This document summarizes a court case regarding whether wealthy nations have an obligation to help alleviate poverty in other countries. The court considers arguments from two petitioners, Peter Singer and Thomas Nagel. While acknowledging Nagel's argument is stronger, the court ultimately rules against both petitioners. It finds that obligations can only exist between parties that consented to an agreement, and one cannot force aid without consent. Additionally, the solutions proposed by both petitioners fail the criterion of practicality, as they would require drastic changes that could increase injustice and harm innocent people. The court concludes wealthy nations have no enforceable obligation to help poor foreign nations.

1. Cristian Santillan 1
GOV S335M
August 8, 2015
Rich v. Poor
The question presented before this court is whether “states should attempt to
ameliorate poverty in distant lands through some form of distributive justice.” The two
petitioners Peter Singer and Thomas Nagel have submitted their arguments for
consideration. After close and careful and reflection I hold the following: The United
States of America along with other affluent countries have no enforceable obligation to
ameliorate the poverty of foreign nations. I rule in favor of neither Peter Singer nor
Thomas Nagel but acknowledge that Thomas Nagel has the stronger argument between
the two petitioners.
The value of my case is Justice defined by Mr. Nagel as, “Justice requires a
collectively imposed social framework, enacted in the name of all those governed by it,
and aspiring to command their acceptance of its authority even when they disagree with
the substance of its decision” (Global Justice Reader 432).
Justice is interpreted to be a created concept among humans, a concept that
involves social norms and people’s acceptance of them and the consequent precepts that
come from those norms. Under this definition of justice men are bound to one another
through self-imposed edicts and when a country enforces and governs with these edicts it
is said that the state is just.
The criterion used to evaluate this case is Practicalityi. The question presented is
one that narrows down to socioeconomic justice and thus the solution needs to be one
that is plausible and thus respect foreign nations and their attempts at self-government.

2. Santillan 2
The petitioner Peter Singer has presented before this court the moral argument
that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without thereby
sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally to do it” (Global Justice
Reader 388). The application here is that if people living in affluent countries have more
money than they need to meet their basic needs those individuals should give the money
to poor counties that need the money. In other words Singer wishes us to live in what he
calls “marginal utility” (Global Justice Reader 394).
To see what Mr. Singer is describing take the following example; a woman,
“Sally” becomes lawyer because she wished to have luxuries. Sally’s salary is
$2,000,000.00 and let us say that her “marginal utility” is $50,000.00. Singer would say
that $1,950,000.00 of her salary ought be given towards poorer countries.
Living at the marginal utility is not practical because it does not respect the
individual and is seen in the Sally case. In the example Sally HAS TO donate 97% of her
yearly income to impoverished countries and she is left with basic necessities. Sally is
denied the ability to buy the luxuries that she wished to have before becoming a lawyer.
This denial and deprivation is okay with Mr. Singer because by looking “well-dressed we
are not providing for any important need” (Global Justice Reader 390). Thus, anything
that does not provide for an important need, according to Mr. Singer, is not necessary and
should not be allowed.
This new and radical concept would change the way that affluent capitalist
countries conduct business. I generalize that most of what is sold in American stores are
“luxuries” and trinkets that one does not “need” to survive. As a matter of fact Mr. Singer
implies that all we really need for survival is “food, shelter, and medical care” (Global

