DISSERTATION LAST VERSION 22

TO ANALYSE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARIS
MOU SATISFIES THE NEEDS OF THE MARITIME
INDUSTRY
Deniz Genoglu
A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the Requirements of
Liverpool John Moores University for the Degree of Bachelor of Science with
Honour.
The author declares that the work is the result of his own independent
investigation, except where indicated.
BSc (Hons) MARITIME BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 2016

i
ABSTRACT
In light of the many maritime accidents in European waters, involving some 644 ships in
2014 with the loss of 61 seafarer lives and the spillage of over 8000 tons of oil, the need
to control the multi-billion euro industry has been increasing. Previous research has
attempted to establish the remedy for these accidents and incidences, leading to the
establishment of among others, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding.
This study is carried out with the aims of comparing regional shipping and maritime
MoUs on Port State Control, analysing the fulfilment of PSC functions by the Paris MoU,
and identifying the disadvantages to stakeholders of implementing the PSC.
Using a mixture of secondary data, involving literary analysis, and primary data,
involving questionnaires, this research study established that the main cause of
maritime accidents is the failure to comply with safety standards and the inadequate
implementation of safety measures. Out of a sample of 20, only one respondent failed
to carry out to the end. Of the remaining 19, an average of 5.95 agrees with the 22
questions posed about the importance of the MoU and the PSC, with an average of
4.82 expressing strong agreement. Insignificant differences, however, exist between the
views on whether some countries have more restrictions than others or not, while still
party to the MoU, which aimed to level the playing field.
Most respondents agree that whether or not flags, connoting compliance with a
particular agreement, are used as cost minimization strategies, frequent inspection of
vessels through PSC will help improve maritime safety. The respondents argued that
PSC inspections have sustained a functioning port system and that stricter MoUs offer
ports competitive advantages.

ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is grateful for the contribution of shipping and chartering companies on the
questionnaire. I would like to thank my wife Jeanette and my daughter Leah for their
understanding and love during the past year. Her support and encouragement was in
the end what made this dissertation possible.

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ABBREVIATION
Abuja MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control for West and Central African Region
AFL International Convention on the Control of
Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, 2001
Black Sea MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control in the Black Sea Region
BUNKER International Convention on Civil Liability for
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001
Caribbean MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control in the Caribbean Region
COLREG Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency
Equasis MoU Memorandum of Understanding on the
establishment of the Equasis information system
CHS Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958
CIC Concentrated Inspection Campaigns
CLC International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969
FCR Federal Code of Regulations
FSC Flag State Control
FSI Flag State Implementation
IACS International Association of Classification
Societies
Indian MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control for the Indian Ocean Region
LOADLINE International Convention on Load Lines,

iv
1966 MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended
Mediterranean MoU Memorandum of
Understanding on Port State
Control in the Mediterranean Region
MLC Maritime Labour Convention, 2006
MSC Maritime Safety Committee
MSCU Merchant Shipping Code of Ukraine
MSM Marine Safety Manual
Paris MoU Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port
State Control
PSCI Ukrainian Port State Control Inspectorate
PSEJ Port State Enforcement Jurisdiction
PSJ Port State Jurisdiction
Riyadh MoU Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding on Port
State Control
RO Recognised organisation
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974, as amended
STCW International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers
TCC Technical Cooperation Committee
Tokyo MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control in the Asia-Pacific Region
TONNAGE International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships, 1969
Viña del Mar MoU Latin American Agreement on Port State Control
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Seas of 10 December 1982
USCG United States Coast Guard

v
TABLE OF CONTENT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................................. ii
ABBREVIATION............................................................................................................................ iii
TABLE OF CONTENT.....................................................................................................................v
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES................................................................................................vii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND..............................................................................................1
1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES............................................................................................................3
1.3 INFORMATION SOURCES OF THE PROJECT......................................................................3
1.4 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE.................................................................................................3
1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROJECT.......................................................................................4
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY......................................................5
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW.............................................................................................................5
2.1.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................................5
2.1.2 Examine the Rationale and Function of Port State Control ............................................7
2.1.2.1 The Origin and Functions of PSC........................................................................................7
2.1.2.2 Flag of Convenience and Its Effects ...................................................................................8
2.2 REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN PSC IMPLEMENTATION .................................................12
2.2.3 The Obligation and Rights of Contracting States Regarding PSC...............................14
2.2.4 The regulatory framework for PSC at regional level......................................................19
2.3 – VESSEL DETENTION THROUGH PSC..............................................................................22
2.3.1 The implications of non-detention for the environment, safety, and security............22
2.3.2 Implication of Detention to Stakeholders........................................................................24
2.5 METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................26
2.5.1 Research Approach and Strategy.....................................................................................26
2.5.2 Sampling Method................................................................................................................26
2.5.3 Data Collection Method......................................................................................................27
2.5.4 Analysis Method.................................................................................................................27

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CHAPTER 3: THE PARIS MOU AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER REGIONAL MOU’S.......27
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................27
3.2 An Overview of the Treaties.................................................................................................28
3.3 COMPARISON OF FACTORS USED IN THE TARGETING SYSTEM IN DIFFERENT PSC
REGIONS.......................................................................................................................................34
3.3.1. Paris and Tokyo MOU New Inspection Regime (NIR) ....................................................34
3.3.2 United State Coast Guard..................................................................................................35
3.3.3 Classification Society.........................................................................................................40
3.3.4 Ship Type and age..............................................................................................................40
3.4.5 Ships Previous PSC Performance....................................................................................41
CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS.............................................42
4.1 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................42
4.2 SUMMARY...............................................................................................................................57
Chapter 5.......................................................................................................................................58
5.1 ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS ......................................................................................................58
CHAPTER 6...................................................................................................................................62
6.1 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................62
6.2 REFLECTION..........................................................................................................................63
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................................64
APPENDIX 1 RESULATION 1052-27 PAGE 4 ..........................................................................69
APPENDIX 2 QUESTIONNAIRE USED OVER PROJECT .......................................................71

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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLES PAGE
Table 2.1 Regional Memorandum founded after Paris Memorandum..........10
Figure 2.2 Ships Total Loss Number over the Time Period ..........................23
from 1973 until 2006
Table 3.1 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU relevant...............28.
instrument
Table 3.2 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU ship.....................33
detention in first half of 2011
Table 3.3 Paris and Tokyo Mou’s Ship Inspection Interval..........................34
Table 3.4 Ship Risk Profile For USCG.............................................................37
Table : 3.5 Paris MoU (NIR) company's performance calculation table.. ....39
GRAPHICS
Graph 4.1 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................42

viii
Graph 4.14 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire................................... 51
Graph 4.21 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire......................................56

1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND
International organisations such as IMO and ILO has been proven to be successful in
establishing a significant number of rules and regulations that primarily covers all aspect
to ensure maritime safety and environmental Protection. Over the years, the Maritime
world has been awarded with success of the rules and regulations. For example, the
amount of marine accident and technical failures on vessels has been significantly
decreased. (Cariou et.al, 2008)
Hence, it is essential to establish protections make sure ships fulfil with conventions
also regulating with maritime safety and environmental protection. This is the one and
only reasons that port state control being created. Since Estonia accident in 1994 and
also the Costa Concordia accident in Italy was first big accident in European waters.
Also European waters has not been face any major oil spill since m/t Prestige sank in
the coast of Spain, speculation about that disaster even now continuous in maritime
world. Still, accidents happens, and preventing that accident and reduced to minimal
amount main concern for authorities.
Maritime Cyprus website in 2015 has mention that the most recent serious accident in
European waters to date was the fire on the Norman Atlantic in December 2014 with
Out of 443 passengers, 56 crew and at least 6 stowaways were lost at sea. Meanwhile,
according to the European Maritime Safety Agency, in 2010 there were 644 ships
involved in accidents in European waters, 61 seafarers lost their lives due to accidents
on board and accidents resulted in a total of 8000 tons of oil spill. For seafarers the
research also discloses high levels of occupational accidents and amongst the highest
occupational mortality and morbidity for all occupations (Robertson and Marlow, 2002).
This accident data in mixture with the prospect of constantly increasing maritime
transports indeed highlight the need to stop under the acceptable vessels from working

2
by European coast lines also make sure that enforcing that vessels compliance with
international and national regulations. Port State control is best procedure for that
purpose.
Regardless of a widespread system of Port State Controls (PSC) on ships, inspection
gaps in European control functions have been reported. Also, risk factors related with
fatigue, anxiety and an undeveloped safety principles on board ships have been
identified in earlier researches (Safe and efficient ships, 1996). These mutual risk
factors may pose a severe threat to maritime safety in European ports.
The port state control officers have a varied range of actions at their file they can ask
vessels to improve or correct deficiency they have found, they could detain ship and
they have legal power to stop leaving to port or as a last option a ship could be banned
from European ports and waters. This whole bulk of options with big economic risks, put
fair amount of tension on Port State Control Officer‘s (Psco) shoulders. Psco has to be
fair, same distance to every ship and operator but the mainly legally secure. For the
reason that of this complication, Quality of Port state Control is vital for the safety of
seafarers, marine industry also for environment.
There is also a need to mention that the PSC is certainly not meant to be the first option
for reducing sub-standard ships from those memorandum areas. It usually enforces the
same requirements imposed by relevant international conventions as mentioned for the
flag State control without adding any additional requirements on foreign flag merchant
shipping (Hoopen, 1998).
Some hesitations have always been under discussion by the maritime world, such as
the effectiveness and fairness of PSC, its impact on the implementation of the SOLAS
and MARPOL conventions, and what we can do to improve the performance of PSC. In
this dissertation, this project have tried to answer these questions. The research is
primary based on the literatures of distinguished scholars and other documents from
IMO.

