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Politicization Under the Rome Statute: A comparative
analysis of Chinese and Russian Voting Behavior on
UN Security Council Referrals to the ICC
by
Arjun Baragi
International Politics
2016
Nicholas D’India
International Politics
2016
Mandy Diec
International Development
2016
Yukito Ono
International Politics
2016
Research paper submitted to the faculty of the School of Global Policy & Strategy at the
University of California, San Diego in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of International Affairs
IRCO 467 Policy Responses to Global Problems
Professor Jesse Driscoll and Stephan Haggard
March 14, 2016

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INTRODUCTION
For far too long, gross human rights violators have been allowed to act with impunity. In
an effort to remedy this, members of the international community came together to adopt the
Rome Statute leading to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Created in
1998 and put into full effect in 2002, the ICC sought to end impunity for the perpetrators of the
most serious crimes of international concern (genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes)1
. At the time, many saw the formation of this permanent treaty based international
criminal court as a promising step in the right direction.
Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, had high hopes for the
court, claiming that it would “deter future war criminals and bring nearer the day when no ruler,
state, no junta and no army anywhere will be able to abuse human rights with impunity.”2
Unfortunately, despite its lofty expectations, many critics agree that the ICC has fallen short of
accomplishing its stated goals, as the Court has limited jurisdiction and can only prosecute
individuals from non-State parties with the help of the United Nations Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can
be quite complicated. The ICC is meant to be an impartial international judicial institution but, in
order for the ICC to extend its jurisdiction to non-signatory countries, it must pass through the
five permanent members of the UNSC: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China,
and Russia (P5). To further complicate things, the United Kingdom and France are the only
members of the P5 who are also signatories to the Rome Statute. The United States, although not
1
17 July 1998, The Rome Statute, International Criminal Court.
2
Simons, Marlise. "Without Fanfare or Cases, International Court Sets Up." The New York Times. The New York
Times, 2002. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.

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a signatory, has proved willing to support ICC referrals in the past but the voting behaviors of
China and Russia have been less predictable. Both countries have stated a strong preference for
non-interference and state sovereignty but their voting records in relation to ICC referrals brings
up some interesting questions. If China and Russia are so interested in protecting national
sovereignty, one would expect them to block all ICC referrals. The basis of our research explores
why this is not the case. In this paper, we seek to better understand what conditions will drive
China and Russia to support or oppose ICC referrals that threaten national sovereignty. Through
our qualitative analysis and case study approach, we will argue that while China and Russia do
indeed prioritize national sovereignty, they will not oppose UNSC referrals to the ICC
when there are reputation costs, threats to strategic interests, no existing alternatives, and
regional support in referring situations to the ICC.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The complicated nature of the relationship between the ICC and the UNSC has been the
subject of many academic articles over the years. William Schabas, Professor of International
Law at Middlesex University, notes that the involvement of the UNSC in ICC affairs can either
help or hurt the legitimacy of the Court. Without UNSC involvement, there would be impunity
for many human rights violators outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. However, the impartial nature
of the ICC is jeopardized by the highly politicized nature of the Security Council3
. There are
concerns over how impartial the Council would be in picking which cases to refer and how much
support it would be willing to give the Court once a decision has been made.
3 Schabas, William A. Accountability for International Crimes – Special Tribunals and Referrals to the
International Criminal Court. Ed. Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte. Cambridge UP, 2014. Print.

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In regards to China and Russia, there have been quite a few articles that focus on the
concept of national sovereignty and how it influences their diplomatic relations during
humanitarian crises. Chengqiu Wu of Fudan University believes that there has been a shift in
China’s political attitude toward international humanitarian crises since the early 2000s.
According to Wu, China has begun to take a much more flexible stance on their prioritization of
national sovereignty and non-intervention. Wu cites the changes in international norms on
human rights such as the emerging concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ as well as China’s desire
to project the image of their peaceful rise to the international community as the main reasons for
their new approach to humanitarian crises4
.
Like Wu, Johan Lagerkvist also sees this shift in foreign policy. By detailing recent
humanitarian crises in Sudan, Libya and Syria, he argues that China will only allow outside
intervention inside the territory of another state if it has been passed through the UNSC and if
there is regional support. He adds several other conditions that must be present for China to
support outside intervention: (1) there is significant risk of military intervention in an area of
Chinese economic influence; (2) the level of Chinese investments and prospects of resource
extraction in the area is either high or promising; (3) there is potential risk to the safety of
Chinese citizens; (4) there is a possibility that China’s international reputation would be severely
harmed if it did not act to solve the situation5
. Based on his analysis, Lagerkvist argues that the
way China will behave in the face of international humanitarian crises in the future will become
increasingly more unpredictable and its actions will be taken on a case-by-case basis, not
depending on a particular political principle.
4
Wu, Chengqiu. "Sovereignty, human rights, and responsibility: Changes in China’s response to international
humanitarian crises." Journal of Chinese Political Science 15.1 (2010): 71-97.
5
Lagerkvist, Johan. “China’s New Flexibility on Foreign Intervention: Seeking global clout, China’s position on sanctity
of sovereingty evolves.” YaleGlobal (2012).

