2024: The FAR, Federal Acquisition Regulations - Part 28
White Paper 2013 presentation
1.
2. 1. France and the evolving strategic context
2. A renewed military strategy
3. Towards the next military programme 2014-2019
4. The White Paper process – Military Programme Act
3. 1. France and the evolving strategic context
2. A renewed military strategy
3. Towards the next military programme 2014-2019
4. The White Paper process – Military Programme Act
4. CONFIRMING THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTINUITY OF THE INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL THREATS TO:
SECURITY INTERESTS
LANDPOPULATION
LB : p. 19 DT : p 5
1. FRANCE AND THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONTEXT
5. RESPONDING TO THREATS
AGGRESSION BY ANOTHER STATE AGAINST THE NATIONAL TERRITORY
ORGANISED CRIME IN ITS MOST SERIOUS MANIFESTATIONS
ATTACKS ON OUR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL POTENTIAL
CYBER ATTACKS
MAJOR CRISES ARISING ON THE NATIONAL TERRITORY
RESULTING FROM NATURAL, HEALTH, TECHNOLOGICAL, INDUSTRIAL AND ACCIDENTAL RISKS
ATTACKS ON FRENCH NATIONALS ABROAD
LB : p. 27 DT : p 5
1. FRANCE AND THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONTEXT
6. CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY IN THE WORLD,
PARTICULARLY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, ASIA AND SOUTH AMERICA
IN THE MIDDLE-EAST AND THE ARABO-PERSIAN GULF, IMPLEMENT THE DEFENCE AGREEMENTS ENTERED
INTO BY FRANCE AND PROTECT ITS SECURITY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS
STABILISE EUROPE’S NEIGHBOURHOOD
GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND THE NORTH-ATLANTIC SPACE
FRANCE‘S GEOSTRATEGIC PRIORITIES
PROTECT THE NATIONAL TERRITORY AND FRENCH NATIONALS ABROAD
GUARANTEE THE CONTINUITY OF THE NATION’S ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
LB : p. 47 DT : p 6
1. FRANCE AND THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONTEXT
7. COMPLEMENTARITY OF NATO AND THE EU
FULL COMMITMENT IN NATO
CAPITALISE ON FRANCE ‘S FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE
MILITARY STRUCTURES OF NATO
SOLIDARITY WITH THE ALLIANCE
ADAPTING TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONFLICTS
OVERHAULING NATO’S MEANS OF ACTION
DYNAMISM AND PRAGMATISM
POLITICAL IMPULSE TO REVITALISE THE CSDP
REINFORCING EFFICIENCY IN TERMS OF GLOBAL APPROACH
FOSTERING DEVELOPMENT AND POOLING OF CAPACITIES
CONTINUING EFFORTS IN TERMS OF INTERNAL SECURITY
1 : CSDP: Common, security and defence policy
LB : p. 61 DT : p7
1. FRANCE AND THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONTEXT
8. STABILISING EUROPE’S NEIGHBOURHOOD
THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA:
A STRATEGIC AREA
ORIENTAL MARGINS
SAHELIAN AND SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
SHARED EUROPEAN VISION OF
RISKS AND THREATS
LB : p. 53 DT : p 13
1. FRANCE AND THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONTEXT
9. MARITIME AND OVERSEAS ISSUES
DEFEND THE 2ND
LARGEST
OCEAN SPACE IN THE WORLD
OPPOSE ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING
ABILITY TO CARRY OUT
SEABORNE OPERATIONS
PROTECT OUR TERRITORIES AND
THEIR POPULATION
MARK OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND
DEFEND OUR INTERESTS
PRESENCE OF OUR ARMED
FORCES ON THESE TERRITORIES
LB : p. 110 DT : p 21
1. FRANCE AND THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONTEXT
10. 1. France and the evolving strategic context
2. A renewed military strategy
3. Towards the next military programme 2014-2019
4. The White Paper process – Military Programme Act
11. GENERAL STRATEGY AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES
PROTECTION INTERVENTIONDETERRENCE
AN
INCREASING
CONVERGENCE
A NEW ARTICULATION
FOUR GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
DT : p 23
2. A RENEWED MILITARY STRATEGY
17. A GLOBAL INTERMINISTERIAL AND MULTILATERAL APPROACH
PREVENTION BY ACTING WITH FRAGILE STATES
CRISIS MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES AND SPECIALISED
CIVILIAN CAPACITIES
STEERING COMMITTEE ON CIVIL-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE AND ORIENTED INTERMINISTERIAL PROCEDURES
USING A VOLUNTARIST APPROACH TO REINFORCE CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
CAPACITIES
EFFORTS AIMING AT IMPROVING THE EU’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES
CIVIL-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT
LB : p. 98 DT : p 32
2. A RENEWED MILITARY STRATEGY
18. CYBER DEFENCE
GROWING DEPENDENCY ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS
MAJOR THREAT
HIGH PROBABILITY
STRONG IMPACT
NATIONAL DOCTRINE TO ADDRESS MAJOR CYBER AGGRESSIONS
DEFENCE OPERATIONAL CHAINDEVELOPING CYBER DEFENCE
CAPABILITIES
LB : p. 105 DT : p 33
2. A RENEWED MILITARY STRATEGY
19. 2 OR 3 SIMULTANEOUS CRISIS MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS
6 000 to 7 000
1 frigate, 1 command and support ship, 1 nuclear-
powered attack submarine
12
1 MAJOR COERCION OPERATION
About 15 000
1 aircraft carrier, 2 command and support ships, 1
supporting task force composed of frigates,
1 nuclear-powered attack submarine
Up to 45
ALERT
(national emergency reaction force)
5000
projection within 7 days
Of a joint force
Of 2 300 troops at 3 000 km
SURGE IN SECURITY FORCES
(MAJOR CRISIS)
Up to 10 000
Appropriate means of both naval
and air forces.
