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SACON
SACON International 2020
India | Bangalore | February 21 - 22 | Taj Yeshwantpur
PRACTICAL THREAT HUNTING:
DEVELOPING AND RUNNING A
SUCCESSFUL THREAT HUNTING
PROGRAM
#SACON #THREATHUNTING WASIM HALANI
Network Intelligence (NII)
HEAD R&D
@washalsec
ARPAN RAVAL
Optiv Inc
Senior Threat Analyst
@arpanrvl
PRACTICAL THREAT HUNTING:
Developing and Running a
Successful Threat Hunting Program
By Wasim Halani and Arpan Raval
WHOAMI
❖Wasim Halani
❖Head R&D @Network Intelligence (NII)
❖~12 years in InfoSec
❖Speaker at SACON, OWASP, BSides, Malcon,
SecurityBytes
❖Twitter @washalsec
❖https://in.linkedin.com/in/wasimhalani
WHOAMI
❖Arpan Raval
❖Senior Threat Analyst @Optiv Inc
❖DFIR and Threat Hunting
❖Twitter @arpanrvl
❖https://www.linkedin.com/in/arpanraval
DEFINE THREAT HUNTING
WHY & WHAT?
PROBLEM OF “DWELL TIME”
6
❖In 2011 Global Median dwell time
mentioned was 416 days!
❖For 2018, Fire Eye M Trends reports
average dwell time mentioned is
101 days!
❖For 2019, Fire Eye M Trends Reports
average dwell time mentioned is 78
days!
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2019/03/mtrends-2019-celebrating-ten-years-of-incident-response-reporting.html
IoC vs TTP
7
IoC
TTP
PYRAMID OF PAIN
I n t r o d u c e d b y D a v i d J B i a n c o
HASH VALUES
IP ADDRESS
DOMAIN NAMES
NW/HOST
ARTIFACTS
TOOLS
TTP
Trivial
Easy
Simple
Annoying
Challenging
Tough!
What is Threat Hunting?
9
“Threat Hunting is a human driven proactive approach to
discover malicious activities that have evaded existing
security control.”
What is Threat Hunting?
10
Detecting the Undetected
PURPOSE OF THREAT HUNTING
11
❖Reduce the Dwell Time
❖Identify Gaps in Visibility
❖Identify Gaps in Detection
❖Design New Detection Mechanism and
Analytics techniques
❖Uncover New Threat and TTPs (Producing
Threat Intelligence).
What is NOT Threat Hunting?
12
▪Triaging Alerts
▪IoC sweeps from Intel Feeds to Incoming telemetry
▪Process with guaranteed result.
▪A replacement for penetration testing or red teaming.
What is NOT Threat Hunting?
13
“Autonomous discovery of
malicious activity by tools.”
Characteristics of Threat Hunting
14
▪Human Driven
▪Human Centric
▪Proactive
▪Assume Breach
▪Detect Unknown
▪Iterative
▪Data dependent
▪Hypothesis Driven
Threat Hunting in Security Operations
15
Security
Monitoring
Threat
Hunting
Incident
Response
Search Queries,
CTI Guided
Detections
Retrohunts
Incident Detection
Event Analysis
Detector Creation
MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK
MITRE ATT&CK
MATRICES Techniques/Numbers
PRE-ATT&CK 174
Enterprise
Windows
macOS
Linux
Cloud
AWS
GCP
Azure
Office 365
Azure AD
SaaS
266
Mobile
Android
iOS
79
ICS 81
APT Groups 94
Software 414
▪Attack Library
▪Knowledge base of adversary’s
TTPs collected based on real
world observations and attacks
▪Describes and Categorize
adversarial behavioral in
different phases of attack
cycle.
MITRE Explained: Tactic
18
▪Answers Why? for adversary’s actions.
