ЄС-Росія

1. EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNION FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
SECURITY POLICY
Brussels, 16.6.2021
JOIN(2021) 20 final
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE
EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL
on EU-Russia relations - Push back, constrain and engage

2. 1
1. Introduction
The European Council on 24-25 May 2021 held a first strategic debate on Russia and
condemned the illegal, provocative and disruptive Russian activities against the EU, its
Member States and beyond. It reaffirmed the EU’s unity and solidarity in the face of such acts
as well as its support to Eastern partners. The European Council reaffirmed its commitment to
the five principles governing EU policy vis-à-vis Russia1 and set out that the EU will continue
coordination with like-minded partners. It invited the High Representative and the
Commission to present a report with policy options on EU-Russia relations, in line with the
five principles, with a view to its meeting in June 2021.2 The following Joint Communication
responds to this invitation.
2. Political context
Russia is the EU’s largest neighbour, and remains a force to be reckoned with in Europe and
globally. This is largely based on its size and geographic reach, its readiness to project power
internationally, and its political, diplomatic and strong military capacity. As a geopolitical
player Russia aspires to retain its global standing in a power politics based, multipolar world,
often in close liaison with other players such as China, rather than contributing and acting
within a stronger, rules-based multilateral system. It tries to enforce its own geopolitical
sphere of influence based mostly on a zero-sum logic. In doing so, the government often
challenges and undermines international law, as well as the OSCE and Council of Europe key
principles, to which it has committed and which structure security and cooperation on the
European continent, including each country’s right to freely determine its own foreign,
security and domestic policy choices.
The Russian leadership uses a variety of instruments to influence, interfere in, weaken or even
seek to destabilise the EU and its Member States, as well as the Western Balkans and Eastern
Partnership countries. As part of these efforts, it continues to invest heavily in its ability to
control and influence the information space inside and outside its borders. Funding of state-
controlled media is growing quickly, in particular for outlets, such as RT, which are directed
exclusively towards external audiences. Russia continues to orchestrate increasingly
sophisticated cyber and information manipulation operations as well as chemical and other
attacks, including against the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
the German Bundestag, the Skripals in Salisbury, as well as the explosion in the Czech
Republic. It undertakes direct military and hybrid actions in the unresolved conflicts that it
feeds in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as well as in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, in
Syria and Libya in particular, and beyond. It seeks to retain control over the authoritarian
regime in Belarus.
Managing the relationship with Russia thus represents a key strategic challenge for the EU3
.
EU-Russia relations have increasingly deteriorated since 2014, following Russia’s illegal
annexation of the Crimean peninsula, as well as its destabilisation of eastern Ukraine.4 This
1 Implementation of the Minsk agreements as the key condition for any substantial change in the EU's stance
towards Russia; Strengthened relations with the EU's eastern partners and other neighbours, including in
Central Asia; Strengthening the resilience of the EU (for example, energy security, hybrid threats, or strategic
communication); The possibility of selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU; Need to
engage in people-to-people contacts and support Russian civil society.
2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/49791/2425-05-21-euco-conclusions-en.pdf
3 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf
4 The European Council reacted swiftly in 2014 to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine by e.g. suspending bilateral
talks on the New Agreement and visa matters, introducing visa bans and asset freezes, cancelling the EU-
Russia Summits, preparing broader economic and trade sanctions as well as suspending new financing

3. 2
includes, more recently, Russia’s military build-up along the Ukrainian border, on the
Crimean peninsula and in the Black Sea, which was taken back only partly, and the prolonged
closure of areas of the Black Sea. Furthermore, the implication of Russian intelligence
services in disruptive actions within EU Member States has led to further negative dynamics.
This includes the expulsion of diplomats, travel bans and the publication by Russia of the so-
called list of “unfriendly states” and ensuing restrictions to diplomatic representation.
Moreover, the Russian government frequently attempts to advance its bilateral relations with
Member States at the expense of EU-Russia relations.
The evolution of Russia's internal policy, characterised by growing political repression by the
government to preserve the current political and economic order, has also increasingly
affected EU-Russia relations. With forthcoming State Duma elections in September 2021, the
situation of civil society, human rights defenders and independent media in Russia has further
deteriorated, also curtailing their ability to cooperate with the EU. Changes in the constitution
and repressive laws on so-called “foreign agents”, “undesirable organisations” and
“extremism” are reinforcing a systematic crackdown on human rights and fundamental
freedoms, despite them being enshrined in the Russian constitution and the country’s
international obligations. Moreover, authorities run disinformation campaigns, creating false
narratives about alleged ‘foreign interference’ in Russian domestic affairs, seeking to deter
real opposition and discredit civil society. The politically motivated sentencing of Alexei
Navalny, following a murder attempt by a chemical nerve agent, the effective ban of the
activities of his political network as “extremist”, as well as the continuous intimidation and
suppression of independent media and journalists are only some of recent examples.