NEW OPERATIONAL CONTRACTS
DETERRENCE
(Oceanic and airborne)
LB : p. 90 DT : p 35
2. A RENEWED MILITARY STRATEGY
20. THE NEW ARMY MODEL
COMMAND CAPACITIES AT CORPS LEVEL
DEVELOPING INTELLIGENCE CAPACITIES
EFFORTS TOWARDS MILITARY CYBER DEFENCE
REINFORCING SPECIAL FORCES
COMPLEMENTARITY AND SUPPORT BETWEEN ARMIES
AND GENDARMERIE
EFFICIENCY CONDITIONED BY JOINT DEPARTMENTS
LB : p. 93 DT : p 37
Land forces
Naval forces
Air forces
66,000 deployable troops approx.
7 combined armed brigades
200 heavy tanks and 250 medium tanks
2700 Infantry fighting vehicles and armoured
personal carriers
140 reconnaissance and combat helicopters
115 manoeuvre helicopters
30 tactical drones approx.
4 SSBN
6 SSN
1 aircraft carrier
15 frontline frigates
15 patrol boats approx.
6 surveillance frigates
3 combined support and command vessels (BPC)
225 fighter aircrafts (air and naval)
50 tactical transport aircrafts
7 detection and aerial surveillance aircrafts
12 multirole refuelling aircrafts
12 theatre surveillance drones
8 medium-range air defence systems
2. A RENEWED MILITARY STRATEGY
21. 1. France and the evolving strategic context
2. A renewed military strategy
3. Towards the next military programme 2014-2019
4. The White Paper process – Military Programme Act
22. LB : p. 138 DT : p 41
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT IN TODAY’S CONTEXT
PRESERVING A COMPREHENSIVE DEFENCE TOOL
3. TOWARDS THE NEXT MILITARY PROGRAMME 2014-2019
23. LB : p. 113 DT : p 42
MEN AND WOMEN SERVING NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
RENEWED RESERVE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENCE MINDSET
3. TOWARDS THE NEXT MILITARY PROGRAMME 2014-2019
24. LB : p. 124 DT : p 43
THE INDUSTRIAL IMPERATIVE
EFFICIENCY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
3. TOWARDS THE NEXT MILITARY PROGRAMME 2014-2019
25. DT : p 45
Employment distribution
Main cities (outside Ile-de-France)
In parentheses:
Employment with large project managers
(excluding outsourcing, accumulating > 500
NUMBER OF JOBS IN THE
REGION
-
-
-
-
-
3. TOWARDS THE NEXT MILITARY PROGRAMME 2014-2019
26. DT : p 44
JOBS GENERATED BY THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
3. TOWARDS THE NEXT MILITARY PROGRAMME 2014-2019
27. DT : p 44
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE 613 « STRATEGIC » SMEs
3. TOWARDS THE NEXT MILITARY PROGRAMME 2014-2019
28. DT : p 47
MAIN PROGRAMMES
TIGER AND NH90 DELIVERIES
LAUNCH OF THE MMP (REPLACEMENT OF MILAN TOW)
SCORPION AND DIGITIZATION: ACQUISITION OF VBMR AND EBRC
GROWTH OF THE RAFALE FLEET
STUDIES (ex: NEURON) TOWARDS RENEWAL AFTER 2020
FIRST DELIVERIES OF A400M IN 2013
LAUNCH OF THE MRTT PROGRAMME IN 2014
EVOLUTION OF THE MICA MISSILE
NH90 DELIVERIES
ANL MISSILE (with UK) AND EVOLUTION OF THE ASTER 30 MISSILE
ONGOING BARRACUDA PROGRAMME
ONGOING FREMM PROGRAMME
RENEWAL OF PATROL BOATS (BATSIMAR)
ACQUISITION OF OIL TANKERS (FLOTLOG)
RENEWAL OF MINE COUNTERMEASURE ASSETS (SLAMF)
ACQUISITIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE, DETERRENCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Land forces
Naval forces
Air forces
3. TOWARDS THE NEXT MILITARY PROGRAMME 2014-2019
29. 1. France and the evolving strategic context
2. A renewed military strategy
3. Towards the next military programme 2014-2019
4. The White Paper process – Military Programme Act
30. LB : p. 144 DT : p 57
4. THE WHITE PAPER & MILITARY PROGRAMME PROCESS
4a. Presidential Mission statement
4b. White paper reflections : schedule, committee composition, hearings
4c. Defence personnel and white paper reflections : intranet site
Presidential
mission
statement
Beginning
of
reflections
Interministeria
l discussions;
Defence
council
Final
revision
White
paper
release
Military
programme
drafting and
submitting
Military
programme
parliamentary
debates
Military
programme
vote
Committee
and working
groups
session;
hearings
13
July 2012
Sum
m
er 2012
Sum
m
er 2012
– January 2013
January – April 2013
29
April 2013
Spring
- sum
m
er 2013
Autom
n
2013
Hinweis der Redaktion
PAGINATION REFERENCE TO THE WHITE PAPER ON THE TOP RIGHT OF EACH SLIDE
-NO COMMENTS-
-NO COMMENTS-