▪Adversary’s objective behind an action
▪Represented by Columns in MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
Enterprise Mobile ICS
Initial Access Initial Access Collection
Execution Persistence Command and Control
Persistence Privilege Escalation Discovery
Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Evasion
Defense Evasion Credential Access Execution
Credential Access Discovery Impact
Discovery Lateral Movement Impair Process Control
Lateral Movement Impact Inhibit Response Function
Collection Collection Initial Access
Command and Control Exfiltration Lateral Movement
Exfiltration Command and Control Persistence
Impact Network Effects
Remote Service Effects
Matrix Tactic
Enterprise 12
Mobile 13
ICS 11
Example
An adversary want to achieve
credential access.
MITRE Explained: Tactic
19
ATT&CK TACTIC EXPLAINATION OBJECTIVE
Initial Access Get into your environment Gain access
Credential Access Steal logins and passwords Gain access
Privilege Escalation Gain higher level permissions Gain (more) access
Persistence Maintain foothold Keep access
Defense Evasion Avoid detection Keep access
Discovery Figure out your environment Explore
Lateral Movement Move through your environment Explore
Execution Run malicious code Follow through
Collection Gather data Follow through
Exfiltration Steal data Follow through
Command and Control Contact controlled systems Contact controlled systems
Impact Break things Follow through
Source: Helping Your Non-Security Executives Understand ATT&CK in 10 Minutes or Less (Elly Searle, CrowdStrike)
MITRE Explained: Technique
20
▪Answers how? for adversary’s objective achievement.
▪Adversary used a technique to achieve an objective
▪Represented by individual cell in MITRE ATT&CK
Matrix
Matrix Technique
PRE-ATT&CK 174
Enterprise 266
Mobile 79
ICS 81
Example
Example: an adversary
may dump credentials to
achieve credential access.
MITRE Explained: Technique-Metainfo
21
❖Tactic:
Related MITRE Tactic
❖Platform:
Required platform for a technique to work in.
❖Permissions Required:
Lowest permission for an adversary to implement the technique
❖Effective Permissions:
Permission an adversary achieves after successful implementation
of the technique
❖Data Sources:
Recommended data to be collection for detection of the technique
MITRE Explained: Enumeration
22
Tactic Example Technique
Obtaining Persistence via Windows Service Creation
Privilege Escalation via Legitimate Credentials Reuse
Defense Evasion via Office-Based Malware
Credential Access via Memory Credential Dumping
Discovery via Built-In Windows Tools
Lateral Movement via Share Service Accounts
Execution via PowerShell Execution
Collection via Network Share Identification
Exfiltration via Plaintext Exfiltration
Impact via Data Encryption
MITRE Explained: Procedure
23
▪Answers what? for adversary’s technique usage.
▪Actual implementation of each technique.
▪Individual technique has a page for description,
examples, sources, references.
Example
A procedure could be an adversary using PowerShell to
inject into lsass.exe to dump credentials by scraping
LSASS memory on a victim.
MITRE ATTACK MAPPING
HANDS ON 1
PRIORITIZED MITRE ATT&CK SUBSETS
29
Let’s create our own prioritized MITRE ATT&CK Subset
based adversarial TTPs based derived from any of these:
❖ Threat Intelligence
❖ Whitepapers
❖ Data Sources
❖ Ad-Hoc Requests
Note: Matrix in upcoming slides is example matrix with dummy data for example which
is not necessarily is true or to promote any tool/technology.
