1. Follow-up Report to the application in Colombia of the Recommendations of the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
-Executive Summary-
The Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) exhibits through the present summary the primary
concerns and central topics of the Follow-up Report to the implementation by the State of
Colombia of the Recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur during his visit to the
country in June 2009. 1 This summary includes updated information up to June 2012 with regard
to those aspects where such information was available.
A. Homicides committed by Security forces
1. Security officers continue to directly violate the right to life. The CCJ registered that, in the
year following the Special Rapporteur’s visit, 2 at least 70 people were victims of violations to
the right to life allegedly committed by security officers out of combat. 3
2. The military justice system continues to partake in the investigations and judgments of
extrajudicial execution cases, as well as it continues to lack collaboration with the ordinary
penal system.
3. The Ministry of Defense, the Prosecutor General’s office (Fiscalía General de la Nación)
and the Inspector General (Procuraduría General de la Nación) subscribed to a tripartite
agreement established in June 2011. In accordance to this agreement, the Government has
conformed a Technical group (Mesa técnica), that can “resolve jurisdictional conflicts when
there is doubt about which natural judge has jurisdiction” 4 in cases regarding extrajudicial
executions. This measure is openly unconstitutional because it ignores the fact that only the
Superior Judicial Council (sala jurisdiccional disciplinaria del Consejo Superior de la
Judicatura)5 can decide the competent jurisdiction in those cases. Due to this, it is important to
urge the Colombian State to implement measures that guarantee administrative and human
resources for the proper functioning of the Superior Judicial Council.
4. Some of the military judges who have tried to comply with their duty to transfer the
extrajudicial execution cases to the ordinary criminal system have been victims of threats and
harassments. 6
5. Impunity in cases of extrajudicial executions committed by security officers that are being
investigated by the ordinary penal system continue. In the Soacha case, 7 even though there has
been a new condemnatory sentence on June 4 2012 against a mayor, a lieutenant, a private and
1
Comisión Colombiana de Juristas. Informe de seguimiento a las recomendaciones del Relator Especial sobre Ejecuciones
Extrajudiciales, Sumarias o Arbitrarias. Febrero 16 de 2012. Available at
http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/libros_e_informes/inf_2012_n1.pdf
2
July 2009 to June 2010.
3
Comisión Colombiana de Juristas. Cuadro de violaciones al derecho a la vida: ejecuciones extrajudiciales, homicidios
sociopolíticos y desapariciones forzadas, Julio de 1996 a junio de 2010. Available at:
http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/cifras/cif_2012-05-04_01.pdf
4
Procuraduría delegada para el ministerio público en asuntos penales. Oficio No. PDMP. 01182 del 02 de febrero de 2012.
5
Constitución Política de Colombia, Artículo 256, numeral 6: “le corresponde al Consejo Superior de la Judicatura dirimir los
conflictos de competencia que ocurran entre las distintas jurisdicciones”.
6
Refer to the specific case of the military penal judge Alexander Cortés Cárdenas contained in pages 16 and 17 of the Report.
7
Refer to the case of the Soacha individuals located on Page 20 of the Report.

2. 2
three professional soldiers for the extrajudicial execution of Fair Leonardo Porras, 8 there are 15
pending investigations related with this case that have not advanced to this date.
6. With regard to the adoption of legal measures that difficult the investigation of the
violations of human rights by the ordinary penal system and/or exonerate the authors of said
violations from prosecution and trial, two initiatives of constitutional reform that would mean a
regrettable setback in the fight against impunity in Colombia are being discussed in Congress:
a. On February 2012 the national Government withdrew the proposal of a constitutional
reform to the military jurisdiction included as part of the Justice’s reform bill,9 and in
March they presented a whole new constitutional reform proposal, exclusively on
restructuring the penal military justice system. 10 Up to this date, this last proposal has
already been approved in the Congress in half of the debates it needs (4 out of 8) and it
contemplates several concerning measures:
- The creation of a new tribunal of criminal guarantees11;
- The inclusion of a restrictive list of crimes excluded from the military justice
system jurisdiction including a group of conducts that constitute severe violations to
human rights: “The Military Penal System will not know about the crimes against
humanity, crimes of genocide, enforced disappearance, torture, extrajudicial
executions, forced displacement, sexual abuses, acts of terror against civilians and
recruitment of children. Excluding the crimes stated above, the infractions to
Humanitarian International Law will be exclusively known by the military
courts.” 12 But it leaves other crimes, like arbitrary detentions, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatments, amongst others, out.
