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Passive Intelligence
Gathering and Analytics
- It’s all Just Metadata!
@ChrisTruncer
Whoami
● Christopher Truncer (@ChrisTruncer)
○  Mandiant’s Red Team
○  Florida State Seminole
○  Open Source Developer
■  Veil Framework
■  Egress-Assess
■  EyeWitness, etc
What’s this talk about?
● Understanding Our Threats
● Threat Intelligence
● Just-Metadata
● Intel Gathering and Analytics
● Intel/Analytics Module Development
● Tempt the Demo Gods
Understanding Our Threats
Who Are Our Threats?
●  Identify - who/what are our threats?
○  What are their motivations?
○  How do they commonly operate?
○  Are they a “sophisticated threat”?
○  What do we know about them?
First Steps
●  You may not know everyone who is
targeting your organization
●  Put yourself in a position to gather as
much information as possible
○  Log, log, log
○  Actually read/use the logs
○  Parse for useful info
What Should You Get?
●  What should you be looking for?
○  Anything that stands out to you
■  Web pages/resources only
employees view (OWA, employee
login)?
■  Resources on non-standard ports
being discovered?
Other Data to Gather
●  Company being targeted by malware
○  Perform static and/or dynamic
analysis on malware
■  (Not using VirusTotal right?)
●  Let’s not tip off our attackers
■  Identify callback domains/IPs
■  Determine protocol(s) used
What’s Next?
●  Now that you have data, what next?
○  Don’t tip off the attackers
○  Start investigating what could be
the recon phase for an attacker
●  Can passive intelligence help?
Passive Intelligence Gathering
http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/PassiveInfoPart1.html
Threat Intelligence is..
https://www.cert.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/An-introduction-to-threat-intelligence.pdf
Threat Intelligence is..
Rebekah Brown - https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2015/12/27/charlie-brown-threat-
intelligence
●  Who do attackers normally target?
○  Industries
○  Countries
●  What type of data are they targeting?
■  PII? Intellectual Property?
Defense Data?
●  Known TTPs? Motivations?
What Information is Useful
This information would be
great to have
Threat Intel Issues
●  Feeds can be expensive
●  May not contain threats relevant to
your organization
●  Rely on analysis of others
●  Can attackers subscribe?
●  Can you justify the cost through the
information you receive?
Is there another option?
Open Source Intelligence Gathering
●  Historically thought of by gathering
freely available data manually:
○  Newspaper articles
○  Magazines
●  Since changed to include electronic
mediums
○  blogs, wikis, mailing lists
○  “collectors”
Open Source Intelligence Gathering
●  Good alternative to traditional active
information gathering techniques
●  OSINT has been around for years
○  Internet & Instant communications
can enhance its effectiveness
●  “...the chief difficulty is in identifying
relevant, reliable sources from…
publicly available info…”
Open Source Intelligence Gathering
●  Pros:
○  Can be very low cost, if not free
○  Don’t alert target(s) of
investigation
●  Cons:
○  Info as good as the source
○  You aren’t generating the intel
Starting Point?
●  Build a list of IPs or domains
○  You want to know more about these
■  Accessing sensitive resources
■  Callback domains?
■  Something custom to your
environment
●  You now have a starting point
Analyzing Data
●  So you have a start, what’s next?
○  Don’t tip off the attackers
■  You don’t need to use any tool
within your network
○  “Blind” intel gathering
■  Look for relationships
○  How can we do this?
Just-Metadata
Just-Metadata Design Goals
●  Fast & easy setup
●  Minimal configurations
●  Lightweight with minimal
dependencies
●  Automate the mundane processes
Just-Metadata Usage Goals
●  Analysis of large datasets
○  Identify useful/interesting info
○  Enrich metadata
●  Agile/Easily customizable framework
○  Utilizes a modular framework
●  Ability to save/load current work state
Just-Metadata Usage
●  Feed Just-Metadata a file containing
IPs/Domains you are interested in
●  Start the automated intel gathering
process
●  Identify “interesting” relationships
Loading IPs
Usability Point
●  Data is stored in memory for quick
access, but obviously is volatile
●  Needed the ability to save the current
state of Just-Metadata
○  All IPs loaded into the framework
○  All data gathered also in framework
Usability Point
●  With a saved state, user doesn’t need
to gather data again
●  Python Pickles to the rescue!
○  IP Objects saved
○  Need to “stress test” how many can
be loaded
Saving States
Importing States
Gathering Intel
Intel Gathering Reminder!
●  Your intelligence is only as good as
your source
○  Consider your sources when
evaluating the credibility of
information
Intel Gathering Goals
●  Automate the intelligence gathering
process
●  Collect as much data as possible
●  Keep data in a format that is easily
parsable
Just-Metadata Intel Sources
●  Network Whois
(Python lib.)
●  Geo-Location
Information
●  Shodan
○  Needs API
Key
●  VirusTotal
●  Various Threat
Feeds
○  Animus
○  Alienvault
○  etc.
Analysis Modules
Analysis Modules
●  At this point, we’ve collected a lot of
data
○  But right now… it’s just a bunch of
data
●  Extracting meaningful information
from the larger dataset is what
provides value
Analysis Modules
●  Geo Info
●  Countries
●  Feed Hits
●  Keys
●  Port Search
●  Top Ports
●  VirusTotal Hits
●  Whois CIDR
Geo Info
●  Parses Geolocation Data - gives the
top “X” results for:
●  Timezones
●  ISP
●  GPS Coordinates
●  Country
●  State
●  City
●  Zip Code
Port Modules
●  Top Ports - Parses Shodan information
to display the top X open ports across
systems
●  Port Search - Searches across all
systems for a specific port
Feed Hits
●  Queries/Parses freely available threat
feeds
●  Blocklist.de
●  NoThinkMalware
●  AntiSpam
●  MalwareBytes
●  etc...
●  TOR Exit Nodes
●  Animus Project
●  EmergingThreats
●  Alienvault
Keys
●  Parses Shodan information and
identifies any system(s) with the
same:
○  SSH Keys
○  HTTPS Certificates
○  Certificate Chains
VirusTotal
○  Shared detected samples
○  Each IP’s total detected samples
○  Shared undetected samples
○  etc...
●  Parses VirusTotal results and looks for
the following information:
Goal of Analysis Modules
Provide meaning to collected data
Module Development
Module Development
●  Multiple “stock” intel gathering and
analysis modules
○  Can’t account for everything
○  I don’t know what’s important to
your environment
Module Development
●  Intel gathering and analysis modules
are Python classes
●  Drag and drop modules into their
respective folders
○  Framework auto-detects modules
●  Each IP has an IP Object
○  All data stored here
Intel Gathering Modules
●  Two required methods
○  __init__
■  cli_name
■  description
○  gather method
■  Receives dict containing all IPs
■  Intel gathered and saved here
Analysis Modules
●  Two required methods
○  __init__
■  cli_name
■  description
○  analyze
■  Received IP objects
■  Parsing and output done here
Use Cases
●  Gathering information on:
○  Systems scanning you
○  Malware callback Ip
●  OSINT gathering/analysis on
assessment target(s)
●  Many other use cases
○  Systems scanning you
○  Malware callback IPs
Future Work
●  Additional intel sources
●  Additional analytical modules
○  What else is useful to you?
●  Time comparisons?
●  Beyond IPs/Domains
○  MD5s?
?
●  Github
○  https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/Just-Metadata
●  Chris Truncer
○  @ChrisTruncer
○  CTruncer@christophertruncer.com

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Passive Intelligence Gathering and Analytics - It's All Just Metadata!

  • 1. Passive Intelligence Gathering and Analytics - It’s all Just Metadata! @ChrisTruncer
  • 2. Whoami ● Christopher Truncer (@ChrisTruncer) ○  Mandiant’s Red Team ○  Florida State Seminole ○  Open Source Developer ■  Veil Framework ■  Egress-Assess ■  EyeWitness, etc
  • 3. What’s this talk about? ● Understanding Our Threats ● Threat Intelligence ● Just-Metadata ● Intel Gathering and Analytics ● Intel/Analytics Module Development ● Tempt the Demo Gods
  • 5. Who Are Our Threats? ●  Identify - who/what are our threats? ○  What are their motivations? ○  How do they commonly operate? ○  Are they a “sophisticated threat”? ○  What do we know about them?
  • 6. First Steps ●  You may not know everyone who is targeting your organization ●  Put yourself in a position to gather as much information as possible ○  Log, log, log ○  Actually read/use the logs ○  Parse for useful info
  • 7. What Should You Get? ●  What should you be looking for? ○  Anything that stands out to you ■  Web pages/resources only employees view (OWA, employee login)? ■  Resources on non-standard ports being discovered?
  • 8. Other Data to Gather ●  Company being targeted by malware ○  Perform static and/or dynamic analysis on malware ■  (Not using VirusTotal right?) ●  Let’s not tip off our attackers ■  Identify callback domains/IPs ■  Determine protocol(s) used
  • 9. What’s Next? ●  Now that you have data, what next? ○  Don’t tip off the attackers ○  Start investigating what could be the recon phase for an attacker ●  Can passive intelligence help?
  • 11.
  • 13. Threat Intelligence is.. Rebekah Brown - https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2015/12/27/charlie-brown-threat- intelligence
  • 14. ●  Who do attackers normally target? ○  Industries ○  Countries ●  What type of data are they targeting? ■  PII? Intellectual Property? Defense Data? ●  Known TTPs? Motivations? What Information is Useful
  • 15. This information would be great to have
  • 16. Threat Intel Issues ●  Feeds can be expensive ●  May not contain threats relevant to your organization ●  Rely on analysis of others ●  Can attackers subscribe? ●  Can you justify the cost through the information you receive?
  • 17. Is there another option?
  • 18. Open Source Intelligence Gathering ●  Historically thought of by gathering freely available data manually: ○  Newspaper articles ○  Magazines ●  Since changed to include electronic mediums ○  blogs, wikis, mailing lists ○  “collectors”
  • 19. Open Source Intelligence Gathering ●  Good alternative to traditional active information gathering techniques ●  OSINT has been around for years ○  Internet & Instant communications can enhance its effectiveness ●  “...the chief difficulty is in identifying relevant, reliable sources from… publicly available info…”
  • 20. Open Source Intelligence Gathering ●  Pros: ○  Can be very low cost, if not free ○  Don’t alert target(s) of investigation ●  Cons: ○  Info as good as the source ○  You aren’t generating the intel
  • 21. Starting Point? ●  Build a list of IPs or domains ○  You want to know more about these ■  Accessing sensitive resources ■  Callback domains? ■  Something custom to your environment ●  You now have a starting point
  • 22. Analyzing Data ●  So you have a start, what’s next? ○  Don’t tip off the attackers ■  You don’t need to use any tool within your network ○  “Blind” intel gathering ■  Look for relationships ○  How can we do this?
  • 24. Just-Metadata Design Goals ●  Fast & easy setup ●  Minimal configurations ●  Lightweight with minimal dependencies ●  Automate the mundane processes
  • 25. Just-Metadata Usage Goals ●  Analysis of large datasets ○  Identify useful/interesting info ○  Enrich metadata ●  Agile/Easily customizable framework ○  Utilizes a modular framework ●  Ability to save/load current work state
  • 26. Just-Metadata Usage ●  Feed Just-Metadata a file containing IPs/Domains you are interested in ●  Start the automated intel gathering process ●  Identify “interesting” relationships
  • 28. Usability Point ●  Data is stored in memory for quick access, but obviously is volatile ●  Needed the ability to save the current state of Just-Metadata ○  All IPs loaded into the framework ○  All data gathered also in framework
  • 29. Usability Point ●  With a saved state, user doesn’t need to gather data again ●  Python Pickles to the rescue! ○  IP Objects saved ○  Need to “stress test” how many can be loaded
  • 33. Intel Gathering Reminder! ●  Your intelligence is only as good as your source ○  Consider your sources when evaluating the credibility of information
  • 34. Intel Gathering Goals ●  Automate the intelligence gathering process ●  Collect as much data as possible ●  Keep data in a format that is easily parsable
  • 35. Just-Metadata Intel Sources ●  Network Whois (Python lib.) ●  Geo-Location Information ●  Shodan ○  Needs API Key ●  VirusTotal ●  Various Threat Feeds ○  Animus ○  Alienvault ○  etc.
  • 36.
  • 38. Analysis Modules ●  At this point, we’ve collected a lot of data ○  But right now… it’s just a bunch of data ●  Extracting meaningful information from the larger dataset is what provides value
  • 39. Analysis Modules ●  Geo Info ●  Countries ●  Feed Hits ●  Keys ●  Port Search ●  Top Ports ●  VirusTotal Hits ●  Whois CIDR
  • 40. Geo Info ●  Parses Geolocation Data - gives the top “X” results for: ●  Timezones ●  ISP ●  GPS Coordinates ●  Country ●  State ●  City ●  Zip Code
  • 41.
  • 42. Port Modules ●  Top Ports - Parses Shodan information to display the top X open ports across systems ●  Port Search - Searches across all systems for a specific port
  • 43.
  • 44.
  • 45. Feed Hits ●  Queries/Parses freely available threat feeds ●  Blocklist.de ●  NoThinkMalware ●  AntiSpam ●  MalwareBytes ●  etc... ●  TOR Exit Nodes ●  Animus Project ●  EmergingThreats ●  Alienvault
  • 46.
  • 47. Keys ●  Parses Shodan information and identifies any system(s) with the same: ○  SSH Keys ○  HTTPS Certificates ○  Certificate Chains
  • 48.
  • 49.
  • 50.
  • 51. VirusTotal ○  Shared detected samples ○  Each IP’s total detected samples ○  Shared undetected samples ○  etc... ●  Parses VirusTotal results and looks for the following information:
  • 52.
  • 53. Goal of Analysis Modules Provide meaning to collected data
  • 54.
  • 56. Module Development ●  Multiple “stock” intel gathering and analysis modules ○  Can’t account for everything ○  I don’t know what’s important to your environment
  • 57. Module Development ●  Intel gathering and analysis modules are Python classes ●  Drag and drop modules into their respective folders ○  Framework auto-detects modules ●  Each IP has an IP Object ○  All data stored here
  • 58.
  • 59. Intel Gathering Modules ●  Two required methods ○  __init__ ■  cli_name ■  description ○  gather method ■  Receives dict containing all IPs ■  Intel gathered and saved here
  • 60.
  • 61.
  • 62. Analysis Modules ●  Two required methods ○  __init__ ■  cli_name ■  description ○  analyze ■  Received IP objects ■  Parsing and output done here
  • 63.
  • 64. Use Cases ●  Gathering information on: ○  Systems scanning you ○  Malware callback Ip ●  OSINT gathering/analysis on assessment target(s) ●  Many other use cases ○  Systems scanning you ○  Malware callback IPs
  • 65. Future Work ●  Additional intel sources ●  Additional analytical modules ○  What else is useful to you? ●  Time comparisons? ●  Beyond IPs/Domains ○  MD5s?
  • 66. ? ●  Github ○  https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/Just-Metadata ●  Chris Truncer ○  @ChrisTruncer ○  CTruncer@christophertruncer.com