1) Russia intervened in Syria for several strategic reasons, including preventing ISIS from expanding into central Asia and protecting Russia's only military base in the Mediterranean at Latakia. 2) Russia aims to defeat ISIS and keep Syria united under Assad's rule while avoiding a permanent military presence. It is relying on Iranian forces like Hezbollah and the National Defence Forces to provide ground support. 3) The situation remains complex with many competing interests from regional powers like Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. There is potential for both cooperation and confrontation between Russia and the US in countering ISIS.

1. Russia in Syria : The Why & What Next
By
Lt General S A Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM (Bar), VSM (Bar)
West Asia continues to occupy the core center of strategic affairs in the
world and are changing at faster pace than most expected. Competing
centres in Central Asia and the South China Sea are yet many light years
behind. Rebalancing is fine as a concept and the US may keep trying to
dilute the significance of the region by simply trying to ignore it but as things
stand its attention will not wane. A review of the situation after the
unexpected entry of Russia into the war zone is necessary to make
any sense of what is happening.
The Russians came in for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, Russia believes that the West was just not serious about
defeating the ISIS. The US and its allies prefer a policy of drift allowing the
emasculation of Bashir Assad and then effecting regime change. The larger
picture of victory of the so called moderates without a simultaneous victory
of the ISIS against Assad is their hope and aim which is unachievable.
Besides what the eventual color of the moderates, who are supported by non
ISIS groups such as Al Nusra and Al Qaida, will be is unpredictable.
Second, Russia fears that time will only allow ISIS to emerge stronger
as the US led air campaign and the creation of counter groups are both
floundering.
Third, the lack of focused action would give scope to ISIS to expand its
activities to Afghanistan and thence to Central Asia. With the situation in Af-
Pak none too certain the ISIS is bound to take advantage of the turbulence.
Its move into Central Asia will have severely negative effects on Russia’s
near abroad region.
Fourth, the only Russian military facility yet intact in West Asia is the
port city of Latakia in Syria and its hold over that for the sake of control of
the West Mediterranean is essential. The fighting was getting dangerously
close to this facility and therefore ‘depth’ had to be afforded to it to keep it
from harm’s way. Bashir Assad’s defeat and fall would have meant the end
of Russian military presence.
Fifth, Putin probably believed that after Ukraine where he had scored
diplomatically this was the opportunity to demonstrate the resurgence of
Russia. During 2008 when it had conducted operations in Ossetia the West
had reported the pathetic state of equipment and weaponry of the Russian
Army. It was important to break the perception that Russia was militarily
regressing and weak.
A few things stand out from the above analysis. It is clear that Russian
interests do not look at any permanent presence but just assurance of a
situation whereby Syria remains united and the port facilities are intact;
defeat of the ISIS is of course the main military objective. Russia knows that