At the same time, Russia suffers from serious and growing structural weaknesses. Real
disposable incomes in Russia have dropped by 10% since 2013. The country is on a declining
demographic and socio-economic trajectory, exacerbated by its business model focused on
fossil fuels, an unbalanced budgetary path and the current impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Despite these fundamental differences, the EU and Russia have a fundamental common
responsibility for peace and security on the European continent. We face common global
challenges and are interlinked in some specific economic fields.5 We are also both bound by
the same obligations in international organisations like the Council of Europe and the OSCE,
which we must live up to.
EU-Russia economic relations
 Russia is the EU's fifth largest trade partner, representing 4.8% of the EU’s total trade
in goods with the world in 2020.
 Vice versa, the EU is by far Russia's biggest trade partner, accounting for 37.3% of the
country’s total trade in goods.
 The EU is also by far the largest investor in Russia. In 2019, the EU’s foreign direct
investment (FDI) stock amounted to EUR 311.4 billion (75% of total FDI in Russia)
 Russia’s FDI stock in the EU was estimated at EUR 136 billion (only 1% of total FDI)
It is evident that, provided the political conditions allow for it, the potential for EU-Russia
cooperation is very considerable. The EU has made a conditional offer of cooperation.
However, the Russian government is actively pursuing objectives that go in the opposite
operations in Russia by the European Investment Bank and coordinating with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to adopt a similar position.
5 As regards cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), constructive steps from Russia towards
more openness in our trade relations, including abiding by its WTO commitments and respecting those of
other EEU members, are necessary before building a relationship between the EU and EEU beyond technical
contacts. Any decision on engaging in formal relations is also conditional on a better political context.

4. 3
direction: creating an area of dependence in its neighbourhood, undermining a politically
united Europe, pushing back our vision of a multilateral, rules-based order, and creating
situations in international affairs to limit the role of the EU and its partners.
3. Implementation of the Minsk agreements
The EU has remained unwavering in its support of the Normandy format, the Trilateral
Contact Group and the OSCE, including the efforts of the OSCE Special Monitoring
Mission (SMM).6 While President Zelenskyy’s election provided a renewed impetus in the
negotiations, the December 2019 Normandy Summit conclusions remain to be fully
implemented. More worryingly, the Russian government increasingly tries to present itself as
a mediator and not as a party to the conflict and demands direct contact between Kyiv and the
so-called “republics”, which runs contrary to the Minsk Protocol. It also scaled up in April
2021 its military presence at the eastern border of Ukraine and on the Crimean peninsula. The
OSCE SMM’s access to eastern Ukraine remains routinely obstructed by the so-called
“republics”, and ceasefire violations are at pre-July 2020 ceasefire level. This trend will likely
persist, with Russia lacking a constructive approach.
The EU continues to support existing formats and instruments. It will also keep emphasising
its readiness to play a leading role in the reconstruction of the conflict-affected regions once
the conditions are met, including by incentivising the full implementation of the Minsk
agreements. Meanwhile, the EU remains steadfast in its endeavours to alleviate the
humanitarian consequences of the conflict.
Indeed, the EU is one of the largest humanitarian donors to the crisis in eastern Ukraine.
Since its beginning, the EU has provided over EUR 190 million in emergency assistance,
including EUR 25.4 million in 2021, and over EUR 1 billion, with the Member States, in
humanitarian and early recovery aid. The EU support benefits vulnerable people and those
most in need on both sides of the line of contact7. The EU is also providing, through the
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, humanitarian assistance to
Ukrainian refugees in Russia. The total assistance for them since 2017 amounts to over EUR
1 million and covers access to healthcare services, vouchers for food, non-food items and
livelihood support.
The EU has imposed three sets of restrictive measures on Russia as a reaction to its illegal
annexation of the Crimean peninsula and ongoing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine.8 They
aim at preventing further escalation or negative developments in Ukraine, and strongly signal
the EU’s support to Ukraine and its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. The
clear linkage of these sanctions to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements is
designed as an incentive for the Russian government to contribute to a solution to the conflict,
6 The EU and its Member States contribute two thirds of the budget and monitors of OSCE SMM, as well as
EU Satellite Centre imagery and analysis. The EU will continue to support local dialogue initiatives,
including the OSCE led Trilateral Contact Group, and mine clearing operations. Work to counter
disinformation in southern and eastern Ukraine has also been stepped up.
7 EU-funded humanitarian projects include multi-purpose cash assistance; provision of basic needs; shelter;
water; protection activities; health assistance including psychosocial support; education in emergencies; mine
risk education; and the distribution of essential winterisation items.