3
1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES
As mentioned in the introduction section, the maritime organisation are working hard to
regulate and minimise the number of accidents in shipping industry. The Paris
Memorandum of Understanding is introduced as a part of the treaty and it is the most
advanced memorandum in the world which leads to this project, where the aim is to
analyse the extent to which the Paris MOU is fit for the purpose mentioned. The project
aim is then will be fulfilled through the objectives below:
 To examine the rationale and function of PSC
 To identify the disadvantages to stakeholders of implementing PSC
 To compare various regional memoranda of understanding on PSC
1.3 INFORMATION SOURCES OF THE PROJECT
A review of secondary data in the field form the basis of the survey used for primary
data collection. The concerned secondary data consist mainly of books, marine journal
and articles, and also reports issued by international organizations. As for the primary
data, a questionnaires sent to shipping companies and a number of Master Mariners.
The participants have secrecy and the results are stated without revealing identities of
individuals or companies.
1.4 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE
In Chapter 2 a literature review focusing on history, framework and effect of port state
control as well as detailed methodology is presented. Chapter 3 overview of
differentially between other memorandums and Paris understanding of memoranda.
Followed by chapter 4 where the result of the Port state control and fairness and port
selection effect questioner and the analysis presented. Chapter 5 includes analyses of
the obtained results and the project is finalised by conclusion and reflection in chapter 6

4
1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROJECT
The aim of the project is to find out and analyse how the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding is filling the gap of some Flag States that these states are unable to
cover and also find the differentials and common point between Paris Mou and the other
existing Memorandum of understandings worldwide. Other researches generally
focuses of the positive impact of the Paris MoU. This project relies on the primary data
compiled in order to try to discover if the other stakeholders are pleased with the
formation of Paris MoU. As this project is receiving an enormous feedback from the
people and companies that is directly involved with PSC instead of the bigger
organisations such as IMO, this will be provide a different angle to understand and in
justifying the PSC.

5
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.1 Introduction
The Port State Control underlined the necessity to intensify the maritime safety and the
protection of the marine environment as an initiative to establish the importance of
improving living and working conditions on board marine vessels. The establishment of
the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has brought a significant progress
among the being the boosting of regional cooperation (Oral, 2013). The effective
applicability of legal instruments for ship owners and the establishment of equilibrium of
different levels of the port state control regimes within a given area increased the levels
of organisation among the stakeholders and users.
The Paris Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) has become the most prominent tool in
the establishment of regional cooperation with its intention to “enforce and reinforce
IMO agreed standards and not develop new standards.’ Member states of the European
Union and also Canada are part of the agreement can effectively exercise good control
of vessels within their regions. This is due to the rapport that was lubricated by the MoU
that demanded an inter-neighbouring state cooperation for the collective handling of
port activities and information sharing to boost consequently regional cooperation and
development. The data gathered by any port within the signed jurisdiction is shared to
avoid excessive amount of work as well as the inconvenience of vessel traffic. In the
world image, the Paris PSC demonstrated the wish of the participating 27 states to
coordinate their efforts for the enforcement of international standards within their ports.
This approach was a success because of the adoption of the uniform procedures (Rue,
Anderson 1998). Aguilar (2008) wrote an article that developed the progression of the
PSC system.
Besides that, Chatzirigopoulou (2010) has conducted a more general examination, but it
was restricted to the update of the PSC system`s legal foundation. The IMO also

6
presents a manual through a model path on PSC that has been updated since 1995,
which continually undergo harmonisation with a different model on the measures.
Researchers such as Knapp and Frances (2010) have been initiating an econometric
study by the use of binary logistic regression and have focused on the computation of
the international condition on the effectiveness of PSC. As a result, their studies have
established that the handling of lines across the rule differs, stating that there is a need
for coordination in all check areas. Moreover, Cariou and Wolff (2011) utilised the
information collected from the Swedish Maritime Administration between 1996 and 2001
to investigate on how the characteristics of a vessel determine the time between two
successive inspections of PSC, jointly with member of the deficiencies noticed during
the controls. Furthermore, a study conducted by Li and Zheng (2008) have discovered
that the PSC enforcement is effectual in improving the security of a ship in maritime
transport. Bang and Li et al. (2012) also presented a review of the studies.
The Paris MoU also significantly enhanced the authority of the port states to govern
towards environmental conservation while enhancing governance as well (Leeuwen,
2010). In 1992, the element hanged from being regional to global through the resolution
adopted by IMO (Keselj, 1999). Subsequently, the Paris port control system was
recognized as a component of the global environmental governance.
There has been however a dissatisfaction between the states of the Paris MoU
members regarding the authority of steering mechanisms. During the development of
the steering mechanism, there was a division of duties between the states that
proposed, negotiated and decided. The shipping industry itself has been providing a
significant amount of support and expertise to influence the decisions and the final
determination (Leeuwen, 2010). The authority was shared among the member states,
but there was no satisfaction in some participating States since the power was shared
unequally.
This chapter first review a series of previous studies on history and origin of port state
control then regularity framework of port state control and its effect to ports and
stakeholders.

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2.1.2 Examine the Rationale and Function of Port State Control
2.1.2.1 The Origin and Functions of PSC
Ships are controlled and inspected by a number of regulating bodies and mechanisms.
The parties involved can be beneficiaries that a have direct connection with the vessel,
such as owners, operators, charterers and cargo owners, or may be third party
organizations. These parties carry out inspections and impose regulatory controls for
the safety of the ships and efficient operations for their shipping activities.
Consequently, ships are maintained and manned in accordance with different standards
by different ship owners and operators, resulting in a huge number of casualties over
the last few years.
Aldwinckle (2000) mentioned that in a world fleet of some 84,000 ships of more than
100 gross tonnes (gt), there are over 1,000 reported serious casualties each year.
Figures show that between 1988 and 1997 there were 9,378 serious casualties,
including ship losses. A look at the reasons behind the figures for serious casualties
over the past ten years reveals that, of the 9,378 incidents, 36% were caused by hull or
machinery failures, 19% were wrecked or stranded, 13% 5 were damaged by fire or
explosion, 13% foundered, and 11% were involved in collisions.
It is relevant to mention that in accordance with these figures the main reasons are the
failure of ships to meet required safety standards. It is widely known that under standard
vessels is a direct consequence of “open registry” otherwise known as “flag of
convenience”. Ship owners are fleeing their own national register in order to get more
flexible and advantageous conditions. However, causes that related to natural disaster
such as force majeure or act of god still occupy a small ratio of maritime casualties.
The management of foreign flagships by the countries PSC is required in order for all
worldwide conventions such as UNCLOS 1982 to be adhered. PSC is a vital component
for the assessment of visiting vessels to the port and is one of the leading third party
examination organisation around the globe.

8
The Port State control has been outlined by the IMO as “the inspection of foreign ships
in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment compliance
with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and
operated in compliance with these rules”.(Imo.org, 2016). PSC aims to determine
whether or not foreign vessels are seaworthy and ensure they will not be a potential risk
in terms of pollution. The PSC also carries out checks to make sure the workforce and
their environment is safe and not putting the workers’ health at risk alongside the
specific conventions from the IMO and ILO.
2.1.2.2 Flag of Convenience and Its Effects
After 1950’s, the number of shipping companies registering their vessel with the flag
states has increased significantly with the flag states given that the opportunities of
open registries to foreign vessels. Registering their vessels to those countries gave
them a big economical and other benefit. Under the flag of convenience system, the
access and transfer of vessel from the register is easy as the country of registration
does not need the shipping tonnage for its own purposes but is keen to earn the
tonnage fees. It is possible for owners to avoid taxation and social security
requirements. FOC countries also allows non-residents to own and regulate the vessel
in their flag and this aids the ship owners to not no pay or pay very little tax for their flag
countries. The most negative implication is where the ship manning by a non-national is
freely permitted and ship owners preferring to work with non-compatible and cheap
labour over the years. Some nation also lack the power to execute a national or
international regulations on their Shipowners (Donn, 1988). The other side this exercise
caused excessive number of deficient vessel meet up under so-titled flag of
convenience.
Even though a large number of vessels are sailing under FOC, the FOC states such as
Liberia and Panama does not have an appropriate facility or control mechanism to
manage these vessels, hence they did not appropriately fulfil their international
responsibilities as a flag state. Additionally, most of them were not even able to carry

