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Hacking	
  Your	
  Website	
  With	
  




       David	
  Mirza,	
  Subgraph	
  Technologies	
  
                          Montreal	
  



             http://www.subgraph.com
Introduc>on	
  
  Who	
  we	
  are	
  
     Open-­‐source	
  security	
  startup	
  	
  
     Based	
  in	
  Montreal	
  
     Experienced	
  founders:	
  
        o Secure	
  Networks	
  Inc.	
  
        o SecurityFocus	
  (Symantec)	
  	
  
        o Core	
  Security	
  Technologies	
  
        o Ne>fera	
  
        o REcon	
  

                            http://www.subgraph.com
About	
  us	
  
  Subgraph	
  is	
  an	
  open	
  source	
  security	
  company	
  
    Helping	
  organiza>ons	
  protect	
  their	
  websites	
  
       o Building	
  high	
  quality	
  soRware	
  
       o Penetra>on	
  tes>ng	
  
       o Code	
  /	
  architecture	
  review	
  
    Incorporated	
  in	
  February	
  2010	
  
    Philosophy	
  of	
  openness	
  important	
  to	
  us	
  
       o More	
  than	
  just	
  releasing	
  the	
  code	
  


                              http://www.subgraph.com
Open	
  Source	
  and	
  Security	
  
                                                                     	
  	
  	
  I	
  say!	
  
  Kerckhoffs’	
  principle	
  
     Auguste	
  Kerckhoffs:	
  19th	
  Century	
  
      Dutch	
  linguist	
  and	
  cryptographer	
  
     Made	
  an	
  important	
  realiza>on:	
  
       o “The	
  security	
  of	
  any	
  cryptographic	
  
         system	
  does	
  not	
  rest	
  in	
  its	
  secrecy,	
  it	
  
         must	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  fall	
  into	
  the	
  enemy’s	
  
         hands	
  without	
  inconvenience”	
  
       o More	
  succinctly,	
  the	
  adversary	
  knows	
  
         the	
  system	
  
     As	
  opposed	
  to	
  “security	
  through	
  
      obscurity”	
  

                                   http://www.subgraph.com
Open	
  Source	
  and	
  Security	
  
  Kerckhoffs’	
  Principle	
  
    Well	
  understood	
  in	
  the	
  world	
  of	
  cryptography	
  
       o New	
  ciphers	
  are	
  not	
  trusted	
  without	
  public	
  scru>ny	
  
         over	
  years	
  
       o Because	
  cryptography	
  is	
  used	
  as	
  a	
  “black	
  box”	
  
              It’s	
  the	
  only	
  way	
  to	
  be	
  sure	
  
       o Once	
  in	
  a	
  while,	
  less	
  now,	
  companies	
  try	
  to	
  market	
  
         proprietary	
  ciphers	
  
              There’s	
  a	
  term	
  for	
  this:	
  “snake	
  oil”	
  
    But	
  what	
  about	
  everyone	
  else?	
  

                                     http://www.subgraph.com
Beyond	
  Cryptography	
  
  Security	
  Research	
  Community	
  
       Ac>ve,	
  global	
  community	
  of	
  passionate	
  professionals,	
  amateurs,	
  students	
  and	
  
        hackers	
  
            o  Collabora>ve	
  
            o  Open	
  
       Examples	
  
            o    Phrack	
  magazine	
  
            o    Bugtraq	
  
            o    Defcon	
  
            o    Blackhat	
  
            o    REcon!	
  