The National security strategy intends to allow France to ward off risks and threats, direct or indirect, likely to endanger the life of the Nation. This concept, introduced by teh 2008 White Paper and enshrined in law in 2009, has been confirmed. It is grounded in recognising the continuity of the internal and external threats menacing France, its territory, population and security interests. It enables us to assess all the different dimensions of these threats and organise our response to them, at the national level, by mobilising the entire apparatus of the State, the armed forces and the internal and civil security forces, together with the resources of decentralised local and regional fovernment and the main operators of vital importance for the country.
The level of threat and the climate of uncertainty characterising our international environment since 2008 have not diminished. Our analysis must now take into consideration:
• « Threats related to power. » The risk of a resurgence of conflicts between States remains plausible within the 2025 time frame
• « Risks related to weakness. » Certain weak of failed States can become a threat.
• « Threats and risks intesified by globalisation. » They include threats and risks to the everincreasing flow of goods, merchandise and people, all of which are intesified by globalisation.
The 2013 classification of the priority threats facing the territory, the population and French nationals abroad to be addressed by the defence and national security strategy are:
• aggression by another State against the national territory
• terrorist attacks;
• cyber attacks;
• attacks on our scientific and technical potential;
• organised crime in its most serious manifestations;
• major crises arising on the national territory and resulting from natural, health, technological, industrial and accidental risks;
• attacks on French nationals abroad.
The White paper clearly sets forth the geostrategic priorities resulting from our duty to protect French citizens, on the one hand, and assume our international responsibilities , on the other:
• protect the national territory and French nationals aborad, guarantee the continuity of the Nation’s essential funtions, preserve our sovereignty in mainland France and the overseas territories;
• guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, with our partners and allies, by playing an active role in the European Union and NATO;
• stabilise Europe’s neighbourhood, with our partners and allies, notably to guard against weakness-related threats in the event of crises likely to jeopardise Europe’s eastern approaches, the Mediterranean region or Africa. A distinguishing characteristic of the 2013 White Paper is the importance placed on the African continent;
• In the Middle-East and Arabo-Persian Gulf, implement the defence agreements entered into by France and jointly, with its allies, protect its security and strategic interests;
• contribute to peace and international security in the world, more particularly in the Indian Ocean and South America.
Within the Atlantic Alliance and thanks to the defence efforts France agrees to provide, our country will retain its identity and its autonomy, likewise its capacity to assume its place in command and wield influence over planning, policy and strategy. This vision, coordinated with its project for Europe, will allow it to retain its freedom of decision and action while at the same time contributing to the allies’ joint effort and solidarity. It also intends to play a very active role in the process of overhauling NATO’s means of action.
The 2013 White Paper lays emphasis on the fact that France and its European partners share a common destiny. Building a European defence and secruity policy will therefore be a strong pillar of France’s strategy. A pragmatic revitalisation of the Common Security and Defence Policy is necessary, in a context marked both by the critical financial situation of several European countries and the pivot of US policy towards Asia.
Europe’s interest, alongside France’s, is that no threat should emerge in its near neighbourhood: the security of Europe’s neighbourhood is therefore a priority for France and the European Union.