9
out regular flag states controls. They were more aimed on the registration part of the
operation as moneymaking reasons. The key critics of this problem were as UNCLOS
(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas) required there are no genuine link
between flag state and ship registered.
The issue of sub-standard vessels and practices subsequently led to co-operation
between countries in efforts to address the problem. PSC originally established as a
multilateral state initiative outside of IMO. The ‘Hague Memorandum’ between several
maritime establishments in the areas around Western Europe was developed in 1978
where it contained the provisions that relates “to enforcement of minimum shipboard
living and working conditions”, as mentioned in ILO Convention. In March 1978, before
the Memorandum came into place, there was grounding taking place of the elite tanker
‘Amoco Cadiz’. Due to this incident there became strong public and political outrage
putting high pressure on governments to improve regulations on the safety of shipping.
Shortly after this, the outcome was the introduction of a new and improved
Memorandum covering the safety of life at sea, prevention of high levels of pollution
from ships alongside living and working conditions on board of ships
Paris MoU on PSC was adopted in January 1982 and was, initially, signed by fourteen
European countries (Lagoni et al., 2010). It come into force on 1 July 1982. Since then,
the Paris MOU has been amended several times to accommodate new safety and
marine environment requirements stemming from the IMO as well as other important
developments such as the various EU Directives which address marine safety.
Currently, 24 European countries and Canada form part of the Paris MOU on Port State
Control. (Rowbotham, 2008)
This MOU has been followed by 8 other regional MOUs these different MoU’s shown on
table below.
Table 2.1 Regional Memorandum founded after Paris Memorandum

10
Name of Memorandum Region covered
Tokyo MoU Asia and Pacific Ocean Region
Acuerdo de Viña del Mar Latin America Region
Caribbean MoU Caribbean Sea Region
Abuja MoU West and Central Africa
Black Sea MoU Black Sea Region
Mediterranean MoU Mediterranean Sea Region
Indian Ocean region Indian Ocean MoU
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab States Of the Gulf
Source: Author 2016
Meanwhile the USA (United States of America) has its own PSC programme operated
by the United States Coast Guard. These regional Port State Control MoU’s are
progressively cooperating and exchanging the obtained inspection data electronically.
This has significantly impacting the substandard ships as they have nowhere left to
trade. The IMO is contributing here by playing a proactive role in the global
harmonisation of PSC. IMO does this through the technical assistance in the
development of the regional MOU’s, organisation of technical workshops for secretariats
and database managers of regional PSC MOU’s. It is also in charge of the
establishment of the Flag State Implementation Committee (FSI) and how the taskforce
is developing and progressing to synchronise PSC activities (Ozcayir 2001).
The most significant handicap in PSC is the limited number of human resources Port
state control officer’s (PSCO’s) in comparison with the ships to be inspected in
particular regions (Cariou, Mejia and Wolff, 2007) . Consequently, regional target
inspection rates are settled almost in every PSC Memorandum. These inspection rates
vary from 10% to 80% according to the Memorandum text and committee resolutions.
Moreover, in selecting ships and conducting more efficient controls “ship targeting
systems” are to be used in the biggest and oldest PSC regimes (Paris MOU, Tokyo
MOU, USCG etc.).

11
These ship targeting conducts systems make risk assessment and score vessels by
using certain determinants (factors) which then finally show the risk level of the
particular vessel. The inspection priority will then be given to the ships which have
higher risk levels. These factors can be considered in two groups. First one is the static
or generic factors like ship’s age, type, flag state, recognised organisation and
management company performance. The second, one is the historical factors such as
the vessel previous inspection results, outstanding deficiencies, detention information
and time interval between inspections. Although targeting systems are similar in
principle, different PSC regimes uses a different targeting systems and this sometimes
cause inconsistent results among different regimes and discussions have been made
accordingly (Eyigun, 2013), Paris MoU (2011) and Tokyo MoU (2014) have replaced old
inspection regime with new (NIR) inspection regime, The new database for Port State
Control, named THESIS replaced the former system SIReNac. (Emsa.europa.eu, 2016)
however, each regime is only using its own inspection data collected in the past to
target vessels for inspections, thus overlooking the examination outcomes of other
regimes. (Borg, 2012)

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2.2 REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN PSC IMPLEMENTATION
As national PSC improves the safety and security of ships, a regional approach in the
meantime will guarantee that the operators of a deficient ships will have fewer places to
hide. Unless a regional approach is put into practice ship owners will just divert their
ships to ports where fewer strict inspections are conducted causing economic
disadvantage to the countries that conducts proper inspection. To remedy this and to
generally improve the effectiveness of inspection presently there is substantial part of
the world is covered by the PSC regime through the existing regional memorandums of
understanding (MOU) in operation.
The development of such organisations has revealed through the years that PSC works
better when it is established on a regional basis. It is relevant, however, to emphasise
that a MOU on PSC is not an international convention or treaty. Member states that
wished to retain individual their own individual competence and the freedom of decision-
making has the right to do so. Consequently, the memorandum could be defined as an
informal diplomatic communication and joint agreement between governments, which
summarises a particular diplomatic purpose or point of view.
In general terms, international law allows states to enter into agreement with other
states, either to restrain or extend their sovereign rights based on the provisions of such
an agreement. Different ways of being party to such agreements have been developed
over the years, in correlation with different degrees of enforcement. Treaties or
conventions are the strictest and the most used method because when states become a
party to these agreements, they are agreeing to be bounded by the legal arrangements
or provisions of the convention and regulation.
Since the PSC exist based on international instruments, the idea of establishing control
on a regional basis was the consequence of the fact that co-operation among member
states will contribute positively to minimise substandard shipping not only regionally but
globally by reducing the freedom of such a category of ships. This regional co-operation
is not only for the benefit of port states but also in the interest of ship-owners and
operators, which can avoid a duplication of control in the same geographical region for a

13
specific period of time (Mohamed, 2000). It also ensures that PSC inspection is carried
out using an identical and unified system worldwide and similar standards is used to all
vessels that faces detention.
According to Özçayir (2004), when considering the option of global port state control,
the following advantages could be identified where PSC will have a maximum impact on
the operation of substandard ships, as ships will be under constant surveillance. It also
ensures maximum availability of relevant information to port states. This will allow for
maximum harmonisation of port state control performances. The cost of operating of the
PSC system will also be minimal. According to Kasoulides (1993), global PSC also has
disadvantages as it lacks, for geographical reasons a sufficient commitment by
participating PSC members. On top of that, it would require an international convention
to administer the system, which would imply lengthy ratification procedures; time-
consuming, rigid amendment procedures; and much compromise, which is detrimental
to the necessary commitment.
The advantages of PSC as a regional effort could be summarised as member countries
can share common safety and environmental interests. Ships stays under observation
while they are operating in the region, which also significantly decreases its possibilities
to trade and operate. Harmonised PSC procedures prevent distortion of competition
between regional ports. According to Osborne and Gaebler (1992), a disadvantage of
regional port state control is that it is only effective in eradicating the operation of
substandard ships furthermore in that particular region; it tends to generate a shift of
operation of substandard ships to other areas.
A regional concept eliminates the disadvantages that exist in the unilateral forms of port
state control and this will allow member states to add more contribution than an
achievable effort under a global system. The formation of a regional system offers these
member states the authority to ban deficient vessels from their region in an effective
manner without implicating the concept of fair competition among their ports.

14
2.2.3 The Obligation and Rights of Contracting States Regarding PSC
Port State jurisdiction is the capability of States to exercise prescriptive (or legislative)
and enforcement jurisdiction over foreign vessels within their ports.(Ozcayir 2004)
Similar to land borders, ports give access to the mainland of a State, and due to the
logical points of control for customs, immigration, sanitation, and national security
purposes (Molenaar, 2005). Ports also give a clear prospect for verifying if visiting
vessel fulfil with certain national and international legislations and standard. In addition,
whether they have been involved in any illegal behaviour in the maritime regions of the
coastal State in where the port is located, or elsewhere. Port State obligations not only
serve more instantaneous national interests, it could also further the benefits of the
international community, for example, marine environmental protection, sustainable use
and conservation of marine living resources, food security, and conservation of marine
biodiversity (Kachel 2008).
Port states could make very significant impact as make sure all vessels visiting their
port compliance with national and international regulatory effort. There are currently no
descriptions for the terms ‘port State’ or ‘coastal State’ in the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea or another global instrument with near-universal participation. Subject on the
instrument, the term ‘port State’ may concern compliance with standards within ports. It
may also be within the maritime zones of the coastal State in which the port is located,
within the maritime zones of other coastal States, on the high seas, and within the ‘Area’
(the seabed beyond national jurisdiction; see Art. 1 (1) (1) UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea; International Seabed Area).
All the regional PSC provisions are mainly similar as they are based on the 1982 Paris
PSC MoU. Lavelli n.d, (2006) mentioned that for every MoU that “contained a wording in
the preamble, which point to the need for a regional approach to prevent the operation
of substandard ships in order to avoid misleading competition between ports”.
Lavelle (2006) mentioned that most PSC MoU encourages the national port authorities
to properly inspect visiting vessels to guarantee that these vessels is “constructed,

