Arabia. The establishment of the
Pharaoh system, which Egypt is famous for, does not mean that tribalism ceased to exist. Just as
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in Saudi Arabia, the tradition of tribalism continued in the central governance of the nation,
which can be characterized as a patrimonial style of rule. Throughout the whole of Ancient
Egyptian history, power was in the hands of a single family at any given time and that power,
specifically, rested with the head of the family. This leader was at the center of all decisions and
power and power to his or her closest family and allies, as power was dependent on your position
in relation to the Pharaoh. Also, like is common in many patrimonial systems, Egyptian leaders
used religion to justify and legitimize their rule, often claiming a relation to the deity or to be
deity themselves ("Egyptian History").
This style of rule continued, although briefly interrupted by Greek rule, until just before
Jesus Christ’s supposed birth when Cleopatra, the last of the Pharaohs, committed suicide and
Egypt was annexed by Rome. After this point, Egypt fell in and out of foreign control being
controlled next by the Byzantines and then the Arabs, at which some autonomy was established
under the Caliphate, though foreign rule was commonplace. Then, finally, in 1517, Egypt came
under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had difficulty controlling Egypt,
however, as was exemplified through the Mamluk’s semi-autonomy, Ali Bey’s insurrection,
French invasion and, later, Mehmet Ali’s governorship of Egypt which, in effect, caused Egypt
to become almost wholly autonomous. Following Mehmet Ali, however, Egypt fell under the
hands of another foreign power, the British, in 1882. After a period of British rule, Egypt
received independence in 1922, although they were still under British influence as dictated by
the terms of the treaty establishing independence in 1922 and, shortly thereafter, the Treaty of
1936 (Milner).
Following independence, Egypt, though it had a bicameral legislation that was
established by its constitution, still maintained a monarchy and, because of the provisions in the
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constitution, the monarchy held most of the power. This line of monarchy persisted until 1952
when the Free Officers Revolution, a group of army officers led by Gamal Nasser, overthrew the
monarchy because of frustrations stemming from King Farouk’s failure to defy British influence,
failure in the War of 1948, and failure to address corruption (Bickerton, pg. 116). After a brief
time in the shadows of the new government, Nasser asserted power in 1954. And, though this
was a republic, Nasser consolidated much of the power in the presidency which was held by
himself ("Egyptian History"). His successor, Anwar Sadat, likewise maintained much of the
power, as did Hosni Mubarak, another ally of Nasser. Mubarak ruled until 2011 when he was
overthrown and, in his place, a theoretically more democratic government was installed, but the
Army recently overthrew the government and is guiding Egypt’s formation of another new
government, although it is worried the power will still lay in the hands of the authoritarian elite
that have controlled Egypt for years, an elite that is represented heavily in the military (Fahim).
Though the power changed hands from time to time, sometimes even resting foreign
entities, a consistent trend of patrimonial rule is clear throughout Egyptian history with one man
or woman being the decision maker and power stemming from that ruler in a patron-client
relationship, especially among the administration and army. In recent years, starting with
Nasser, Egypt has claimed that it is a republic but it has not been under democratic rule as
strongmen, whether it be Nasser, Sadat, or Mubarak, are really the source of power and
patronage, controlling the bureaucracy and army almost exclusively. Also, in recent years, many
have characterized the Egyptian state as secular, however, though its leaders have not been
particularly religious, it still, to this day, has Islam as the constitutional religion of the state and
the values and promotion of Islam was one of the key tenants in establishing the republic, at least
in name, as is evident in the 1962 National Charter. The leaders may not truly believe or adhere
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to Islam, nor does it inform their decisions to the degree it does in Islam, but it is still used as a
means to legitimize their authoritarian rule.
Throughout the Middle East, whether a nation is Islamist or secular, a republic or a
monarchy, authoritarianism is present. This is in a large part due to the influence of religion
which, in the case of Islam, lends itself to a style of governance that is excepting of authoritarian
rule as long as it is serving and subservient to Allah’s law. That is why governments which are
not heavily influenced by Islam claim Islam as a state religion; because if you challenge the
state, you challenge Allah. The ideology that Islam informs, as well as its use by governments,
both Islamist and secular, has not only given rise to authoritarian governments in the Middle
East, but it supports their ongoing existence. Patrimonial rule and tribalism, likewise, have
influenced the Middle East across the board as nations, both monarchy and republic, have
centralized the power of the nation into one man’s or family’s hand, creating a patrimonial
system of rule with patronage used to support and command the loyalty of the bureaucratic and
military arms of the state. This is seen clearly in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt specifically, but it
is a reality that exists throughout the region (Bellin).
Patrimonial leadership and religion that is used as a justification for authoritarian rule,
however, are not factors unique to the Middle East. Conditions such as those once existed in
Europe, one of the most democratized regions of the globe today. Hereditary monarchies existed
in Europe for centuries and religion, such as Christianity, was used to justify authoritarianism.
Authoritarianism, though, did not persist. These two cases seem similar but, in reality, there are
key differences which explain the perpetuation of authoritarian rule in the Middle East, versus
Europe. One of the most relevant differences is that Christianity does not dictate the same
intertwining of religion and state power and, though this was done in practice for a time, it
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became much less common following the Protestant reformation. In addition, democracy traces
its roots back to Europe and many saw it as a homegrown ideology and movement. In the
Middle East, it conflicts with their history, culture of tribalism, and is seen as a foreign import
and, consequently, it has struggled to gain widespread support (Kurtoglu-Eskiar). Finally,
unique factors such as established political structures and coercive structures in the Middle East,
many of them supported by foreign entities, makes any change, even if it was desired by the
public, difficult to achieve (Pearson). And, as long as the Arab nations can provide support and
employment for its citizenry, often based off their rentier economic position, such as is the case
in nations like Saudi Arabia, change will likely not find a foothold (Bellin).
Many factors, such as foreign influence and economics, played a role in the rise of
authoritarianism in the Middle East and these same factors continue to play a role in its
persistence. Factors such as these, however, fail to explain the phenomenon of authoritarianism
as adequately as the factors of religion and patrimonial leadership, as these two aspects of culture
lie at the core of the Arab world’s acceptance and propagation of an authoritative style of rule.
The answer ultimately lies in the culture, and understanding this is imperative as the world
moves forward in its interactions with the Middle East. Changing a culture is challenge that may
never be overcome.
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