The European territory and its oriental neighbourhood must remain under close scrutiny: weaknesses remain in some States stemming from the collapse of the USSR and of the former Yugoslavia, and the relationship with Russia must be maintained and consolidated.
The action and influence of Turkey, an active member of NATO, in the Caucasus, Central Asia and in the Middle-East, as well as the dense relations it maintains with European Union countries, including France, make it a forefront ally.
The Mediterranean is a strategic front for the EU. The Maghreb is, for France and Europe, of particular importance, due to common and multiple interests and shared issues, especially in the volatile context of post-Arab revolutions. Furthermore France and Europe have been involved in South-Mediterranean crises, i.e. Lebanon, israeli-palestinian-related crises and today, Syria.
The Sahel, from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, as well as parts of Sub-Saharan Africa – particularly the Gulf of Guinea and neighbouring countries – are priority areas for France: a distinguishing characteristic of the 2013 White Paper is the importance placed on the African continent. The Atlantic front of Africa is particularly important for European interests, considering the developing relations with South America.
The White Paper reaffirms three objectives:
Ensure the rule of Law. France has the 2nd largest ocean space in the world, which means strategic resources. It is our duty to defend our sovereignty, to ensure order and to provide security. It is the purpose of maritime preservation and of State action at sea. Versatility, complementarity and endurance of services of the various administrations present at sea will continue to guarantee the implementation of this permanent mission.
• Oppose illegal trafficking, both autonomously and within international frameworks, notably the European Union. Our capacity to monitor large areas, operate intelligence and cooperate with other nations is key to succeeding in this fight.
• Finally, carry on seaborne operations. Controlling the ocean space is a major challenge and a power issue, which explains the reinforcement of naval ambitions and capacities of certain countries, particularly in Asia. This challenge will be taken on, for the defence and security of our country, and to allow for the consolidation of Europe and the respect of our alliances. It is a fundamental issue for the implementation of high intensity capacities of naval forces, capable of projecting power and force through the maritime ways.
Overseas:
France is present on all oceans and on most continents, especially due to its overseas territories. Beyond their economic and strategic importance, those territories allow us to maintain strong bilateral relations with faraway countries, and to be a member or a partner in various regional organisations, seldom as the only European country.
In this context, France will retain its capacity to mark its sovereignty and defend its interests. France must be able to monitor, control and possibly take military action with regards to threats to the integrity of national territory and to the security of populations.
Renewed means of action:
Effective and reactive presence of our armed forces of all territories;
Maintaining all armed capacities (land, air and naval forces) associated with protection and security missions: the requirement to protect overseas populations is as important as in mainland France;
Maintaining a strong presence at sea, through units ensuring military missions and contributing to interministerial missions (patrol boats, multipurpouse ships, surveillance frigates, etc.);
Finally, force projection capabilities will be retained, but relying more on mainland capacities.
-NO COMMENTS-
France’s strategy has evolved. The 1972 white Paper was focused on nuclear deterrence. The 1994 White Paper placed conventional confrontation at the heart of both doctrine and means. In 2008, the White Paper extended our strategy to national security and identified five strategic functions: knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, prevention and intervention.
The 2013 White Paper sets out a strategy which is characterised by a new articulation of missions of protection, nuclear deterrence and intervention.
On this basis, the White Paper restates the five strategic functions identified in 2008, which it confirms and redefines in accordance with developments occurring since then.
Four guiding principles frame our new armed forces model at the service of our strategy:
strategic autonomy. It is key to freedom of decision and action and to France’s capacity to take the initiative in operations it may deem necessary, likewise to wield influence in a multinational coalition in which it might be engaged.
The consistency of the model with the diversity of possible engagement by our forces in conflicts and crises.
Differentiation of forces, which consists of distinguishing between them as a function of the types of missions they are required to perform (deterrence, protection, crisis management, coercion and war operations).
Pooling, which will give us the capacity to allocate a core of multi-role, scarce and technologically high-level capabilities to several missions (protection, deterrence and intervention).
Intelligence is a priority, underlined several times by the President of the Republic, especially when the works of the 2013 White Paper were launched: « what is at stake here is the capacity of our country to maintain its freedom of assessment and decision. » (July 13th, 2012)
Assessment is based on complementary information originating from three pillars: human intelligence, analysis of intercepted messages and frequencies in electromagnetic spectrum and image collection (as well as video). The six intelligence agencies have been made into an « intelligence community » since 2008, whose governance is organised around the National intelligence Coordinator (CNR). The intelligence academy has contributede to the emergence of a shared culture within the French intelligence community.
The 2013 White Paper dedicates various developments to our strategy of nuclear deterrence.
In accordance with the declarations of the President of the Republic, the distribution of these developments beyond the dedicated chapter confirms that nuclear deterrence remains a fundamental of our national security and defence strategy.
Protection is at the heart of the national security and defence strategy.
