Behavioural finance

•Als PPT, PDF herunterladen•

1 gefällt mir•587 views

Babasab Patil

Behavioral finance BEC BAGALKOT

Business Wirtschaft & Finanzen

The Exam ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Short answer questions: summarise & evaluate ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Essay question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Recap ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

The Financial Instability Hypothesis ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Fisher & Debt Deflation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Fisher & Debt Deflation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Fisher & Debt Deflation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Fisher & Debt Deflation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

The Wall Street Crash To below 42 at its trough With rallies that implied “the worst is over…” By the final end, market was down 89% from its peak 25 years to recover From 382 at its peak in less than 3 years

From Sage to Laughing Stock… ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Keynes and Debt-deflation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Keynes and the Dual Price Level Hypothesis ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Keynes on Uncertainty and Expectations ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Schumpeter on Cycles & Credit ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Schumpeter’s model: money has real effects ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Schumpeter’s model: money has real effects ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Aside: “Marx with different adjectives” ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Integration: Financial Instability Hypothesis ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Chracterstics of financial marketing on basis of cartoon published in 1987

nidhisss

Theory of interest

Khemraj Subedi

Financial crisis

Mudassara

I. Introduction II. Causes of the current financial crisis III. A timeline of the most important events IV. Fannie and Freddie V. The current financial crisis’ nature VI. The great depression & lessons from the past VII. The Impact on Emerging Countries. VIII. How to solve this problem IX. Executive Summary X. Sources I made this paper for my English course. It\'s a nice paper if you\'re interested in the crisis. You don\'t need to be an economist to understand what I\'m writing about, it\'s written in clear,understandable English! This version still contains some errors...(it\'s not the final version)

The Financial Crisis- paper

Philippe De Smit

Fisher black and the revolutionary idea of finance

Futurum2

[2 Session] TA controversis, Indicator, divergence, 9 rule for Divergence [29...

Md. Ahsan Ullah Raju

Was ist angesagt? (6)

Chracterstics of financial marketing on basis of cartoon published in 1987

Theory of interest

Financial crisis

The Financial Crisis- paper

Fisher black and the revolutionary idea of finance

[2 Session] TA controversis, Indicator, divergence, 9 rule for Divergence [29...

Andere mochten auch

Super Engaged Gen Y & X: Influencing with social technologies, gamification &...

Mark Neely

Behavioural Finance Applied

Clare Levy

Financial Economics Lecture 18 Behavioural Finance

Stephen Kinsella

Behavioural Finance

Shrey Sao

Heuristics- Behavioural finance

Shravya Reddy

Behavioral finance -_an_explanation

smritipattnaik

Behavioral finance

Ekrem Tufan

Behavioral Finance

hus gary

Key Principles of Behavioural Finance

Jawwad Siddiqui

Behavioural Finance Final Ppt

sharadaiyer

Andere mochten auch (10)

Super Engaged Gen Y & X: Influencing with social technologies, gamification &...

Behavioural Finance Applied

Financial Economics Lecture 18 Behavioural Finance

Behavioural Finance

Heuristics- Behavioural finance

Behavioral finance -_an_explanation

Behavioral finance

Behavioral Finance

Key Principles of Behavioural Finance

Behavioural Finance Final Ppt

Ähnlich wie Behavioural finance

Michael Durante Western Reserve 1Q029 review

Michael Durante

Financial crisis 2008

Muheed Khan

Ricardo V Lago -Interbank- Lima-22 04 2009

neiracar

Bill Janeway Warburg Pincus Productive Bubbles Business of Software Conferenc...

Business of Software Conference

Money, credit and finance

Babasab Patil

2008 Seminar Ppt 2

nickhohn

Confessions of a risk manager

Davidkerrkelly

FI 340 Final Paper

Tom Bopp

Deep Value and the Aquirer's Multiple by Tobias Carlisle for QuantCon 2016

Quantopian

$Occam\'s Razor - Inflation (Sept. 2009)$ $Occam\'s Razor - Inflation (Sept. 2009)$

Occam\'s Razor - Inflation (Sept. 2009)