15
equipped, crewed and also operated in compliance with the standards set by the
relevant international treaties”.
Where vessels that is identified as not being in full compliance with the condition set by
these conventions, related nation has the authority to stop a vessel from departing until
the deficiencies have been resolved (McDorman 2005). Port state control has its basis
and operational principle cooperation between regional states. That cooperation has as
its aims safer ships and cleaner seas, and this aim will only be achieved if all regional
states apply and impose the same rules in a similar way to visiting ships. Where all the
ports collaborate in applying the same procedures in a similar way, then not any single
port takes or gains competitive advantage by proposing to excuse the substandard
vessels (Molenaar, 2005).
The core of port state control is that the visiting vessel has to comply with the national
laws of the host country. As one commentary states, "By entering foreign ports and
other internal waters, ships put themselves within the territorial sovereignty of the
coastal State” (Churchill and Lowe, 1983).
This is due to the fact that these visiting vessel is subject to compliance with the laws
and regulations of the country that it is entering. However, there are several potential
exceptions where if the vessel is owned by a specific government, an issue of
sovereignty or even diplomatic immunity may arise. Secondly, if a vessel in entering the
territorial waters or a port of a nation due to emergency circumstances or to seek for
refuge, there may be a restriction in terms of the customary international law on the port
state’s authority regarding that vessel (Churchill and Lowe, 1983). McDorman (2000)
mentioned that although the legal basis of PSC in excess of visiting ships is very clear,
a reference must be made to the “flag state jurisdiction and the potential conflict
between the laws of a port and the laws of the flag”.
The aim of every regional ports state control is that every PSCO will apply identical
standards as included in the established International treaties. For example, the Paris
Port State Control MoU looks out 17 relevant instruments for the purpose of the
memorandum against all visiting vessels:

16
 the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (LOAD LINES 66); For the purposes
of the Memorandum 'relevant instruments' are the following
 the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines,
1966 (LL PROT 88);
 .the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS);
 the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS PROT 78);
 the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS PROT 88);
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
Modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, and as further amended by
The Protocol of 1997 (MARPOL);
 the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 78);
 the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, 1972 (COLREG 72);
 the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969
(TONNAGE 69);
 the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO
Convention No. 147) (ILO 147);
 the Protocol of 1996 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards)
Convención, 1976 (ILO Convención No. 147) (ILO P147)
 the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006);
 the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
(CLC1969);
 Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC PROT 1992);
 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on
Ships, 2001 (AFS2001);
 the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution
Damage, 2001;

17
 the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast
Water and Sediments (BWM)
It essential to make certain that the laws and regulations that is enforced by a port state
to a visiting ship does not devoid its legal limit. International law dictates “a port state
can only enforce laws that relate to activities of a foreign vessel that take place while the
vessel is in port.” (Mc Dorman, 2000). This take account of implementing laws
concerning the construction, level of safety, and also the crewing and vessel’s
equipment standards that a vessel must comply with. According to the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention supra note 16 part VII, Port state control also able to enforce any illegal
or wrongful activities in the water of the host state before the vessel’s entry to port. This
statement primarily implies the concerns that vessels are engaged in piracy activities,
as long as the activities takes place in the territorial jurisdiction of the state, prior to the
entrance of the vessel to the port. Other wrongful activities may also include human and
drug trafficking, and unauthorised propagation on the high seas, where in this
circumstances, the applied law would be based on the laws of the flat or coastal that
where the activities takes place (Mc Dorman, 2000).
Principally, a PSC’s main duty is to apply regional standards to visiting vessels and
ensure not seek to prevent vessel access to ports. Conversely, a result of PSC might be
the areas where a regulation is imposed on commercial vessels entering the port area
and also the possibility for the vessel to be rejected in the port entree to a certain vessel
because of their deficient condition.
The World Trade Organizations in 2016 has mentioned that the Merchant Shipping PSC
Regulations (2011) gives the authority for PSC to deny the access to enter a port for
vessels that “the ship-owner has failed to bring the vessel into conformity with the
relevant standards. Port state denying access or imposing conditions grounded upon
the flag of the ship, but not addressed is the situation where access is denied or
conditions are to be met that are determined by the vessel itself rather than the flag”.
The international law of the sea delivers that a port state control has broad authority
upon vessels voluntarily in their port. Dependent on rights imposed by a specific treaty,
an access to a port can be denied and enforced on foreign vessel. Few restrictions exist

18
in regards to the laws and regulations “that a host state can apply to a visiting vessel
regarding construction, design, equipment, operation and crewing” (Sik, Pinto and
Syatauw, 1997). Lastly, the host state has varied authority to arrest and seize a vessel
in port where local laws are breached. However, the regional port state controls MoU’s
are an effort to evade competition among ports and to stability the legal capability of a
port state with the commercial requirements and modern prospects of the global
shipping industry.

19
2.2.4 The regulatory framework for PSC at regional level
Port state control comes together with couple of different nature coats which constitute
its legal framework and organisational in addition to its mechanism. General universal
principle of PSC mainly covers UNCLOS and its legal groundwork through the
regulatory conventions of an international maritime establishments and organisations. In
the other side, IMO guidelines is globally an endorsed framework on which
supplementary regional MOUs is based on. The latest level in this chain is the specific
countries arrangements on PSC where each level has its own scope and applications of
its legal guidelines.
Nonetheless, it will be revealed that the substantial capacity of the provisions of the IMO
guidelines on PSC are merged into the regional MoU’s that indicates a good success of
IMO to bring the global steady regime of Port state control. As explain by I.M.O
Procedures For Port State Control, 2011(See Appendix 1), Indeed, it is a foundation
problem for the harmonisation of regional MoU’s matter of regional policy among states
where International Maritime Organization place reflects the approach of cooperation
among them. Section two also mentioned an identically vital principle that is implanted,
which are establishes a general recognition in the regional MoU’s. First one is the no
favourable treatment principle. The principle affirms that vessel that is not a party of the
convention should be given no more favourable treatment. The treatment ensures that
an equal number of surveys and inspections is conducted with an equivalent level of
safety which also involves the protection of the marine environment as ensured by IMO
resolution a 1052(27). Where vessels of non-parties states to IMO regulatory
conventions are not provided with correct certificates, or crew members do not supply
STCW certificates, it should be satisfied that such ship or crew do not present a threat
to ship or persons on board or an irrational danger of harm to the marine environment.
Second principle instructs that in applying PSC, only the provisions of the conventions,
that is in force and which the member states have accepted could be applied and
enforced. Hereafter in the similar regional PSC regime, there could be different practice
to the implementation of a regulation, where this is very unwanted for the matter of

20
reliability, particularly where the collaboration within the states is not strong as
supposed to be. Section 1.7 of the resolution A. 1052(27) provides essential definitions.
Two of them are found reflection in the text of MoU’s. Section 1.7.5 outline an inspection
as “a visit on board a ship to check both the validity of the relevant certificates and other
documents, and the overall condition of the ship, its equipment and its crew” that is in
correspondence with equivalent provisions of almost all regional MoU’s. Paris MoU
does not have such description. (Rise.odessa.ua, 2011)
But, there are some alterations made in the text of MoU’s as well. While Black Sea
MoU, Abuja MoU, Mediterranean MoU, in similarity mentioned about complementing on
the living and working condition of the crew while the Tokyo MoU, Indian MoU, Riyadh
MoU does not include this matter but focuses on the hygienic conditions on board
instead.
One more very significant definition of “clear grounds” is given by the IMO Resolution
A.1052 (27), supra note 22, sec. 1.7.2 which is incorporated with minor alterations in the
Tokyo MoU, Indian MoU, Black Sea MoU, and Viña del Mar MoU’s. “Clear grounds” are
described in IMO Resolution A.1052 (27), supra note 22, sec. 2.2.5 as:
“… Evidence that the ship, its equipment, or its crew does not correspond
substantially with the requirements of the relevant conventions or that the master
or crew members are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to
the safety of ships or the prevention of pollution.”
The description of an inspection given above are within the involvement of the
preliminary inspection. It is insisted on that in conducting an initial inspection on ships,
Section 2.2.4 of IBID states that “the validity of the relevant certificates and other
documents and the overall condition of the ship should be checked. If the certificates
are valid and the PSCO has general impression of a good standard of maintenance
onboard then inspection should be confined to be reported or observed deficiencies”.
It is very vital provision, which at times may be ignored by incompetent PSC Officers. As
any further inspection resulted to an extra loss of time for a vessel, PSCO must be very
vigilant about it, of course, in no prejudice of characteristic of an inspection. All MoU’s