  This	
  community	
  changed	
  the	
  soRware	
  industry	
  
       Full-­‐disclosure	
  won	
  
       Beaer	
  security	
  for	
  all	
  
       Bug	
  boun>es	
  
            o  Google,	
  Mozilla	
  


                                              http://www.subgraph.com
Open	
  Source	
  and	
  Security	
  
  Tools	
  
      These	
  researchers	
  write	
  tools	
  
         o Exploits	
  
         o Network	
  security	
  (e.g.	
  nmap)	
  
      Enough	
  to	
  have	
  specialized,	
  dedicated	
  LiveCDs..	
  
         o BackTrack	
  –	
  Penetra>on	
  tes>ng	
  LiveCD	
  
         o Helix	
  –	
  Forensics	
  LiveCD	
  
      The	
  security	
  industry	
  owes	
  all	
  so	
  much	
  
         o Grassroots,	
  open	
  source	
  innova>on	
  
         o Some	
  open	
  source	
  projects	
  became	
  commercial	
  successes	
  
                 Snort	
  IDS	
  
                 Metasploit	
  
                                     http://www.subgraph.com
Open	
  Source	
  and	
  Security	
  
  Open	
  source	
  has	
  always	
  been	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  security	
  
       Collabora>ve,	
  open	
  research	
  
       Open	
  source	
  tool	
  development	
  
  Kerckhoffs’	
  Law:	
  open	
  code	
  scru>ny	
  
       Means	
  beaer	
  security,	
  in	
  general	
  
  Open	
  source	
  security	
  soRware	
  
       Is	
  more	
  trustworthy:	
  read	
  the	
  source,	
  compile	
  it	
  yourself	
  
       No	
  worries,	
  no	
  maaer	
  where	
  in	
  the	
  world	
  you	
  live	
  
  Why	
  doesn’t	
  everyone	
  demand	
  open	
  source	
  for	
  
   security?	
  
                                 http://www.subgraph.com
Open	
  Source	
  and	
  Security	
  
  Web	
  applica>on	
  security	
  
     Followed	
  the	
  same	
  path	
  
     Collabora>ve,	
  open	
  research,	
  advocacy	
  
        o E.g.	
  OWASP	
  
     Great	
  open	
  source	
  tools,	
  frameworks	
  
  Also,	
  the	
  cueng	
  edge	
  of	
  web	
  applica>on	
  
   development	
  
     En>rely	
  open	
  source!	
  

                              http://www.subgraph.com
Web	
  Security	
  Timeline	
  




       http://www.subgraph.com
Commercial	
  Web	
  Security	
  SoRware	
  
  Advantages	
  of	
  commercial	
  tools	
  
      Ease	
  of	
  installa>on,	
  upgrade,	
  use	
  
      User	
  experience	
  
      Quality	
  Assurance,	
  bug	
  fixing	
  
      Documenta>on/Help	
  
      Development	
  driven	
  by	
  demand/need	
  
  Disadvantages	
  
      Expensive	
  
      Bizarre	
  license	
  restric>ons	
  
      EOL,	
  acquisi>ons,	
  other	
  events	
  
      Proprietary,	
  closed	
  source	
  
                              http://www.subgraph.com
Open	
  Source	
  Web	
  Security	
  SoRware	
  
  Since	
  I’ve	
  already	
  talked	
  about	
  the	
  advantages..	
  
  Disadvantages	
  
       No	
  integra>on	
  /	
  sharing	
  of	
  data	
  between	
  the	
  various	
  tools	
  
       Poor	
  or	
  non-­‐existent	
  UI,	
  documenta>on,	
  help	
  
       Painful,	
  broken	
  installa>ons	
  
       Code	
  is	
  of	
  inconsistent	
  quality	
  
       Developer,	
  contributor	
  unreliability	
  
       Development	
  driven	
  by	
  whim,	
  interest,	
  skill	
  level	
  
       Forks	
  
       Abandonment	
  	
  	
  
           o Developer	
  finished	
  college,	
  got	
  a	
  job	
  
           o Successfully	
  reproduced	
  

                                       http://www.subgraph.com
Exis>ng	
  Landscape	
  of	
  Web	
  Tools	
  
  There	
  are	
  very	
  good	
  commercial	
  tools	
  
    HP,	
  IBM,	
  Qualys	
  
    SAAS,	
  such	
  as	
  Whitehat	
  
    NetSparker	
  
    BurpSuite	
  (free	
  version	
  available)	
  
