This document summarizes a roundtable discussion on strategic lessons from stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Solomon Islands. The key themes that emerged were: 1) Leadership and unity of effort are challenging but critical for effective transitions from external to local control. 2) Local and external actors must work together under a shared plan with mutually reinforcing civilian and military activities. 3) Joint assessment teams are needed to accurately understand needs and inform policy, and regular interagency meetings improve coordination. 4) National reviews of coordination, decision-making, and communication can identify lessons to improve future crisis responses.

1. Report of the International Case-Study Roundtable on Strategic
Lessons from Stabilisation in Afghanistan, Haiti and Solomon Islands
10 December 2010, Canberra

2. ExEcutivE DirEctor’s
introDuction
The Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence contributes to the Australian Government’s efforts to enhance
international peace and security. It supports the development of national civil-military capabilities to prevent, prepare for, and
respond more effectively to, conflicts and disasters overseas. The Centre’s responsibilities include, amongst others, advising
Australian Government departments and agencies on civil-military issues relating to the development of integrated capabilities
to achieve a coherent, whole-of-government strategy for peace and stabilisation operations and on the transition between the
military and civilian phases of operations. In line with this focus, in December 2010 the Centre launched a major project called
the Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP), initiated by a Case-Study Roundtable on Strategic
Lessons from Stabilisation in Afghanistan, Haiti and Solomon Islands. The roundtable was held at the Australian Defence
Force’s Royal Military College - Duntroon, in Canberra on 10 December 2010.
The objectives of the roundtable discussion were to:
• Share national experiences and strategic lessons on implementing a civil-military approach in three current peace
and stabilisation operations; and
• Exchange views on the key civil-military issues, challenges and best practices to emerge from current operations
and highlight future priorities for improving national and international civil–military capabilities.
The roundtable drew on the experience of international government and non-government actors, including representatives
from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and Sweden. While the case studies represented very
different geopolitical and contextual problems, a common thread emerged. This highlighted the need for continued national
and international effort to understand stabilisation and its associated tasks more comprehensively, with a particular focus
on how and why it differs fundamentally from traditional approaches to development and security.
The Centre is pleased to continue to create networks internationally and domestically through forums such as this
roundtable. As we are now talking more about conflict affected and fragile states, with different types of threats and
non-state actors, it is becoming increasingly more important that we improve civil-military collaboration across the
‘Whole of Community’ spectrum. We also know that our governments will only develop robust policies if public servants
take seriously the responsibility to provide them comprehensive and considered advice. It’s important to ensure that
lessons learned are fed back into the decision making process, something that the Australian Federal Police’s International
Deployment Group has been able to do very effectively based upon their ongoing commitment to the Solomon Islands
and Timor Leste. We also need to acknowledge new initiatives such as the Australian Civilian Corps, and ensure that our
leaders support and resource such proposals at all levels across and all agencies.
Many of the lessons learned that are currently shaping future peace and stabilisation policies are being based on what is now
occurring in Afghanistan. Certainly many of these lessons are valid, but as we saw during this roundtable so are the lessons
learned from other engagements in places such as Haiti and the Solomon Islands. These lessons should not be ignored and
indeed should form the basis for developing more robust multiagency frameworks and capabilities. The Centre’s work on
a conceptual framework for Strengthening Australia’s Conflict and Disaster Management Overseas was the foundation of
our effort in this area. The MAPSOP now continues that work and will provide further opportunities to engage across the
Australian Government and the international community on civil-military issues in peace and stabilisation operations.