21
agreed to accept that provision the at combination with this provision one more caution
is required that “all possible efforts should be made to avoid a ship being unduly
detained or delayed. If a ship is unduly detained or delayed, it should be entitled to
compensation for any loss or damage suffered”. Flag state must be notified as soon as
possible it is vital to inform any detention under its flag. Every MoU recognise this
practice. (IMO Resolution A.1052 (27), supra note 22, sec. 4.1.3.)
Even though the wording of the instruction is not the same in every MoU’s. The
(Resolutions and other decisions of the 25th assembly, 2008) offers for the situation
where:
“The ship has been allowed to sail with known deficiencies; the authorities of the
port State should communicate all the facts to the authorities of the country of the
next appropriate port of call, to the flag State, and to the recognized organization,
where appropriate.”
To permit the vessel is to navigate without repairing its deficiencies is very risky as it
may lead to a partial or full loss if the shipping company has not voluntary
encouragement to do it. However, depending on the circumstances take vessel to
dockyard or facilities where available to fix the deficiencies it may be the only choice.
Moreover, in the application of PSC, section 4.1.2 of IBID has also mentioned that
“whenever a party denies the entrance of a foreign vessel to a port or offshore terminals
under its jurisdiction, whether or not as a result of information about a substandard ship,
it should forthwith provide the master and flag state with reasons for the denial of entry”.
At present, there is single regional MoU, namely Paris MoU according to the associated
regulation such as SOLAS 1/19, MARPOL article 11, and also the Loadline Convention
article 21 that provides the right of PSC to prohibit the entrée of a vessel to any of the
ports in the region. This is very crucial point for many flags of convenience under
standard vessels

22
2.3 – VESSEL DETENTION THROUGH PSC
2.3.1 The implications of non-detention for the environment, safety, and security
In an accident investigation, the most important indicators is the ship's age and type of
vessel. An indicators-related studies by Faragher, (1979) examines in marine accident
caused by the ship's structural disturbances and engine breakdowns proportion against
age of the with the ship, while Pronce (1990) compared the age of the ship and ship
accident end up with the full losses.
Thyregod and Nielsen, (1993) meanwhile investigated on Vessels age which has its
impacts on annual accidents rates, which according to world fleet statistics in 2011, very
small (under 500 grt) and medium tonnage (25000 grt) ship hold big proportion of the
world fleet, 54.2% of the world fleet is 15 years old and over and general cargo as the
dry cargo ship fleet produced %24 of the world fleet. In this circumstances, old dry
cargo ships with small tonnage that constitute a significant portion of the world's fleet
and that clearly show they are in highest risk in terms of accidents, indeed according to
Lloyd's Register, ship accident statistics between 1985 to 1995, out of 1582 accidents
952 ship losses was belong to dry cargo ships. Zheng (2007) investigated ship
accidents changes by times in approximately 40-year period and data’s from his
researches and studies has been published “Casualty Return” and World Casualty
Statistics by Lloyd Register.
Figure 2.1 below analysed the following information. The numbers of accidents resulting
in the loss of the ship, annual average reduction of 3.2% between the time set. In 1973,
363 units of total loss, It fell to 120 in 2006. 1982 considered being the beginning of the
Port State controls, Comparison has been made exact losses between 1973-1982 and
1982-2006 with the accidents completed with complete losses, decreased at a rate of
40% on average compared to the previous period which has been identified.

23
Figure 2.2 Ships Total Loss Number over the Time Period from 1973 until 2006
Source: World Casualty Statistics2011
When the case of total loss rate compared between 1973-1982 and 1982-2006, will find
highest total lost rate (4.3%) after port state control still lower than lowest (4.86%)in
previous period. After PSC regime was formatted there was serious decline in accidents
in the world, PSC regimes played an active role when it comes to safety in shipping,
especially years between 1990 -2000 while most of ship-owners took advantages of
easy flag, effective parts of PSC very important in reducing accidents, especially since
1993 when Tokyo MoU was introduced after Paris MoU. It is observed that there are
significant decline in number on rate of losses.
International Conventions permission national laws assigning PSCO’s to detain vessels
under definite circumstances (Manual for PSC officers, 2001). Different from a vessel
arrest, there is no condition for past deliberation of the related evidences of detention by

24
an arbiter. Port state control will unavoidably have impacts, particularly if a vessel is
subject to detention or a banning order, and there are likely to be financial implications
for ship owners and other stake holders.
2.3.2 Implication of Detention to Stakeholders
Therefore, there is no legal possibility for a ship owner to stop a provisional detention
order from being issued (Apart of course from the obvious one of ensuring that the
vessel is properly maintained and operated). After detainment, the ship-owner cannot
straightaway retrieve their vessel by confirming the company’s financial security by
using a letter of guarantee obtained from related authorities such as the P&I Club and
other elated authorities. In overall, the only way to the release a vessel from detention is
that proving all the deficiencies has been found on PSCO inspection successfully
remedied (Port state control, 1995).
In most cases, deficiencies could be recovered and repaired quickly and in terms of the
ships planned departure from a specific port, no penalty will be issued. Conversely, in
matter of serious deficiencies or in cases when there is delay in fixing or supply
evidence for deficiencies (For example because of delay in obtaining spare parts or
locating crewmembers certificates of competency). The stopping of the vessel from
departure port can have severe effects for many parties. Vessel detention consequently
has a significant impact on the costs on the vessel owners which involves a possibility
on the loss of revenue from ships and also technical matters which involves vessel
repairs conducted in a short notice, which usually is more expensive.
There are however a case where the vessel is not apparently delayed (Because
deficiencies are remedied within the scheduled “port time). There is a negative feature
to detention as it may affect the reputation of a specific vessel as well as its owner or
operator relating to the the vessel’s future employment prospects. If the vessel in
subject on a time charter, the owner instant financial loss is expected to be that the ship
may be placed off hire (Wilford, Coghlin and Healy, 1978). If it is subject to detention
order, the ship will be off hire and charterers will be excluded and be obliged to pay hire
this will be of course depends on the defined wording of the provisions in the charter

25
party. Also in the matter of the vessel employed on a voyage charter the running lay
time and demurrage will be affected. If a PSCO find, deficiencies it is potential that any
Notice of Readiness will be invalid. (Gard.no, 1999) at the very least commencement of
lay time is likely to delayed. A detention order in particular could have effects could have
the effect of making the voyage overall take longer than anticipated when the
charterparty was originally agreed. Owner calculations of the freight and demurrage
rates require may be of no value. Profit margins may be reduces or even into a loss.
(Kidman, 2003) Certainly even more substantial than delay or detention orders may be
outcomes of a banning order. Any order that avert the ship calling at selected port may
take it impossible for the contract to be achieved. Any failure to complete may cause to
a repudiation of the contract that would be the charterer or other party to end the
contrast and make the claim for the damages. (Kasoulides, 1993). Also in even worse
situation if banning order to ship enforce middle of the voyage for example at an
intermediate port and if vessel still got already cargo on board from previous ports it
most probably vessel will not continue to agreed discharge port and substitute
arrangements will have to be made for delivery cargo .
2.3.2.1 Detention Effect to Ports
Another effects of the ship being detained is taking very precious berth place on many
ports and this can course challenge for the port authority or other shipping companies,
even ship owner has to pay demurrage fee, not able to accommodate other vessels
while detained vessel hold the berth till deficiencies has been found on PSCO
inspection successfully remedied. A carrier’s competence in port can be implicated by
the actions of other carriers that is using the same marine terminal.
Congestion at port may have nothing to do with whether an ocean carrier has a
container prepared for shipper pick-up. Some port congestion problems can be a result
of a combination of factors and Port State control time to time one of them. (Some
Observations on Port Congestion, Vessel Size and Vessel Sharing Agreements, 2015)
It costs money to keep vessels at anchor for days waiting to discharge and to manage
container imbalances. Carriers are beginning to implement congestion surcharges.

26
For example, Mediterranean Shipping Company has announced that, “With several
weeks of slowdown on U.S. West Coast port operations, our vessels are being worked
at a slower pace, extending the stay at the port, which consequently leads to other
vessels having to wait a significant number of days outside the port. (Mark Szakonyi,
2015)
2.4 PORT STATE CONTROL HARMONISATION
The most difficult task in conducting PSC is the harmonisation of procedures, after the
case of Erica, importance of harmonisation of procedures has been proof again. The
key object for that is not only because different administrations establish different
priorities and items to be inspected, but also that each PSCO in each administration has
his own precedence, based on its own background. Experience has shown that nautical
surveyors and engineer surveyors chose different items to check on board ships when
carrying out PSC.
2.5 METHODOLOGY
2.5.1 Research Approach and Strategy
With reference to the nature of study, this research will make use of qualitative methods
in the collection and analysis of data. Selected from primary and secondary sources, the
information gathered will be presented in descriptive form taking into account thematic
evidence to validate the objective of the research.
2.5.2 Sampling Method
The data type from secondary sources will be both quantitative and qualitative as it will
provide statistical accounts of improved operations or port efficiency values over the
years the port state MoU has been in effect. The application of secondary and primary
sources is to adapt a mixed research method making use of complementary qualitative
and quantitative analyses. The primary sources and the secondary accounts from
published materials such as books and journals will be compared regarding observed
likely trends.