Protection remains primary in our national security and defence strategy. It aims at guaranteeing the integrity of mainland and overseas territories, ensuring an efficient protection for French nationals against all risks and threats, preserving the continuity of the Nation’s vital functions and guaranteeing its resilience.
The implementation of protection measures can encompass the territory of EU countries, in accordance with the solidarity clause, instituted by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
Preserve our efforts to help fragile States
Aiming at avoiding the emergence of crisis centres, especially in our near environment, France’s prevention policy is to be primarily directed at fragile States, whose situations can have a direct impact on Europe and on our overseas. Hence, a significant part of our development aid is to be directed at these countries. This assistance may, according to the situation, include military, police, judiciary, or administrative (etc.) aspects.
2. Maintaining a credible capacity in prevention and civil-military crisis management
The prevention policy must be carried out within a global policy framework. The latter will be defined by a framework document setting out the interministerial strategy in terms of prevention and civil-military crisis management, including high-priority geographical areas.
3. Reinforcing our operational organisation
The organisation will rely on an operational doctrine and agreed-upon interministerial procedures, as well as, before a crisis emerges, on the implementation of rapid-response structures, composed of representatives of relevant ministerial departments. These structures will be placed with the ministry of Foreign Affairs. Concerning field action, necessary civilian expertise will be stemmed from a pool of voluntary experts, a pool that must be consolidated, enlarged and updated.
4. Improve the EU capacities in global crisis management
This approach comes within the scope of our efforts to improve the crisis management capacities of the EU, including military aspects. We must work towards better coordination between institutional actors, intergovernmental and European policies and crisis management instruments, both civilian and military.
5. Support our prevention capacity through our prepositioned plan.
The positioning of armed forces in countries with which we maintain close relationships or in certain maritime areas is at the crossroads of the strategic functions of prevention, intervention and knowledge and anticipation. In this regard, France will rely on permanent naval deployments in one or two maritime areas and on prepositioned means both on the United Arab Emirates base as well as in one or several African locations. Concerning Africa, those locations will be transformed so that they have reactive and flexible capacities able to adapt to the continent’s future realities and needs
Our armies must be able to respond in an adjusted and differentiated fashion to the diversity of threats and crisis situations:
Against organised State-led military forces: coercion operations
A highly characterised political and military objective: force the adversary’s political will by neutralising the sources of its power (military apparatus, power centres, economic targets….) through an attrition campaign.
2. Situations deriving from the weakness of certain States: crisis management operations
These operations can take different shapes: peacekeeping, interposition, securing fragile States surroundings, fighting against trafficking, piracy or terrorism, assisting a government, counterinsurgency…
In certain situations, our forces will have to adapt to the emergence of « hybrid threats », with enemies combining asymmetrical action modes, acquired or stolen State-level and/or highly technological means. Our forces will thus have to be able to engage localised coercion and attrition means, as well as capacities consistent with both securisation missions and the imperative to control large areas.
A credible capacity of civil-military crisis prevention and management is paramount to our national defence and security strategy. Areas of focus of civil-military action: crisis prevention and management.
At the strategic level, geographical priorities – especially in terms of monitoring, anticipation and prevention – will be determined and updated on a regular basis by the steering committee on civil-military crisis management.
At the operational level, the organisation will rely on an operational doctrine and interministerial procedures, including the availability of representatives of the relevant ministerial departments to the benefit of the ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Reinforcing civilian action in the field will include a rapid mobilisation of civilian expertise, especially in critical domains (customs, judiciary, etc.). The French interministerial approach must come within the context of our efforts to improve European crisis management capacities.
Since the last White paper, the possibility of a major cyber attack on digital networks and infrastructures has increased. Cyberspace is full-grown confrontation field ; in this context, the 2013 White Paper calls for a strong effort in developing cyber defence capacities.
In order to increase the security level of State IT systems and major operator information systems, the 2013 White Paper points out that legislative and regulatory measures will be taken. Our capacity to act in the event of a major crisis at the Network and information security agency (ANSSI), national authority for security and defence of IT systems (attached to the general secretariat for national defence and security (SGDSN)) will be reinforced.
Several areas of effort, coordinated by the SGDSN, have been identified:
reinforcing human resources devoted to cyber defence, to reach the same level of efforts made by our principal European partners, State support to powerful scientific and technological cyber skills, the capacity to guarantee autonomous production of security systems, notably in terms of cryptology and attack detection, as an essential component of national sovereignty, the development of close relationships with reliable international partners.
With regards to the ministry of Defence, the new army model includes the development of military cyber defence capacities, in close relationship with the intelligence field. France will develop its stance based on a cyber defence organisation integrated into the forces, which will have both defensive and offensive capacities to prepare and support military operations.
