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Hra 310 chapter 12
- 2. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–2
Chapter Outline
• Strategic Importance of Variable Pay
• Linking Pay to Performance
• Individual Incentives
• Group Incentives
• Barriers to Pay-for-Performance Success
• Summary: Making Variable Pay Successful
• Executive Compensation
- 3. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–3
Strategic Importance of Variable Pay
• Aim is for Employees Who Can:
– Understand the Goals of the Organization
– Know their Role in Accomplishing these
Goals
– Become Appropriately Involved in
Decisions of the Organization
– Accept that Their Rewards Are Related to
Their Contribution to the Goal Attainment
of the Organization
- 4. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–4
Alignment
• A major strategic goal is to align
organizational and individual goals
through pay
• Best understood through examples of
misalignment
- 5. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–5
Examples of Misalignment
• What is being signaled to co-workers when well-
intentioned but ineffective employees are given
above-average merit increases?
• What is being signaled when executives are given
large bonuses after the organization has had a
below-average year, and only small increases are
given to other workers?
• What is being signaled if high commissions and
other incentives are paid to field sales reps, but
there is no monitoring of sales practices?
• What is being signaled if bonuses are paid even
when the organization did not earn the profits
necessary?
- 6. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–6
Table 12.1 Ratings of the Effectiveness of
Various Incentive Pay Reward Programs
Source: HR Focus, Vol. 78 (4), April 2001, pp.3-4.
- 7. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–7
Linking Pay to Performance
• Reasons to Link Pay to Performance
– Motivation
• Expectancy
• Instrumentality
• Valence
- 8. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–8
Figure 12.1 Major Elements of
Expectancy Theory
- 9. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–9
Table 12.2: Ratings of Pay Incentive
Plans
Source: E.E. Lawler, Pay and Organization Development, 1981 Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Addison Wesley Longman.
- 10. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–10
Linking Pay to Performance
• Reasons to Link Pay to Performance
– Motivation
– Retention
– Productivity
– Cost Savings
– Organizational Objectives
• Reasons Not to Link Pay to Performance
• Factors Affecting the Design of Incentive
Systems
- 11. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–11
Individual Incentives
• Piece-Rate Incentive
– The Taylor Plan
– Standard Hour Plan
• Commissions
• Bonuses
• Skill-Based Pay
• Merit Pay
- 12. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–12
Skill-Based Pay
• A reward system that pays employees
on the basis of the work-related skills
they possess rather than associated
rewards with performance levels or
seniority
– Stair-step model
– Job-point accrual model
– Cross-department model
- 13. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–13
Table 12.4 Merit Increase Guidelines
- 14. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–14
Merit Pay
+
A major motivational device
–
Permanent commitment to an increased
salary
- 15. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–15
Group Incentives
• Profit Sharing
• Gain-Sharing Plans
– Scanlon Plan
– Rucker Plan
– Improshare
– Winsharing
– Summary
- 16. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–16
Table 12.5 Principal Features of Gain-
Sharing and Profit-Sharing Programs
Source: Robert Doyle, Gainsharing and Productivity: A Guide to Planning, Implementation, and Development. Copyright © 1983 by AMACOM, a division of
American Management Association. Sections adapted from Jay R. Schuster and Patricia K. Zingheim, The New Pay: Linking Employees and
Organizational Performance (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1992).
- 17. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–17
Group Incentives
• Profit Sharing
• Gain-Sharing Plans
– Scanlon Plan
– Rucker Plan
– Improshare
– Winsharing
– Summary
• Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
- 18. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–18
Table 12.6 America’s Largest Companies
Over 50% Employee Owned
Source: “The Employee Ownership 100,” National Center for Employee Ownership, July 2004. (Available at : http://www.nceo.org/library/eo100.html)
- 19. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–19
Barriers to Pay-for-Performance
Success
• Nature of the Task
• Performance Measurement
• Amount of Payout
• Frailty of the Linkage
- 20. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–20
Summary: Making Variable Pay
Successful
• Characteristics of Successful Incentive
Systems:
– Employee-Organization Partnerships
– Employee Empowerment
– Relevant, Simple Measures
– Effective Communication
– Balance Between Short- and Long-Term
Performance Factors
– Line-of-Sight Considerations
- 21. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–21
Executive Compensation
• Goals of Executive Compensation
• Executive Bonus Plans
• Long-Term Incentives
• Perquisites
• Determining Executive Compensation
• Reforming Executive Compensation
- 22. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–22
Reasons for Interest in Executive
Compensation
• In 1993, the average CEO earned
$3,841,273. In 1997, just four years later,
CEO pay more than doubled to an average
$7.8 million.
• In 2000, U.S. CEOs earned on average a
princely $13.1 million.
• The result of the weakening returns led to the
first decreases in more than a decade in the
early 2000s with the 2003 average of CEO
salary, bonus, and long-term compensation at
$8.1 million.
- 23. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–23
Reasons for Interest in Executive
Compensation (cont’d)
• Reuben Mark, CEO, Colgate-Palmolive,
was the top-paid CEO with a total pay
of $141.1 million. This at a time when
Colgate-Palmolive saw a –19 percent
return in the three year period ending in
2003
• In 1980, CEO pay was 42 times the pay
of a factory worker; in 1997, the CEO
earned 326 times as much.
- 24. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–24
Reasons for Interest in Executive
Compensation (cont’d)
• In 1980 CEO pay was 42 times the pay of the
ordinary factory worker; by 1991 this ratio had
increased to 104; by 1993 to 149; by 1997 to
326; and was 531 times the average worker
in 2001. As a result of the collapsing stock
market, this ratio fell to 282 in 2002
• In the period 1990 to 2003, CEO pay rose
313 percent. During that time the S&P 500
stock index rose 242 percent, corporate
profits increased 128 percent, the average
worker’s pay climbed 49 percent, and inflation
rose 41 percent
- 25. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–25
Reasons for Interest in Executive
Compensation (cont’d)
• If the minimum wage had risen as much
as CEO pay over the thirteen years, it
would be more than $15.00 per hour
instead of the current rate of $5.15.
- 26. Copyright © Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. 12–26
Review
• Strategic Importance of Variable Pay
• Linking Pay to Performance
• Individual Incentives
• Group Incentives
• Barriers to Pay-for-Performance Success
• Summary: Making Variable Pay Successful
• Executive Compensation