27
2.5.3 Data Collection Method
Two approaches and two data collection instruments are designed to collect data for the
study. To get information regarding how the Port State MoU serves and how to ship
operators feel about their work of member states. A sample of 25 stakeholders on the
MoU such as port owners, port managers, as well as users of port services. The data
collection instrument, in this case, would be questionnaires. The questionnaire would be
send to the participants through Email. The merit of choosing interviews to collect the
data is associated with the need to acquire as much information regarding the utilization
of the Port State MoU by stakeholders. Also, the method also allows for follow-up
questions to gather insight on the subject matter. However, the data collected would be
analyzed thematically linking the responses to specific themes affecting ports and
related to Port State MoU.
On the other hand, secondary sources of information will be referenced in an attempt to
gather and much Intel on the subject matter as possible.
2.5.4 Analysis Method
Data analysis will take into account descriptive approach to interpreting the observed
thematic patterns with statistical patterns reported in published material. In this case, no
statistical modelling will be considered as the sample size does not have a standardized
achievement measure to influence correlations between the variables.
CHAPTER 3: THE PARIS MOU AND COMPARISON WITH
OTHER REGIONAL MOU’S
3.1 Introduction
The primary objective of this research chapter is to compare the Paris MOU with other
MOUs, specifically Tokyo and Viña del Mar. These MoUs are selected due to the fact
that they are the most established and important agreements after Paris MoU. The
chapter first provides a general overview of the general approach adopted by the MOUs
to the implementation of PSC. Subsequently, several parameters are used for
comparison as follows: performance of vessel operator and classification society, flag

28
state, ship type and age and previous inspection outcomes and detention rates.
Additionally, the parameters include the role of authorities that assess whether the
documentation and certificates are in order, assurance on the ship's condition,
machinery, equipment, hygienic conditions, accommodation and whether the staffs is
meeting the MoU requirements.
3.2 An Overview of the Treaties
Every MoU is established to support a successful execution and the general and
constant importance, of the applicable IMO/ILO unions in vessels working in the area
under the MoU. As observed in Table3.1, the three agreements of Tokyo, Paris, and
Viña del Mar are practically consistent in the international instruments provisions
observe, while under the European conformity, the record is additionally broad
Table 3.1 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU relevant instruments
TOKYO MOU PARIS MOU VINA DEL
LOAD LINE 1966( AMENDED 1988) LOAD LINE 1966( AMENDED 1988) LOAD LINE 1966( AMENDED 1988)
SOLAS 1974 (AMENDED 1978/1988) SOLAS 1974 (AMENDED 1978/1988) SOLAS 1974 (AMENDED 1978/1988)
MARPOL 1973(AMENDED 1978) MARPOL 1973(AMENDED 1978) MARPOL 1973(AMENDED 1978)
STWC 1978 STWC 1978 STWC 1978
COLREG 1972 COLREG 1972 COLREG 1972
TONNAGE 1969 TONNAGE 1969 TONNAGE 1969
ILO 147 ILO 147 ----
---- CLC 1969 CLC 1969
---- CLC AMENDED 1992 ----
AFS 2001 AFS 2001 ----
---- BUNKER 2001 ----
The international maritime conventions mentioned in the previous section, referred to as the “relevant
instruments”,are asfollows:
 International ConventiononLoadLines1996, as amended,its1998 protocol,(LOADLINES66/88);

29
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, its Protocol of 1978, as
amended,andthe Protocol of 1998, (SOLAS74/78/88);
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the
Protocol of 1978, as amended(MARPOL73/78);
 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers
1978, as amended(STCW78);
 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972, as amended
(COLREG 72);
 International Convention onTonnage Measurementof Ships1969 (TONNAGE1969);
 Merchant Shipping(MinimumStandards) Convention,1976 (ILOConventionNo.147)
 International ConventiononCivil LiabilityforOil PollutionDamage,1969 (CLC 1969);
 Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
1969 (CLC PROT1992)
 International ConventiononCivil LiabilityforBunkerOil PollutionDamage,2001 (+Bunker)
 International Conventiononthe Control of Harmful Anti-FoulingSystems onShips,2001 (AFS2001)
Source: Acuerdolatino.int.ar, 2016, Tokyo-mou.org, 2016, Parismou.org, 2016
In 1982, the Paris MoU was the first to execute a local PSC system that introduced two
inspection groups applied to all the vessels and particular kinds of ships believed to be
at major risk (Gupta, 2010). A preliminary examination and a more comprehensive
investigation are established. Inspections that influence definite vessels of particular risk
fall into a single class, the systematic review. Mostly, this inspection system has been
accepted commonly in the other agreements, beginning with the 1992 Viña del Mar
treaty and the 1993 Tokyo treaty.
Besides, the Paris MoU was the first in setting up a technique for picking vessels to be
examined which has been personalized. The Paris MoU had two primary practical
measures for the selection: first, the ship was previously listed; and second, it had a
noble common selection cause. All vessels in the in the sequence are allocated a risk
profile that decides the inspection priority, the maximum inspection interval, and the
inspection scope (Kwiatkowska, & Dotinga, 2001). The information system ships are

30
most likely classified as high, standard or low risk depending on historical and general
limits. The ship’s risk report are recalculated every day after analyzing adjustments in
the most vital factors such as the 36 months’ account, age, and company performance.
What`s more, recalculation takes place after each inspection and when appropriate,
presentation tables for recognized organizations and flags are changed. In the
inspection of the MoUs of Viña del Mar and Tokyo, the authorities decide the priority
order, in standard, by the ship targeting means employed by the committee (Leeuwen,
2010).
Authorities undertake assessments that establish whether the documentations and
certificates are in order, and to assure themselves that the ship's condition, machinery,
its equipment, hygienic conditions, accommodation, and staff meet the requirements.
The structure of precedence and inspection time windows applied in particular MoU can
just be extended to other agreements. The organizational formation based on maritime
authorities’ committees with the existence of supranational institutes, on upholding a
more permanent secretariat, and on appealing to participants from different accords has
been imitated in all the local agreements signed (Liu, 2009). A major problem affecting
the Viña del Mar accord is the impasse that numerous MoU signatory states are not yet
signatories to various international conventions that form the basis of the MoU PSC
system. An additional negative aspect is that the Viña del Mar nations do not have
appropriate policies and operations when compared to the other MoU’s especially
Tokyo and Paris MoU’s (Liu, 2009).
Besides, states with heavy traffic like Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia, have not
achieved the 15% inspection of ships at their ports (Cariou and Wolff, 2011). Recently,
there have been and increasing and high levels of support for the Paris and Tokyo
agreements. PSC Committee Meetings attended by both representatives of the MoUs
through 2011 have indicated relentless efforts and enhanced synchronized measures
made; for instance, there have been numerous demanding assessment campaigns, on
certain main topics, like structural protection, and fire safety systems among others
(Monios, 2014). As a result, it is believed that the Paris and Tokyo agreements are the
two longest-established and satisfactory transactions. The success is attributed to the

31
functions of the more economically good and influential states, and their physical
exposure. These areas also host the most experienced naval services for personnel
training dedicated to the examination and management of ships, with supportive
infrastructures. Several participant states are additionally lively in accomplishing
detailed and intermittent operations on particular topics that need exceptional attention
at certain times (Monios, 2014).
After evaluating the unclear outline, the succeeding step is to inspect the performance
of the inspections when put into practice. The confinement of a ship for non-compliance
signifies a severe intervention in the marine transportation (Monios, 2014). A detention
of a non-complying ship is the only sanction in the control system recognized in the
local memorandums, like those of Tokyo, Paris, Viña Del Marand, Mediterranean and
others; thus, detentions are an essential pointer for establishing if the agreements are
operational and successful.
In the assessment of the data, a broader data found in the MoUs annual reports will be
differentiated from the more extensive data matching the 2011 initial six months. In a
different study, inspections were prepared with the three main and strongest MoU’s that
concluded in the detention of 1,242 vessels. The fraction breakdowns of the overall data
for the MoU’s are indicated in Table 3.2 below.
It is important to note the lack of inspection activity by South America signatories of Viña
del Mar MoU that account for less than 5% of the full investigations under the three
agreements (Cariou and Wolff, 2011). It is declared that a large percentage of the
substandard liners (roughly 40%) were not categorized by an IACS Society member
(Tedsen, Cavalieri, & Kraemer, 2014). Additionally, the conventional of the ships flag
states is found on the blacklist; the arrangement of these undesirable aspects signify
that the protection levels of these vessels are reduced to the lowest scores, and thus
implying the subsistence of a gap in the discovery of official organizations of uncertain
standing. Also, the vessels` age is a significant variable. Noticeably, the old ships have
a high-risk category; in VHR and HR, the typical age of the detained vessels goes
beyond 25 years. Furthermore, the average age of the detained ships is alike in the