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One interesting article written by David Zweig and Bai Jianhai argues that China is
primarily driven by material factors, more specifically, its growing demand for energy resources.
They look at China’s relations with “pariah states” criticized by the West for having poor
humanitarian records and how most of them also happen to have an abundance of natural
resources. They claim this priority for energy is the main driver in China’s foreign policy6
but we
have found through our research that energy is just one of many factors China considers when
deciding whether or not to allow outside intervention. The passing of UNSC Resolution 1593 to
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC is proof that energy is not the only factor China considers
in these types of situations.
Less has been written on Russia though there has been research that aims to elucidate the
voting behavior of Russia on the Security Council in regards to ICC referrals. Dmitri Trenin, for
instance, believes that the nationalist fervor domestically has begun to influence Russia’s foreign
policy. Putin has fed off this and has stated that he plans on “winning full sovereignty for Russia
by eliminating foreign political influence in the country and ensuring that Moscow’s special
interests in its former borderlands are recognized”7
. Andrei Kolesnikov concurs with Trenin and
adds to his work by examining how the evolving Russian ideology is affecting Russia’s view on
human rights. According to Kolesnikov, the new ideology focused on “national pride” emerged
following the annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 and has been strengthened by constant
references to Russia’s glorious past.8
This nationalistic ideology has the Russian people focused
6
Zweig, David, and Bai Jianhai. "China's global hunt for energy." Foreign Affairs-New York- 84.5
7
Trenin, Dmitri. "Russia’s Breakout from the Post-Cold War System: The Drivers of Putin’s Course." Carnegie
Moscow Center (2014).
8
Kolesnikov, Andrei. “Russian Ideology after Crimea.” Carnegie Moscow Center (2015).

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inward and less concerned with humanitarian situations abroad. Because of this, Russia
maintains that national sovereignty should be upheld above all else.
The literature we found gave us a solid foundation to work from but more research
needed to be done in order to better understand the voting behaviors of China and Russia in
relations to ICC referrals. In next section, we will explain our research design and what we were
able to derive from it.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Since 2002, only individuals from 8 countries have been prosecuted for war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. Based off those cases and the list of potential cases for
ICC investigation in Figure 1, it is clear that random sampling and rigorous experimental design
are not feasible or practical approaches. Instead, we aim to compare cases that share a substantial
amount of relevant, common characteristics. What factors seem to separate cases that get
referred and cases that do not get referred to the ICC? Specifically, why does China and Russia
vote differently on similar cases, thus leading to different outcomes in prosecution?
Our research technique focuses on qualitative analyses done through the most similar
systems design (MSSD). We chose pairs of cases that are similar on all measured independent
variables that could affect whether or not cases get referred, investigated, and ultimately indicted.
The control variables we matched on include the country’s human rights score, signatory status
to the Rome Statute, existence of an UN Special Rapporteur, regime type, number of battle
deaths, strength of judiciary, and level of arms trade with UNSC P5 members. We suspect that
states with poor human rights scores are more likely to be indicted because of the egregiousness
of crimes are probably worse. Countries that chose not to sign the Statute may also be large

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offenders that strategically opted out of an international agreement that made them vulnerable to
prosecution. Those that have an UN Special Rapporteur assigned are already suspected of human
rights problems that require close monitoring. Autocracies and non-democratic regimes are also
more prone to human rights violations just like countries with extreme counts of battle deaths
were likely involved in civil wars with violations from both government and opposition groups.
Because the ICC is meant to be the court of last resort, states with strong judicial systems that
can handle violations domestically are less likely to need the Court’s intervention. Finally,
countries with high levels of arms trade may indicate smaller chances of prosecution due to
military and strategic interests that could be eroded by political instability following any ICC
intervention. Our variable of theoretical interest is China and Russia’s vote during UNSC
resolutions that tried to refer the cases to the ICC. Whether or not cases have been referred to the
ICC is our outcome variable we care about. To understand how our dependent and independent
variables were measured and operationalized, please refer to Figure 2.
Paired cases are similar on many background conditions that could otherwise explain the
variation in admissibility to the Court. Here, we try to include case variations to better represent
the sample of cases we have chosen to analyze. Purposive sampling is appropriate here so that
we can focus on the small sample of cases available and enable useful arguments in answering
our relevant research question. We examined pools of cases from ongoing, preliminary, and
closed investigations as well as states with highly known profiles of human rights abuse and risk.
We selected countries that stand out, meaning they possess conditions that match with Rome
Statute conditions or align with the above characteristics of referred and indicted cases. The two
pairs of cases we chose to analyze are 1) Sudan and Myanmar and 2) Libya and Syria. The
reasons for these pairings and their detailed comparison and analyses are as follows.