The operational organisation will thus include an operational chain of defence:
Unified: to take into account the dimming of the notion of border in cyberspace; Centralised, from the joint planning and command centre of operations (CPCO), to guarantee a global vision and a rapid mobilisation of necessary means; Specialised, because it calls for oriented skills and attitudes.
The operational contract derives from the analysis of our environment and threats. It points out the major operations in which we could participate, the permanent stances to adopt, the potential crisis management operations related to State fragility and threats induced by globalisation. It aims at responding to the strategic challenge of high levels of threat, to the economic challenge of the recovery of our finances, and to the political challenge of the responsibilities we must be able to assume on the international scene. Thereby, our forces will have to undertake permanent and non-permanent missions.
The French armies’ command and control capacities will allow for the planning and conduct of both autonomous operations and multilateral operations in which France could act as a framework-nation. Specifically, in the context of a major deployment, i.e. within the NATO framework, the armies will retain the capacity to set up command structures for the land, sea and air components at corps level.
Intelligence capacities will be developed as a priority.
The military cyber defence capacities will be enhanced, in close liaison with intelligence and defensive and offensive planning in preparation for, or support of military operations.
Special forces have proven to be a strong capacity in all recent operations. They will be reinforced in terms of personnel, command capabilities and in their capacity to coordinate with the intelligence services. The joint dimension of COS (special operations command) will be strengthened.
According to the differentiation principle, the three armies are made of the main capacities outlined on the slide.
National gendarmerie
Armed force placed under the authority of the Interior ministry and used daily for domestic security missions. It is a major asset, thanks to its military organisation, to the military status of its personnel, to its territorial distribution, its operational reserve and its mobile forces. It will be able to deploy backbone capacities.
Joint departments
Inseparable from the armed forces, joint departments are the condition of their efficiency, both in the field and on national territory. It is particularly the case with the Defence medical services (SSA), Military fuel service (SEA), the Joint directorate of infrastructure networks and information systems, the Military commissariat service, support services…..
-NO COMMENTS-
The 2013 White Paper fills the gap caused by a combination of previsions made in the military programme act (LPM) 2009-2014 and financial outlooks. The White paper provides for the allocation, between 2014 and 2025, of 364 billion euros 2013 to the « Defence » mission. It is a substantial effort considering the context of public finances.
1. The White paper pays a nationwide tribute to men and women serving our national security and Defence. Civilian and military personnel are the cornerstones that guarantee the consistency of our Defence. The White paper restates that these men and women have chosen to serve their country. For military personnel, engagement means availability, discipline, loyalty and a sense of sacrifice ; the specificity of this engagement justifies the nation’s recognition as well as a protective status which must be preserved and updated.
2. Greater consistency between the obligations of men and women of national security and public life
Full citizenship : men and women in defence and national security, both civilian and military, must be able to have, as citizens, a role in public life, particularly through freedom of speech. These rights and duties must be practised – for military personnel – in accordance with the preservation of the neutrality of armed forces. The armed forces must remain outside of any partisan debate.
Adapting to public life: ministries of Defence and Interior must continue to acknowledge certain major personal constraints, and facilitate arbitration between professional military life and private life: spouse employment, children education, access to property.
A renewed consultation:
within the framework of the internal dialogue reform (called upon by the government), the role of consultation bodies shall be strengthened.
new instruments will be implemented: permanent liaison group with the Minister for military consultation, implementation of the Bercy agreements and continued rollout of the social agenda in the framework of rich and respectful dialogue with civil personnel.
Online cooperative tools of expression will be promoted.
3. Taking into account the downsizing of the workforce
The 2008 White Paper had intended to reduce the workforce of the ministry of Defence by 55.000. The foreseen departure of more than 10.000 men and women in 2014-2015 will contribute to reaching this objective. A further downsizing of about 24.000 is envisaged in the 2013 White Paper in title of new operational contracts and efforts to rationalise both the ministry’ organisation and administration. All in all, between 2014 and 2019, the ministry will have to reduce its workforce by around 34.000
4. Elements of a renewed human resources governance
In this context, the governance of human resources will need to ensure the balance of resources and the requirements of service (career readibility, professional roadmap, support, respect of statutory rules, performance of career change).
This will be done through a renewed human resources policy which will aim to:
benefit from the complementarity and wealth of both civilian and military personnel within the ministry of Defence;
Define a new balance between contracted personnel and career personnel;
create new management instruments to support the ministry’s evolutions (career change, incentives and financial measures to support departures, better career readibility).
Make competence logic prevail over statute logic
Undertake a strict management of the workforce in a respectful, equitable and transparent fashion, and fully engage the ministry of Defence towards managing public spending.