  Expensive	
  
    Some	
  free/community	
  versions,	
  crippled	
  
  Proprietary	
  
                         http://www.subgraph.com
Open	
  Source	
  Tools	
  	
  
  There	
  are	
  also	
  some	
  fantas>c	
  open	
  source	
  tools	
  
      Specialized	
  
         o Various	
  specialized	
  fuzzers	
  
         o Standalone	
  proxies	
  
         o Standalone	
  scanners	
  
         o Standalone	
  brute-­‐forcing	
  tools	
  
      They	
  do	
  not	
  share	
  a	
  data	
  model	
  
         o Integrate	
  them	
  yourself	
  
      In	
  our	
  experience:	
  
         o Some>mes	
  buggy	
  
         o Last	
  commit	
  was	
  in	
  2008..	
  
         o Broken	
  user	
  interfaces	
  

                                     http://www.subgraph.com
Free/Open	
  Source	
  Web	
  Security	
  Tools	
  




                 http://www.subgraph.com
Our	
  Vision	
  
  One	
  web,	
  one	
  web	
  security	
  tool	
  
      Open	
  source	
  
      Consistent,	
  well-­‐designed	
  UI	
  
      Func>ons	
  really	
  well	
  as	
  an	
  automated	
  scanner	
  
         o Shouldn’t	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  penetra>on	
  tester	
  
         o Advanced	
  features	
  for	
  those	
  who	
  are	
  
      User	
  extensibility	
  
         o Community	
  
      Plus	
  all	
  that	
  boring	
  stuff	
  
         o Documenta>on,	
  help,	
  business	
  friendly	
  features	
  	
  

                                 http://www.subgraph.com
Hi,	
  My	
  Name	
  Is:	
  



  Vega	
  is	
  a	
  web-­‐applica>on	
  security	
  scanner	
  
  It	
  finds	
  vulnerabili>es	
  in	
  your	
  website	
  
  Wriaen	
  in	
  Java,	
  runs	
  on:	
  
       Mac	
  OS	
  X	
  
       Windows	
  
       Linux	
  
  A	
  desktop	
  applica>on	
  with	
  a	
  nice	
  GUI	
  
       Eclipse	
  RCP	
  

                                 http://www.subgraph.com
Introducing	
  VEGA	
  
  Currently	
  two	
  modes	
  of	
  opera>on	
  
    Automated	
  scanner	
  
       o Point	
  and	
  click	
  hacking	
  
    Intercep>ng	
  proxy	
  
       o Instrumenta>on	
  
       o Manual	
  closer	
  inspec>on	
  
       o Penetra>on	
  tes>ng	
  




                              http://www.subgraph.com
Scanner	
  
  Automated	
  scanner	
  
      Crawls	
  your	
  web	
  applica>on	
  recursively	
  
      Analyzes	
  links	
  
      Runs	
  a	
  configurable	
  set	
  of	
  audit	
  and	
  aaack	
  ac>ons	
  on	
  these	
  
       links	
  
      Limited	
  brute	
  forcing	
  
      Tests	
  parameters	
  for	
  favorites,	
  such	
  as:	
  
