1. Austin Schiano- Professor Galliotti-Transnational Security- 12-08-14
Recommendation: In an effort to forestall the use of social media by belligerent non-
state actors, specifically the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the United States
government must create stronger partnerships, and facilitate legal strategies with social
media corporations, that allow for greater censorship, and curtail the spread of: terrorist
propaganda, global outreach of terrorism, and terrorist communication.
I. Executive Summary
ISIS has redefined the ideology of global jihadism, moving away from the traditional
dogmatism of Al-Qaida, and toward a more inclusive engagement, in perpetrating and
orchestrating terror attacks. Social media, and various online technologies, have largely
aided in defining this shift of the organizations propaganda, communication, and
recruitment . Strengths in combatting ISIS’s online strategy include: social media
corporations being publicly owned and US based, along with an ability of to control site
content, current US legislation, and political leadership; weaknesses center on the
uncoordinated censorship measures across platforms, labor outsourcing, along with
speech and press restriction. Recommendations include: the United States government
working more closely with the private sector, coordination regarding the internet within
international institutions, further investment technology that disables communication,
and, as a last resort, measures of lethal force against ISIS via targeted bombing.
II. Assessment of the issue
A. The evolution of Islamic extremism and online technology
Other incarnations of Islamic extremists, have also strategically utilized the
internet. Al-Qaida’s internet actions in the early 2000’s however, were disseminated
through the means of a strict hierarchy. This meant that it relied upon the dogmatic
messaging of key figures such as Usama Bin Laden, to communicate with Al-Qaida
members abroad, through videos that re-affirmed the importance of centralized leadership
. The organization would then use the internet, to distribute information on: membership
protocol, ideology, strategy, and operations. This created the allusion of an almost
religious value being placed upon Al-Qaida leadership, creating an intentional disconnect
with subordinates and new recruits, who passively received instruction from top figures.1
It also made it significantly harder to join Al-Qaida.
The core foundation of ISIS challenges Al-Qaida’s structure, as developed by the
now deceased jihadist ideologue, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi rejected the
dogmatism of Al-Qaida, moving authority away from the radical Islamist intelligentsia,
and toward soldiers fighting on the battlefield.2 ISIS has provided a means to utilize
1 Brachman,Jarret “TranscendingOrganization:Individuals and theIslamic State”,(START- National
Consortiumfor the Study of Terrorismand Responses to Terrorism, June 2014),at 3.
2 Zelin,Y Aaron “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global JihadistMovement”(
The Washington Institutefor Near East Policy,June 2014),at 3.

2. aspects of social media to further this notion, using online technology, to redesign the
central model of directing communication in active combat, and recruitment. This creates
the opportunity for deeper radicalization, and more solidified commitment to ISIS’s
cause, within an exponentially reduced period of time. As individuals connect with ISIS,
they feel an increased sense of personal legitimacy and community, as they rise through
the ranks of ISIS communication. Likewise, ISIS has also masterfully utilized online
platforms, to exponentially spread propaganda material.
B. Detailing ISIS’s systemic use of Social Media
ISIS utilizes an advanced system of communication, which encourages discourse
between those on the frontline, those sympathetic to the organizations cause, and aspiring
members. The methodology of this interaction plays out across various levels of
engagement. The first step, consists of inspiring individuals with “visual propaganda”
distributed on Instagram, or similar platforms, that is meant to encourage the user to
follow a foreign fighter on Twitter. The organization’s anticipation is then, that after
following the individual on the frontline, the sympathizer will look to engage, in a
mediated communication, on Ask.fm, a site that allows users to pose anonymous
questions, to a given username. If there is mutual interest then, between the individual
and ISIS affiliates, to continue the conversation, the parties will utilize a private direct
message system such as: Kik, Surespot, or Skype direct Messenger. 3 It is generally at
this point, that the individual would join, or make a firm commitment, to ISIS and the
global jihadist movement. This process of communication of course, is not the only way
that ISIS interacts and recruits members. However, it highlights a tangible example of
how there are many levels of correspondence in this sytem, each level with a unique goal,
that requires an increase of trust and commitment by both ISIS and the individual.
In regard to the first step of the above process, what we can refer to as traditional
social media interaction, ISIS spreads their message with accounts that both represent the
group as a whole, and through those of members and supporters. A reason why ISIS is so
represented and accessible on social media platforms, is because of the value the
organization places on individual fighters, and not key leadership figures. This means that
if one account is deleted by a website, another account can easily spread the same
information, without breaking institutional protocol, or first seeking a higher level of
authorization from a leader. ISIS is collectively, active upon the platforms of: Facebook,
Twitter including certain English speaking jihadist’s utilizing the username
“#AmessagetoUSfromISIS”, Instagram instituting doctored photos that flout American
symbols of power (specifically an ISIS flag in front of the White House), You-Tube
Channels displaying videos such as the Hollywood-esque “Clanging of the Swords IV”,
along with the series of terrifying beheadings.4 ISIS has also shown great sophistication,
playing upon divisive moments in western culture, and engaging in radicalized messaging
when liberal moral superiority was under scrutiny, notably, the November protest’s in
3 Brachman,Jarret “TranscendingOrganization:Individualsand the IslamicState”,(START- National
Consortiumfor the Study of Terrorismand Responses to Terrorism, June 2014),at 3.
4 Brooking, Emerson “The ISIS Propaganda machine is Horrible and Effective. How Does It
Work?”(CFR, August 2014),at 1.