MITRE DETECTION MAPPING
30
MITRE Enumeration
Initial Access Persistence
Privilege
Escalation
Defense
Evasion
Credential
Access
Discovery
Lateral
Movement
Execution Collection Exfiltration
Command
and Control
External Remote
Services
DLL Search order Hijacking
WDATP
Brute Force
Elastic
Account
Discovery
Elastic
Windows Remote Management
TBD
Automated
Collection
UEBA
Automated
Exfiltration
ZScaler
Commonly
Used Port
ZScaler
Valid Accounts
UEBA
Credential
Dumping
WDATP
Application
Window
Discovery
ZScaler
COM and DCOM
Elastic
Clipboard Data
WDATP
Data
Compressed
ZScaler
Communicatio
n Through
Removable
Media
Symantec DLP
Spearphishing
Attachment
TBD
Accessibility Features
TBD
Indicator
Removal on
Host
WDATP
Application
Deployment
Software
Elastic
Command Line
WDATP
Data Staged
UEBA
Data Encrypted
Symantec DLP
Spearphishing
Link
TBD
AppInit DLLS
WDATP
Masquerading
WDATP Credential
Manipulation
UEBA
File and
Directory
Discovery
UEBA
Execution
through API
TBD
Data from Local
System
UEBA
Data Transfer
Size Limits
TBD
Custom
Command and
Control
Protocol
Symantec DLPAppCert DLLs
WDATP
Decode File or
Info
TBD
Pass the Ticket
WDATP
Graphic User
Interface
TBD Data from
Network
Shared Drive
ZScaler
Exfiltration
Over
Alternative
Protocol
ZScalerApplication Shimming
TBD
DLL Side-
Loading
WDATP
Credentials in
Files
UEBA
WDATP
Process
Discovery
Elastic
InstallUtil
WDATP Custom
Cryptographic
Protocol
ZScalerNew Service
TBD
Disabling
Security Tools
Elastic
Input Capture
WDATP
Remote Desktop
Protocol
Elastic
PowerShell
WDATP
No detection Detected,
No validation
Detected
Key
DATA SOURCE MAPPING
31
MITRE Enumeration
Data does not exist Data exists, not
monitored
Data exists analyzed
and monitoredKey
Initial Access Persistence
Privilege
Escalation
Defense
Evasion
Credential
Access
Discovery
Lateral
Movement
Execution Collection Exfiltration
Command
and Control
External Remote
Services
DLL Search order Hijacking Brute Force
Account
Discovery Windows Remote Management
Automated
Collection
Automated
Exfiltration
Commonly
Used Port
Valid Accounts
Credential
Dumping
Application
Window
Discovery
COM and DCOM Clipboard Data
Data
Compressed Communicatio
n Through
Removable
MediaSpearphishing Accessibility Features
Indicator
Removal on
Host Application
Deployment
Software
Command Line Data Staged Data Encrypted
Spearphishing
Link
AppInit DLLS Masquerading
Credential
Manipulation
File and
Directory
Discovery
Execution
through API
Data from Local
System
Data Transfer
Size Limits Custom
Command and
Control
ProtocolAppCert DLLs
Decode File or
Info
Pass the Ticket
Graphic User
Interface
Data from
Network
Shared Drive
Exfiltration
Over
Alternative
Protocol
Application Shimming
DLL Side-
Loading
Credentials in
Files
Process
Discovery
InstallUtil
Custom
Cryptographic
Protocol
New Service
Disabling
Security Tools
Input Capture
Remote Desktop
Protocol
PowerShell
32
MITRE Enumeration
Key
DETECTION MATURITY HEATMAP
33
MITRE Enumeration
Limited Initial Stable Current InnovativeMaturity Key
Initial Access Persistence
Privilege
Escalation
Defense
Evasion
Credential
Access
Discovery
Lateral
Movement
Execution Collection Exfiltration
Command
and Control
External Remote
Services
DLL Search order Hijacking Brute Force
Account
Discovery
Windows Remote
Management
Automated
Collection
Automated
Exfiltration
Commonly
Used Port
Valid Accounts
Credential
Dumping
Application
Window
Discovery
COM and DCOM
Clipboard
Data
Data Compressed Communication
Through
Removable
MediaSpearphishing
Attachment
Accessibility Features
Indicator
Removal on
Host Application
Deployment
Software
Command
Line
Data Staged Data Encrypted
Spearphishing
Link
AppInit DLLs Masquerading
Credential
Manipulation
File and
Directory
Discovery
Execution
through API
Data from
Local
System
Data Transfer Size