- The attribution that is exclusively granted to the military justice system to
investigate and judge International humanitarian law’s breaches exceeds the limited
role that this type of justice should play in a democratic society.
This draft bill also emphasizes in the need to “harmonize national legislation with
international humanitarian law”, in the understanding that international humanitarian
law would effectively allow an offensive position in the context of armed conflict,
whereas national penal law would supposedly restrict security forces by only allowing a
defensive position. This proposal is preoccupying because it can lead to a flexible
interpretation of international humanitarian law, understood as a license to the parts in
conflict to commit excesses and be exempt from responsibilities, as opposed to its main
objective of protecting civilians and individuals not taking part of the hostilities.
8
El Espectador. Junio 4 de 2012. Condenados a 52 años mayor y teniente del Ejército por falso positivo en Soacha.
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-350918-condenados-52-anos-mayor-y-teniente-del-ejercito-falso-positivo
9
“Gobierno anunció retiro del fuero militar de la reforma a la justicia”, Eluniversal.com.co, Cartagena, febrero 19 de 2012, En:
http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/nacional/gobierno-anuncio-retiro-del-fuero-militar-de-la-reforma-la-justicia-65566
10
Proyecto de acto legislativo 192 de 2012 Cámara – 16 de 2012 Senado, “Por el cual se reforman los artículos 116, 152 y 221
de la Constitución Política de Colombia”.
11
The proposal to establish a special court of criminal guarantees that is allowed to participate “in any investigation or criminal
proceeding against members of the security forces (Article 1)” is confusing, since is not easy to understand why there should be
such a wide power of control in all processes against military members, without a restriction, at least, to those processes in which
the offense has a direct link with the service. But even if this form of control is restricted to the latter processes, this guarantee
court would remain questionable, because it ignores the right to equality by establishing an unjustified difference in the treatment
of members of the security forces that are subjected to criminal proceedings and other persons who are under the same
circumstances. It is worth remembering that in both, ordinary and military criminal justice, there are “guarantees judges”
responsible for protecting the constitutional rights of the accused. Thus, the draft bill seems to assume that these judges, in the
ordinary criminal justice and in the military criminal justice, do not fulfill their duty adequately, and therefore seeks to replace
them. So, this draft bill creates a parallel justice exclusive for the military, a privilege that opposes to the constitutional duty to
treat all people equally.
12 Congreso de la República de Colombia. Informe de Conciliación al Proyecto de Acto Legislativo Número 16 de 2012 Senado,
192 de 2012 Cámara. Gaceta del Congreso, Año XXI número 340. Junio 12 de 2012

3. 3
The creation of a mixed Commission (civilians and militaries) that can preliminarily
investigate the facts in order to determine the competent jurisdiction in those cases
where “doubts exist over the actual competence of the military justice system” is also
included in the bill. This proposal entails a veiled constitutional reform since it modifies
the competence to solve the conflicts between the civil and the military jurisdiction
attributed to the Superior Judicial Council. It also alters the operating presumption
which states that in case of doubt with regard to the competent judge for a crime
committed by members of the military forces, it is the ordinary courts that have
competence.
b. On the other hand, the bill known as legal framework for peace (“marco jurídico para
la paz”) has been approved by the Colombian Congress after eight (8) debates 13. It
contemplates a reform to include in the Constitution the use of instruments of
transitional justice (judicial and non-judicial), and concretely the implementation of
selection and prioritization criteria for the criminal investigations.