5. A closer link between society and its army
A Renewed reserve: the military reserve is composed of the operational reserve, contributing daily to the fulfillment of armed forces missions, and the « citizen » reserve. The latter will remain a way to strengthen, in particular, our cyber security, to promote the Defence mindset and to disseminate knowledge of the army in the civilian sphere.
6. Developing the Defence mindset: academic trinomals and the network of defence correspondents will be enhanced, and the Defence and Citizenship Day (JDC) will be modernised ; the defence - national education protocol will be renewed ; the White paper calls for an effort towards future elites through an academic curriculum comprised of a course on the national security and defence strategy, and the development of a remembrance policy.
1. The White Paper recognises the defence industry as an essential component of France’s strategic autonomy. It covers all sectors concurring to a consistent defence tool: combat aeronautics, missiles and bombs, intelligence and surveillance, communications and networks, nuclear armaments, etc…
It guarantees a security in our most critical procurement needs. It also guarantees our capacity to autonomously maintain our equipments in service ; in this regard, the White Paper sets objectives of high efficiency to maintain our equipment active. Keeping a significant volume of public orders is of strategic importance to preserve the vital skills in key identified sectors.
2. The White paper acknowledges the defence industry as a driver of competitiveness for the French economy and employment. With 4.000 companies, revenues of almost 15 billion euros, and a workforce of about 165.000 (20.000 of which are highly qualified), the defence industry is an essential sector. It maintains a dense web of SMEs, which benefit from public credits and are supported in their exports efforts and relationships with large companies. The defence industry also allows for development in our regions.
It exports from 25% to 45% of its output, and thus contributes to our country’s balance of trade . With a very high level of investment in R&D, it is a vector of our technological competitiveness, including for the civilian sector. This priority is also reflected by the importance placed on studies and research to secure future capability: this funding will be maintained at the present level throughout the 2014-2025 period.
The State will furthermore use all available means, as shareholder, customer and prescriber to facilitate the necessary evolutions while keeping in mind strategic and economic interests, particularly industrial restructuring, which will contribute to adapting the defence industry to increased international competition, and the reduction of public spending in Europe.
3. The White Paper places the industrial defence sector as a major instrument on the international stage.
It reaffirms the importance of the armament export policy within the defence and security policy, in order to preserve the key skills that are essential to our security and allow us to fight against proliferation. This proactive policy will be accompanied by firm State support for companies (including SMEs) in the field of exports, while respecting our commitments in terms of control. In this area, it will foster partnerships with the principal customers.
The European dimension of the government’s strategy will include a crucial industrial component. France will take initiatives here in the context of the preparation for the European Council meeting of December 2013. It will promote common frameworks to support technological and industrial capabilities, relying in particular on the French-British experience in missiles, based on the principle of freely agreed interdependencies.
The White Paper strengthens the objectives and principles of cooperation in programmes:
sharing development and production activities must now be organised according to a strict principle of industrial efficiency and economic performance;
potentialities of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the organisation for joint armament cooperation (OCCAR) must be exploited;
France will make sure that the European industry plays its full part with regards to NATO initiatives in terms of procurement.
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Combat aeronautics
The growing Rafale fleet, a versatile aircraft that has proved its operational performance in recent conflicts, will be sustained both qualitatively and quantitatively, with research studies being undertaken in order to integrate Meteor missiles and laser designation pods. The most recent Mirage 2000 (Mirage 2000D) will be renovated. Furthermore, the studies initiated with the NEURON combat drone demonstrator will continue, with a view to lead up to a programme able to renew combat aviation.
2. Transport aviation
The A400M carriers, developed by 7 countries and whose first deliveries are expected in 2013, will progressively reinforce the capacities of the air force in the tactical and strategic transport fields. The MRTT programme will be launched in 2014 to ensure the replacement of current refuelling aircrafts C-135 FR and KC-135 R by Airbus 330 MRTT. Their versatility will also allow for the replacement of strategic carrier aircrafts currently in service (A310 and A340).
3. Helicopters
The renewal of the helicopter fleet will continue, with deliveries of both Tigre and NH90. The Tiger is a multi-role helicopter capable of providing fire support against ground objectives (including tanks) and air objectives, and able to act as armed escort to manoeuvre helicopters.
The NH90, in its « land » version, provides tactical transport for 14 to 20 commandos, and in its « navy » version, provides capacities to fight against maritime submarine threats.
4. Missiles and bombs
The need to renew operational capacities has led to the launch of new programmes, guaranteeing France’s level of autonomy in this field.
• ANL : light anti-ship missile developed in cooperation with the UK
• MMP : medium-range surface to surface missiles for ground combattants (will replace MILAN).