          o Reflected,	
  persistent	
  XSS	
  
          o SQL	
  injec>on	
  
          o Command	
  injec>on	
  
          o Local	
  file	
  include	
  
          o Local	
  file	
  reading	
  
      Tries	
  to	
  iden>fy	
  server	
  misconfigura>ons	
  

                                   http://www.subgraph.com
Proxy	
  
  Intercep>ng	
  proxy	
  
     Intercepts	
  requests,	
  responses	
  
       o Based	
  on	
  request	
  method	
  
       o Filters	
  	
  
     Can	
  be	
  edited	
  
     Requests	
  can	
  be	
  replayed	
  or	
  created	
  
     Data	
  decoding	
  and	
  encoding	
  
     Customized	
  automa>c	
  manipula>on	
  of	
  requests,	
  
      responses	
  
     Response	
  processing	
  scanner	
  modules	
  
                             http://www.subgraph.com
What’s	
  Inside	
  
  Architecture	
  
    Eclipse	
  RCP	
  
    Modularity	
  of	
  design	
  enforced	
  with	
  OSGI	
  
    Using	
  Apache	
  HTTPComponents	
  
    JSoup	
  
    Google	
  Guava	
  
    DB4O	
  
    Rhino	
  JS	
  Interpreter	
  

                         http://www.subgraph.com
Extensibility	
  
  Extending	
  Vega	
  with	
  ease	
  
    Scrip>ng	
  of	
  custom	
  modules	
  
       o Javascript	
  
       o DOM,	
  JQuery	
  
       o Clean,	
  sensible	
  API	
  	
  
    Scrip>ng	
  of	
  proxy	
  
       o Automated	
  manipula>on	
  of	
  intercepted	
  requests,	
  
         responses	
  
    Custom	
  alerts	
  
       o XML	
  Templates	
  
                                http://www.subgraph.com
VEGA	
  



      DEMO	
  




http://www.subgraph.com
Current	
  Status	
  
  We	
  are	
  really	
  close	
  
       Finish	
  a	
  few	
  features	
  
       Polish	
  
       Tes>ng	
  
       Fixing	
  bugs	
  
  Documenta>on	
  
       User	
  
       Developer	
  
       Help	
  
  Beta!	
  
       Mid-­‐April	
  
                                   http://www.subgraph.com
Future	
  
  Fun	
  stuff	
  
       Penetra>on	
  tes>ng	
  	
  
           o Exploita>on	
  of	
  vulnerabili>es	
  
           o Support	
  for	
  advanced	
  aaacks	
  
       Brute	
  Forcing	
  
           o Directories	
  
           o Username/password	
  
       Fuzzing	
  
           o E.g.	
  A	
  really	
  good	
  web	
  services	
  fuzzer	
  
       Specialized	
  support	
  for	
  audi>ng	
  apps	
  
           o CakePHP,	
  Rails,	
  J2EE	
  
  Less	
  fun	
  
       Really	
  nice	
  repor>ng	
  
                                         http://www.subgraph.com
Thank	
  you!	
  Interested?	
  	
  




  Web	
                                                           E-­‐mail	
  us	
  
        hap://www.subgraph.com	
                                         info@subgraph.com	
  
  Twiaer	
                                                        MTLSEC	
  
        Company:	
  @subgraph	
  (we’ve	
  been	
  quiet)	
              If	
  you’re	
  in	
  Montreal,	
  we	
  do	
  a	
  monthly,	
  
        Me:	
  @aaractr	
                                                 informal	
  5@7	
  
                                                                          hap://www.mtlsec.com,	
  @mtlsec	
  
  IRC	
  
        irc.freenode.org,	
  #subgraph	
  

                                           http://www.subgraph.com

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hacking your website with vega, confoo2011