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Figure 1. Existing and Potential Cases for ICC Intervention
ONGOING TRIAL
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
CLOSED
SIGNATORY
STATES NEVER
INVESTIGATED
OTHER
COUNTRIES
Uganda Afghanistan Comoros Mexico Syria
Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Colombia Honduras Burundi Pakistan
Kenya Georgia North Korea Chad Somalia
Central African
Republic
Guinea Venezuela Philippines Myanmar
Sudan (Darfur) Iraq Liberia Yemen
Libya Nigeria
Ivory Coast Palestine
Mali Ukraine
Figure 2. Measuring Independent and Dependent Variables
INDICATORS OPERATIONALIZATION SOURCE
Human Rights Score Coded Free, Partly Free, or Not Free Freedom House
Signatory to Statute Coded Yes or No International Criminal Court
UN Special
Rapporteur
Coded Yes or No
United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights
Regime Type
Coded (best to worst): Full Democracy,
Democracy, Open/Closed Anocracy,
Autocracy, or Failed/Occupied, based on
regime trends from 1946-2013
Polity IV Project
Battle Deaths
Total deaths related to internal and
external warfare during time frame of
relevant conflict
Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO), Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP), World Bank,
University of Massachusetts Political
Economy Research Institute
Strength of Judiciary
Coded 0, 1, or 2: Not independent,
partially independent, or generally
independent respectively, averaged from
2002-2012
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human
Rights Data Project
Arms Trade with P5
Total value of arms trade with Russia,
China, France, United Kingdom, and
United States, from 2002-2012
Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms
Transfers Database
China and Russia Vote
in UNSC Resolution
Coded Support, Against, or Abstain
United Nations Security Council
Meeting Records

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CASE STUDY PAIR 1: SUDAN AND MYANMAR
Background
Civil conflicts in Sudan and Myanmar both arose out of religious and ethnic differences.
Indictments that have occurred in Sudan pertain to the War in Darfur that began in 2003. The
ongoing civil war has been comprised of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) as the main rebel groups against Sudanese government. On the
government side, the Sudanese military and Arab militia groups such as the Janjaweed
coordinated attacks against non-Arab ethnic groups with targeted killings and warfare resulting
in casualties estimated to be around 300,000. Directed attacks, raids, and warfare were highly
concentrated during the first few years of the conflict. Ethnic persecution was the underlying
basis for human rights violations against Darfur’s non-Arab population. Mass extermination,
murder, persecution, as well as calculated killings and attacks against civilians were violations
that would later be categorized under genocide and crimes against humanity.
In Myanmar, similar crimes of murder, torture, persecution, and targeted killings are
known and evidenced, but have yet to be investigated. Internal conflict in this country is
considered one the world’s longest civil wars that is still ongoing today. Religious tensions
began as early as the 1960s when the military junta came into power and began issuing policies
discriminating against minority ethnic groups. For example, a 1982 citizenship law stripped
Rohingya minorities of their Burmese citizenship. Recurrent protests and insurgencies (such as
the 8888 Uprising) have led the government of Myanmar to coordinate military attacks and
offensives against many ethnic minorities across the country, including the Karen in Kayin State,
Kachin in Kachin State, and the Rohingya and Rakhine in the Rakhine State. Despite political
reforms toward democracy, systematic persecution and civil war between the Burmese