Michael G. Smith AO
Executive Director
Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence
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3. ExEcutivE suMMArY
Stabilisation is a term that tends to be over-used and under-analysed. The complexity of today’s multidimensional
crises has resulted in an evolution in the approach of intervention actors, and the international community as a whole,
to the task of bringing peace and stability to nations in crisis. This evolution has reached the point where it is now the
conventional wisdom that a comprehensive civil-military approach is required to address the various interconnected
problems of conflict and instability. The ‘3Ds’ – diplomacy, defence and development – are much talked about in terms
of a comprehensive or integrated approach, but there is arguably a fourth component, a fourth ‘D’ that represents the
stabilisation task: a period of time and space in which international governments intervene in situations of fragility or
conflict with a clear political purpose. This is fundamentally different to humanitarian and development work, and to
traditional security operations and policy makers need to understand how and why stabilisation operations are unique.
Stabilisation work very often involves relationships between people whose ethics and values are not the same, but which
require cooperation to achieve goals. Finding a way to negotiate the challenges of working in and with vastly different
cultures and polities requires pragmatism and a firm commitment to clear end goals. The international community’s
experience across a range of systems of government has served to demonstrate the limitations of Western models in
non-Western contexts. There are two important implications: often our own experts can’t help much and we need
a much broader view. Local ownership is now clearly understood as a necessary pre-condition for the reduction and/
or withdrawal of external assistance. It needs to be made a priority from the outset of a mission, and requires difficult
questions to be asked about what that means for the civilian, police and military operational objectives and how they
are to be achieved. Parallel early recovery and stabilisation planning and thinking must occur in the emergency phase
to ensure a longer-term view prevents short-terms ‘fixes’ that might inhibit stabilisation (and later peacebuilding and
development) efforts.
A clear articulation of the strategic objective of a stabilisation effort is important both for the psyche of commitment
and as a driver of planning. It sets the tone for a mission and assists in the dedication of capabilities and resources to the
response ahead of time. It is imperative for external support actors and local actors to work together under one plan
(and potentially several sub-plans tailored to geographic sub-regional requirements). Political efforts to establish effective
relations between the government and its people must be supported by civilian and military actors working together to
deliver a comprehensive and coherent range of activities across several mutually reinforcing lines of operations.
Relying on a network of individuals to pull together a multiagency approach to policy and operations in crisis situations
is considered inadequate in the longer-term. The institutionalisation of a systemic approach to multiagency collaboration
across the range of stabilisation tasks (analysis, assessment, planning, implementation, evaluation, lessons learned) is vital
to develop clear processes and mechanisms to support operational effectiveness. In a complex multidimensional conflict
there are often many moving parts. It is important to identify someone who can ‘turn on the switch’ and perform
as a focal point for a multiagency effort. Strong multiagency links across the entire security, development and peace
building community, ranging from the most senior decision-making and advisory bodies down to the Non-Government
Organisation level, have proven important to building effective capacity to apply a comprehensive and integrated
national civil-military approach to peace and stabilisation operations.
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4. A joint multiagency civilian, police and military capability to deploy to affected areas to assess needs, engage other
donors and the local government, and identify possible actions for external assistance is a critical capability. It is not
possible to build peace or to stabilise a situation unless there is an accurate understanding of why conflict broke out
in the first place. Conflict assessment built on broad based, multidisciplinary analysis is a necessary foundation for the
development of comprehensive policies and strategies for peace and stabilisation operations.
The inherently political nature of conflict necessitates the use of mediation as a tool to overcome legitimate political
grievances. The involvement and support (or at least not active resistance) of regional neighbours in any mediation
process is critical: and neighbours are often far better suited culturally to assist in resolving regional issues than distant
powers. The mobilisation of diplomatic efforts to manage crises and disasters is critical to effective responses. This can
also ensure there are no gaps within national efforts, and between national and international efforts.
This report provides a summary of a case-study roundtable held in Canberra in December 2010. It includes an
introduction to the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence’s Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations
Project (MAPSOP), of which this roundtable was the first activity (Section 1), a narrative overview of the key themes,
lessons, issues and ideas discussed at the roundtable (Section 2) and a catalogue, in dot point format, of the primary
lessons identified during the roundtable (Section 3) under the categories of:
• Strategic and Political Considerations;
• Implementing a Coherent Civil-Military Approach;
• Operational Considerations;
• Evaluation and Review; and
• Future Priorities/Areas of Focus.