This selection would have as a purpose to allow the Congress to approve, through a law
proposed by the Government, several criteria to guide the choice of certain violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law to be investigated. With regard to those
cases that are not selected, the State can choose to renounce to the prosecution. If such a
proposal is approved, it would represent a grave failure of the Colombian State to
comply with its constitutional and international obligations to investigate human rights
violations, as well as an absolute opposition towards the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court on the matters of access to justice, victim’s rights and human rights.
Also, approving the use of selection criteria would mean the granting of prohibited
judicial benefits which have already been tried through laws, but that haven’t been
approved because judges have closed this alternative. Specifically, the possibility to
renounce to investigate in cases of human rights violations or breaches of international
humanitarian law was already established through the figure of “principle of
opportunity” for demobilized paramilitaries, and it was declared unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court in 2010. The main argument in this decision was that the renounce
to prosecute and sanction people who committed these crimes was in opposition to the
Constitution and against the international human rights law, the international
humanitarian law, and the international criminal law. Thus, approving the use of
selection criteria would allow the State to renounce to the criminal prosecution in cases
of human rights violations or infractions to international humanitarian law, openly going
against the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and the main international human
rights obligations.
The prioritization means the implementation of criteria to decide which cases should be
investigated first and which others should be investigated later. That could lead to a
violation of the State’s duty to investigate human rights violations in a reasonable lapse
of time, or could even involve, in the actual application of the measure, the renounce to
the investigation of the cases, as a consequence of budget, capacity or technical
limitations.
13
See: Texto aprobado en Sesión Plenaria del Senado de la República el día 14 de junio de 2012 en segunda vuelta al Proyecto
de Acto Legislativo 14 de 2011 Senado, 94 de 2011 Cámara, “Por medio del cual se establecen instrumentos jurídicos de
justicia transicional en el marco del artículo 22 de la Constitución Política y se dictan otras disposiciones.”

4. 4
Lastly, an additional concern with regard to this constitutional reform’s project is that it
would open the door for amnesties towards military, police and state agents14 or
demobilized paramilitaries who have are responsible of violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law.
7. Ministry of Defense’s Directive No. 029 of November 17, 2005, which offers rewards and
incentives to the members of the armed forces that kill people in combat, is still in force. Even
though the Ministry of Defense firmly states in a response to a request remitted by the CCJ, that
“The Permanent Ministerial Directive 029 of November 17, 2005, is no longer in force”15, it
doesn’t accurately provide the information about the act that explicitly revoked the directive.
The Ministry of Defense states that:
“Currently the Permanent Ministerial Directive 021 of the 9 of July 2011 serves the purpose of
regulating the criteria for the payments of rewards” but informs that “The Directives in
question are classified documents that have legal reserve [which means] that its circulation is
restricted and their contents deal with topics closely related to public defense and safety. As a
consequence, the lack of expedition of copies of these documents has legal support due to the
principles of reason and proportionality (law 57 of 1985).”16
8. Since there has been a discretionary use by state forces members of the “confidential
expenses” (gastos reservados) for paying rewards to informers, and the fact that those
expenses, along with other informal funds, are the more likely source of payments to recruiters
in the cases of extrajudicial executions committed by state forces members17, it is necessary to
insist in recommending the monitoring by the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría
General de la República). The monitoring of the use of the funds with which they allegedly
paid rewards to civilians, made by the Office of the Comptroller General, is of imperative need.
The results of this monitoring should be public.
9. The State has failed to provide adequate information about the suspension of public officials
involved in investigations for presumed extrajudicial executions.
10. The State has violated the rights of extrajudicial executions victim’s families by granting
awards and acknowledgements to the members of the Security Forces that are being
investigated for their involvement in those crimes, and by the procedural actions made by the
Military Defense (DEMIL) to obstruct the action of justice in extrajudicial execution cases.