MAMC84

$Occam\'s Razor on Inflation$ $Occam\'s Razor on Inflation$

Occam\'s Razor on Inflation

MAMC84

Ricardo V Lago Universityof Miami Business Forum 15 01 2009

neiracar

Mike Hayward: With the help of DK, I have redrafted my Meltdown presentation to be suitable for an International Audience and it is attached below. I have already given this talk at several UK universities with more to come. It is designed multidisciplinary audiences so it is not too technical and is richly illustrated. Please feel free to use and adapt the presentation to suit your own needs and viewpoint. My name is not mentioned in the presentation. The subject is too important to claim authorship or credit. Summary...... The global debt mountain, peak oil, population growth, resource depletion, population growth, the pension time bomb and climate change are all interconnected. Meltdown did not occur in October 2008, but we were within 4 hours of it happening. It has only been deferred. Remember, only 3 dozen economists correctly predicted the 2008 global financial crisis, out of a profession of 20,000 members. Not one of the World politicians and Central Bankers saw the crisis coming, but all of them claim to know the remedy. The reasons for the 2008 crash have not gone away. The US housing market is still in freefall and US and European Banks are becoming increasingly insolvent, although they won't admit it. Economic growth will be stifled by rising oil prices. The bailouts are not working. World Politicians, Bankers and Economists are trying to maintain the status quo but they are losing control. Fundamentally, the real systemic causes of the crisis are rarely discussed with transparency and have not been addressed. Fractional Reserve Banking and universal public ignorance of banking practices are the cause of all the our global problems. The collapse will happen within the next couple of years. The Eurozone or USA will most probably be the epicentre. The interconnectivity of the financial system means we will all be affected. What happens next after the collapse is impossible to predict. History is replete with examples but not on a Global scale. Massive political unrest will prevail. There will be a rise in popularity of extreme left and right political parties.

Meltdown presentation atca full master Mike Hayward

Ed Dodds

ALTERNATIVES TO THE F E D ? Bennett T. McCallum I must begin by saying that I have been extremely disappointed— the word "appalled" may be more accurate—by several develop- ments over the last two years involving tlie Federal Reserve. It was, I believe, appropriate that the Fed would respond widi expansionary monetary policy in the face of a major macroeconomic downtum, which it did. But it did not have to do so by means of operations tliat incorporated major excursions into credit policy, as weU as monetary policy, and thereby into the unauthorized exercise of fiscal policy. ̂ By engaging in such operations on a very large sctile, die Fed's actions are iJmost certain to have detrimental effects on tlie Fed's independ- ence—and thereby on its resulting ability to focus attention on what shotild be its principal objective, namely, price level stability. Furthermore, tlie Fed has not been moving quickly—if at all—to explain and correct this situation. AH in aU, die recent experience has had flie effect of moving the Fed away from die type of policy behavior tliat niixinstream academic analysts have been promoting over tlie past 15 years—namely, an activist but mle-based monetary stabilization policy fliat emphasizes Catojounwl, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Fall 2010). Copyright © Cato Institute. All rights reserved. Bennett T. McCiilhtin is Professor of Econotnics at Carnegie Mellon University. He thanks Marvin Coodfriend for helpful cotntnents. 'Coodfriend and McCallum (2009) distinguish between pure monetary policy (changes in base money by central bank purchase or sale of Treasury securities), pttre credit policy (changes in the cotnposition of central bank assets witli no change in base tnoney), and ititerest-on-reserves policy (with no balance sheet changes). Since the Fed returns to the Treasury the interest received on the Treasury securities that it holds, it is the case that when the Fed sells Treasuries to fund expansionary credit policy the net results are the satne as if the Treasury fttianced credit extensions by selling its securities to (i.e., borrowing from) the public. 439 CATO JOURNAL die avoidance of significant inflation while also avoiding deflation. In saying this, I do recognize that the term "inflation targeting" has been gradually corrupted so as to pemiit excessive aspects of "fine tuning" relating to output and employment levels, but by and large I believe that the academic literature has been mosdy constructive and that much ofthe commentary tending to discredit it on the basis of recent events has done so mistakenly. Monetary Policy and Exchange Rates In previous writings, I have argued that monetary policy and exchange rate policy are linked togedier so intimately that diey should be considered as two sides of the same coin. From that per- spective, it seems an unfortunate anachronism that official exchange- rate responsibility is assigned to the Treasury or Finance Ministry in many economies, including the United.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE F E D Bennett T. McCallumI must b.docx