Limits Custom
Command and
Control
Protocol
AppCert DLLs
Decode File or
Info
Pass the Ticket
Graphic User
Interface Data from
Network
Shared Drive
Exfiltration Over
Alternative
Protocol
Application Shimming
DLL Side-
Loading
Credentials
in Files Process
Discovery
InstallUtil
Custom
Cryptographic
Protocol
New Service
Disabling
Security Tools
Input
Capture
Remote
Desktop
Protocol
PowerShell
THREAT HUNTING METHODOLOGY
TYPES, PROCESS AND CYCLE
Threat Hunting Approaches
35
▪Long Term
▪Ad-hoc
▪Short Term
Threat Hunting Types
36
▪Structured Hunting
▪Unstructured Hunting
▪Intel Guided Hunting
-------------------------------------
▪Host Based
▪Network Based
▪Business Use Case Based
Hunting Type: Intel Guided Hunting
37
▪Guided by Threat Intelligence Inputs
▪Threat Intel Reports
▪Threat White Papers
▪MITRE APT Groups
Hunting Type: Structured Hunting
38
▪Hypothesis Based
▪Well Scoped
▪TTP driven or Entity Driven
▪Other Synonyms in industry:
▪ATT&CK Drive
HANDS ON LAB 2
STRUCTURED HYPOTHESIS – BITS, ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES
BITS Jobs
Defense Evasion, Persistence
40
MITRE ID T1197
MITRE Tactic Defense Evasion, Persistence
MITRE
Technique
BITS Jobs
Platform Windows
Required
Privilege
User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Data Sources API monitoring, Packet capture,Windows event logs
BITS Jobs
Defense Evasion, Persistence
41
Description
Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is
a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism
exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is
commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other
applications preferred to operate in the background
(using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other
networked applications.
Implementation
Bitsadmin.exe
Powershell.exe Start-BitsTransfer
BITS Jobs
Defense Evasion, Persistence
42
Source Event ID
Event
Field
Details
Windows Security
Event Logs
4688 New
Process
Name
*bitsadmin.exe
Windows Security
Event Logs
4688 Process
Command
Line
*create*
Proxy-Logs userAgent
Microsoft BITS/*
Hunting Type: Unstructured Hunting
43
▪Data Driven
▪Anomaly/Outlier based
▪Other synonym in industry:
▪Data Driven Hunting
▪Free Style Hunting
HANDS ON LAB 3
PROCESS ANOMALY
HYPOTHESIS GENRATION PROCESS
Assume Breach
Scope
Hypothesis
Execute Validate Document
Accessibility Features
Persistence, Privilege Escalation
48
MITRE ID T1015
MITRE Tactic
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
MITRE
Technique
Accessibility Features
Platform Windows
Required
Privilege
Administrator
Data Sources Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Accessibility Features
Persistence, Privilege Escalation
49
Description
Windows contains accessibility features that may be
launched with a key combination before a user has logged
in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon
screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs
are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor
without logging in to the system.
Implementation
Binary Replacement
OR
Registry Value Change
Limitations
Depending on Windows versions
The replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for
x64 systems,
The binary must reside in %systemdir%
It must be protected by Windows File or Resource
Protection (WFP/WRP)
Accessibility Features
Persistence, Privilege Escalation
50
Attack Emulation: Set the Debugger value for the desired accessibility feature application
Accessibility Features
Persistence, Privilege Escalation
51
Accessibility Features
Persistence, Privilege Escalation
52
Accessibility Features
Persistence, Privilege Escalation
53
Source
Event
ID
Event Field Details
Sysmon
12, 13 TargetObject *SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows
NTCurrentVersionImage File
