11. Context of Project
Needs and requirements bound to the payment card are heavier
Management becomes more and more complex and expensive
to design and validate a new open and
standard POI (Point of Infrastructure)
Architecture for the Distribution of
secure Services
standardization
proposals
(EPAS, ISO)
A Web Major scientific
architecture - a thin client POI
- A server of infrastructure and industrial
- Some ADS+ services impacts
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
14. Technical innovation on the POI
Replace the certificats x.509 in
Composants Authentication
POI
PUF Technology
Low cost No private key to
protect
less complex than PKI
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
16. PUF Concepts
Introduced by Pappu (cf Physical One Way Functions 2001)
(cf. One-Way Functions,
The observation :
Component manufacturing processes induce minor
differences between two objects yet being made under
the same conditions
The idea :
To exploit these minor differences to generate a secret
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
17. How to generate a secret ?
g
Black
Application challenge Response
Box
Error detect o a d co ect o
o detection and correction Noisy
SRAM PUF
PUF,
Hardware
Optical PUF
Coating PUF
Arbiter PUF
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
18. Categories of PUFs
g
t-Strong PUF vs Weak PUF
« a Strong t-PUF has a sufficient number of Challenge-response pairs
such that it is difficult for an Attackers, who obtained some challenge-
response p
p pairs during a time t, to p
g , predict a response from a challenge
p g
with a high probability »
Source : Rührmair, Sölter, Selmke On the foundation of Physical Unclonable Functions (2009)
C
Controlled PUF vs U
ll d Uncontrolled PUF
ll d
Controlled PUF
Black
Challenge Response
box
Can forbid Can encrypt and hash
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
20. Optical PUF
Response
Transparent with random
scatterers
Challen
ge
20 | 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
21. Coating PUF
random dielectric particles
C a e ge
Challenge
(voltage of a Response
R
certain frequency (a random
and amplitude) capacitan
ce
Metal sensors
Value)
21 | 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
25. The PUF response as session key
p y
Enrollment phase
PUF 1 1 c1 r1
cm rm
DB
n c1 r1
PUF n
cm rm
Session key establishment
Id id c1 r1
PUF
c1
DB
r1 Black box cm rm
Session Key r1
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
26. The PUF response for Authentication
p
Enrollment phase < gk> a group
Ri = gri where ri is a PUF response to challenge ci
PUF 1 1 c1 R1
cm Rm
BD
n c1 R1
PUF n cm Rm
PUF authentication
Id
PUF id c1 R1
c1 BD
Black box
r1 cm Rm
Zero–Knowledge proof
Keith B. Frikken, Marina Blanton, Mikhail J. Atallah Robust Authentication using physically unclonable functions (2009) .
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
27. The PUFs to create a secure channel
- PUF uses in key exchange protocol
Data base attacks Impersonate the PUF
- PUF uses in a authentication protocol
No shared secret No session Key
- A secure channel : authentication + session key
A new protocol has been developed : DHZKP protocol
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team
29. Conclusion
▶ Physically Unclonable Function
– Use Physical characteristic to extract unique pattern
– Less expensive than a secure element
– Use cases : Anti-Counterfeit, M2M authentication
▶ ADS+
– M2M context
– Replace PKI by a disruptive technology
– Our PUF can be considered strong as we are in a Tamper Resistant Device
g p
▶ Protocol Layer : Our DHZKP
– Scientific Papier about the DHZKP protocol (We are making the security proof)
– RFC about the TLS extension by DHZKP
– Tests in a real situation (POI / server)
– Open source
29 | 16-11-2011| Cauchie Stéphane
O&D-R&D Team