This document summarizes a presentation about replacing the propulsion control system on SEPTA's Broad Street Subway. The reasons for replacement are high failure rates, high maintenance costs, and parts obsolescence of the current system. The presentation outlines the work breakdown structure of the project and identifies key risks such as selecting the lowest bidder, poor consultant performance, the system failing acceptance testing, high failure rates during the warranty period, and obtaining inadequate spare parts. Plans to mitigate each risk are also discussed.
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WBS – Major Indents
B4 Propulsion System Upgrade
1. Proposal
2. Preliminary Scope of Work
3. Financial Authorization
4. Bidding Process
5. Awards Process
6. Pre-production Prototypes (4 Vehicles)
7. Installation on 121 Vehicles
8. Deliverables Review and Validation
9. Warranty Period
10. Project End
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Risk Identification
Using the WBS I identified my project’s
individual risks by mentally stepping through all
the aspects of the WBS activities to produce my
list of uncertainties.
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Qualitative Risk Analysis
I used the NASA risk template which uses
likelihood and consequences as its x-y
inputs. Since, I am the expert on this
project I am differentiating the values of
likelihood (probability) and consequences
(impact) and assigning them to the
individual WBS risk elements to determine if
my severity is high, medium, or low.
Impact and Probability were on a 1-5 scale.
0-5 = Low
6-15 = Medium
16-25 = High
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Severity=Impact X Probability
Examples
Risk Event: Severity= Impact X Probability
Lowest
Bidder High 5 5
Untrained
Workforce Medium 2 5
Document
Translation
Problems
Low 1 3
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Qualitative Risk Analysis
Due to the nature of my company most of
the high severity risks fell under the
technical/performance category.
Project cost risks were generally low
because SEPTA historically has used their
operating budgets for project cost overruns
and has accepted unmet specifications by
making trades with the vender.
Project scheduling risks were generally low
because new systems are installed a one
car at a time and the new systems are
required to work in mixed consist with the
other cars.
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Quantitative Risk Analysis
I further quantified my most severe risks by
adding a detectability factor. Also, since 2 of my
risks will cause other high, medium, and low
risks I quantified these as ultra high.
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Risk #1: Lowest Bidder
The lowest bidder risk would be realized
during the awards Phase (1.5) of the
project.
Awarding the contract to the lowest bidder
and not to the best qualified bidder
increases the probability and impact of the
other risks.
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Risk #1: Lowest Bidder
Expected Scenario: Inability to meet less critical
contract demands, such as: maintenance training and
documentation requirements. This scenario will affect
the long-term life cycle requirements.
Pessimistic Scenario: Inability to meet major design,
quality, and safety requirements which could result in
the halting of the project causing major cost and
schedule overruns. This scenario could have the
potential to create a public and political scandal.
Optimistic Scenario: In this case we saved money
and will get a good product that will be maintainable for
years to come. Perhaps the lowest bidder was under
cutting the competition because they are efficiently run
or they wanted to enter the market.
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Risk #1: Lowest Bidder Plan
Acceptance: Specify that they must have documented
manufacturing expertise in rail propulsions systems.
Acceptance: Set clear quality control checkpoints, such
as: first article inspections and on-site inspection of the
manufacturer’s quality assurance plans.
Acceptance: Select best personnel to monitor, validate
and communicate vender performance.
Risk Triggers:
1. It is a matter of policy.
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Lowest Bidder or
Best Qualified
Bidder
Lowest Bidder
Best qualified
Works
Fails
Works
Fails
4/9/2005
Lowest Bidder Decision Tree
Title
Quality, Cost, and
Performance suffer.
Life cycle costs increase
Title
Quality, Cost, and
Performance suffer.
Life cycle costs increase
plus $ difference of cost
minus lowest bidder
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Risk #2: Poor Consultant
Performance
The poor consultant risk would be realized
during the specification Phase (1.2.2) and
acceptance phases (1.6.2 & 1.7.2) of the
project.
SEPTA relies on engineering consultants to
write the system specifications. This risk
increases the probability and impact of the
other risks.
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Risk #2: Poor Consultant
Performance
Expected Scenario: The consultant will write a
satisfactory specification but will not be held accountable
to enforce it and will not be paid to stay on the project
full time. The program manger will make uninformed
decisions and make engineering changes that will affect
operation and maintenance departments negatively.
