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Unmasking Miscreants
Derbycon 3.0
Allison Nixon && Brandon Levene
(⌐■_■)
( •_•)>⌐■-■
( •_•)
About Us (⌐■_■)--︻╦╤─ - - -
● Allison Nixon (@nixonnixoff)
○ Incident Response & Pentesting at Integralis
○ GCIA
○ Independent Security Researcher focused on
malicious services
● Brandon Levene (@seraphimdomain)
○ Incident Handler for large cloud provider
○ GCIH, GCIA, GPEN
○ Independent Security Researcher focused on Exploit
Kits and associated Malware
Why are we interested?
There are bad people on the
internet.
They are also dumb.
● Actions taken to ensure
information leakage doesn’t
haunt you
● Proactive Paranoia
● Appropriate Compartmentation
tldr: STFU
(╯°□°)╯︵ ┻━┻
Working Definition: “OpSec”
For More (from the Grugq):
https://www.anti-
forensics.com/operational-
security-for-hackers/
Common Actor Traits
● Male
● 14-22
● Middle(ish) Class
● Live with parents
○ Limited/no income
○ Most income goes towards hobbies
● Social interaction predominantly online
○ Not necessarily “anti-social”
Warning
● You are playing with fire!
○ Playing with fire is fun
● Identity is hard to find from online aliases
○ Account sharing
○ Hacked accounts
○ Fake accounts
● False accusations are bad. And easy
○ Hurts your reputation
○ Hurts the reputation of innocent bystanders
● No vigilantism
○ Don’t harass people you find
Scoping
● What do you look for?
○ Bannings
○ Complaints (generally scamming)
■ Infractions
○ Vouches
○ Purchased Reputation
○ Multi-community membership/participation
○ Technical questions related to a service
● Who do you look for?
○ Premium or Sponsored Sellers
○ Authors of stickied threads (Forums)
○ Primary sellers
○ Vouches/Reputation given/received
So I’ve identified a bad, what next?
● Tools
○ Google
■ Always check cached results if a link appears
dead
○ Spokeo
○ checkusernames.com
■ Username reuse
○ Reverse Image Searches
○ Maltego
● Get as much information as possible, then
sift through for overlaps and relationships
(HUMINT) For more resources: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/doxing-
footprinting-cyberstalking
Youtube Fail
On his Youtube account, out of all his videos, one second in one video had his name in focus.
Technical Recon
● Maltego
○ Consolidates Serversniffing, Whois, Dig, Registrant
searches
○ Still useful to doublecheck!
● Manual inspection
○ Google Dorking (site:evil.com)
○ Tamperdata
○ Burp Proxy
○ Whatweb
● Cloud DDoS Solutions
○ Are they a dead end?
○ Nope, nocloudallowed
NoCloudAllowed(and other DDOS
protection bypasses)
● A scanner to check every server for the
existence of the hidden web site
● Many sites hide behind DDOS protection
○ (mostly Cloudflare, a few other companies)
● Bypass by contacting the origin directly
● Finding the origin is easy
○ Outbound connections
○ Outbound e-mail
○ Old DNS records
○ Server specific information leakage
● Nocloudallowed.com for details
Tracking
● Weaving a tangled web
● Finding e-mails
○ Whois info
○ Paypal accounts
■ Even Paypal pages that conceal the e-mail
○ Gleaming mails from ads
■ “Selling stolen credit cards! Contact
evil@gmail.com”
○ E-mail contacts in their profile pages
● Database dumps are your friend
Honing in on Bads
● In order to sell, one must advertise
○ Find the ads!
○ Look for affiliates
● Social Media is an invaluable intelligence
tool
○ Look for OOB contact methods
■ MSN, ICQ, Email(various), AIM, Skype, Twitter
■ Be wary of hacked/stolen accounts
● The longer an account has been used in similar context, the
less likely its been newly compromised
■ Twitter is easy to search
■ Email <-> Facebook is trivial
Honing in on Bads, pt. II
● Read
○ Forum Posts (and PMs)
○ Social Media
○ Really, anything that can be attributed to the target
○ Read everything
● Watch
○ Youtube (Take screenshots!)
■ Huge vector of information leakage
○ Twitter feeds
○ Current v. Historical posting trends
○ AOL Lifestream
Identification
● Find data overlaps
○ Use the data a target is forced to present to the
community
○ Compare against samples from multiple sources
● Utilize multiple sources to verify
○ Don’t rely on one search engine or tool for data
● Reconcile target personas
○ Utilize data overlaps/leakage to link online ID to physical
person
● Document, Document, Document!
○ Its extremely likely someone else is going to need to
follow your logic. Make sure its sound.
● Identity VS Reputation
Results!
“We are taking proactive steps to prevent DDoS
(Distributed Denial of Service) for hire services from using
PayPal to facilitate/fund illegal activities. PayPal's
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) states that our customers
may not use PayPal's service relating to transactions that
encourage illegal activities. Our goal is to provide a safe
payments service that buyers and sellers around the world
can use every day.”
-Paypal
Questions?