Execution Options<AFU>Debugger
AFU=sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe,
Magnify.exe, Narrator.exe,
DisplaySwitch.exe, AtBroker.exe
Windows Security
Event Logs
4657 Object Name sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe,
Magnify.exe, Narrator.exe,
DisplaySwitch.exe, AtBroker.exe
Windows Security
Event Logs
4657 Object Value
Name
Debugger
THE THREAT HUNTING CYCLE
HUNT ONCE
03
OUTLIER/ANOMALY IDENTIFICATION
05
DETECTOR CREATION
04
INCIDENT VALIDATION
02HUNT EXECUTION
01
HYPOTHESIS CREATION
POST HUNT ACTIVITIES
POST HUNT ACTIVITY
Execution
Completed
Hunt Ended with Hits
Hunts Without Hits
Need Enabler
EscalatetoCorrectTeam
CollectMetrics
RequestNewLogSource
NeedMoreAccess
CollectMetrics
UpdateBaseline
DocumentHunt
PROGRAM METRICS
❖Hunt Hypothesis
❖Total time spent hunting (hours)
❖Total dwell time (hours)
❖incidents found
❖use cases updated
❖vulnerabilities found
Check out Magma Framework for awesome
Metrics and Charts in resources link
References and Awesome Resources
60
▪ http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html
▪ https://github.com/hunters-forge
▪ https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/tree/master/hunts
▪ https://www.threathunting.net/
▪ https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab
▪ https://www.betaalvereniging.nl/veiligheid/publiek-private-samenwerking/magma/
▪ https://www.betaalvereniging.nl/wp-content/uploads/DEF-TaHiTI-Threat-Hunting-
Methodology.pdf
▪ https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/enterprise/
▪ https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK
THANK
YOU

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Cyber Threat hunting workshop

  • 1. SACON SACON International 2020 India | Bangalore | February 21 - 22 | Taj Yeshwantpur PRACTICAL THREAT HUNTING: DEVELOPING AND RUNNING A SUCCESSFUL THREAT HUNTING PROGRAM #SACON #THREATHUNTING WASIM HALANI Network Intelligence (NII) HEAD R&D @washalsec ARPAN RAVAL Optiv Inc Senior Threat Analyst @arpanrvl
  • 2. PRACTICAL THREAT HUNTING: Developing and Running a Successful Threat Hunting Program By Wasim Halani and Arpan Raval
  • 3. WHOAMI ❖Wasim Halani ❖Head R&D @Network Intelligence (NII) ❖~12 years in InfoSec ❖Speaker at SACON, OWASP, BSides, Malcon, SecurityBytes ❖Twitter @washalsec ❖https://in.linkedin.com/in/wasimhalani
  • 4. WHOAMI ❖Arpan Raval ❖Senior Threat Analyst @Optiv Inc ❖DFIR and Threat Hunting ❖Twitter @arpanrvl ❖https://www.linkedin.com/in/arpanraval
  • 6. PROBLEM OF “DWELL TIME” 6 ❖In 2011 Global Median dwell time mentioned was 416 days! ❖For 2018, Fire Eye M Trends reports average dwell time mentioned is 101 days! ❖For 2019, Fire Eye M Trends Reports average dwell time mentioned is 78 days! https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2019/03/mtrends-2019-celebrating-ten-years-of-incident-response-reporting.html
  • 8. PYRAMID OF PAIN I n t r o d u c e d b y D a v i d J B i a n c o HASH VALUES IP ADDRESS DOMAIN NAMES NW/HOST ARTIFACTS TOOLS TTP Trivial Easy Simple Annoying Challenging Tough!
  • 9. What is Threat Hunting? 9 “Threat Hunting is a human driven proactive approach to discover malicious activities that have evaded existing security control.”
  • 10. What is Threat Hunting? 10 Detecting the Undetected
  • 11. PURPOSE OF THREAT HUNTING 11 ❖Reduce the Dwell Time ❖Identify Gaps in Visibility ❖Identify Gaps in Detection ❖Design New Detection Mechanism and Analytics techniques ❖Uncover New Threat and TTPs (Producing Threat Intelligence).
  • 12. What is NOT Threat Hunting? 12 ▪Triaging Alerts ▪IoC sweeps from Intel Feeds to Incoming telemetry ▪Process with guaranteed result. ▪A replacement for penetration testing or red teaming.
  • 13. What is NOT Threat Hunting? 13 “Autonomous discovery of malicious activity by tools.”