• FSAF ASTER 30 B1NT : evolution of the surface to air ASTER 30 missile
• RMV SCALP : renovation of cruise air to air SCALP missiles de croisière to guarantee their use until 2030
• MICA evolution: air to air missile arming combat aircrafts for control of the airspace
• Furthermore, the next few years will see the continuing production of anti-ship Exocet missiles and naval cruise MDCN missiles, launched from frigates or submarines
5. nuclear-powered attack submarines (SNA)
To ensure the protection of the strategic oceanic force (FOST) or an air-sea force, the renewal of the 6 « Rubis » submarines will continue. These submarines will be replaced by « Barracuda » submarines.
6. Land systems and ammunition
Modernising the full scope of the land forces’ equipments has led to the launch of the SCORPION programme, designed to renew close combat vehicules while progressing in the digitization of the area of operations. This renewal is mainly three-tiered: replacing the VAB by multi-role armored vehicles (VBMR); replacing the AMX 10RC armored vehicles and ERC 90 by armored reconnaissance and combat vehicles (ERBRC); and on the progressive achievement of information means integrated into those vehicles.
7. Naval combat and anti-submarine fight
The « multi-role European frigates » programme (FREMM) will bring about intervention and rapid reaction capacities in the fields of power projection, sea to land action, fight under the sea and the control of air-maritime spaces.
The BATISMAR programme (surveillance and intervention ships) will renew the patrol boat fleet, necessary to control maritime spaces, especially in our surroundings and overseas. The renewal of the whole range of anti-mine means will be undertaken by the SLAMF programme (future naval anti-mine system). Finally, the FLOTLOG programme (logistical fleet) will aim at acquiring refueling oil tankers able to ensure support in both « liquids » (gasoline), and « solids » (ammunition, food, etc…).
8. Intelligence - surveillance
Bearing in mind that this field is an instrument of sovereignty guaranteeing the national autonomy of appreciation and decision, a particular effort is made:
fulfillment of the space observation programme (MUSIS), for which France takes care of two optical satellites,
continuing renewal of air space surveillance capacities, flight control capacities, command of air operations and land to air defence, through the SCCOA programme
The launch of the CERES programme, which will bring about, by 2020, new interception, characterisation and localisation capacities from space for electromagntic transmitters
Acquisition of MALE drone systems and tactical SDT systems,
The renovation of combat systems for Atlantic 2 maritime patrol aircraft
9. Information and communications systems
The next few years will see the fulfillment of programmes designed to renew communications and information control capacities :
The COMSAT NG programme, which will replace the SYRACUSE satellites by 2020, will provide secured satellite communications necessary to ensure the autonomy of the engagement of armed forces in intervention areas, and to the command structure.
The CONTACT programme, launched in 2012, will be in charge of fulfilling the radio communications needs for tactical operations while creating a network of these means,
The DESCARTES programme will take over from current telecommunications and telephone networks between the different locations of the ministry of Defence,
The SIA programme will allow French forces to plan, prepare and conduct operations thanks to a network-based information management based on weapon systems and sensors. Furthermore, a particular accent will be placed on the development of securisation means for information and cyber security systems.
10. The deterrence programmes
In order to guarantee the consistency of our deterrence system in the long-run, in its two components (oceanic and airborne), and of associated transmission means, the following new or extended programmes are planned until 2025, with respect to the principle of strict sufficiency:
For the oceanic component:
The SN3G programme of nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying submarines will replace the the second-generation submarine (« Le triomphant » type), the first of which was admitted to active service in 1997.
the continuation of the M51 missile programme, for which incremental versions will be developed.
For the airborne component:
the mid-life renovation of ASMPA missiles, which entered active service in 2009 and have been fully operational since the end 2011 on Mirage 2000 and Rafale.
the first studies for the renewal of the ASMPA weapon system.
Furthermore, the nuclear transmissions mechanism will undergo important renovation works. Finally, the efforts made since 1995 on the simulation programme will continue. The latter is paramount to guarantee, in the long-run, the conception, reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.
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The ministry of Defence wished to allow civilian and military personnel (including gendarmerie) to participate in the reflection on the new White Paper. To this end, a dedicated website was created on the internal network. It has been deemed a success, and some contributions were of high quality.
Functioning on three driving principles
Respond to an information need
Allow all Defence personnel to contribute to the reflection on the White Paper
Give all personnel a freedom of tone, due to the possibility to post contributions under an alias, and with no upstream filtration
2. The main themes that were debated
The main themes addressed in the contributions were (by order of importance): more than 30%, human resources (consultation, training, career change, wages, civic rights for military personnel, Nation-army relationship);
Around 20%, reforms (defence bases, civilianisation issues, process of mixing forces);
at 15%, the defence industry (industrial sovereignty, outsourcing issues, etc…)
Finally, the defence strategy (Europe, NATO, nuclear deterrence, cyber defence etc…).
3. Perspectives
In accordance with the guidelines outlined in the White Paper, and faced with such a success, the ministry plans to use such a communications and internal reflection tool more often.