( •_•)
( •_•)>⌐■-■
(⌐■_■)

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Unmasking Miscreants: Tactics for Identifying Anonymous Actors

  • 1. Unmasking Miscreants Derbycon 3.0 Allison Nixon && Brandon Levene (⌐■_■) ( •_•)>⌐■-■ ( •_•)
  • 2. About Us (⌐■_■)--︻╦╤─ - - - ● Allison Nixon (@nixonnixoff) ○ Incident Response & Pentesting at Integralis ○ GCIA ○ Independent Security Researcher focused on malicious services ● Brandon Levene (@seraphimdomain) ○ Incident Handler for large cloud provider ○ GCIH, GCIA, GPEN ○ Independent Security Researcher focused on Exploit Kits and associated Malware
  • 3. Why are we interested? There are bad people on the internet. They are also dumb.
  • 4. ● Actions taken to ensure information leakage doesn’t haunt you ● Proactive Paranoia ● Appropriate Compartmentation tldr: STFU (╯°□°)╯︵ ┻━┻ Working Definition: “OpSec” For More (from the Grugq): https://www.anti- forensics.com/operational- security-for-hackers/
  • 5. Common Actor Traits ● Male ● 14-22 ● Middle(ish) Class ● Live with parents ○ Limited/no income ○ Most income goes towards hobbies ● Social interaction predominantly online ○ Not necessarily “anti-social”
  • 6. Warning ● You are playing with fire! ○ Playing with fire is fun ● Identity is hard to find from online aliases ○ Account sharing ○ Hacked accounts ○ Fake accounts ● False accusations are bad. And easy ○ Hurts your reputation ○ Hurts the reputation of innocent bystanders ● No vigilantism ○ Don’t harass people you find
  • 7. Scoping ● What do you look for? ○ Bannings ○ Complaints (generally scamming) ■ Infractions ○ Vouches ○ Purchased Reputation ○ Multi-community membership/participation ○ Technical questions related to a service ● Who do you look for? ○ Premium or Sponsored Sellers ○ Authors of stickied threads (Forums) ○ Primary sellers ○ Vouches/Reputation given/received
  • 8. So I’ve identified a bad, what next? ● Tools ○ Google ■ Always check cached results if a link appears dead ○ Spokeo ○ checkusernames.com ■ Username reuse ○ Reverse Image Searches ○ Maltego ● Get as much information as possible, then sift through for overlaps and relationships (HUMINT) For more resources: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/doxing- footprinting-cyberstalking
  • 9. Youtube Fail On his Youtube account, out of all his videos, one second in one video had his name in focus.
  • 10. Technical Recon ● Maltego ○ Consolidates Serversniffing, Whois, Dig, Registrant searches ○ Still useful to doublecheck! ● Manual inspection ○ Google Dorking (site:evil.com) ○ Tamperdata ○ Burp Proxy ○ Whatweb ● Cloud DDoS Solutions ○ Are they a dead end? ○ Nope, nocloudallowed
  • 11. NoCloudAllowed(and other DDOS protection bypasses) ● A scanner to check every server for the existence of the hidden web site ● Many sites hide behind DDOS protection ○ (mostly Cloudflare, a few other companies) ● Bypass by contacting the origin directly ● Finding the origin is easy ○ Outbound connections ○ Outbound e-mail ○ Old DNS records ○ Server specific information leakage ● Nocloudallowed.com for details
  • 12. Tracking ● Weaving a tangled web ● Finding e-mails ○ Whois info ○ Paypal accounts ■ Even Paypal pages that conceal the e-mail ○ Gleaming mails from ads ■ “Selling stolen credit cards! Contact evil@gmail.com” ○ E-mail contacts in their profile pages ● Database dumps are your friend
  • 13. Honing in on Bads ● In order to sell, one must advertise ○ Find the ads! ○ Look for affiliates ● Social Media is an invaluable intelligence tool ○ Look for OOB contact methods ■ MSN, ICQ, Email(various), AIM, Skype, Twitter ■ Be wary of hacked/stolen accounts ● The longer an account has been used in similar context, the less likely its been newly compromised ■ Twitter is easy to search ■ Email <-> Facebook is trivial
  • 14. Honing in on Bads, pt. II ● Read ○ Forum Posts (and PMs) ○ Social Media ○ Really, anything that can be attributed to the target ○ Read everything ● Watch ○ Youtube (Take screenshots!) ■ Huge vector of information leakage ○ Twitter feeds ○ Current v. Historical posting trends ○ AOL Lifestream
  • 15. Identification ● Find data overlaps ○ Use the data a target is forced to present to the community ○ Compare against samples from multiple sources ● Utilize multiple sources to verify ○ Don’t rely on one search engine or tool for data ● Reconcile target personas ○ Utilize data overlaps/leakage to link online ID to physical person ● Document, Document, Document! ○ Its extremely likely someone else is going to need to follow your logic. Make sure its sound. ● Identity VS Reputation
  • 16.
  • 17. Results! “We are taking proactive steps to prevent DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) for hire services from using PayPal to facilitate/fund illegal activities. PayPal's Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) states that our customers may not use PayPal's service relating to transactions that encourage illegal activities. Our goal is to provide a safe payments service that buyers and sellers around the world can use every day.” -Paypal