  • 14. Characteristics of Threat Hunting 14 ▪Human Driven ▪Human Centric ▪Proactive ▪Assume Breach ▪Detect Unknown ▪Iterative ▪Data dependent ▪Hypothesis Driven
  • 15. Threat Hunting in Security Operations 15 Security Monitoring Threat Hunting Incident Response Search Queries, CTI Guided Detections Retrohunts Incident Detection Event Analysis Detector Creation
  • 17. MITRE ATT&CK MATRICES Techniques/Numbers PRE-ATT&CK 174 Enterprise Windows macOS Linux Cloud AWS GCP Azure Office 365 Azure AD SaaS 266 Mobile Android iOS 79 ICS 81 APT Groups 94 Software 414 ▪Attack Library ▪Knowledge base of adversary’s TTPs collected based on real world observations and attacks ▪Describes and Categorize adversarial behavioral in different phases of attack cycle.
  • 18. MITRE Explained: Tactic 18 ▪Answers Why? for adversary’s actions. ▪Adversary’s objective behind an action ▪Represented by Columns in MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Enterprise Mobile ICS Initial Access Initial Access Collection Execution Persistence Command and Control Persistence Privilege Escalation Discovery Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Evasion Defense Evasion Credential Access Execution Credential Access Discovery Impact Discovery Lateral Movement Impair Process Control Lateral Movement Impact Inhibit Response Function Collection Collection Initial Access Command and Control Exfiltration Lateral Movement Exfiltration Command and Control Persistence Impact Network Effects Remote Service Effects Matrix Tactic Enterprise 12 Mobile 13 ICS 11 Example An adversary want to achieve credential access.
  • 19. MITRE Explained: Tactic 19 ATT&CK TACTIC EXPLAINATION OBJECTIVE Initial Access Get into your environment Gain access Credential Access Steal logins and passwords Gain access Privilege Escalation Gain higher level permissions Gain (more) access Persistence Maintain foothold Keep access Defense Evasion Avoid detection Keep access Discovery Figure out your environment Explore Lateral Movement Move through your environment Explore Execution Run malicious code Follow through Collection Gather data Follow through Exfiltration Steal data Follow through Command and Control Contact controlled systems Contact controlled systems Impact Break things Follow through Source: Helping Your Non-Security Executives Understand ATT&CK in 10 Minutes or Less (Elly Searle, CrowdStrike)
  • 20. MITRE Explained: Technique 20 ▪Answers how? for adversary’s objective achievement. ▪Adversary used a technique to achieve an objective ▪Represented by individual cell in MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Matrix Technique PRE-ATT&CK 174 Enterprise 266 Mobile 79 ICS 81 Example Example: an adversary may dump credentials to achieve credential access.
  • 21. MITRE Explained: Technique-Metainfo 21 ❖Tactic: Related MITRE Tactic ❖Platform: Required platform for a technique to work in. ❖Permissions Required: Lowest permission for an adversary to implement the technique ❖Effective Permissions: Permission an adversary achieves after successful implementation of the technique ❖Data Sources: Recommended data to be collection for detection of the technique
  • 22. MITRE Explained: Enumeration 22 Tactic Example Technique Obtaining Persistence via Windows Service Creation Privilege Escalation via Legitimate Credentials Reuse Defense Evasion via Office-Based Malware Credential Access via Memory Credential Dumping Discovery via Built-In Windows Tools Lateral Movement via Share Service Accounts Execution via PowerShell Execution Collection via Network Share Identification Exfiltration via Plaintext Exfiltration Impact via Data Encryption
  • 23. MITRE Explained: Procedure 23 ▪Answers what? for adversary’s technique usage. ▪Actual implementation of each technique. ▪Individual technique has a page for description, examples, sources, references. Example A procedure could be an adversary using PowerShell to inject into lsass.exe to dump credentials by scraping LSASS memory on a victim.
  • 25. PRIORITIZED MITRE ATT&CK SUBSETS 29 Let’s create our own prioritized MITRE ATT&CK Subset based adversarial TTPs based derived from any of these: ❖ Threat Intelligence ❖ Whitepapers ❖ Data Sources ❖ Ad-Hoc Requests Note: Matrix in upcoming slides is example matrix with dummy data for example which is not necessarily is true or to promote any tool/technology.