The case-study roundtable provided a benchmark of international thought and opinion on civil-military interaction
in peace and stabilisation operations and this report serves to frame and inform the Centre’s subsequent MAPSOP
activities. The roundtable was held under the Chatham House rule: comments and references in this report are
not attributed.
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5. sEction 1:
tHE MuLtiAGEncY
PEAcE AnD stABiLisAtion
oPErAtions ProJEct
Overview. One of the key issues undermining effectiveness in peace and stability operations is a lack of coherence and
cooperation between civilian and military activities and actors. In addition, connectivity and responsiveness between
the strategic and operational divide is often sub-optimal, with the policy environment too far removed from operational
realities. Improving connectivity and coherence between national policy and strategy development and on-the-ground
situational realities, and between strategic and operational actors in peace and stabilisation operations contexts, is the
primary goal of the Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP).
Lessons learned from case studies such as Afghanistan, Haiti and the Solomon Islands highlight the reality that nations are
often required to make a strategic decision to deploy capabilities without the necessary strategic or operational analysis
to inform and develop a comprehensive and integrated civil-military response. There has been an historic tendency
to respond with a ‘security first’ approach, with civilian responses lagging significantly behind. The consideration and
development of integrated multiagency assessment, planning and responses for peace and stabilisation contingencies
outside of a crisis context is important to provide a solid foundation from which better and more integrated responses
can be formulated under the time and operational pressures of crises.
Practicing multiagency collaboration as a deliberate process provides the opportunity to strengthen existing, or create
new, collaborative frameworks and mechanisms that make the necessary and sensible connections across the ‘whole
of community’ spectrum of actors and actions. A key question for the MAPSOP is how to develop the required
connectivity and coherence within the Australian system, and between Australian and international actors, in a manner
that supports effective and timely strategic decision-making and enhances civil-military capability. Further, it is to consider
how to benefit from, and contribute effectively to, international developments and progress in multiagency approaches
to complex peace and stabilisation operations.
Concept: MAPSOP engages a core group of Australian Government policy and operational actors to form a community
of practice for peace and stabilisation operations and connects Australian efforts to the international community of
practice. This ensures that lessons learned in the international community are able to benefit the ongoing development
of Australia’s integrated civil-military capabilities for peace and stabilisation operations and similarly that Australia’s
evolving multiagency approach can be effectively shared with the international community. Drawing on existing
international and national assessment and planning tools and best practices, and with the benefit of the lessons learned
in the international community, the Australian community of practice will work together under the MAPSOP to apply a
multiagency approach to: conflict analysis and assessment; multiagency strategy development and planning; operational
implementation; and monitoring and evaluation, in a peace and stabilisation operations scenario-based series of activities.
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6. Australian Government actors will consider how a multiagency approach can enhance individual agency processes,
and vice versa, and help guide the development of Australian multiagency frameworks and mechanisms. This work will
provide a more robust insight into Australia’s experiences in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, Bougainville, and Solomon Islands
and can usefully inform future thinking about peace and stabilisation operations.
MAPSOP Outcomes:
• A stronger ‘Whole of Government’ and ‘Whole of Community’ approach to policy, planning and implementation
for peace and stabilisation operations by enhancing multiagency collaboration and interaction between key policy
and operational actors.
• The development of a cadre of personnel within relevant agencies who have a robust understanding of the
nature of modern peace and stabilisation operations and the range of tools, options and capabilities that can
most effectively be applied in the process of developing and implementing multiagency responses.
• Development of a more formalised collaborative multiagency framework at the working level for peace and
stabilisation operations scenarios.
• Greater awareness within agencies of their counterpart agencies’ perspectives, processes and priorities, as well
as their individual and collective capabilities, roles and responsibilities in peace and stabilisation operations.
• A stronger capacity within the Australian policy and operational community to understand and work effectively
with the interdependencies that exist across the entire peace and stabilisation spectrum of activities.