8 Measures concerning the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine: targeted individual listings of persons and
entities, and targeted economic measures directed at promoting a change in Russia's actions in Ukraine,
leading to a peaceful settlement and a political solution of the Ukraine crisis. Measures concerning the illegal
annexation of the Crimean peninsula: targeted economic, trade and financial restrictions directed at
promoting a change in Russian policy on the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Council Decision
2014/512/CFSP of 31.7.2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31.7.2014, Council Decision
2014/145/CFSP of 17.3.2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17.3.2014, and Council Decision
2014/386/CFSP of 23.6.2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23.6.2014.

5. 4
while the perspective of the EU agreeing additional sanctions is meant as a deterrent against it
worsening the situation further through its aggressive behaviour. The continued unanimous
rollover of sanctions demonstrates EU unity and credibility. The EU measures have increased
Russia’s cost of further aggression and constrained the further use of military capabilities and
expansion in Ukraine. Russia will be held responsible for any deterioration in the so-called
“republics”9. It also remains crucial to maintain the existing coordination and unity, including
on sanctions, with like-minded partners such as the G7.
To ensure respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the full
application of EU rules on Schengen visas in Russia and Ukraine, the EU has also provided
guidance on the non-recognition of certain categories of ordinary Russian international
passports issued to residents of the Crimean peninsula and on the handling of visa
applications from residents of non-government controlled areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and
Luhansk regions.
4. Strengthened relations with the EU's eastern partners and other neighbours
The EU continues to offer closer relations to its Eastern partners for prosperity, good
neighbourliness, and reforms. A well-functioning Eastern Partnership is a tool to enhance
European stability, security and prosperity. In March 2020, the High Representative and the
Commission proposed the long-term policy objectives of the Eastern Partnership10 in the
areas of economy, governance, environment and climate, digital, and society, with a particular
emphasis on resilience. The 6th Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2021 will endorse a
renewed agenda beyond 2020.
The EU firmly rejects the Russian pursuit of a privileged sphere of influence. The Eastern
partners have a full, sovereign right to shape the breadth and depth of their relations with the
EU and other international players freely. Still, the Russian government continues its
confrontational policy, employing soft and hard policy tools to exert pressure. Therefore, the
EU’s policy remains to strengthen the Eastern partners’ resilience via bilateral agreements
(including Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas) and
important financial support, with a particular recent focus on necessary reforms in the
economy, governance and the rule of law, green and digital transformations, and inclusive
societies. In the last seven years, almost EUR 5 billion in grant assistance was delivered, with
a special emphasis on the resilience against hybrid and cyber threats and disinformation, and
international law enforcement cooperation. Moreover, the EU provided in 2020 almost EUR 1
billion to help the countries address the COVID-19 consequences. The EU has also provided
significant macro-financial assistance to three Eastern partners.
The EU also continued to counter the Russian government’s attempts to portray itself as a
mediator and not a party to the territorial conflicts affecting Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. It
pursued its non-recognition policy regarding the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula
and the Russian-supported “independence” of the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
9 Russian efforts to seek de-listings of individuals (such as parliamentarians and some government members)
show that EU sanctions have a practical impact and affect Russia’s calculations. Apart from the Ukraine
crisis, Russian individuals and entities are listed under the EU sanctions regimes on Libya (for violating the
UN arms embargo), on cyber attacks (ransomware, cyberattacks against the OPCW and the German
Bundestag) and on the use and proliferation of chemical weapons (Skripal and Navalny poisonings) as well
as under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (Navalny imprisonment, and torture and repression
against LGBTIQ persons and political opponents in Chechnya).
10 JOIN(2020) 7 final of 18.3.2020.

6. 5
The EU renewed its Central Asia strategy in June 2019 to step up its engagement and to
contribute to the development of the region with a focus on resilience, prosperity and regional
cooperation. The EU has maintained an ad hoc dialogue with Russia on Central Asia. Yet the
Russian government’s attitude towards EU engagement in the region remains negative,
including on the conclusion of Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.
5. Strengthening the resilience of the EU
Over the last years, the EU has made significant progress in strengthening its resilience
against challenges emanating or being instrumentalised from abroad. Managing and
accelerating the twin green and digital transitions enhances EU resilience, by making us
gradually less dependent on foreign supplies and the geopolitics of energy, and by making the
advanced hard- and software of our economies more robust to foreign influence. The Trade
Policy Review11 and the Update to the 2020 Industrial Strategy12 also set out concrete
actions to enhance the Union’s open strategic autonomy and to address strategic
dependencies. Generally, the Union is equipping itself with more autonomous tools such as
the FDI screening mechanism13, the 5G toolbox or the new instrument on foreign subsidies14.