Pessimistic Scenario: The consultant will write a poor
specification that does not hold the system manufacturer
to the highest design, quality, and safety requirements
and standards. SEPTA will not get what it wants and we
will not be able to hold the manufacturer liable.
Optimistic Scenario: The consultant will write an
outstanding specification and be able to hold the
manufacturer to it so that so that everything specified
was received.
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Risk #2: Poor Consultant
Performance Plan
Transference: Ensure consultant contract includes bonding of
services.
Mitigation: Ensure the consultancy firms has the proper resources
and experience required along with backup personnel.
Mitigation: Hire an engineer to do the job.
Acceptance: Compare spec with similar project in other transit
agencies.
Risk Triggers:
1. If specifications are outdated or are replicas of older
spec.
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Risk #3: Fails Acceptance
The failure to pass acceptance testing
would be realized during the pre-
production prototype phase (1.6) of the
project.
Once SEPTA approves the pre-production
units the remaining units are produced. If
SEPTA signs off and later finds certain
problems it will cost SEPTA to fix them.
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Risk #3: Fails Acceptance
Expected Scenario: The manufacturer will pass
the major portions of testing but will require time
and many early morning runs to tweak the software
and get the bugs out.
Pessimistic Scenario (PERT added 71 days to
the expected): The manufacturer will not be able
to pass major portions of the testing and will have
to continue to research and develop on our train
and they will require the use of SEPTA expertise to
assist them.
Optimistic Scenario: The manufacturer will
exceed the timing and parametric constraints of the
acceptance test.
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Risk #3: Fails Acceptance Plan
Transference: The spec requires successful acceptance
or production will not be signed off on by the
engineering manager.
Mitigation: Free up the appropriate SEPTA personnel to
lend their expertise on the car to assist the
manufacturer.
Mitigation: Ensure we keep old equipment in good
condition in case we have to put it back on.
Risk Triggers:
1. Prototypes fail.
2. The manufacturer is asking “dumb” questions.
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Risk #4: High MTBF
The failure to pass the mean-time-
between-failure requirements would be
realized during the warranty phase (1.9)
of the project.
Once SEPTA installs the propulsion
replacement a 2 year warranty period
begins. SEPTA must ensure that the
failure rate is >50,000 miles between
failure.
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Risk #4: High MTBF
Expected Scenario: The manufacturer will
satisfy most of the vehicles MTBF parameters.
Some vehicles will fail due the integration of the
old and new systems.
Pessimistic Scenario: The manufacturer will
not be able to pass the 50K mark on any of the
vehicles which will require major reengineering
and field modifications.
Optimistic Scenario: The manufacturer will
exceed the requirements and find ways to
predict propulsion failures before they happen.
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Risk #4: High MTBF Plan
Transference: The spec requires successful MTBF or
the manufacturer will have to redesign the system.
Mitigation: Free up the appropriate SEPTA personnel to
lend their expertise on the car to assist the
manufacturer.
Mitigation: Ensure we keep old equipment in good
condition in case we have to put it back on.
Risk Triggers:
1. < 50,000 miles failure rate.
2. Red flags going up in prototype acceptance phase.
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Risk #5: Inadequate Spares
The failure to obtain adequate spare parts
would be realized during the project end
phase (1.10) of the project.
Once SEPTA completes the 2 year
warranty period they can compile a spares
list using the manufacturers failure
information. SEPTA must maintain a low
vehicle downtime and quick turn-around
times.
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Risk #5: Inadequate Spares
Expected Scenario: The manufacturer will try to
convince SEPTA that their equipment wont fail and
SEPTA will buy a limited amount of spares forcing
operations to buy more later.
Pessimistic Scenario: The manufacturer will not
provide every lowest replaceable unit and SEPTA will
have trains out-of-service awaiting these parts.
Optimistic Scenario: The manufacturer will
exceed the requirements because SEPTA decided to
listen to their maintenance personnel and support
them with an amount of spares that they would be
happy with.
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Risk #5: Inadequate Spares Plan
Transference: The spec requires a set amount of
spares.
Transference: Start setting up a contingency in the
operating budget to buy more spares.
Mitigation: Ensure we have the proper test equipment
and documentation to repair a small float of spares.
Risk Triggers:
1. Placing vehicles out-of-service for parts.
2. Failure data is not provided or conclusive.