32
MoUs under study, though ships under the Tokyo MoU are somewhat less obsolete
(Kidman, 2003).
Findings from most research indicate the technical intricacy differences between types
of vessel, and the old ships held are those of general load while the most recent are the
tankers in the three agreements. Furthermore, related trends and parameters are
observed in the three regions. However, a moderately small amount of ships held in the
Viña del Mar area reduces the strength of the assessment. When similarity is made in
connection with astronomical universal results for the same efforts of PSC applied by
the maritime authorities, by looking at the investigated annual reports of the most
strongest MoUs, around 19,000 assessments were undertaken in Paris` MoU,
compared with Tokyo MoU`s 29,000 (Knapp, and Franses, 2007). When evaluating the
fractions of these inspections that led to holding up of vessels in the regions, the year
2011 figures present: Tokyo 1.50%, Paris 3.61%. During the same period, deficiencies
detected were: Tokyo, 103,549 and Paris, 50,738The diversity of flags between the
inspected vessels is greatly superior in the Tokyo and Paris agreements (Tedsen,
Cavalieri, & Kraemer, 2014). A level of likeness is also observed in the ages of confined
vessels under the Tokyo and Paris agreements, where vessels of approximately 50
years old are substandard. Considering the deficiencies type, differences between the
regions, meaning that the MoU`s may have opposite approaches. For instance, the
proportion of defects initiated in group working circumstances in the MoU of Paris is
higher compared to the other agreements; however, the entitlement is inferior on
matters of pollution (Tedsen, Cavalieri, & Kraemer, 2014).
These second results are probably associated with the enhanced understanding in
Europe relating to the common environment results in vessels being better outfitted. A
different study to present a comparison of the flags lists of flags of ships regularly
sanctioned in the Tokyo and Paris MoU’s it is monitor that certain flag states appear
more often in Asia-Pacific compared to Europe, and the most important scenarios are
found in Panama and Cambodia (Bang, 2012).

33
Table 3.2 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU ship detention in first
half of 2011
Tokyo
Memorandum
Paris
Memorandum
Vina del Mar
Memorandum
Detention 848 335 59
68.28% 26.97% 4.75%
By Flag Type
Black 320 77 2
37.80% 23% 3.40%
Grey 31 32 8
3.70% 9.50% 13.60%
White 489 216 45
57.70% 64.50% 76.30%
By Black List Per Risk Type
Very high Risk 27 9 0
8.40% 11.70% 0%
High Risk 196 16 0
61.20% 20.80% 0%
Medium High Risk 37 35 0
11.60% 45.40% 0%
Medium Risk 60 17 2
18.80% 22.10% 100%
By Classification Society Type
IACS 478 232 44
56.40% 69.25% 76.40%
NON-IACS 362 93 11
42.70% 27.75% 18.60%
Source: Piniella, Diaz and Alcaide, 2014

34
3.3 COMPARISON OF FACTORS USED IN THE TARGETING SYSTEM IN
DIFFERENT PSC REGIONS
3.3.1. Paris and Tokyo MOU New Inspection Regime (NIR)
New inspection regimes (NIR) over the recent years have come into force by both
Tokyo and Paris MOUs. This regime introduces a new intelligence led model which
helps to assign the risk profile of the vessel based on its age, flag and performance of
the company. MOUs database regularly calculates these risk profiles and classifies the
vessels category which could be low or high risk profiles, this then helps with the
evaluation of the vessels and based on that evaluation if its good then the vessels
would not be inspected regularly however high risk ships would be required to
undertake inspections with each 6 passing months whereas the low risk ships would be
inspected every 24 months.
Together based on the performance of the vessel, flag and company a comparison is
then made in four distinct grades: low average, above average, and very low average.
To calculate the company’s performance pervious port state inspections of the particular
vessel are looked at and based on that a calculation is made to determine a vessels
class. SRP in the database are utilized daily with taking the modern information
inspection into consideration. The purpose of the NIR is to recognise, through the use
up to date intelligence the ships that require the greatest attention under port state
control. Following the last 24 months inspections the LRSs are rewarded with no
inspection, with a maximum inspection free time span of 36 months whereas the SRSs
are subjected to being inspected every 12-10 months. HRSs face the most severe
inspections which are every 6 months. Diagram of ship inspection intervals shown
below ,to see ship risk profile diagram check appendix 3
Figure 3.3 Inspection Intervals.

35
Source : Parismou.org, 2011, Tokyo-mou.org,
3.3.2 United State Coast Guard
The US does not involve itself with the agreements on port state control. It accepts
control measures on an independent basis. The US coastguard on 1st may 1994
introduced its revised initiative for port state control. The main focus of this programme
is to isolate the high risk profile foreign vessels based on their owners previous
performance record, classification society and flag state, which allows them to
systematically target the vessels to board.
In the USA there is no contract or document to identify with what is especially dedicated
towards PSC, hence then it becomes impossible to point out a conclusive list of US port
state conventions. The US enforces its authority through the US Coastguard Foreign
Vessel Boarding Programme, known as the port state control plan. In the USA, the PSC
system is established as the primary factors in the decision-making prior to the vessel’s
on-board inspection process which includes the ship owner or operators list, the list of
classification societies, its flag states, the vessel’s boarding history, and also the vessel
trade and type.
According to the US port state the first three points reflects on the vessels operational
conditions and compliance with addition to the international safety and environmental
standards. And so, if any of these individuals fails to accept its accountabilities fully for a

36
ship’s safe operation, then the ship is likely to be measured a below average vessel by
the US Coast Guard. The likelihood of a foreign vessel being boarded is based on the
number of points the vessel gets under the boarding urgency conditions. However, the
points allocated to a sea-going vessel that is under this targeting system does not
categorise the vessel as below average; only a boarding and examination can reveal
such conditions.

37
Table 3.4 Ship Risk Profile for United State Coast Guard
Owner Flag Class History Ship Type
5 points
Listed owner or
operator
7 points
Listed Flag State
Priority I
Ten arrivals with
detention ratio
more than 4 times
the average OR
Ten arrivals and
involved with at
least one detention
in the previous 3
years.
5 points each
Detention within
the previous 12
months.
1 point
Oil or chemical
tanker.
5 points
Ten arrivals with a
detention ratio
between 3&4 times
the average.
1 point each
Other operational
control within the
previous 12
months.
1 point
Gas Carrier
3 points
Ten arrivals with a
detention ratio
between 2&3 times
the average.
1 point each
Casualty within the
previous 12
months.
2 points
Bulk Freighter over
10 years old.
1 point
Ten arrivals with a
detention ratio
between the
average and twice
the average.
1 point each
Violation within the
previous 12
months.
1 point
Passenger Ship

38
Source: Author 2015
3.4.3 Performance of Vessel Operator
The vessel operator’s reputation with regard to performance in PSC inspections is
considered as a major factor in the ship inspection management. However, only in
USCG if the vessels operator does not meet the expected criteria, the vessels operators
is then given 5 risk points. At the beginning the Paris MOU did not take this factor into
account, however since 1st Jan 2011 with new inspection system, companies’
performance has been considered as important criteria. Other MoU’s the ones using
Sirenac targeting system like Vina Del Mou still not taking vessel operator performance
as a main criteria as in their target calculation system. The Paris MOU created a
formula to indicate the company’s performance. If the company's performance is low or
very low vessel is given 2 risk points, and also that vessel is consider in high risk group
then it can expect more frequent inspections.
0 points
Ten arrivals with a
detention ratio
below the average
OR
Ten arrivals with
no detentions in
the previous three
years.
1 point each
Not boarded within
the previous 6
months.
2 points
Carrying low value
commodities in
bulk.

39
The company's performance calculation table used in the new inspection regime are
given below.
Table : 3.5 Paris MoU (NIR) company's performance calculation table
Source: Author 2016
3.4.2 Flag State
The flag of a vessel is an integral part of the ship, the flag state of a vessel is the first
and main source that indicates if the vessel is meeting with the international
conventions and compliance. It is considered that the flag of the vessel can produce a
major effect on how the vessel is seen. Therefore, it is considered as performance
criteria in all control systems, and the detention rate compared with the average rate of
detention of the ship's flag, with ship risk ratio calculated according to the criteria. when
targeting factor calculating relating to ships flag ,USCG given 7 risk point for
underperformed flag states vessels, with new inspection regime in Paris MoU ships
given 1 or 2 points regarding how satisfying ships flag state with international
conventions,