  • 1. Hacking  Your  Website  With   David  Mirza,  Subgraph  Technologies   Montreal   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 2. Introduc>on     Who  we  are    Open-­‐source  security  startup      Based  in  Montreal    Experienced  founders:   o Secure  Networks  Inc.   o SecurityFocus  (Symantec)     o Core  Security  Technologies   o Ne>fera   o REcon   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 3. About  us     Subgraph  is  an  open  source  security  company    Helping  organiza>ons  protect  their  websites   o Building  high  quality  soRware   o Penetra>on  tes>ng   o Code  /  architecture  review    Incorporated  in  February  2010    Philosophy  of  openness  important  to  us   o More  than  just  releasing  the  code   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 4. Open  Source  and  Security        I  say!     Kerckhoffs’  principle     Auguste  Kerckhoffs:  19th  Century   Dutch  linguist  and  cryptographer     Made  an  important  realiza>on:   o “The  security  of  any  cryptographic   system  does  not  rest  in  its  secrecy,  it   must  be  able  to  fall  into  the  enemy’s   hands  without  inconvenience”   o More  succinctly,  the  adversary  knows   the  system     As  opposed  to  “security  through   obscurity”   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 5. Open  Source  and  Security     Kerckhoffs’  Principle    Well  understood  in  the  world  of  cryptography   o New  ciphers  are  not  trusted  without  public  scru>ny   over  years   o Because  cryptography  is  used  as  a  “black  box”     It’s  the  only  way  to  be  sure   o Once  in  a  while,  less  now,  companies  try  to  market   proprietary  ciphers     There’s  a  term  for  this:  “snake  oil”    But  what  about  everyone  else?   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 6. Beyond  Cryptography     Security  Research  Community     Ac>ve,  global  community  of  passionate  professionals,  amateurs,  students  and   hackers   o  Collabora>ve   o  Open     Examples   o  Phrack  magazine   o  Bugtraq   o  Defcon   o  Blackhat   o  REcon!     This  community  changed  the  soRware  industry     Full-­‐disclosure  won     Beaer  security  for  all     Bug  boun>es   o  Google,  Mozilla   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 7. Open  Source  and  Security     Tools     These  researchers  write  tools   o Exploits   o Network  security  (e.g.  nmap)     Enough  to  have  specialized,  dedicated  LiveCDs..   o BackTrack  –  Penetra>on  tes>ng  LiveCD   o Helix  –  Forensics  LiveCD     The  security  industry  owes  all  so  much   o Grassroots,  open  source  innova>on   o Some  open  source  projects  became  commercial  successes     Snort  IDS     Metasploit   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 8. Open  Source  and  Security     Open  source  has  always  been  a  part  of  security     Collabora>ve,  open  research     Open  source  tool  development     Kerckhoffs’  Law:  open  code  scru>ny     Means  beaer  security,  in  general     Open  source  security  soRware     Is  more  trustworthy:  read  the  source,  compile  it  yourself     No  worries,  no  maaer  where  in  the  world  you  live     Why  doesn’t  everyone  demand  open  source  for   security?   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 9. Open  Source  and  Security     Web  applica>on  security    Followed  the  same  path    Collabora>ve,  open  research,  advocacy   o E.g.  OWASP    Great  open  source  tools,  frameworks     Also,  the  cueng  edge  of  web  applica>on   development    En>rely  open  source!   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 10. Web  Security  Timeline   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 11. Commercial  Web  Security  SoRware     Advantages  of  commercial  tools     Ease  of  installa>on,  upgrade,  use     User  experience     Quality  Assurance,  bug  fixing     Documenta>on/Help     Development  driven  by  demand/need     Disadvantages     Expensive     Bizarre  license  restric>ons     EOL,  acquisi>ons,  other  events     Proprietary,  closed  source   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 12. Open  Source  Web  Security  SoRware     Since  I’ve  already  talked  about  the  advantages..     