B. Killings and other breaches to humanitarian law made by guerrilla groups
11. Guerrilla groups such as FARC and ELN continue to commit breaches to humanitarian
law, against the lives of the population of Colombia. Furthermore, these groups continue to
violate the right to freedom and personal integrity by using weapons that are prohibited by
humanitarian law (landmines amongst others), kidnapping individuals and recruiting boys and
girls.
14
The final part of the first section in article 1 of the bill calls: “A statutory law may authorize, in cases of a peace arrangement,
to offer a differential treatment for the different members of the illegal armed groups who have taken part of the conflict, and
also for state agents, with regard to their participation in it”.
15
Ministerio de Defensa, Oficio No. 14131/MDVPAIDH-725 de 20 de febrero de 2012.
16
Ibidem.
17
Naciones Unidas, Informe del Relator sobre ejecuciones extrajudiciales, sumarias o arbitrarias, Philip Alston. Misión a
Colombia. Documento A/HRC/14/24/Add.2 Disponible en:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add.2_sp.pdf

5. 5
12. With regard to the government’s position on the possibilities of peace negotiations with the
guerrilla groups, President Juan Manuel Santos has given public declarations that disincentives
people who are interested in elaborating proposals on the subject. Currently, the Superior
Tribunal of Cundinamarca is about to rule on an Action of Compliance (“acción de
cumplimiento”, a constitutional action to compel state agents to fulfill the law) against the
President because he has not convoked the National Peace Council (“Consejo Nacional de
Paz”) since his Government started in 2010.
13. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has given declarations before the UN Security Council that
jeopardize UN agencies’ efforts in the protection of boys and girls victims of armed conflict, in
accordance to the resolution 1612 of the Security Council.
C. Homicides committed by paramilitary groups
14. The paramilitary groups have not been effectively dismantled. This has been recognized by
the Prosecutor General’s office (Fiscalía General de la Nación). However, the Government
continues to deny the existence of said groups and considers them as organized criminals and
drug traffickers. This has negative consequences, particularly for the recognition, attention and
protection of their victims, who are not considered victims of the armed conflict anymore.
15. The Government has promoted and supported the adoption of the “legal framework for
peace” bill18 and the law 1424 of 2010. This law hinders and blocks the Prosecutor General’s
possibility to use valued information provided by the demobilized paramilitaries regarding
serious violations of human rights in criminal investigations. But it was declared constitutional
by the Constitutional Court, arguing that the declarations proffered by the demobilized to a
“non judicial mechanism towards the contribution of truth” (mecanismo no judicial de
contribución a la verdad) can in fact be used in criminal prosecutions, only not in those against
demobilized persons from their same armed group.
D. Killings and threats against members of vulnerable groups and public servers
16. During 2011, 33 human rights defenders were victims of violations to the right to life, the
highest number of this type of attacks since 1996. The National Labor union School (Escuela
Nacional Sindical) registered that at least 23 union workers were murdered between January
and October 2011.
In February 2012 written death threats against human rights defenders like the Santander
Agricultural Association (Asociación Agraria de Santander –ASOGRAS-), a group of peasants
and leaders of land restitution processes19 and 12 women, 20 among which is the Ombudsman
delegate for the Rights of Children, Youth and Women, 21 and people dedicated to the defense
of human rights including UN agencies present in Bogotá were made public. These threats were
18
See number 6, supra.
19
Direct urgent actions published by ASOGRAS and registered by the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, received on February
17th 2012, documents D-12016 y D-12017.
20
Olga Amparo, Ana Jimena Bautista, Angélica Bello, Rubi Castaño, Piedad Córdoba, Maria Eugenia Cruz, Nini Johana
Gonzales, Osana Medina, Claudia Mejía, Pilar Rueda, Yovana Sáenz y María Eugenia Urrutia. Tres hombres fueron también
amenazados: Iván Cepeda, Eusevio Mosquera y Gustavo Petro.