40
The underperformed flag countries vessels have a high chance of being inspected
frequently. In Tokyo MOU the risk factor is ships flag detention rate against average
detention rate. Also in Paris MOU ships flag countries signing international conventions
and passing IMO control is a factor for the ships flag to be put in the low risk category in
accordance with assessment.
Under Paris MOU there is an effect vessels are put in the low risk categories if their flag
countries have signed all the conventions and passed the IMO control.
3.3.3 Classification Society
The classification societies plays an important part in the ships performance, if a vessel
is class under a particular society then these classification societies are responsible for
the verification of the vessel, and also the publication of the annual certification
requirements and periodic checks. Ships class companies’ performance is an effective
part for calculating ships risk score by port state control mechanism. Vessels that are
registered in the underperformed class companies get 0-5 risk points, by USCG in Paris
MOU they are awarded 1 risk point.
In the Tokyo MOU if vessel is not a member of IACS, then the vessels are likely to get a
huge 10 risk point on its profile. Also in the Paris MOU if the vessels class is not
recognisable by the EU, even after meeting all the requirements it can still be
considered as a high risk vessel.
3.3.4 Ship Type and age
These two factors are generally independent from each however in some targeting
system they are considered similar. For example USCG for chemical, petrol, gas
tankers and passenger ships regardless of their age its given 1 point, bulk carrier older
than 10 years are given 2 points. In new inspection system in the Paris MOU vessels
type and age is not considered as same criteria, and so 2 risk points are given to
tankers, dry bulk and passenger vessels. Also regardless of the vessels age, if its 12
years old it gets 1 risk point, and if the vessel is 15 years old, then the tankers, dry bulk
and passenger vessels will get an additional 4 points,

41
3.4.5 Ships Previous PSC Performance
In all memorandums ships previous inspection record is considered to be a very
importing factor to calculate the ships targeting cause. In the Paris MOU if the vessel
has 2 or more detentions in the last 36 months, the vessel will get 1 risk point, and if the
vessels have passed the every inspections less than 5 deficiencies then it will be
considered as a low risk vessel. And the vessels that have not been inspected in a long
time are also considered as a priority to be inspected. In USCG Also in same time
period (36 month) if ship not inspected, that vessel consider as priority inspected vessel.
If the vessel has been detained in the last 12 months than 5 risk points are added on
the risk targeting calculation in the USCG targeting system.
Tokyo MOU takes into account the vessels last 4 inspections and detention rate and
then gives its risk points which are based in-between 15 to 100. Also in the last 4
inspections if there's a deficiency, amount of deficiency is multiplied by 0.6 and then
added towards the vessels risk calculations, and for each vital deficiency 2 more risk
points are added. Also if last inspection date 6-12 month before 3 points, if 12-24 month
6 points and if last inspection was more than 24 month ago ship targeting factor will be
added extra 50 point

42
CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
.
This chapter considered the raw data and tabulated in in MS Excel for visual
representation of participants strongly supporting the question views and those with
other views such as strong opposition. The sample size was 19 and the questions were
22. Participants were engaged in answering a closed-ended questionnaire with coded
responses. The codes 5 to 1 indicates strong agreement and strong opposition
respectively.
Graph 4.1 Graphic Detail of Question 1 Of The Questionnaire
Views on the question that PSC (Port State Control) inspection regimes, a target
inspection rate should be established indicated that the portion of the sample strongly
agreeing is 7 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 6
against 3 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly
disagreeing participants make 3 of the sample for disagreeing and none for strongly
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree
In PSC (Port State Control) inspection
regimes, a target inspection rate should be
established

43
disagreeing. Therefore, the feedback on this question indicates that a target inspection
rate should be established since it carries the majority view.
Graph 4.2 Graphic Detail Of Question 2 Of The Questionnaire
Viewsonthe questionthat “targeted inspection ratesforportscan be achieved with an adequate
numberof qualified and experienced PSCO” indicatedthatthe portionof the sample stronglyagreeingis
6 of the 19 respondents.Onthe otherhand,agreeingviewshada countof 8 against5 for those
consideringthemselvesuncertain.Disagreeingandstronglydisagreeinghadnoparticipants.Thus, the
feedbackonthisquestionindicatesthat “targeted inspection ratesforportscan be achieved with an
adequatenumberof qualified and experienced PSCO” isapopularview since itcarriesthe majority
affirmative responses.
0
2
4
6
8
10
Targeted inspection rates for ports can be
achieved with an adequate number of
qualified and experienced PSCO (Port State
Control Officers).

44
Views on the question on whether “outcomes of inspections by PSCOs are
reliable" indicated that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is _3of the 19
respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 5 against 7 for those
considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants
make 2 of the sample for agreeing and 1 for strongly disagreeing. Thus, the feedback
on this question indicates that “outcomes of inspections by PSCOs are reliable” and
therefore is relative satisfaction with the current inspection strategies.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Outcomes of inspections by PSCOs are
reliable

45
Views on whether “easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels generally have a
greater risk rate than that of other flagged vessels” indicated that the portion of the
sample strongly agreeing is 13 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing
views had a count of 6 against none for those considering themselves uncertain.
Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views on this question did not have any support.
Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that majority of the participants support
the view that “easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels generally have a greater risks
compared to ordinary vessels.
Views regarding whether “frequent inspections of vessels through PSC improved
ship standards” indicated that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 13 of the 19
0
5
10
15
Easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels generally
have a greater risk rate than that of other flagged
vessels
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Frequent inspections of vessels through PSC
will improve ship standards

46
respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 4 against none for those
considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views got no
support from the participants concluding that frequent inspections of vessels through
PSC is one way of improving ship standards.
Assessing whether “classification societies should have an increased role in
ensuring shipping standards for the purpose of PSC”, results indicated that the portion
of the sample strongly agreeing is 9 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing
views had a count of 6 against 4 for those considering themselves uncertain.
Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views had not support from the sample. The result
here indicates that a majority of the participants have a strong believed that if
classification societies had an increased role in ensuring shipping standards for the
purpose of PSC, the approach would be beneficial.
0
2
4
6
8
10
Classification Societies should have an
increased role in ensuring shipping standards
for the purpose of PSC

47
Investigation on whether “inspections of low risk vessels owned by reputable
companies was a waste of time and money” showed that the portion of the sample
strongly agreeing is none of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had
a count of 5 against none for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and
strongly disagreeing participants make a majority of 9 and 5 respectively. Thus, the
feedback on this study question indicates that inspections of low risk vessels owned by
reputable companies is not a waste of time and money.
8 above represents the views on whether “certain countries and certain ports are
stricter than other ports in same MoU’s” and shows that the portion of the sample
strongly agreeing is 5 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a
count of 6 against 6 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and
strongly disagreeing participants make 2 of the sample for disagreeing and none for
0
5
10
Inspections of low risk vessels owned by
reputable companies is a waste of time and
money
0
2
4
6
8
certain countries and certain ports are stricter
than other ports in same MoU’s

48
strongly disagreeing. Thus, the feedback indicates that some support, but not entirely
reliable, is present regarding the views on whether certain countries and certain ports
are stricter than other ports in same MoU’s.
Views on whether “the strictness of PSC enforcement in a port could influence
the decision for vessels to use that port” indicated that the portion of the sample strongly
agreeing is none of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count
of 5 against 7 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly
disagreeing participants make 5 of the sample for disagreeing and 2 for strongly
disagreeing. The mixed feedback however, shows that more investigation should be
carried out to determine whether strictness plays a role.
Viewsonwhether“someportsused PSCasa tool to enhancetheir competitiveadvantage”indicated
that the portionof the sample stronglyagreeingwas3of the 19 respondents.Onthe otherhand,
0
5
10
The strictness of PSC enforcement in a port
could influence the decision for vessels to use
that port
0
2
4
6
8
Some ports use PSC as a tool to enhance their
competitive advantage.

49
agreeingviewshadacount of 6 against4 forthose consideringthemselvesuncertain.Disagreeingand
stronglydisagreeingparticipantsmake 4of the sample fordisagreeingand2 for stronglydisagreeing.
Thus,the feedbackonthisquestionindicatesthatisconsiderablethatsome portsmaybe usingPSC as a
tool to enhance theircompetitive advantage.
Investigating whether “political disagreements between states impact on effective
PSC” found out that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 5 of the 19
considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants
make 2 of the sample for disagreeing and 2 for strongly disagreeing. The negative
views in this case tend to hold little to no significant grounds and therefore do not deny
that “political disagreements between states impact on effective PSC”.
0
2
4
6
8
Political disagreements between states impact
on effective PSC.

50
Studying whether “distinction between vessel type was an effective parameter for
assessing risk’ returned that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 5 of the 19
considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views did not
get support. Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that distinction between
vessel type is relatively effective parameter for assessing risk since a significant portion
of the sample did not appear sure.
The perspectives on whether the “level of quayside activity influenced the extent
of PSC vessel inspection” showed that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Distinction between vessel type is an effective
parameter for assessing risk
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
The level of quayside activity influences the
extent of PSC vessel inspection

51
of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 10 against 2
for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing
participants make 5 of the sample for disagreeing and none for strongly disagreeing.
Therefore, it is conclusive that although the level of quayside activity was considered to
have some influence on the extent of PSC vessel inspection, it is not a primary
requirement as such.
Views on the question whether “white, grey and black list of flag States was a fair
mechanism for distinguishing between vessels of varying risk” showed that the
participant strongly agreeing was 6 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing
views had a count of 8 against 4 for those considering themselves uncertain.
Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants make 1 of the sample for disagreeing
and none for strongly disagreeing. Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that
the color codes indicate varying risks.
0
2
4
6
8
10
white, grey and black list of flag States is a fair
mechanism for distinguishing between vessels of
varying risk

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