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government and armed ethnic groups have led to forced displacement for tens of thousands of
people with casualties estimated between 130,000 to 250,000. As such, there has been increasing
evidence that pro-government militia have been committing acts of genocide against rebel ethnic
groups in the country.9
Figure 3. Most Similar Systems Design: Sudan vs. Myanmar
INDICATORS SUDAN MYANMAR
Human Rights Score Not Free Not Free
Signatory to Statute No No
UN Special Rapporteur Yes Yes
Regime Type Closed Anocracy Closed Anocracy
Battle Deaths 300,000 130,000 - 250,000
Strength of Judiciary 0 (Worst) 0 (Worst)
Arms Trade with P5 $993M $1.59B
China's Vote in UNSC Resolution Abstain Against (Veto)
Russia's Vote in UNSC Resolution Support Against (Veto)
OUTCOME INDICTED NOT INDICTED
When comparing Sudan and Myanmar, we study similar cases in order to find the real
causes that affect Chinese and Russian voting patterns. By noting that both countries measure
identically or very closely on independent variables that can explain whether or not a situation is
supported for referral, we isolated factors that could justify China or Russia’s voting as purely
based on gravity of crimes, whether the ICC is a court of last resort, and if the situation is a threat
to international peace and security per the Rome Statute. In Figure 3, we see that both Sudan and
Myanmar 1) have poor human rights scores, 2) are not signatories to the Statute, 3) have an UN
9
Thomson, Mike. “New evidence backs claims of genocide in Burma.” The Telegraph. 05 Mar 2006.

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Special Rapporteur already looking into human rights violations, 4) have weak autocratic-
democratic regime types, 5) similar casualties and intensity of conflict, 6) weak non-independent
judicial systems and 6) similar arms trade values with P5 countries. Both situations have similar
potential for an UNSC referral to the Court; yet have been assessed differently by China and
Russia. Voting patterns by these two P5 countries affect whether cases get referred, investigated,
and related individuals are ultimately indicted.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
Resolution 1593: Situation in Sudan – The Sudan case was referred to the ICC through
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2005. Resolution 1593 passed with 11 UNSC
members in favor (including Russia) and 4 abstentions (including China), As a result, 7
individuals have been indicted, including members of the Sudanese government (including
President Omar al-Bashir), Janjaweed, and opposition groups. As a non-signatory country to the
Rome Statute, the prosecution of these individuals were made possible by the passing of UNSC
Resolution 1593. The proceeding aimed to establish that the war in Darfur was indeed
threatening international peace and security and was therefore applicable for ICC jurisdiction.10
As a result, the Court obtained jurisdiction over the case in Sudan, giving it power to charge
individual criminals regardless of whether or not citizens in the state recognized ICC authority.
This was the first ever UNSC referral to the Court.
In official statements, China justified its abstention by noting that it neither supported
violations of human rights nor the Court overstepping its jurisdiction over nationals not party to
the Statute. The Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Wang Guangya, noted that attempts
at prosecuting violators have occurred in Sudanese courts and China did not support referrals that
10
Resolution 1593 (2005). United Nations Security Council. 21 Mar 2005.

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brought in ICC intervention without consent of the Sudanese government.10 Russia, on the other
hand, supported the resolution by simply condoning the fight against impunity and implying that
human rights perpetrators should be rightly prosecuted.
Draft Resolution in 2007: Situation in Myanmar – In 2007, a draft resolution was
introduced to the UNSC in attempt to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC. The draft
resulted from several Human Rights Council documents and Special Rapporteur reports that
highlighted human rights issues and conflict developments in the state. The provisions of the
draft emphasized efforts to resolve persecution and release political prisoners including Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi. The resolution was supported by 9 UNSC members, had 3 abstentions, and
failed due to vetoes from South Africa, China, and Russia. All 3 countries noted that the situation
in Myanmar was beyond the mandate of the Security Council.
In official statements, Wang Guangya supported China’s veto but explained that
Myanmar did not pose a threat to international or regional peace and security and the situation
was an internal affair that could be dealt with help from other relevant UN agencies11
. Russia’s
Ambassador Vitaly Churkin also stressed the situation was not a threat to international security,
an opinion that was also supported by Myanmar’s neighbors. Like Wang, Churkin noted other
international institutions were considering the problems in Myanmar and “attempts aimed at
using the Security Council to discuss issues outside its purview are unacceptable.”12
11
Wuthnow, Joel. Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy and the United Nations Security Council. New York:
Routledge, 2013.
12
ibid.