The EU is continuing to strengthen its resilience and energy security by diversifying its
international sources and supplies and through the creation of a single EU energy market, in
particular regarding gas. This has been achieved through better ‘hardware’ (e.g. new
infrastructure including interconnectors, reverse flow pipelines, more storage facilities and
Liquefied Natural Gas terminals) as well as clearer legislative ‘software’, providing inter alia
for open, non-discriminatory retail markets, the unbundling of generation and supply from the
operation of networks, regulatory independence and cooperation, and the full application of
EU competition rules. EU-Russia energy relations are marked by a substantial degree of
interdependence: Russia is currently the EU’s first energy provider and the EU is by far
Russia’s first energy export destination. Additional energy-related challenges include the
cybersecurity of EU energy installations and the acquisition by Russian state-controlled
players of strategic assets in the Union and close neighbours. However, also by moving
decisively toward decarbonisation, our energy independence will further grow and reliance on
Russian supplies overall decrease. Russia will see its exports of energy products to the EU
shrink significantly within the next 10-20 years, which will inevitably have a domestic
impact.
EU-Russia energy relations
 Russia currently accounts for 26% of EU oil imports and 40% of EU gas imports.
 However, Russia is clearly dependent on the deep, stable and lucrative energy markets
of the EU: nearly two thirds of Russia’s oil exports, two thirds of its gas exports and
roughly half of its coal exports go to the EU, whereas only 27% of its oil exports and
only 2% of its gas exports go to China.
 Energy exports are also critical for Russia’s business model, representing 60% of its
total exports, 40% of its budget revenue and 25% of its GDP.
Enhancing the EU´s capabilities to tackle hybrid threats has been an essential aspect of the
EU’s security agenda in the last five years. Triggered by the illegal annexation of the Crimean
peninsula and subsequent disinformation campaign against the EU, the 2016 Joint
11 COM(2021) 66 final of 18.2.2021.
12 COM(2021) 550 final of 5.5.2021.
13 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of 19.3.2019.
14 COM(2021) 223 final of 5.5.2021.

7. 6
Framework15 is building a broad EU policy framework. It was further developed in 201816
after the Salisbury chemical agent attack, including a new, dedicated EU sanctions regime
related to the use of chemical weapons17, and in the ongoing roll-out of the Security Union
Strategy18.
The EU’s counter-hybrid toolbox is building societal resilience against shocks of different
hybrid attacks in fields such as protecting critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, countering
disinformation, election integrity and foreign direct investment screening.
Russian players have become more assertive in cyberspace, conducting and/or allowing
malicious cyber activities that advance its political objectives, threaten Western open societies
and economies, and harm human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the EU is
strengthening its ability to prevent, deter and respond to cyberattacks. The EU also adopted,
for the first time, sanctions in response to cyberattacks in July 202019. This targets, among
others, Russian hackers involved in Cloud Hopper, WannaCry and NotPetya cyberattacks.
The 2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy20 further strengthens the EU’s collective resilience in
this field and the dedicated EU toolbox21 provides a set of robust and comprehensive
measures with a view to ensuring an adequate level of cybersecurity of 5G networks across
the EU. Cyber defence is one of the areas in which the EU and NATO are strengthening their
cooperation. The Strategic Compass to be adopted in 2022 will provide a framework which
will help focus Member States’ efforts in security and defence. Through Permanent
Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund the EU is supporting Member States
in the development of their defence capabilities ensuring coherence with NATO efforts.
Russia continues to deploy information manipulation and interference activities, using a range
of different tactics, techniques and procedures. These disinformation campaigns are carried
out in an intentional and coordinated manner, with the objective to mislead, sow distrust or
undermine democratic processes and institutions. This has become even more obvious during
the COVID-19 pandemic, where Russia has supported disinformation action aimed at
undermining the EU’s response.22
The EU has put in place a series of structures and measures to tackle foreign information
manipulation and interference. It continues to strengthen its situational awareness, to build
resilience and to become more effective in disrupting these activities. With its strategic
communications capability, and in particular the East Stratcom Task Force, the EU detects,
analyses and exposes Russian disinformation. It continues to build capacity and pro-actively
engages with audiences inside the EU, the Western Balkans and the neighbourhood. The
Rapid Alert System connects EU institutions with Member States and like-minded partners,
such as the G7 and NATO, to enable joint responses. With the Code of Practice, the EU has
also established a clear framework for online platforms to deal with this challenge. The
15 JOIN(2016) 18 final of 6.4.2016.
16 JOIN(2018) 16 final of 13.6.2018.
17 Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 of 15.10.2018 and Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 of 15.10.2018.
18 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2328
19 Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17.5.2019 and Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of 17.5.2019,
Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1127 of 30.7.2020.
20 JOIN(2020) 18 final of 16.12.2020.
21 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-
measures
22 These activities are documented in a series of Special Reports issued by the EEAS:
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-
the-covid-19-pandemic-update-december-2020-april-2021/?highlight=covid

8. 7
implementation of the European Democracy Action Plan23 will further enhance these
instruments.
6. Possible selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU
As per the five guiding principles agreed in March 2016, the EU is open to selective
engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU. The EU has such interests on
elements of our green agenda (climate, environment, energy) as well as on some foreign
policy issues. Ongoing selective engagement on issues such as trade, economic and digital
matters, home affairs and public health have brought some limited concrete results, whilst
there exist major irritants, notably in the fields of trade and transport.
Shortly after Russia joined the Paris Agreement and given the EU’s ambitious climate goals24,
the EU has gradually resumed senior officials’ discussions on climate with Russia, including
through the EU-funded conference in December 2020 in Moscow, in the run-up to the COP-
26 in Glasgow. Russia has been working on a long-term strategy and has slightly updated its
nationally determined contribution, though it still leaves considerable space for growing
emissions. Russia has also taken some legislative steps to update its climate policies25, but its
recent efforts could generate false expectations.26 The Russian authorities have increasingly
requested technical discussions with the EU on the possible impact of the EU’s climate policy
on the Russian economy. The EU has offered thematic discussions, including on carbon
pricing, climate change adaptation, and possibly the carbon border adjustment mechanism.
Russia shares more than 2,000 kilometres of border with the EU and faces a number of
environmental challenges that have an impact on the EU and its Member States. Deeper
cooperation could include issues such as waste management, reducing cross-border and air
pollution, the circular economy, sustainable forest management, and fighting forest fires. This
would also have a positive impact on climate change, the effects of which already tangibly
affect Russia, such as melting permafrost. In the short term, the upcoming Conference of the
Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity provides an opportunity for prior
engagement.
While the EU-Russia energy dialogue remains suspended, there are a number of pressing
issues. The correct implementation of the agreement on Ukraine gas transit needs to be
monitored. The synchronisation of the Baltic States to the European grid and electricity trade
should be completed while ensuring continued safe operation of the Russian and Belarusian
grid.
On digital issues, working level exchanges with Russia have lacked concrete results. Pursuing
EU interests, notably coordination on the use of the 700 MHz frequency band27 and market
access for EU companies in Russia, remains important. Other topics, including research and
innovation, big data, data protection, copyright, internet governance and autonomous
vehicles, were discussed without any substantial follow-up. The EU should also actively
23 COM(2020) 790 final of 3.12.2020.
24 COM(2019) 640 final of 11.12.2019.
25 Such as the recent draft bill on monitoring greenhouse gas emissions at corporate level and a special law to
turn Sakhalin into a pilot territory for carbon-neutrality.
26 In the context of the recent legislative developments on climate policies, the Russian authorities have put a
lot of emphasis on creating the conditions for forest-based offsetting projects to grow, thus benefitting from
the possible opportunities of international voluntary carbon markets, but the EU is not planning on using
international credits for EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) compliance after 2020.
27 The failure of Russia to manage the switchover of the 700Mhz band prevents EU Member States bordering
Russia from fulfilling their own legal obligations to do so.

9. 8
address Russia’s import substitution policy in public procurement of software and hardware to
avoid significant risks and difficulties to the EU’s digital industry.
As regards foreign policy issues, there are persisting tensions in the EU’s neighbourhood, and
growing competition in other regions where Russia is strategically seeking to assert its role,
such as the Western Balkans and the Southern Mediterranean, as well as the African
continent. Nevertheless, there are areas where the Russian government has been playing a
constructive role, such as on the preservation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPoA) with Iran and ensuring its full and effective implementation. The same holds for the
ongoing diplomatic efforts in Vienna to facilitate a possible return by the US to the JCPoA
and a full resumption by Iran of its nuclear commitments. In the context of Libya, the key EU
priorities are to ensure the Russian government’s positive attitude to the ongoing political
process and for a swift withdrawal of its mercenaries. Russia’s view on the Middle East
Peace Process has remained in principle close to that of the EU.
On Syria, the EU’s and Russia’s positions differ sharply. The Russian government supports
the current Assad regime, including the recent “Presidential elections” on 26 May 2021. Its
military intervention in Syria may have been instrumental in securing the survival of the
regime, but has further undermined the stability and viability of the Syrian state and
contributed to a regional humanitarian crisis. For the EU the only way forward is a genuine
political solution based on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 in
full, which would also open a path to a possible voluntary, safe and dignified return of
refugees. In any case, the EU will keep engaging with Russia on the need to sustain
humanitarian access to Syrians in need, as well as on upholding International Humanitarian
Law in Syria.
The EU continues to engage with Russia within the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea
region. Cooperation under the Transport and Logistics Partnership of the Northern Dimension
focuses on possible sharing of views and best practices on decarbonisation of transport.
Discussions are also ongoing on Russia’s participation in the Black Sea Basin and Northern
Periphery and Arctic Interreg programmes in 2021-2027, in which it has expressed interest.
The Russian leadership continues to block the EU’s application for observer status in the
Arctic Council, which it now chairs, although this has not prevented the EU from
contributing to its work. Russia also blocks the establishment of Marine Protected Areas in
the Southern Ocean.