3. Santillan 3
Justice Reader 389). If people were to live at marginal utility, business such as Cadillac,
Apple, and Dillard’s would be left with no other option but to shut their doors. Along
with the closing of their doors they have also removed thousand of jobs from the
American work force. Closing American companies additionally goes against Singer’s
own argument because he states that we should not hurt our own economy and we should
“limit to the extent to which we should deliberately slow down our economy” (Global
Justice Reader 394). This concept of slowing down our economy would bring countries
to their knees for reasons that I have aforementioned.
If we were to employ Singer’s theory we would be in the situation that I describe
in the Sally case and those conditions are not compatible with capitalist markets and
individuals of such countries would find it difficult to accept. I find that I cannot accept
Mr. Singer’s arguments because instead of providing the reader with a solution he
presents a headache with far too much ambiguity and unresolved problem. Above all the
moral obligation that Singer provides fails to pass the threshold for practicality. Mr.
Singer also doubts his own argument when he presents a self-foreseen objection to his
stance “is too drastic a revision of our moral scheme” (Global Justice Reader 391).
The petitioner Thomas Nagel has presented before this court the political
argument that “global justice without a world government is [but] a chimera” (Global
Justice Reader 417). Nagel affirms that there is a problem with poverty in the world and
that there should be a solution. Yet, he shows that there is an obligation for rich nations to
help poor ones. Rather, the remedy comes in the form of global institutions. Nagel argues
that “justice will expand only through developments that first increase the injustice of the
world by introducing effective but illegitimate institutions to which the standards of

4. Santillan 4
justice apply, standards by which we may hope they will eventually be transformed”
(Global Justice Reader 436).
For Nagel there is no obligation towards poor countries because socioeconomic
justice “is fully associative. Socioeconomic justice depends on positive rights that we do
not have against all other persons or groups, rights that arise only because we are joined
together with certain others in a political society under strong centralized control”
(Global Justice Reader 424). Socioeconomic justice here requires that one party give the
other party money. This means that A (poor country) with a positive right for
socioeconomic justice against B (rich country) would like B to give A money.
Yet, economics involves positive right and thus there needs to be a “strong
centralized control” that is going to enforce the claim from A to party B (Global Justice
Reader 424). If there is no “association” then there is no “centralized control” and thus
there is no way to force B to give money to A. Ergo, without “centralized control” the
there can be no enforceable obligation among parties.
As I have mentioned earlier the value of this case is justice and it can only be
achieved among parties who enter into an agreement of “collectively imposed social
framework” (Global Justice Reader 432). In conclusion, two countries cannot be forced
into an agreement and without an agreement there is no obligation between the two
parties: I fully support this conclusion. There is no obligation for rich countries to give
money to poor countries.
The question that I must also resolve is, whether Nagel’s argument meets the
criteria that I have set forth in this case: The answer is no. Nagel’s argument does not
pass the threshold for what I consider to be Practical. The reason is that the argument

5. Santillan 5
requires that I rule in favor of the following drastic conclusion: “The global scope of
justice will expand only through the developments that first increase the injustices of the
world by introducing effective but illegitimate institutions to which the standards of
justice apply, standards by which we may hope they will eventually be transformed”
(Global Justice Reader 437).
I refuse to uphold such a statement because upon further analysis it is mere
speculation. First, note how Nagel guarantees, “justice will expand” through such means.
Next, examine how he says “we may hope they will eventually be transformed” the two
statements are inconsistent with each other, the former part declares certainty while the
latter leans on “hope” and clear uncertainty. Politics is a deadly game to be playing with
and results in the death of innocent people when played incorrectly. It is because Nagel’s
conclusion provides that I uphold the “increase the injustices of the world” and the
uncertainty of death of innocent people that I rule Nagel’s argument to be impractical.
Closing Statements
This court finds that The United States of America along with other affluent
countries have no enforceable obligation to ameliorate the poverty if foreign nations.
Obligations can only exist among parties that have willingly entered into an enforceable
agreement. It is unjust and illegitimate to force people and countries to comply without
their consent, which is what this case is concerned with. Finally, the petitioners Singer
and Nagel have provided arguments which both favor the amelioration of poverty
stricken countries but both arguments fail to meet the criterion of practicality on the
grounds that they are too dramatic and thus finds in favor of neither petitioner and
accepts neither petitioner’s solution to wealth distribution.

6. Santillan 6
Works Cited
Brooks, Thom. The Global Justice Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008. Print.
Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. Web. 9 Aug. 2015
End Notes
i Practical
relating to what is real rather than to what is possible or imagined
: likely to succeed and reasonable to do or use
: appropriate or suited for actual use