  • 26. MITRE DETECTION MAPPING 30 MITRE Enumeration Initial Access Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Execution Collection Exfiltration Command and Control External Remote Services DLL Search order Hijacking WDATP Brute Force Elastic Account Discovery Elastic Windows Remote Management TBD Automated Collection UEBA Automated Exfiltration ZScaler Commonly Used Port ZScaler Valid Accounts UEBA Credential Dumping WDATP Application Window Discovery ZScaler COM and DCOM Elastic Clipboard Data WDATP Data Compressed ZScaler Communicatio n Through Removable Media Symantec DLP Spearphishing Attachment TBD Accessibility Features TBD Indicator Removal on Host WDATP Application Deployment Software Elastic Command Line WDATP Data Staged UEBA Data Encrypted Symantec DLP Spearphishing Link TBD AppInit DLLS WDATP Masquerading WDATP Credential Manipulation UEBA File and Directory Discovery UEBA Execution through API TBD Data from Local System UEBA Data Transfer Size Limits TBD Custom Command and Control Protocol Symantec DLPAppCert DLLs WDATP Decode File or Info TBD Pass the Ticket WDATP Graphic User Interface TBD Data from Network Shared Drive ZScaler Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol ZScalerApplication Shimming TBD DLL Side- Loading WDATP Credentials in Files UEBA WDATP Process Discovery Elastic InstallUtil WDATP Custom Cryptographic Protocol ZScalerNew Service TBD Disabling Security Tools Elastic Input Capture WDATP Remote Desktop Protocol Elastic PowerShell WDATP No detection Detected, No validation Detected Key
  • 27. DATA SOURCE MAPPING 31 MITRE Enumeration Data does not exist Data exists, not monitored Data exists analyzed and monitoredKey Initial Access Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Execution Collection Exfiltration Command and Control External Remote Services DLL Search order Hijacking Brute Force Account Discovery Windows Remote Management Automated Collection Automated Exfiltration Commonly Used Port Valid Accounts Credential Dumping Application Window Discovery COM and DCOM Clipboard Data Data Compressed Communicatio n Through Removable MediaSpearphishing Accessibility Features Indicator Removal on Host Application Deployment Software Command Line Data Staged Data Encrypted Spearphishing Link AppInit DLLS Masquerading Credential Manipulation File and Directory Discovery Execution through API Data from Local System Data Transfer Size Limits Custom Command and Control ProtocolAppCert DLLs Decode File or Info Pass the Ticket Graphic User Interface Data from Network Shared Drive Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Application Shimming DLL Side- Loading Credentials in Files Process Discovery InstallUtil Custom Cryptographic Protocol New Service Disabling Security Tools Input Capture Remote Desktop Protocol PowerShell
  • 29. DETECTION MATURITY HEATMAP 33 MITRE Enumeration Limited Initial Stable Current InnovativeMaturity Key Initial Access Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Execution Collection Exfiltration Command and Control External Remote Services DLL Search order Hijacking Brute Force Account Discovery Windows Remote Management Automated Collection Automated Exfiltration Commonly Used Port Valid Accounts Credential Dumping Application Window Discovery COM and DCOM Clipboard Data Data Compressed Communication Through Removable MediaSpearphishing Attachment Accessibility Features Indicator Removal on Host Application Deployment Software Command Line Data Staged Data Encrypted Spearphishing Link AppInit DLLs Masquerading Credential Manipulation File and Directory Discovery Execution through API Data from Local System Data Transfer Size Limits Custom Command and Control Protocol AppCert DLLs Decode File or Info Pass the Ticket Graphic User Interface Data from Network Shared Drive Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Application Shimming DLL Side- Loading Credentials in Files Process Discovery InstallUtil Custom Cryptographic Protocol New Service Disabling Security Tools Input Capture Remote Desktop Protocol PowerShell
  • 31. Threat Hunting Approaches 35 ▪Long Term ▪Ad-hoc ▪Short Term
