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Egress-Assess and
Owning Data Exfiltration
Christopher Truncer & Stephan Borosh
Who We Are
● Christopher Truncer (@ChrisTruncer)
○  Veil Framework Developer, Florida State Seminole
● Steve Borosh (@424f424f)
○  U.S. Army Infantry Combat Veteran, bug hunter
● Red Teamers, Pen Testers, and Security
Researchers for Veris Group’s Adaptive
Threat Division
What’s this talk about?
●  Data Exfiltration Today
○  Motivations and goals
●  Egress-Assess
○  State of the framework
○  Technical discussion of tunneling
protocols
○  PowerShell component
○  Developing new modules
●  Tempt the Demo Gods
Modern Day Ownage
http://www.ozarksfirst.com/media/lib/184/2/1/c/
21c76ea6-2da0-4287-90ea-1a156ec78d14/Story.jpg
http://i0.wp.com/static.bangordailynews.com/wp-content/
blogs.dir/254/files/2015/02/anthemHACKED-450x338.jpg?
quality=90&w=588
Moar Ownage
http://epmgaa.media.lionheartdms.com/img/photos/2014/01/13/
Target_t750x550.jpg?626c74b6d570df44fd02ecca30244159e005ff34 http://cbsnews2.cbsistatic.com/hub/i/r/2014/10/03/
e4f01ebf-2679-4336-93fc-010cbf978d1d/thumbnail/
940x470/1f6caf32404b9d045f81ceb9015694f9/
en100314mason286601640x360.jpg
What’s the target?
●  Home Depot
○  Credit cards and e-mail addresses
●  Anthem
○  SSNs, name, address, income… everything
●  Target
○  Credit cards, names, e-mails, phone numbers
●  JP Morgan
○  Customer account data
Attackers don’t just target this...
http://2we26u4fam7n16rz3a44uhbe1bq2.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/
041514_1356_MurderingDe30.png
What’s the point?
●  End Goal -
Money/Data
○  !disrupt,
○  !deny,
○  !degrade
○  !destroy (maybe
deceive)
○  Not just shells
anymore
○  Data - grab it,
get it out
...they target
this
Assessment Lifecycle
Attacker C2 Comms
Tradecraft Evolution
●  Pen Tests traditionally exploit
vulnerabilities
○  Find and exploit vulnerabilities
○  Assess the security as a point in time
●  Why not add in some exfiltration
testing as well?
○  Attackers DO this, why not help prep our
customers?
○  Let’s emulate our threats
Our Solution
What does it do?
●  Standard client/server model
●  Simulates data exfiltration
○  Faux social security numbers or credit
cards
○  And now real files :)
●  Exfils over multiple protocols
Project Goals
●  Fast to set up for use
●  Minimal (if any)
configurations
required to work
●  Lightweight and no
excessive
dependencies
●  Exfiltrate data over
different protocols
●  Modular framework
that allows easy
expansion of
capabilities
Project Goals
●  Store all data/files transferred for proof
of transfer
○  Stored in a specific directory
○  Time and date stamped for correlation with blue
team logs
●  Demonstrate different options for data
exfiltration and help test blue team
detection capabilties
Tunneling Protocols
Supported Tunneling Protocols
●  Protocols merged into Egress-Assess
●  ICMP
●  SMB
●  DNS
●  DNS_Resolved
●  HTTP
●  HTTPS
●  FTP
●  SFTP
FTP and SFTP
●  Generates faux data and writes it to
disk, or transfers a file specified by user
●  Creates FTP or SFTP connection to
server and transfers the file to the
server
●  If faux data is used, it deletes the file
FTP Transfer
ICMP
●  Takes advantage of ICMP type 8 (echo)
○  Protocol allows you to specify the data used
in the echo request
●  Splits data in 1100 byte chunks
●  Base64 encodes data
●  Uses encoded data for the echo
ICMP Transfer
DNS (Direct)
●  Uses DNS TXT records
○  Max 255 bytes
●  Split data into chunks, base64 encode
each chunk, send packets directly to
Egress-Assess server
●  Multiple limitations when working with
DNS
○  Size restrictions, UDP, etc.