2. in such an environment where Islamic fighters are hidden in nooks and
corners air power alone can never suffice. It also knows that the
employment of airpower has to be for the purpose of weakening the
capability of the ISIS and those others opposing Assad, something which has
not been adequately done by the Coalition. Follow up with boots on the
ground is an imperative but for that it is depending on ability of Iran to
muster the forces. The National Defence Forces or NDF in Syria has been in
the making for over three years and it has acted as the main infantry for
Syria in the civil war. The raising, equipping and training has been personally
overseen by Iran’s well known and high profile Quds Force commander
General Qasem Suleimani. Iran and Hezbollah played a key role in the
formalization of the NDF along the model of the Iranian ‘Basij’ militia", with
the NDF recruits receiving training in urban guerilla warfare from Army of
the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC). Apparently this still loyal
1,50,000 strong force along with 5000 Hezbollah front line fighters, some
mechanized elements of the Russians and some supervisory military leaders
from Iran will form the ground elements to effect the push towards Aleppo.
CNN is already reporting the Russians having targeted 60 major targets in
24 hours and the battle for Aleppo has begun.
It is reported that some understanding about targets for aerial bombing has
been reached between the US and Russia but what and how this will work
remains extremely vague. Will the US sit back and allow the Free Syrian
Army and others, who it supported in the vain hope that they will defeat
both Assad and the ISIS, to be decimated by the Russian-Iranian-Hezbollah-
Assad combine? The doubts are because of the US disinterest in the region
and caution arising from the approaching US Presidential Election. However,
the increasing Russian involvement may progressively bring the US back into
the game.
Surprisingly what seems to emerge is that far from an opposition from Tel
Aviv it is actually tacit agreement with the Israelis that drives the Russians
even though it also has Iranian support. This complicates the equations even
further. Tel Aviv considers ISIS an enemy as much as it does Iran and has
Saudi support in that. Possibly, as long as advanced weaponry is being used
by Russia only to support the Allawite-Hezbollah combine and no transfer is
done it may meet Israel’s need. Defeat of the ISIS is a major objective for
Israel too since Syria and Iraq in ISIS hands would lead to an almost certain
war with the renegade group.
The one player who could make a major difference is Turkey but it is bound
by its internal problems. Recep Erdogan is in no position to act decisively.
The Turkish – Syrian border is the route of most movement of recruits and
military hardware. The Russians are unlikely to be sensitive to any Turkish
needs except the grave humanitarian situation arising out of the mass
movement of refugees. In fact they profess that to end the crisis is one of
the objectives of the campaign.

3. The other contingency – will the US cooperate with Russia in the campaign
to defeat the ISIS. With the backdrop of Ukraine related trust deficit, to
undertake such a measure of cooperation and diplomacy is unlikely. A
situation of utter complexity with potential of armed standoff is what
analysts fear will mark the near future; that is until something more
definitive appears in the battle situation.
The Iran Nuclear Deal is still not cemented; will there be any effect on that.
An Iran-Russia equation clearly brings out a typical cold war situation.
However, US may also realize the need to prevent Iran going completely
Russia’s way.
One of the most significant players in West Asia is Saudi Arabia. The
developing situation is obviously not to its liking as the entire region from
Iran to Mediterranean will come under Russian-Iranian control and if Russia
withdraws early the situation would decidedly be in favor of Iran. In the
sectarian conflict with Iran such a strategic piece of territory coming under
Iranian dominance is not acceptable to the Saudis. Militarily Saudi Arabia is
also involved in Yemen and the war is not going too favorably for it. The
Saudi-Israeli axis has the common cause of denying Iran the strategic space
and in that it will have the support of the US. The US is likely to refocus
attention on West Asia and a resurgence of US-Saudi ties would be on the
cards for short term gains in preventing the balance of power shifting in the
direction of Iran.
Militarily, the situation remains uncertain but the weight of the Russian
military engagement in the last few weeks and the commencement of
ground operations early are positive indicators. Whether the ISIS will receive
support from any quarters to contest the Russian combine is doubtful
because of the reputation that it has established for itself. However, one
thing is clear and that is the phenomenon that national boundaries are no
obstacles to movement of human beings, arms and other military
wherewithal. It may still have multiple sources of funding and manpower.
Resistance can therefore continue for long.
The effect on Russia’s own 11 million Muslim (mostly Sunni) populations is
an issue of concern for it. A large number of ISIS fighters are from Russia
and a long drawn stand off will remain a source of worry for Russia.
Is there a chance for diplomacy to yet succeed? There are
configurations likely in various talks in the near future. The Russians are
speaking to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and just about anyone else. After
Assad’s red carpet welcome at Moscow on 21 Oct 2015 it is clear that Russia
backs Assad completely. Yet, more consultations are being set up at Vienna
where it is likely that Russia will attempt to convince others on the need for

4. treating Assad differently while they all make common cause against the
greater danger from ISIS. That is a tall order but that Russia is seen as the
lead player in both the military and diplomatic initiatives on West Asia is a
great achievement for Putin. The US could not be too happy about this and
its own receding importance in as crucial a region as West Asia.