  • 32. Threat Hunting Types 36 ▪Structured Hunting ▪Unstructured Hunting ▪Intel Guided Hunting ------------------------------------- ▪Host Based ▪Network Based ▪Business Use Case Based
  • 33. Hunting Type: Intel Guided Hunting 37 ▪Guided by Threat Intelligence Inputs ▪Threat Intel Reports ▪Threat White Papers ▪MITRE APT Groups
  • 34. Hunting Type: Structured Hunting 38 ▪Hypothesis Based ▪Well Scoped ▪TTP driven or Entity Driven ▪Other Synonyms in industry: ▪ATT&CK Drive
  • 35. HANDS ON LAB 2 STRUCTURED HYPOTHESIS – BITS, ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES
  • 36. BITS Jobs Defense Evasion, Persistence 40 MITRE ID T1197 MITRE Tactic Defense Evasion, Persistence MITRE Technique BITS Jobs Platform Windows Required Privilege User, Administrator, SYSTEM Data Sources API monitoring, Packet capture,Windows event logs
  • 37. BITS Jobs Defense Evasion, Persistence 41 Description Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. Implementation Bitsadmin.exe Powershell.exe Start-BitsTransfer
  • 38. BITS Jobs Defense Evasion, Persistence 42 Source Event ID Event Field Details Windows Security Event Logs 4688 New Process Name *bitsadmin.exe Windows Security Event Logs 4688 Process Command Line *create* Proxy-Logs userAgent Microsoft BITS/*
  • 39. Hunting Type: Unstructured Hunting 43 ▪Data Driven ▪Anomaly/Outlier based ▪Other synonym in industry: ▪Data Driven Hunting ▪Free Style Hunting
  • 40. HANDS ON LAB 3 PROCESS ANOMALY
  • 41. HYPOTHESIS GENRATION PROCESS Assume Breach Scope Hypothesis Execute Validate Document
  • 42. Accessibility Features Persistence, Privilege Escalation 48 MITRE ID T1015 MITRE Tactic Persistence Privilege Escalation MITRE Technique Accessibility Features Platform Windows Required Privilege Administrator Data Sources Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
  • 43. Accessibility Features Persistence, Privilege Escalation 49 Description Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. Implementation Binary Replacement OR Registry Value Change Limitations Depending on Windows versions The replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, The binary must reside in %systemdir% It must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP)
  • 44. Accessibility Features Persistence, Privilege Escalation 50 Attack Emulation: Set the Debugger value for the desired accessibility feature application
  • 47. Accessibility Features Persistence, Privilege Escalation 53 Source Event ID Event Field Details Sysmon 12, 13 TargetObject *SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionImage File Execution Options<AFU>Debugger AFU=sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe, Magnify.exe, Narrator.exe, DisplaySwitch.exe, AtBroker.exe Windows Security Event Logs 4657 Object Name sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe, Magnify.exe, Narrator.exe, DisplaySwitch.exe, AtBroker.exe Windows Security Event Logs 4657 Object Value Name Debugger
  • 48. THE THREAT HUNTING CYCLE HUNT ONCE 03 OUTLIER/ANOMALY IDENTIFICATION 05 DETECTOR CREATION 04 INCIDENT VALIDATION 02HUNT EXECUTION 01 HYPOTHESIS CREATION
  • 50. POST HUNT ACTIVITY Execution Completed Hunt Ended with Hits Hunts Without Hits Need Enabler EscalatetoCorrectTeam CollectMetrics RequestNewLogSource NeedMoreAccess CollectMetrics UpdateBaseline DocumentHunt
  • 52. ❖Hunt Hypothesis ❖Total time spent hunting (hours) ❖Total dwell time (hours) ❖incidents found ❖use cases updated ❖vulnerabilities found Check out Magma Framework for awesome Metrics and Charts in resources link
  • 53. References and Awesome Resources 60 ▪ http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html ▪ https://github.com/hunters-forge ▪ https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/tree/master/hunts ▪ https://www.threathunting.net/ ▪ https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab ▪ https://www.betaalvereniging.nl/veiligheid/publiek-private-samenwerking/magma/ ▪ https://www.betaalvereniging.nl/wp-content/uploads/DEF-TaHiTI-Threat-Hunting- Methodology.pdf ▪ https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/enterprise/ ▪ https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK