2. evolutionary economics of copyrightmonopoly rents vs. business model adaptation Economics of IP (incentive, not asset) Why many economists are against IP - static & dynamic arguments Innovation, uncertainty and experimentation Jason Potts, CCI
3. Economic growth caused by new ideas but⊠fixed costs, free copying = no incentive so⊠Need IP to deal with this market failure LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION MARKET SOLUTION maybe the competitive process will work ok⊠âŠor
4. from the economic perspective What is copyright/IP for? Incentive for novelty Temporary monopoly Fixed costs All else is rent Not to create an asset
5. IP is not a form of property IP is closer to a form of market protectionism Thatâs why economists donât like it so much. They are not fooled by the word âpropertyâ
6. IP is not intended to create property But it does create long-lived rents
7. Who likes IP & why? Creators & companies like it, as an asset (property income) IP lawyers like it (service revenue) Consumers, Librarians, etc donât (cost) But economists understand IP as an institutional incentive artificial monopoly (rent) as a mechanism to achieve an end institutional configurations are âtechnologiesâ competes with other âinstitutional technologiesâ they like it or not depending upon whether it works as an incentive
8. What is this really all about? novelty under competition Some say it canât exist Others say it can
9. either there is, or there is not, market failure in the incentive and appropriation mechanism for the production of new ideas that drives economic growth ⊠a testable proposition most evidence is that âthere is notâŠâ
10. Testable how? Validation: strong IP & growth Falsification: weak IP & growth Can we find weak IP regimes where new ideas drive economic growth? 19C Switzerland (B&L 2006) Fashion industry (R&S 2006) China music (M&P 2009) German music (Handke 2009) Open source (Benkler 2006)
11. Hirshleifer J (1971) âThe Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activityâ American Economic Review 61: 561-574. Liebowitz, S (1985) âCopying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals.â Journal of Political Economy,95(5): 945-57. Klein B, A Lerner, K Murphy (2002) âIntellectual property: Do we need it? The economics of copyright fair use in a networked worldâ American Economic Review, 92(2) 205-8. Romer P (2002) âWhen should we use intellectual property rights?â American Economic Review, 92(2) 213-6. Boldrin M, Levine K (2002) âThe case against intellectual propertyâ American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 92(2) 209-12. Boldrin, M. Levine K (2005) âThe Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Propertyâ, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102, 1252-56. http://c4sif.org/ Centre for the study of innovative freedom
12. 19C Switzerland Fashion industry China music German music Open source Novels in 19C US Software (most network) Drugs (!) Design ⊠What do these strong IP âcounterfactualsâ have in common? all outcomes of intense innovation-driven competition First to market New business models Reputation/branding effects i.e. âotherâ appropriation mechanisms
13. But without IP, wonât people just copy the successful ideas/businesses/works?
14. But without IP, wonât people just copy the successful ideas/businesses/works?
15. How do you know whatâs successful? Because theyâve already⊠Sold lots of copies Been widely adopted Made lots of money Garnered reputation So ⊠explain why we need copyright again?
19. IP skepticism (pre-internet age) IP abolitionism (post-internet age) âŠeither the copyright system adapts to the natural advantage that has evolved [digital technology & internet] or it will perish Francis Gurry, WIPO
20.
21. Two lines of economics against IP Neoclassical not property, but monopoly rents Evolutionary/Austrian not effective appropriation mechanism; other mechanisms far more important, e.g. business models
22. The economic issue Analysis of dynamic gains (incentive to innovate) vs. static losses (monopoly pricing) Posner (2003) Proponents of IP must argue that: dynamic gains > static losses Yet many economists think: the dynamic gains are mostly rents Vaidhyanathan 2001, Klein, Lerner & Murphy 2002, Jaffe & Lerner 2006, Boldrin & Levine 2008 (2) there are even more losses Landes & Posner 1989, Bessen & Raskind 1991, Wu 2006
23. Innovation & evolutionary economists think IP laws are broken tooNo evidence IP works as an effective appropriation mechanism Dynamic competition Dynamic competence Costly routines Complementary assets Absorbtive capacity These factors explain incentive to innovate IPR relatively unimportant
24. Novelty incentive & appropriation IPR a weak solution Effects of uncertainty IPR can compound the problem due to new technologyâŠ
25. creative industries markets are characterized byuncertaintyexplains therole of discovery & experimentationon the producer and consumer side problem solution
27. Tim Wu (2006) The problem with strong IP is that because it creates monopoly it also centralizes industry structure & thus decision making Thatâs not good for experimentation
28. Potts & Montgomery (2010)on Chinese music industry (weak IP enforcement) business model adaptation works Same finding for German music industry (Handke 2009) That is good for experimentation
29. Joe Karaganis, SSRC 3 year, 6 country multipartner study on causes of piracy âOur explanation is very simple: high prices for media goods, low incomes, and cheap digital technologies are the main ingredients of global media piracy. If piracy is ubiquitous in most parts of the world, it is because these conditions are ubiquitous.â This is what happens when single business models are applied globally
30. (2) Uncertainty in demand Social network markets When choice demands on choices of others Novelty bundling markets When multiple novelty is better than single
31. So⊠strong IP can stymie business model adaptation & innovation, and also social learning in context of uncertainty This is⊠an unintended consequence that harms industry evolution
Hinweis der Redaktion
You are there to help the audience shift their heads from the very specific, practical proposal being put forward by Frances, towards the bigger, more theoretical questions that researchers should be tackling.his symposium explores the transformation of creative industry business models in response to digital technologyThis session considers business model innovation and the role of copyright in a digital age from a broader perspective. Are there lessons that might be taken from âBlue Oceanâ markets like China and India? How does the shift from an informal economy dependant on piracy, towards a more structured industry, occur? And what value can copyright offer in this context?