21
Asociación de Afrocolombianos Desplazados (AFRODES), Afromupaz, el Alto Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los
Refugiados (ACNUR), la organización Arco Iris, la Casa Mujer, la Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento
(CODHES), la Fundación Nacional Defensora de los Derechos Humanos de la Mujer (FUNDHEFEM), Juntos por la vida, la
marcha indígena, el Movimiento de Crímenes de Estado (MOVICE), el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
(PNUD), la Ruta Pacífica y la corporación SISMA Mujer.

6. 6
allegedly made by the paramilitary group Águilas Negras. 22 In all cases, the pamphlets made
reference to the participation of these individuals and organizations in the strengthening and
guidance of victims in the processes of land restitution.
17. There has been dialogue between the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and
NGOs in relation to the defenders of human rights. However, cases like the stigmatization of
the victims’ lawyers in the Mapiripán massacre and of the displaced people from Las Pavas
community, demonstrate not only the continuation of declarations made by State authorities
that disqualify the work done by defenders of human rights but also the State’s denial of the
reality of these situations. These circumstances continue to put at risk the victims and the
human rights defenders.
18. Three years after the public revealment of the illegal intelligence activities made by the
Administrative Department of Security (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad –DAS-)
against human rights defenders, magistrates of the High Courts, politicians belonging to the
opposition, union workers and journalists, amongst others, there has been no ordinary
condemnatory decision against the individual state agents responsible for these crimes. The
only condemnatory decisions issued have been the product of the acceptance of charges of the
processed, or the result of pre-agreements with the Prosecutor General’s Office. These rulings
have not contributed to the efficient definition of the circumstances of time, mode, place, the
actors and intellectual determiners responsible of these illegal activities.
19. The surfacing of new facts that suggest that the illegal activities against defenders of human
rights, magistrates of the High Courts, politicians belonging to the opposition, union workers
and journalists have not ceased is extremely preoccupying.
20. It is important to recommend that Colombia presents concrete results regarding the
investigation, judgment and sanction of Colombian ex President Álvaro Uribe Vélez and his
relation with the violations of human rights committed by the Administrative Department of
Security -DAS-.
21. The Constitutional Court and numerous international organs of human rights protection
have urged the State of Colombia to comply with the measures ordered in order to guarantee
the protection of indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians. None the less, the measures
taken by the State have been more formal than material, thus meaning that both communities
continue to suffer the consequences of the disrespect of their ancestral territories and of the
grave violations against their human rights.
E. Institutional Strengthening
22. The State has taken some measures towards the strengthening of the Early Warning System
of the Ombudsman Office (Sistema de Alertas Tempranas de la Defensoría del Pueblo -SAT-),
which have been reflected in a better capacity of analysis. However, these measures have not
contributed to improve the effectiveness of the preventive response by the authorities, because
these measures have not dealt with the problems of lack of independence of the Intersectional
Commission of Early Warning System (Comisión Intersectorial de Alertas Tempranas –CIAT-
), which prevent the Risk reports presented by the SAT from becoming actual Early warnings
and activating the institutional response on time.
22
Direct urgent actions published by ASOGRAS and registered by the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas received on February
29th 2012, documents D-12018 y D-12019.

7. 7
23. The Colombian State continues to fail in the implementation of an information system as
recommended by the Special Rapporteur. This weakens the task of defending the rights of the
victims, prevents the families of the victims from accessing to information on the judicial
investigations and contributes to the unawareness of the Colombian society about the
magnitude of impunity in cases of serious violations to human rights committed in the country.
Conclusion
The recommendations formulated in 2009 have only been partially implemented by the
Colombian State, and although the number of extrajudicial executions has apparently
diminished after the visit of the Special Rapporteur, they continue to occur and the main causes
for their commission remain untouched. Not only is the level of impunity deeply worrying
because of the insufficient results in the prosecution of the responsible state agents, but also
because of the Governmental promotion of practices and legislative measures to prevent the
members of the military from accountability. A renewal of the 2009 recommendations and a
close follow-up are necessary.
Bogotá, June 15th, 2012