1. The U.S. airstrike campaign in Yemen may force al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to alter its ground campaign, but the Yemeni civil war will preserve permissive conditions for the group. The U.S. conducted dozens of airstrikes targeting AQAP in central and southern Yemen in the past week. One of these strikes killed Usayd al Adani, an explosives expert and AQAP’s emir in Abyan governorate, as well as former Guantanamo Bay detainee Yasir al Silmi. AQAP will likely reposition its forces in response to a sustained U.S. air campaign. This repositioning would benefit the al Houthi-Saleh faction, which is waging a ground campaign against AQAP and allied forces in central Yemen. AQAP will retain and expand popular support while the Yemeni civil war continues, even if U.S. airstrikes disrupt the group’s operations in the near term. 2. Escalating competition over Libya’s oil resources will exacerbate instability in Libya and set conditions for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda to gain strength. An Islamist coalition with ties to al Qaeda attempted to seize ports held by the Libyan National Army (LNA) on March 3. The ports remain contested. The LNA’s counterattack into central Libya risks igniting a broader conflict between the LNA and rival militias just as political processes championed by the UN and regional states break down. The resurgence of active conflict in Libya would give ISIS the opportunity to regain its attack capabilities unopposed. Al Qaeda, which has embedded itself within the vanguard of Libya’s hardline Islamist movement, would use this conflict as a call to jihad. 3. Al Qaeda affiliates formed a unified command structure that will facilitate their campaign to undermine security amid rising political discord in northern Mali. The new umbrella group, the “Group for the Aid of Islam and Muslims,” includes AQIM’s Sahara division, al Murabitoun, Ansar al Din, and the Macina Liberation Front. The new group reaffirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda’s senior leadership, including AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel and al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri. This consolidation occurs as rising tensions threaten to derail the implementation of joint security measures by the Malian government and former rebel groups. Al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Sahel, which also include the Burkina Faso-based Ansar al Islam, will attack security personnel in an effort to destroy the fragile cooperation between the government and rival groups.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
March 7, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The U.S. airstrike campaign in Yemen may disrupt AQAP in the near term, but
the Yemeni civil war will preserve permissive conditions for the group.
2. Escalating competition over Libya’s oil resources will increase instability in
Libya and set conditions for ISIS and al Qaeda to gain strength.
3. Al Qaeda affiliates formed a unified command structure that will facilitate their
campaign to undermine security amid rising political discord in northern Mali.
1
2
3

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
The death of al Qaeda deputy leader Abu Khayr al Masri may provoke retaliatory attacks on
Western targets. A U.S. drone strike killed al Masri in Idlib Province, Syria on February 26. Al
Qaeda’s general command, AQAP, AQIM, and al Shabaab eulogized al Masri and called for
attacks against the West.
Outlook: U.S. airstrikes targeting al Qaeda leadership will have no lasting impact on global
al Qaeda operations.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates
Pakistan temporarily reopened border crossings to mitigate tensions with Afghanistan in the
midst of a crackdown on Salafi-jihadi militants in the border region. Jamatul Ahrar, a TTP
splinter group, may be responsible for an attack on Pakistani soldiers in Mohmand Agency in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Jamatul Ahrar seeks to implement shari’a in
the FATA. The Pakistani cabinet approved long-awaited governance reforms in the FATA
that will require local security forces to implement tribal law.
Outlook: The tense Afghan-Pakistani relationship, as well as changing power structures in
the FATA, may impact Pakistani government support for U.S. military operations.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Hadi government is building new relationships in pursuit of development aid. President
Hadi spoke to Indian and Indonesian leadership to encourage investment in Yemen. Hadi’s
oil minister is pursuing a relationship with French and Chinese corporations.
Outlook: Instability will prevent the Hadi government from addressing popular grievances.
Security
Al Houthi-Saleh forces halted Hadi government forces’ attempt to seize Yemen’s western
coast with an ambush campaign in Taiz governorate. Hadi government forces are targeting
al Houthi-Saleh bases to the east but have not advanced meaningfully toward al Hudaydah.
Outlook:The Hadi government will seize al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
Five consecutive days of U.S. airstrikes targeting AQAP have likely disrupted the group’s
operational capabilities in Yemen. U.S. airstrikes may inadvertently benefit the al Houthi-
Saleh bloc, which is fighting a ground campaign against AQAP in central Yemen.
Outlook: AQAP attacks in central Yemen will decrease in the near term.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 02-06 MAR: U.S.
airstrikes targeted
AQAP throughout
central and southern
Yemen.
2) 04 MAR: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces fired
artillery at popular
resistance forces in
Lawder district.
3) 04 MAR: AQAP
destroyed an al
Houthi-Saleh
outpost near Hamat
Sarar village.
4) 05 MAR: AQAP
attacked al Hizam
forces in al Arqub.
5) 06 MAR: Hadhrami
Elite Forces raided
an AQAP weapons
cache in Daw’an.
5
4
3
2
1
1
1