Disadvantages     No  integra>on  /  sharing  of  data  between  the  various  tools     Poor  or  non-­‐existent  UI,  documenta>on,  help     Painful,  broken  installa>ons     Code  is  of  inconsistent  quality     Developer,  contributor  unreliability     Development  driven  by  whim,  interest,  skill  level     Forks     Abandonment       o Developer  finished  college,  got  a  job   o Successfully  reproduced   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 13. Exis>ng  Landscape  of  Web  Tools     There  are  very  good  commercial  tools    HP,  IBM,  Qualys    SAAS,  such  as  Whitehat    NetSparker    BurpSuite  (free  version  available)     Expensive    Some  free/community  versions,  crippled     Proprietary   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 14. Open  Source  Tools       There  are  also  some  fantas>c  open  source  tools     Specialized   o Various  specialized  fuzzers   o Standalone  proxies   o Standalone  scanners   o Standalone  brute-­‐forcing  tools     They  do  not  share  a  data  model   o Integrate  them  yourself     In  our  experience:   o Some>mes  buggy   o Last  commit  was  in  2008..   o Broken  user  interfaces   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 15. Free/Open  Source  Web  Security  Tools   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 16. Our  Vision     One  web,  one  web  security  tool     Open  source     Consistent,  well-­‐designed  UI     Func>ons  really  well  as  an  automated  scanner   o Shouldn’t  need  to  be  a  penetra>on  tester   o Advanced  features  for  those  who  are     User  extensibility   o Community     Plus  all  that  boring  stuff   o Documenta>on,  help,  business  friendly  features     http://www.subgraph.com
  • 17. Hi,  My  Name  Is:     Vega  is  a  web-­‐applica>on  security  scanner     It  finds  vulnerabili>es  in  your  website     Wriaen  in  Java,  runs  on:     Mac  OS  X     Windows     Linux     A  desktop  applica>on  with  a  nice  GUI     Eclipse  RCP   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 18. Introducing  VEGA     Currently  two  modes  of  opera>on    Automated  scanner   o Point  and  click  hacking    Intercep>ng  proxy   o Instrumenta>on   o Manual  closer  inspec>on   o Penetra>on  tes>ng   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 19. Scanner     Automated  scanner     Crawls  your  web  applica>on  recursively     Analyzes  links     Runs  a  configurable  set  of  audit  and  aaack  ac>ons  on  these   links     Limited  brute  forcing     Tests  parameters  for  favorites,  such  as:   o Reflected,  persistent  XSS   o SQL  injec>on   o Command  injec>on   o Local  file  include   o Local  file  reading     Tries  to  iden>fy  server  misconfigura>ons   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 20. Proxy     Intercep>ng  proxy     Intercepts  requests,  responses   o Based  on  request  method   o Filters       Can  be  edited     Requests  can  be  replayed  or  created     Data  decoding  and  encoding     Customized  automa>c  manipula>on  of  requests,   responses     Response  processing  scanner  modules   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 21. What’s  Inside     Architecture    Eclipse  RCP    Modularity  of  design  enforced  with  OSGI    Using  Apache  HTTPComponents    JSoup    Google  Guava    DB4O    Rhino  JS  Interpreter   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 22. Extensibility     Extending  Vega  with  ease    Scrip>ng  of  custom  modules   o Javascript   o DOM,  JQuery   o Clean,  sensible  API      Scrip>ng  of  proxy   o Automated  manipula>on  of  intercepted  requests,   responses    Custom  alerts   o XML  Templates   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 23. VEGA   DEMO   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 24. Current  Status     We  are  really  close     Finish  a  few  features     Polish     Tes>ng     Fixing  bugs     Documenta>on     User     Developer     Help     Beta!     Mid-­‐April   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 25. Future     Fun  stuff     Penetra>on  tes>ng     o Exploita>on  of  vulnerabili>es   o Support  for  advanced  aaacks     Brute  Forcing   o Directories   o Username/password     Fuzzing   o E.g.  A  really  good  web  services  fuzzer     Specialized  support  for  audi>ng  apps   o CakePHP,  Rails,  J2EE     Less  fun     Really  nice  repor>ng   http://www.subgraph.com
  • 26. Thank  you!  Interested?       Web     E-­‐mail  us     hap://www.subgraph.com     info@subgraph.com     Twiaer     MTLSEC     Company:  @subgraph  (we’ve  been  quiet)     If  you’re  in  Montreal,  we  do  a  monthly,     Me:  @aaractr   informal  5@7     hap://www.mtlsec.com,  @mtlsec     IRC     irc.freenode.org,  #subgraph   http://www.subgraph.com