nettletondevon

Keynes’s Analysis of Capitalist Depressions Throughout the remainder of the General Theory, Keynes consistently assumed that the rate of utilization of the productive capacity of physical capital declined sharply in times of depression, and the number of employed workers declined sharply as well. Keynes’s theory was addressed to those obvious realities of depression in an insightful and coherent manner. But because it is an equally obvious fact of capitalist depressions that the real wages of workers did not increase when employment decreased, Keynes’s adherence to the marginal productivity theory that wages were always equal to the workers’ marginal productivity contradicted the rest of his theory. As we have frequently pointed out in this book, the contradictions in a great thinker’s theory (and Keynes was a logician of the first order) give the best insights into the thinker’s ideological orientation. Keynes wished to furnish capitalist governments with theoretical insights that would help to save capitalism. In doing so, it was necessary for him to abandon some tenets of neoclassical theory. But, as we will see, he wanted to retain as much neoclassical ideology as possible. So he adhered to both the marginal productivity theory of distribution and the belief that the free market efficiently allocated resources (once full employment was attained), despite the fact that both these tenets of neoclassical ideology were logically tied to the belief that the free market automatically created a full employment, Pareto optimal situation. Even with theorists having the extraordinary logical ability of Keynes, ideology very frequently wins out over logic. Keynes rejected the notion that if a capitalist economy started from a situation of full employment, then the rate of interest would automatically equate saving and investment and thus keep aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply. His major departures from the doctrines that comprised the neoclassical theory of automaticity were twofold: First, although he accepted the neoclassical notion that saving was influenced by the rate of interest, he insisted that the level of aggregate income was a far more important influence on the amount of saving than was the rate of interest. Second, he argued that saving and investment did not determine the rate of interest. The interest rate was a price that equalized the demand and supply of money—something quite different from (although not unrelated to) investment and saving. These were very important departures indeed, because, although Keynes was unaware of it, they destroyed not only the neoclassical theory of the automaticity of the market but also the two other pillars of neoclassical ideology—the marginal productivity theory of distribution and the theory that a free, competitive market will result in a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. Keynes wanted to achieve the first result (the destruction of the belief in the automaticity of the market) but ...

Keynes’s Analysis of Capitalist DepressionsThroughout the remain

TatianaMajor22

The_Neoclassical_Keynesian_Synthesis.ppt

MahiMahi943985

Economic and financial crises a fundamental analysis from Islamic financial...

Econ635ukpres2

Econ635 uk pres

Monetarist.pptx

Ähnlich wie Behavioural finance (20)

Michael Durante Western Reserve 1Q029 review

Financial crisis 2008

Ricardo V Lago -Interbank- Lima-22 04 2009

Bill Janeway Warburg Pincus Productive Bubbles Business of Software Conferenc...

Money, credit and finance

2008 Seminar Ppt 2

Confessions of a risk manager

FI 340 Final Paper

Deep Value and the Aquirer's Multiple by Tobias Carlisle for QuantCon 2016

$Occam\'s Razor - Inflation (Sept. 2009)$ $Occam\'s Razor - Inflation (Sept. 2009)$

Occam\'s Razor - Inflation (Sept. 2009)

$Occam\'s Razor on Inflation$ $Occam\'s Razor on Inflation$

Occam\'s Razor on Inflation

Ricardo V Lago Universityof Miami Business Forum 15 01 2009

Meltdown presentation atca full master Mike Hayward

ALTERNATIVES TO THE F E D Bennett T. McCallumI must b.docx

Keynes’s Analysis of Capitalist DepressionsThroughout the remain

The_Neoclassical_Keynesian_Synthesis.ppt

Economic and financial crises a fundamental analysis from Islamic financial...

Econ635ukpres2

Econ635 uk pres

Monetarist.pptx

Mehr von Babasab Patil

Segmentation module 4 mba 1st sem by babasab patil (karrisatte)

Babasab Patil

Marketing management module 1 core concepts of marketing mba 1st sem by baba...

Babasab Patil

Marketing management module 2 marketing environment mba 1st sem by babasab pa...

Babasab Patil

Marketing management module 4 measuring andforecasting demand mba 1st sem by...

Babasab Patil

Measuring and forecasting demand module 4 mba 1st sem by babasab patil (karri...

Babasab Patil

Notes managerial communication 3 business correspondence and report writing ...

Babasab Patil

Notes managerial communication mod 2 basic communication skills mba 1st sem ...

Babasab Patil

Notes managerial communication mod 4 the job application process mba 1st sem ...

Babasab Patil

Notes managerial communication mod 5 interviews mba 1st sem by babasab patil...

Babasab Patil

Notes managerial communication part 1 mba 1st sem by babasab patil (karrisatte)

Babasab Patil

Principles of marketing mba 1st sem by babasab patil (karrisatte)

Babasab Patil

Segmentation module 4 mba 1st sem by babasab patil (karrisatte)

Babasab Patil

Marketing management module 1 important questions of marketing mba 1st sem...

Babasab Patil

Discovery shuttle processing NASA before launching the rocket by babasab ...

Babasab Patil

Corporate lessons from__iim__calcutta by babasab patil

Babasab Patil

Communication problems between men and women by babasab patil

Babasab Patil

Brasil waterfall byy babasab patil

Babasab Patil

Best aviation photography_ever__bar_none by babasab patil

Babasab Patil

Attitude stone cutter

Babasab Patil

Attitude stone cutter

Babasab Patil

Mehr von Babasab Patil (20)