• New or enhanced processes, mechanisms and frameworks for horizontal communication and collaboration
across agency and community boundaries.
• Identification of ways to manage the seams between agency efforts outside of a crisis situation so that when
the next operation looms there is a strong collaborative framework to inform high level policy making and
options development.
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7. sEction 2:
strAtEGic LEssons
FroM intErnAtionAL
stABiLisAtion EFForts in
AFGHAnistAn, soLoMon
isLAnDs AnD HAiti
The case studies presented at the roundtable provide valuable lessons that can be used to shape future decisions being
made by Australian and other national policy makers. It is clear that there are numerous common themes that link the
lessons learned across many international organisational and geopolitical contexts.
Leadership and unity of effort (strategic direction) present significant challenges in peace and stabilisation operations,
especially where local governance capacity differs markedly across a national or regional effort and where the security
situation is fluid and dynamic. Transitioning from significant external support to increasing (eventually complete) local
authority and control requires careful planning, a large degree of flexibility and considerable capacity for effective
mentoring, ensuring institutional and societal support and empowerment.
For full effectiveness, external and local actors must work together under one plan (and potentially several sub-plans
tailored to geographic sub-regional requirements). Political efforts to establish effective relations between the government
and its people must be supported by civilian and military actors working together to deliver a comprehensive and
coherent range of activities across several mutually reinforcing lines of operations. In stabilisation and peacebuilding
there is generally a wider mission: to facilitate good governance and longer term economic recovery of the affected
state. This work is best undertaken in a partnership arrangement or framework which outlines the key areas where
host nation and external actors will work together to achieve agreed goals.
A joint multiagency civilian and military capability to deploy to affected areas to assess needs, engage other donors
and the local government, and identify possible actions for external assistance is a critical capability. Joint civil-military
assessment teams should be well-prepared and trained to accurately interpret the needs of the society in crisis and
provide an effective policy foundation for decision-making. Throughout a crisis response and on-going stabilisation
operations regular interdepartmental meetings assist liaison and communication between government departments
and other operational actors.
National after-action reviews provide a useful mechanism to assess the effectiveness of coordination across government,
the policy basis of decision-making, the effectiveness of communication between the working level and senior
management (between the operational and strategic levels) and to identify results, best practices and lessons to
make recommendations to improve future responses.
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8. The role of oversight bodies and mechanisms needs to be brought to the fore of the discussion and work on
stabilisation. Oversight provides important external checks and balances which make decision makers accountable and
ensure resources are used far more efficiently. In order to make oversight effective there needs to be recognition in
bureaucracies that difficult news from the field - that approaches and programs are failing - is just as important as the
good news stories. Deployed personnel must be encouraged and rewarded for their honesty in reporting, particularly
where this demonstrates that efforts are failing to achieve their objectives.
The ‘3Ds’ – diplomacy, defence and development – are much talked about in terms of a comprehensive or integrated
approach to peace and stabilisation efforts. But there is arguably a fourth component that represents the stabilisation
task: a period of time and space in which international governments intervene in situations of fragility or conflict with a
political purpose. This is fundamentally different to humanitarian and development work, though stabilisation takes place
in a manner that is complementary (and all may be occurring at the same time), and policy makers need to understand
that stabilisation operations represent a different approach. The more key decision makers discuss it, the better they will
become at doing it.
Legislatures share a role in developing and managing policies and operations for stabilisation purposes. As an example,
in the US experience in Colombia there has been a significant (positive) turn-around in the situation because of the role
the US Congress has played. The involvement of Congress allowed a long term commitment of funding which makes
an important difference to how policies can be implemented and resourced. Resources were successfully secured for
Plan Columbia because consensus was reached about the strategic objectives and the level of commitment required to
achieve them in both Houses.
The voice of the local population is often dismissed, overlooked, or underrepresented in stabilisation efforts, as is often
the voice of the host government. While lip service is frequently paid to the importance of local voices there is rarely a
commensurate effort to understand how to take this forward meaningfully. First, there is a need to better understand
how to capture and use knowledge about the local population, government and conditions in a stabilisation operation:
how to tap into globally dispersed and locally based knowledge. Second, it is important to be alert to how learning
can occur (and be implemented) on the ground, what can be done to benchmark situations and what indicators are
important as measures of success in regards to the objectives.
A larger issue is to develop the capacity (or willingness) to remove the ‘policy-maker’ hat and decide to make local
ownership a priority in a stabilisation mission, placing the host nation at the centre of the effort. This requires taking
seriously the phrase ‘locally driven’ by asking what local ownership would actually look like, what lines in the sand might
have to be crossed? These are difficult but ultimately critical questions to address in the quest for ‘local ownership’ –
a necessary pre-condition to the withdrawal of direct external support.
Roundtable participants noted that good progress was being made in Southern Sudan because international actors
and donors were listening to what the Sudanese want. In Afghanistan, the more successful Departments tend to be
those managed and administered by the Afghans, which have received capacity support over several years and have
established technocrats within them, and have an official who is responsible for international donor coordination.
Similar lessons learned can be identified in other countries such as in post-tsunami Aceh where peace became possible
when guerrillas left the jungles and headed to the coast to look for their families: they became more effectively engaged
in decision-making about the peace process. The enormous scale of the tsunami disaster in Aceh provided the tragic
backdrop for renewed political engagement between key guerilla leaders and the Indonesian political leadership which
created favourable conditions for a peace agreement after 30 years of insurgency.
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9. Haiti is another important case study as it is a complex operation on a huge scale. The key challenges in Haiti stemmed
from the need to grapple with a range of interdependent issues after the earthquake, mostly around the theme of
civil-military interactions, especially with actors external to the UN mission. As well there were existing networks that
could be tapped but which were also stressed because of the devastation, there was a massive influx of well meaning
NGOs, many with no emergency management experience which was a strain on the system and priorities had to be
established to determine what issues needed early attention. The Haiti example provides an important reminder that
these responses are inherently difficult. But while the international community should continue to focus on what it can
do better, it should also recognise that lessons have been learned. The decision by the international community to hold
a donor’s meeting on 25 January 2010 (the Montreal Conference) and to underscore lessons from the past and abide by
a set of agreed principles to lead stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Haiti was notable. The international response
in Haiti was working reasonably well after only a few weeks. Though there were lost hours and huge challenges, there
were elements of the international response that went surprisingly well and that demonstrate that the international
community has successfully learnt and applied lessons from the past.
There is a distinction between learning lessons and applying them: applying lessons is difficult. Having standing capacities
and knowing contexts and counterparts is important. We may have this for Afghanistan, but consideration also needs to
be given to contingencies in places like North Korea, Sudan, and Central America. It is critical that decision-makers start
establishing the critical cross national and cross organisational relationships (among interested third parties, international
organisations and with important actors within a country itself where possible) vital to stabilisation efforts before a crisis
occurs. With so many lessons identified from stabilisation efforts their capture, analysis and dissemination becomes an
important issue in itself. Organisations that focus on lessons learned have an important role to play to ensure lessons are
not merely identified, but also learned and applied.
It is not possible to build peace unless there is an understanding of why war broke out in the first place. In many cases
the heart of the problem lies at the political level rather than in the field. It may therefore be necessary to use mediation
as a tool to overcome legitimate political grievances. The involvement and support (or at least not active resistance)
of regional neighbours in any mediation process is critical: neighbours are often far better suited culturally to assist in
resolving regional issues than distant powers. Emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India are demanding more
political clout in this regard and traditional stabilisation actors need to consider what role emerging powers might
play in these types of operations and how to open the door to effective engagement to encourage their support for
international peace and stabilisation efforts. The different perspectives that emerging powers offer could provide useful
ways to recast many of the problems of stabilisation, including by thinking more in terms of a partnership model with a
host nation rather than a donor-recipient model.
Strong multiagency links across the entire security, development and peace building community, ranging from the most
senior decision-making and advisory bodies down to the Non-Government Organisation level, have proven important
to building effective capacity to apply a comprehensive and integrated national civil-military approach to peace and
stabilisation operations. These relationships and links should be both formal and informal and are vital to success in
fragile and conflict affected states.
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10. sEction 3:
suMMArY oF LEssons
iDEntiFiED in tHE
rounDtABLE
Strategic and Political Considerations
1. Stabilisation objectives are most successful when they are grounded in a relevant historical and cultural context. For
example, the Helmand end plan for development as an economic corridor is consistent with its historical function in
that role.
2. Many political leadership initiatives and positions in insecure and weak states are inherently fragile. Setbacks are
almost inevitable and planning must take this into account.
3. Stabilisation processes often involve relationships between people with different sets of ethics and values. Finding a
way to negotiate the challenges of working in and with vastly different cultures and polities requires pragmatism and
a firm commitment to clear end goals.
4. The international community’s experience across a range of systems of government has served to demonstrate
the limitations of Western models in non-Western contexts. There are two important implications: often our own
experts can’t help much and; we need to be open to a broader view, often that of local authorities.
5. Local ownership is a necessary pre-condition for the reduction and/or withdrawal of external assistance. It needs
to be made a priority, and requires difficult questions to be asked about what that means for the operational
objectives and how they are to be achieved. State building efforts are more successful, for example, when a
(capable) local official in a department is responsible for international donor coordination.
6. The strategic concept for a stabilisation effort has to connect to and reflect operational realities in responsive and
dynamic ways. Setting a course in capitals and ‘taking our hands off the wheels until it is blatantly obvious it has all
gone horribly wrong’ is irresponsible and ineffective. Objectives, ideas and realities evolve and policy and operations
must be responsive to both an improving understanding of the context and changing situations on the ground.
7. Relying on a network of individuals to pull together a multiagency approach to policy and operations in crisis
situations is inadequate in the longer-term. The institutionalisation of a systemic approach to multiagency
collaboration across the range of stabilisation tasks is vital to develop clear processes and mechanisms to support
operational effectiveness. Of great value is political engagement and insistence at the political level on an integrated
national and international policy approach.
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11. 8. People-to-people ties are an important driver of strategic interest and can play an important role in continuing
domestic and international support to a stabilisation effort.
9. Existing internationally agreed principles provide an important framework for cohesive international responses. The
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)’s
‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’ provides an example of appropriate
guidance that can assist alignment between the approaches of the range of actors in stabilisation and peace operations.
10. The mobilisation of diplomatic efforts to manage crises and disasters is critical to effective responses. This can
ensure there are no gaps within national efforts, and between national and international efforts.
11. A clear articulation of the strategic objective of a stabilisation effort is important both for the psyche of
commitment and as a driver of planning. It sets the tone for a mission and assists in the dedication of capabilities
and resources to the response ahead of time.
12. A clear understanding of why people started fighting in the first place should provide the foundation for strategies
for peace or stabilisation operations. Regional neighbours are incredibly important. They have the capacity to
support or undermine the effort in important ways.
13. Greater consideration needs to be given to asking developing countries to contribute their views and support.
The perspectives of emerging powers should be represented in future international discussions about peace and
stabilisation. The international community has gained experience working in diverse stabilisation contexts in recent
years. There is a need for important on-going reflection on the lessons identified, including how to expand the
engagement of partners from the global south in stabilisation operations’.
Implementing a coherent civil-military approach
14. In a complex multidimensional conflict there are often many moving parts. It is important to identify someone to
‘turn on the switch’ and perform as a focal point for a multiagency effort.
15. National actors should develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that guide multiagency interaction and
collaboration in support of a coherent national strategy. Secondments and training are a positive corollary to SOPs.
