1. Lone Superpower, the Democratic Peace and the War on Terror 1989-9/11
While other Western countries had been subjected to heavy paramilitary violence during the 1970s
and 1980s – the UK and IRA, Spain and the ETA, Italy and Red/Black terrorism – the United
States of America had little experience with national terrorism. Apart from minor accidents,
usually involving relatively small groups, before 9/11 the US could consider itself relatively safe
from external terrorist attacks.
A possible explanation to the sudden growth in interest for undermining US power internationally
with violent attacks can arguably be found in the foreign policy decisions taken by presidential
administrations following the fall of the USSR in 1989.
Among these decisions were a) an exponentially growing interest in opening up to the Middle East
via new trade agreements – including the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
(Kennedy-Pipe 2012, p.278) – and b) military intervention to support countries deemed
strategically essential for the prospering American economy. President Bush’s Sr. intervention in
support of Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion can thus be justified as a political decision necessary
to safeguard the US interest in Middle Easter oil.
Moreover, the relationship between US and Saudi Arabia – which had signed a pact of non-
aggression with Iraq shortly before the beginning of the conflict – was further strengthened by the
decision of Sheik Abdulaziz bin Abdulla bin Baz, a senior cleric, to emanate a special fatwa (ruling)
blessing all fighters participating in the ‘holy war’ against Iraq, including US troops. (Miller 1991)
This interventionist streak continued as the US tried to stabilise its role as the ‘indispensable
nation’ (Albright in Kennedy-Pipe 2012, p.278) following the apparent end of bipolarity that had
come with the fall of the USSR: both Clinton’s administrations sought to demonstrate the prowess,
and power of the US by adopting bold foreign policies – these included the intervention in Haiti in
1994, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and the more active participation to broker peace talk
between Israel and Palestine.
However, it would later appear that the US attempt to ‘bestow’ freedom and democracy globally
was not favourably met by everyone.
Osama bin Laden was a Saudi-born of Yemeni descent who had fought along the mujahidin during
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979-80: the Saudi rebuttal for help guarding the Two Holy
Places of Islam (Makkah and Medinah), both situated in Saudi Arabia, plus the continued presence
of US troops following the end of the First Gulf War, prompted bin Laden to establish an extremist
group called al-Qaeda to expel ‘crusader forces’ from Islamic soil. ( Rogers 2012, p.345).
Starting off with minor attacks on US targets in Riyadh in 1996, and the US embassies in Nairobi
and Dar as Salaam in 1998, al-Qaeda would soon evolve into more well-planned attacks on US soil.
(Rogers 2012, p.339)
On September 11, 2001 two hijacked planes crashed into the North and South Towers of the World
Trade Centre – subjected to a previous, yet minor, attack in 1993 – another plane hit the Pentagon,
while a third plane went down in Pennsylvania following the intervention of the passengers.

2. 9/11 gave way to a new form of foreign policy based on stronger relationships with strategic
partners in the West, and Middle East, such as UK, France, Morocco and Syria.
Public acceptance of the new policies was won through the adoption of a whole new type of
language, a language of terror. New terms began to be adopted, and pressure was put on the
importance of nationalistic, and patriotic support: the decade of “us vs. them,” as phrased by
President Bush, had begun.
As Fred Halliday points out in his posthumous book Shocked and Awed, words and power are
intersected as states make use of language to create illusions to justify actions that, if explained
with untwisted words, would be unjustifiable. (Halliday 2011, p. ix)
Included in the unjustifiable decisions taken by the US on matter of foreign policy following 9/11
was the creation of the Extraordinary Rendition Programme: an effective form of kidnapping, the
programme established ties with foreign countries where the use of ‘extraordinary’ interrogation
methods – torture – was renowned, but not addressed officially by the US in exchange of providing
information received by prisoners. (Halliday 2011, p. 68)
After the beginning of the War on Terror, the United States established, and strengthened ties with
several countries all over the world under the guise of the global fight on terrorism. Foreign policy
became deeply militarised and dependant on collaboration with other countries: without their
support, it is arguable that international law would have allowed the US to act with impunity on
matters regarding torture – Abu Ghraib and Bagram – and human rights violation – such as the
unofficial rendition of prisoners to other countries, and the kidnapping and detention of an
Egyptian Imam in Italy.