The EU has maintained technical contacts with Russia on trade that are usually limited to
exchanges, with few results, on the numerous irritants28. Most of them emanate from the
Russian government’s policy of import substitution, which is increasingly justified on
purported security grounds related to sanctions. This comes in addition to already existing
government-induced significant distortions in the Russian economy. As a result29, the overall
business and investment climate in the country is further deteriorating. In a relatively more
positive context, the EU and Russia have engaged on WTO reform, including on the
restoration of dispute settlement.
28 Discrimination in procurement by state-owned enterprises, intellectual property rights and other challenges
affecting healthcare goods and to goods and services, unreasonable technical requirements for alcoholic
products and cement, export bans of raw materials, a drastic increase of a “recycling fee” for vehicles, etc.
These can have an impact also on customs clearance of goods. Over the last five years (2015-2020) some
trade irritants with Russia (regulation on medical devices, measure on toys) were solved in the WTO’s
Technical Barriers in Trade Committee.
29 Russian import substitution policy and limited contacts has led to a gradual loss of EU positions in the
Russian market: whereas in 2013 the EU was the origin of 43% of Russian imports and China of 17%, the
numbers for 2020 are 34% and 24%. EU investors in Russia, notably in areas particularly linked to national
security such as ICT, are under continuous pressure.

10. 9
The Russian government has banned the import of approximately half of agricultural
products from EU Member States to allow the increase of domestic production and put
pressure on the remaining agri-food trade, in particular wine, spirits and pet food, via various
sanitary and phyto-sanitary restrictions. Notably EU Geographical Indications continue to be
misused. However, the EU agri-food sector has been remarkably resilient. With some
sectorial and regional differences, it has generally been able to find alternative markets so
that, since the imposition of the embargo, the value of global EU exports has increased
considerably.30
Some expert dialogues on home affairs are continuing at varying intervals. The last meetings
of the EU-Russia Migration Dialogue and the Joint Visa Facilitation and Readmission
Committees took place in 2018-2019. Although the Russian government considers
cooperation in these areas important, it does not meet fully its obligations.31 It also often
opposes the EU on counterterrorism and cybercrime in international fora. The last high-level
EU-Russia counterterrorism talks took place in October 2019. A Russia-sponsored UN
Resolution has started a challenging process possibly threatening the position of the Budapest
Convention on Cybercrime. The expert dialogue on drugs exchanges relevant information
annually.
There are no regular technical EU-Russia exchanges on public health, although there is good
regional level cooperation within the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and
Social Well-Being. The European Medicines Agency started in March 2021 a rolling review
of the Russian COVID-19 vaccine Sputnik V, assessing its compliance with the EU standards.
A variety of other contacts is ongoing, on sectors ranging from customs cooperation via
industrial and competition issues to transport. These contacts remain at a technical level.
7. People-to-people contacts and support to Russian civil society
Russia remains an important partner in terms of people-to-people mobility. It is the country
where most Schengen visas are issued worldwide: between 3.1 million and 3.8 million in
2016-2018, 4.1 million in 2019 (accounting for 27% of total Schengen visas issued
worldwide), and 635,000 in 2020 (26%). Furthermore, around four out of five Schengen visas
issued in Russia since 2016 are for multiple entries.
Research and innovation has been an important area of cooperation, particularly through the
participation of Russian entities in the EU programmes32. For example, under Horizon 2020,
their participation in the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions involved 36 different organisations
and approximately 520 Russian researchers. Cooperation is based on the principle of co-
funding, with Russia supporting its own scientists in joint projects or making a commensurate
financial and material contribution. EU interests include accessing Russia’s leading large-
scale research facilities, engaging Russian scientific expertise for research on topics related to
EU policy priorities and global challenges, facilitating the adoption of European solutions in
Russia, and maintaining bridges with Russia’s academic community. Both sides have
completed the internal procedures to renew the EU-Russia Science and Technology
Cooperation Agreement for a new five-year period, but the renewal remains blocked due to an
issue related to its territorial scope. Whilst the renewal would ensure a stable long-term
30 Despite these serious issues, the Russian market remains the sixth export destination for EU agri-food
products, which have gradually increased since 2017 (to decline in 2020).
31 The main issues of concern for the EU remain the lack of visa reciprocity (e.g. low share of multiple-entry
visas issued to EU citizens), the need to restart (previously satisfactory) cooperation on readmission after the
pandemic and the necessity to hold both Joint Committees on a regular basis.
32 Framework Programmes for Research & Innovation (Horizon 2020 (2014-2020), Horizon Europe (2021-
2027)).

11. 10
framework for cooperation, the Joint S&T Cooperation Committee meetings are held
annually.
As regards education, youth and culture, the EU supports the outreach to Russian society,
the academic and research community, youth and culture stakeholders via EU programmes33.
Russia has been a full member of the European Higher Education Area and the Bologna
Process. Russia holds the first place among all international partner countries participating in
Erasmus+ 2014-2020 International Credit Mobility with over 23 000 Erasmus+ two-way
academic exchanges of students and staff.
In the area of culture, Russia can participate in the Cultural Relations Platform. Erasmus+
2021-2027 foresees continuing established cooperation with Russia in higher education and
youth and new funding actions in vocational education and training and virtual exchanges.
Under Horizon Europe 2021-2027, the intention is to further balance the researchers’ flows
between Russia and the EU. The recently adopted amendments to the Law on Education34
could have implications for international cooperation in education and research.
Russia currently participates in eight Interreg cooperation programmes which remain one of
the few EU instruments investing in projects in Russia via central authorities. Russia is a
committed contributor to the programmes.
The EU is a leading supporter of Russian civil society and human rights organisations. EU
action for Russians covers a broad range of areas, including support for universal rights,
media literacy, youth, women, gender equality, social inclusion, elderly, women and children,
people with disabilities, migrants, people belonging to minority communities, victims of
domestic violence, prisoners, and other marginalised and vulnerable groups. The EU also
funds the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum. EU action has been crucial for Russian civil
society organisations to continue their activities despite a very repressive and further
tightening environment, enhance awareness, and allow for providing factually correct
information about the EU and important topics.
As set out above, the more restrictive legal framework35, suppression of independent voices
and limitations on fundamental freedoms in Russia impose major constraints to the work of
civil society. A number of independent journalists and human rights activists have left the
country. The EU has continued to support people-to-people contacts and civil society
unabatedly, as an investment for the future.36
Finally, the EU is now equipped with specific instruments against those violating human
rights. The adoption and first listings under the new EU Global Human Rights Sanctions
33 Erasmus+, Horizon’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions, and the European Solidarity Corps.
34 According to the new law, any activity classified as ‘educational’ must be coordinated with the authorities.
35 Such as the legislation on “foreign agents” organisations that is used e.g. to harass NGOs and activists with
possible criminal liability as well as to pre-screen electoral candidates and bar NGOs and media from
participating in election campaigns. Under the law on “undesirable organisations”, for which amendments are
being considered to toughen its scope, the authorities can shut down foreign or international organisations in
Russia. The concept of a candidate “performing the function of a foreign agent” and “affiliated with a person
performing the function of a foreign agent” was recently introduced in the electoral law and will most likely
be applied in a selective and discriminatory manner targeting non-systemic opposition. The Russian
authorities often abuse legislative provisions to ban inconvenient political gatherings and new provisions
provide for labelling of single pickets as a mass action and criminal liability for blocking roads and
sidewalks. Several legal acts, with often vague wording, restrict media freedom and give the state agencies
significant powers.
36 The EU also updated in February 2021 its guidelines on supporting human rights defenders and civil society
as well as enhancing people-to-people contacts.

12. 11
Regime sent a clear political signal about our willingness to act against those undermining
them, including in Russia.37
8. Conclusions and action points
This report sets out the state of EU-Russia relations in all their complexity, clearly identifying
challenges and opportunities. Russia remains our largest neighbour and an important global
actor. However, as this report shows, the deliberate policy choices and aggressive actions of
the Russian government over the last years have created negative spiral.
To meet the strategic challenge posed by the Russian leadership, our collective
implementation of the five principles has given the EU purpose and a principled approach to
defending our interests and promoting our values. The EU and its Member States shall
continue to act with unity and consistency, defending their fundamental values, principles and
interests. Bilateral engagement should not be pursued at the expense of common EU interests
and goals.
History, geography and people bind the EU and Russia. However, a renewed partnership
allowing us to realise the full potential of close cooperation seems a distant prospect. Against
the backdrop of the challenging political context and in light of Russia’s strategic choices, the
EU needs to prepare for a further downturn of its relations with Russia as the most realistic
outlook for the time being.
Our ambition should be to explore paths that could help change the current dynamics
gradually into a more predictable and stable relationship.
To enable this, the EU will maintain open channels of communication with Russia. We expect
the Russian leadership to demonstrate a more constructive engagement and political
commitment and stop actions against the EU and its Member States, as well as against third
countries. This is indispensable to turn the current unproductive and potentially dangerous
tide in this important relationship.
The EU will simultaneously push back, constrain and engage Russia, based on a strong
common understanding of Russia’s aims, an approach of principled pragmatism and fully in
line with the five principles.
The EU will continue to push back against human rights violations and will speak up for
democratic values, including in international fora, making clear that these are matters of
direct and legitimate concern to all UN, OSCE and Council of Europe States and do not
belong exclusively to the internal affairs of a country. The Russian government needs to abide
by its international obligations and commitments.
The EU will continue to raise Russia’s consistent breaches of international law in Ukraine,
Georgia, and elsewhere prominently, including through initiatives with like-minded partners.
This includes calling on Russia to assume its responsibility as a party to the conflict and to
fully implement the Minsk agreements. The EU will more actively challenge the false
narratives employed by Russia to justify its actions, on all levels. We will continue to counter
(through our visa practices) Russia’s policy of “passportisation” in Ukraine.
The EU will continue to respond to the Russian government’s malicious actions, including to
hybrid actions, in an appropriate manner. This could include scaling-up and expanding its
various existing sanctions regimes and/or taking additional restrictive measures if needed.
37 Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 of 7.12.2020 and Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7.12.2020, and
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/372 of 2.3.2021.

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The EU will aim at limiting the resources the Russian government can draw on to carry out
its disruptive foreign policy. We will also enforce EU legislation more effectively to counter,
in a targeted manner, criminal activities originating from Russia (including ransom attacks),
together with like-minded partners. We will step up our fight against corruption and money
laundering, including through increased transparency on financial flows concerning Russia.
The EU will step up its action against coercive practices by third countries, including Russia,
by developing a new, autonomous tool permitting effective responses to dissuade and offset
coercion.
To constrain Russia’s attempts to undermine EU interests, the Union itself must become
more robust and resilient.
We must counter threats and malign actions more systematically and in a joined up way,
whilst ensuring coordination with like-minded partners such as NATO and G7. Member
States should coordinate their responses to Russia’s actions even more pro-actively.
We should further develop the EU’s cyber security and defence capacity, as well as its
strategic communication capabilities. We will further step up our action to address and stop
information manipulation and disinformation, including by strengthening the regulatory
framework for social media platforms. The EU is considering introducing new instruments
allowing to impose costs on perpetrators, including in the framework of the European
Democracy Action Plan.
We should continue to strengthen our capabilities against hybrid threats, including the EU
Hybrid Fusion Cell, Helsinki European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats,
and our structured cooperation with NATO, and take dedicated action to protect better the
EU’s and Member States' democratic processes, institutions and electoral infrastructure.
We will make better use of the leverage provided by our energy transition and will fully
implement EU energy market rules. We will support the energy security of our neighbours,
including the correct implementation of the agreement on Ukraine gas transit. Completing the
synchronisation of the Baltic States to the European grid and electricity trade remains a high
priority.
We will step up support to our Eastern partners, working to realise the full potential of the
Eastern Partnership. The upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit will be an important occasion
to forge this common post-2020 agenda. Successful political and economic reforms, in
particular in the areas of the rule of law, human rights, the fight against corruption and good
governance, will reduce the vulnerabilities of our partners and serve as a key antidote to
interference and destabilisation attempts by Russia. Our agenda could include investing in
security partnerships with our neighbours to further increase their resilience.
To further its own interests, the EU should engage Russia on several key challenges.
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the common interest for constructive engagement on
public health, e.g. on tackling cross-border health threats, better preparedness, work on
antimicrobial resistance, regulatory convergence and access to medical products.
In light of our common interest to combat climate change and other environmental issues,
the EU should engage in a closer dialogue with Russia, most immediately in the run-up to the
COP-26 in Glasgow and the COP-15 on Biodiversity in Kunming. It should also pursue
thematic discussions in these fields, including on carbon pricing, renewables, methane
emissions, climate change adaptation and the EU’s future carbon border adjustment
mechanism. This is all the more important for Russia given the fast-changing geopolitics of
energy and its own delayed low-carbon transition.

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There should be more technical engagement with the Russian government on the vast number
of economic irritants, e.g. on import substitution, trade barriers and subsidy controls,
leveraging the EU’s competitive advantages. Depending on the issue and strictly in line with
the sovereign choices of other countries concerned, this would also include targeted, technical
work with the Eurasian Economic Union, within the latter’s remit.
The EU will further people-to-people contacts. This could include more visa facilitation (e.g.
visa fee waivers) for the youth, work-and-travel programmes, academic cooperation, science
and education, and student exchanges.
As regards regional and cross-border cooperation, we should continue to pursue
programmes with Russia, cooperation under the Northern Dimension and practical
cooperation in regional inter-governmental formats, e.g. the Council of the Baltic Sea States,
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Black Sea region as well as in the Arctic.
The EU will enhance its support to Russian civil society and human rights defenders,
applying more flexible and creative approaches. We will step up support to independent
Russian language media outlets to strengthen a plurality of views. We will also fine-tune our
aid programmes as needed to ensure their effectiveness and avoid the repression of partners.
The EU will work on conflict prevention and bilateral de-confliction and confidence-
building mechanisms. We will cooperate on regional (such as JCPoA, Middle East, Libya,
Afghanistan) and global issues (such as counter-terrorism and nuclear proliferation), based
on the full respect of international law as the core of a rules-based international order. The EU
will continue to engage with Russia in multilateral organisations.
On the basis of overall developments and guidance from the European Council, the
Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President will operationalise the agenda set
out above.