16. Having a clear political lead is critical to prevent things ‘falling through the cracks’ and maintaining the primacy of the
political goal. Departments and Agencies are often ‘robbed’ to staff standing and/or adhoc interdepartmental task
forces and committees but such groups have proven vital to the coherence of the multiagency effort.
Operational Considerations
17. The location of the delivery of aid in stabilisation contexts can help to either support or undermine stabilisation
goals: for example, in Haiti the aid effort began to deliver aid outside of the disaster zone in safe places outside of
the city. This drew people away from the disaster zone, helped make room for the clean-up and possibly mitigated
drivers of instability and crime in city centres.
18. Parallel early recovery and stabilisation planning and thinking must occur in the emergency phase to ensure
a longer-term view prevents short-terms ‘fixes’ that can inhibit stabilisation (and later peacebuilding and
development) efforts.
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12. 19. Interdepartmental strategic assessment teams have proven useful in informing and calibrating different elements of a
national response and providing an accurate needs-based assessment of the requirement.
20. Embedding civilian policy and development officers within a military effort from the outset serves critical functions:
civilians can act as the civilian interface with NGOs, the United Nations and the host nation civilian government; and
they can begin planning for and supporting the soonest possible transition from a military to civilian lead, providing a
clear objective for military and civilian planning purposes.
21. The use and recruitment of local staff and connecting to local capabilities as soon as possible assists in developing
resilience and ensuring alignment with local goals, which is especially critical at points of transition.
22. Joint pre-deployment preparation of civilian, police and military actors is a major factor in their capacity to operate
as an effective and integrated team in the field.
23. In chaotic and demanding conditions it is important to think about rational capabilities and to use what is available to
deliver what’s needed. Sometimes this will result in second- or third-best options being deployed in the recognition
that these are most often better than nothing at all. Creativity and flexibility are critical in stabilisation efforts.
24. Grass roots and local actors should be considered as a central point – especially those with key decision making
capacity within society or government.
25. It is important to avoid duplication between international coordination mechanisms and those being established
by the government of the affected country.
Evaluation and Review
26. Systematic After Action Reviews after major catastrophic events should be conducted both internally and externally
comprising independent actors from civil society, headquarters, the field and capitals. External perspectives provide
insights that cannot be gained from internal reviews and are essential to understanding the effectiveness of a
response using objective measures.
27. The role of oversight mechanisms and bodies is important in enhancing effectiveness and the efficient use of
resources. The huge amount of money involved in stabilisation efforts requires consideration about the role of
money in fueling instability, corruption and criminality.
28. Evaluation and reporting is slow to identify failing programs and projects and is too focused on trying to ‘fix’
fundamentally flawed problems rather than accept that something is not working and consider a new approach.
29. Personnel need to be encouraged to provide (and be rewarded for providing) honest assessments of the success
of policies and programs, against a range of measures and metrics that are both strategically and locally relevant
to the objectives.
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13. Future Priorities / Areas of Focus
30. Small internal wars seem to be on the increase. If this so, stabilisation work will be an enduring requirement into
the foreseeable future. There is, therefore, a strong imperative to understand its nature, requirements and
mechanisms better.
31. There is often a disconnect between operational and policy/strategic frameworks for stabilisation. The operational/
strategic divide is a challenge that requires further focus and attention.
32. Coordination and alignment between host nation, bilateral and international efforts in stabilisation is a weak point.
Effort is required at the international level to enhance cooperative and collaborative frameworks and mechanisms
to support stabilisation efforts and develop best practices.
33. Stabilisation is not merely the sum of diplomatic, defence and development efforts (the 3Ds): it represents a
space and time period in which international organisations and governments are doing politically motivated work
to achieve distinct objectives. Traditional development and humanitarian efforts should be complementary to
stabilisation, but they are not the same.
34. There is a requirement to think again about the very complex relationship between ends, ways and means in
stabilisation contexts.
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14. w w w.c i v m i l co e . gov. au