■  We’d say a joke, but you might not get it :)
DNS (Direct) Transfer
Direct Comms Woes
●  Other protocol modules work well, but
fail when a proxy is required
●  Other tools have shown that DNS can be
used as a communications channel
○  Cobalt Strike’s Beacon, dns tunnelling
projects (dnscat), etc.
○  Began researching different methods
to exfil data via DNS
Why Use DNS
●  “But we don’t allow port 53 out!”
●  Locked down environments can have
proxies
●  How many people inspect DNS?
○  How many people only resolve certain
domains?
○  Can you block protocol compliant C2 comms
or data exfiltration attempts?
●  Customer’s own DNS server FTW!
DNS (Resolved)
●  Resolves local system’s nameserver
●  Send request to system/network
nameserver
○  <base64encodeddata>.subdomain.domai
n.com
●  Server listens for incoming DNS A record
request
○  Grabs record being requested, decodes
it, and writes data to disk
http://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/06/20/thatll-never-work-we-dont-allow-port-53-out/
DNS Resolved Setup
●  Create DNS A record for your final
destination
●  Create NS Record for subdomain, point
to A record
https://www.christophertruncer.com/exfiltrate-data-via-dns-with-egress-
assess/
DNS (Direct) Transfer
More DNS Woes
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1HfXVJyXElzBshZ9SYNjBwJf_4MBaho6UcATTFwApfXw/preview?sle=true&slide=id.g2d0184395_097
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1HfXVJyXElzBshZ9SYNjBwJf_4MBaho6UcATTFwApfXw/preview?
sle=true&slide=id.g34d85052a_00
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1HfXVJyXElzBshZ9SYNjBwJf_4MBaho6UcATTFwApfXw/preview?sle=true&slide=id.g34d85052a_00
DNS Info
●  Leads to problems when transferring
files
○  Faux data, don’t need to preserve order, or
100% integrity
○  Binary files, this is a problem
●  Currently working on essentially TCP
over UDP DNS transfers
Powershell Client
PowerShell all the things
●  Same client modules as Python client
●  Simulate attackers from Windows
systems
●  Domain proxy support
●  Deployable through Beacon,
Meterpreter, etc..
Get-Help
Beacon Deployment
Beacon HTTP SSN Receive
●  ./Egress-Assess.py --server http
●  Data saved in Egress-Assess/data/(timestamp)web_data.txt
Beacon HTTP SSN Transfer
HTTP Snort Capture
Weaponization
NTDS.dit
Setup for SMB Delivery
●  ./Egress-Assess.py --server SMB
●  Shared as //host/data (anonymous read/write)
●  Data saved in Egress-Assess/data/
Delivery Via SMB
SMB NTDS.dit Receive
Module Development
Protocol Modules
●  Used to create Client and Server
modules for Egress-Assess
●  The transport mechanism for the
generated (or real) data to exfil
●  Eight different modules currently
○  HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SFTP, SMTP, ICMP, DNS,
DNS_Resolved
Client Protocol Modules
●  Single “Protocol” Python Class
●  __init__ method
○  All it needs is a name
○  Access to all CLI options (for username,
pass, etc.)
●  transmit method
○  Data to be exfiltrated is passed in, and is
used to transfer data
Datatype Modules
●  Modules which create data to be
exfiltrated by the framework
●  Currently there are two generators
○  Social Security Numbers
○  Credit Card Numbers
●  But any sort of data can be generated by
Egress-Assess and used for exfil
Datatype Module
●  Single “Datatype” Python class
●  __init__ method
○  Give your module a name, description, and
“type” of data generated
○  All CLI options passed in to this method
●  generate_data method
○  This method is called to generate and
return the data that is to be transferred
Shameless Hiring Plug
●  We’re growing!
●  Want to research cool stuff?
●  Want to work with 13 x OSCPs and 4 x
OSCEs?
●  Benefits: Research budget, training budget.
●  Hit us up to join Veris Group’s Adaptive
Threat Division!
?
●  Github
○  https://github.com/ChrisTruncer/Egress-Assess
●  Chris Truncer
○  @ChrisTruncer
○  CTruncer@christophertruncer.com
●  Steve Borosh
○  @424f424f
○  steveborosh@rvrsh3ll.net

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Egress-Assess and Owning Data Exfiltration