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UAE recalled its ambassador from Somalia after the Somali Federal Government (SFG)
appealed for Saudi Arabia to halt the construction of an Emirati base in Somaliland.
Somaliland seeks recognition as a state. The SFG seeks to maintain its full sovereignty.
Outlook: Regional tensions will likely impede distribution of humanitarian assistance.
Security
Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) operations targeted al Shabaab strongholds along the
Kenyan-Somali border in an effort to disrupt al Shabaab and reverse a narrative of defeat.
Outlook: Kenya will increase operations in Somalia ahead of general elections in August.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab’s assassination campaign in Mogadishu is intended to demoralize the new
administration and generate insecurity in the capital. Militants have targeted more than 10
government officials in 2017. Severe drought conditions also provide opportunities for al
Shabaab to gain influence in devastated regions in central and southern Somalia.
Outlook: Shabaab will attempt to co-opt humanitarian aid and redistribute it to gain support.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
2
3
1
5
1) 28 FEB: KDF
airstrikes targeted al
Shabaab positions in
Gedo region.
2) 02 MAR: KDF
operation kills 57 al
Shabaab militants in
Lower Jubba region.
3) 02-03 MAR:
Disease and
starvation killed 110
people in Bay
region.
4) 04 MAR: Al
Shabaab militants
ambushed AMISOM
forces in Bay region.
5) 05 MAR: Al
Shabaab militants
ambushed AMISOM
forces in Lower
Shabelle region.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Russia is increasing its support for LNA commander Khalifa Haftar. Russia likely provided
the LNA with at least one warplane. The head of the UN-backed GNA traveled to Moscow to
discuss economic deals. Russia works with rival Libyan factions to advance its interests.
Outlook: Russian military support for Haftar will protract the conflict but will not resolve it.
Security
The Libyan civil war escalated after the BDB, an Islamist militia coalition, attacked LNA-
controlled oil ports in northeastern Libya. The LNA counterattacked but the ports remain
contested. Militias allied with a hardline Islamist political bloc broke in to the headquarters of
Libya’s National Oil Corporation in conjunction with the BDB attack.
Outlook: Clashes over oil sites may grow into broader civil conflict in central Libya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
Al Qaeda may provide military support for ISIS in Libya, according to unconfirmed reports. Al
Qaeda’s support network in Libya is much more extensive than that of ISIS.
Outlook: Access to al Qaeda’s network may accelerate ISIS’s regeneration in Libya.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 03 MAR: The BDB
attacked LNA-
controlled oil ports
at al Sidra and Ras
Lanuf.
2) 03 MAR: Islamist
militants broke into
the NOC’s Tripoli
headquarters.
3) 03-05: The LNA
counterattacked at al
Sidra and Ras
Lanuf.
4) 04 MAR: The LNA
recaptured an
apartment complex
from the BRSC in
Benghazi.
5) 05 MAR: The LNA
conducted airstrikes
against the MSCD at
Dahr al Homir.
2
3
1
4
5

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Tunisia signed an agreement with Germany to expedite the return of 1,500 rejected asylum
seekers to Tunisia. Tunisians protested against the government’s position on the re-entry of
Tunisian foreign fighters in 2016.
Outlook: Tunisian citizens may protest against the return of illegal immigrants.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
Al Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel formed a new umbrella coalition called the Group for the Aid
of Islam and Muslims (JNM). JNM is trying to create a power vacuum in northern Mali by
undermining a peace agreement between the Malian government and former rebel groups.
Famine is weakening Boko Haram’s Barnawi faction. The faction, which has ties to both ISIS
and AQIM, cannot capitalize on its local support base because of the famine’s severity. All
factions of Boko Haram are unable to feed their fighters.
Outlook: JNM will attack joint patrols that include Malian soldiers and former rebels. Boko
Haram’s operational tempo will remain low through the end of the dry season in April.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 02 MAR: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a five-
member militant cell
in Sajanan, Bizerte
governorate,
Tunisia.
2) 02 MAR: Tunisian
security forces
arrested three
members of al
Qaeda associate
Ansar al Sharia
Tunisia in Gabes
governorate,
Tunisia.
3) 06 MAR: Algerian
security forces killed
two militants in
Dellys, Boumerdes
province, Algeria.
2
3
1

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 03 MAR: Boko
Haram-Shekau
suicide bombers
destroyed three fuel
tankers in Maiduguri,
Nigeria.
2) 04 MAR: MAA and
CJA militants
besieged Malian
government offices
in Timbuktu.
3) 05 MAR: The
Nigerian Army
cleared a Boko
Haram-Barnawi
stronghold in Lake
Chad.
4) 05 MAR: Ansar al
Islam attacked a
MAA-Malian army
position near
Kerboule, Burkina
Faso.
2
3
1
4

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569