3. Ferguson Missouri. Also, ISIS shocked the world with the development of the now
revoked Android App, that, before it’s removal, served as an aggregate for all
information related to the actions of the organization.
III. Opportunities and Strengths in combatting ISIS online
 Facebook, Twitter, Instagram (owned by Facebook), Youtube (owned by
Google),Android Apps (approved by Google), and Skype (owned by Microsoft),
are all administered by private corporations, that have the resources and methods
to censor content.
 Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Microsoft, all have their headquarters in America.
 The above - mentioned corporations are all publicly owned, and traded, on the
New York Stock Exchange. This means, that if they do not want to cooperate with
the desired censorship measures, the government could publicize, in an
information campaign, the fact that terrorists are using social media outlets, that
this is a matter of national security, and thereby create instability in the market.
This would cause stock prices to drop, threaten global commerce, and pressure the
corporations into government compliance.
 Americans have been galvanized in the fight against ISIS, specifically with the
collective horror from the publicized beheadings of westerners, but are reluctant
of measures that require troops. This sort of partnership, or legislative strategy to
combat ISIS, and should not appear costly to the American population, and not
cause controversy.
 The United States government can utilize the framework of the 2001 Patriot Act,
to justify these efforts of increased censorship, or outright surveillance, at least
concerning the American domestic population.
 The Republicans have recently achieved a majority in Congress, and this political
party should be more supportive to such measures against terrorism.
IV. Weaknesses andChallenges in combatting ISIS online
 Facebook has traditionally been more pro active in censoring images of sexuality,
and hesitant in removing images of political meaning or violence.
 Facebook utilizes third party corporations to engage in censorship. This labor, has
largely been exported to Morocco, or South East-Asia, both of which have large
Muslim populations. ISIS could infiltrate these populations, co-opt individuals
who worked in these locations, and edit or learn from the way in which the
Facebook’s censorship occurs.
 Twitter is hesitant to censor controversial information in conflict zones, due to the
fact that the site has been viewed as a source of positive user generated content,

4. and “citizen reporting”, in fragile states and conflict zones. Examples of this
include Twitter’s role in the attempted Iranian revolution, and the Arab Spring.
 The KIK platform, does not currently have strongly developed measures of
censorship.
 The Ask.fm platform, due to the intentionally ambiguous nature of questions
posed on the site, does not have strongly developed measures of censorship.
 The government risks both international and public backlash, specifically from
journalists, for any social media censorship, as per claims that it limits free
speech, and freedom of the press. Such claims have already been expressed, in
previous instances, by non-government organizations, ex: Article 19.
V. Recommendations
 The United States government must work with domestic institutional structures,
which engage with private technological corporations to regulate social media.
 Increased supervision over social media, by the United States government, must
be conducted with the strictest scrutiny, and focus on cutting off the relationship
of those on the battlefield, with access to technology. This is integral, as
communication with those on the frontline, is key to both the structure and
legitimacy of the organization.
 The United States government must recognize that the activities of ISIS represent
a global threat to international peace and security. The United States should
utilize it’s status as a member-state of the United Nations, and member of the UN
Security Council, to spearhead and pressure the Internet Governance Forum, and
the International Telecommunication Union, and Global Network Initiative, all
affiliated UN entities, to co-opt expertise, and pledge support for global
censorship measures, against ISIS.
 The United States government must provide resources to research technologies
that can disable communication mechanisms.
 (In the case that the above point is not effective) The United States government
must use lethal force, preferably without the presence of soldiers (i.e. drones), to
destroy fighting ISIS members, and their centers of command, along with means
of communication.

5. VI. Bibliography
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(January-June 2014) https://transparency.twitter.com/removal-requests/2014/jan-jun *It
is interesting to note that while these reports do provide a brief synopsis concerning the
content, and location of the tweets and accounts that were removed, there is no mention
made of ISIS. It would be telling, for further research endeavors, to see if Twitter lists the
removal of ISIS tweets, and from what location, in the July-December 2014 transparency
report.
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