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Motives for Voting Behavior
Did Chinese and Russian statements on their voting rationale justify different referral
outcomes that led to Sudan’s ultimate indictment and Myanmar’s protection from ICC
prosecution? In both situations, China believed that the Court’s intervention was inappropriate
although Myanmar’s case was curiously strong enough to elicit a veto. Russia straightforwardly
supported the referral for Sudan stating, “all those responsible for grave crimes must be
punished.” Was this not the case in Myanmar? Our research shows that the gravity of crimes and
types of violations under the Rome Statute are indeed comparable between the two countries.
Thus, it is critical to examine external factors and interests of China and Russia as powerful P5
members to explain their voting behavior between these cases.
Situation in Sudan – In analyzing ulterior motives, it is important to note that national
sovereignty and non-intervention are key interests for both China and Russia, though it is clear
exceptions are made in particular situations. Despite China and Sudan’s strong economic ties and
trade partnership, China did not protect Sudan from ICC indictment. The Chinese decision to
abstain its vote instead of an outright veto indicates that other existing factors may have tied
China’s hands in referring the situation in Sudan.
At the time, UNSC resolutions on the situation in Sudan were highly prioritized as
international criticism grew from inaction in Darfur. When Resolution 1593 came around, the
Darfur situation had become very internationalized and China in particular, was gaining
unwanted attention for its unconditional support to the Sudanese government. As the Chinese
were increasingly blamed for obstructing peace and accountability in the region, China focused
its efforts at mediating the situation and finding diplomatic solutions to the war. International

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news revealed that China was actively present in global conferences and meetings aiming to end
the conflict, while Chinese special envoys were advising the Sudanese government on how to
address the situation on the ground. Members of the African Union had also alerted and
pressured China to mediate the conflict and lead the country toward a peaceful resolution.13
As
resolutions were building up to address the war in Darfur, China had begun asking for more time
for the Sudanese government to resolve conflict, an indication that mediations were not
working.13 Western pressure and international criticism of China’s role with Sudan became an
inherent challenge to Chinese stakes in Africa, including its rising investments and oil stakes in
the region. With Sudan as China’s 2nd
largest oil supplier, stability was in China’s commercial
interests.
At face value, China endorsed non-intervention policies but reputation costs and
international pressures allowed for flexibility. One explanation for China’s abstention in
Resolution 1593 was that the window for alternative solutions was closing. Despite efforts at
political dialogue and conflict resolution, China was beginning to realize that the Sudanese
government was being dishonest about the situation on the ground. Even with Chinese pressure,
officials in Khartoum continued to exercise aggression in Darfur and support the Janjaweed
militia.14
Consequently in 2004, China abstained and allowed Resolution 1556 to pass, pushing
for the Sudanese militia to disarm and apprehend individuals that have violated human rights in
Darfur.15
Actions leading up to the Sudan’s ICC referral in 2005 indicated that the Chinese were
faced with increasing pressure on the situation and alternatives for a peaceful resolution were
diminishing. Right before Resolution 1593 was on the table, headlines began to circulate calling
13
ibid
14
Ahmed, Gaafar Karrar. “The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict.” Paper No. 67. South African Institute of
International Affairs. Sep 2010.
15
Resolution 1556 (2004). United Nations Security Council. 30 Jul 2004.

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Beijing the host of the 2008 “Genocide Olympics.” Moreover, scholars like Susan Rice realized
that the situation had come to a point where China had little alternatives to supporting a referral
to the Court. Resolution 1593 would now be a dare for China to publicly veto and support the
long-standing genocide in Darfur.13 Indeed, internationalization of the situation and intense
pressure from Western powers like the U.S. had made it difficult for China to vote negatively
and not suffer political and reputational costs that could later translate into economic costs as
well. Violence was worsening in Darfur and soft diplomacy was obviously futile. China cared
about its oil interests in Sudan, but cooperation with the international community was a larger
stake. In fear of pressure for economic embargoes in Sudan, challenges to future African
investments, and international opposition to events like the Beijing Olympics, China chose to
abstain and allow the Security Council Resolution to pass and refer individuals to the ICC.
Unlike China, Russia’s strategic interests in Sudan were negligible with weak economic
and trade ties. In reality, Russia had very little incentives to veto Resolution 1593. In alignment
with China, Russia had abstained from prior resolutions regarding the situation in Darfur, aiming
to balance its non-interventionist policies and growing international recognition that human
rights violations were happening in the conflict. Scholars like Brian Mund argue that Russia
believes the Security Council is a tool for maintaining international peace if its legal basis
supports Russia’s general interests.16
Since cases like Sudan do not immediately threaten its self-
interests, Russia will use a legal interpretation to advocate for international stability. As such,
Russia’s statement in support of Resolution 1593 was a very legalist approach, simply pointing
out that perpetrators of grave crimes should be punished.
16
Mund, Brian Zachary. “In Defense of Sovereignty: An Analysis of Russian Voting Behavior in the United Nations
Security Council (1995-2012).” Scholarly Commons. University of Pennsylvania. 1 Apr 2013.

16. 16
Additionally, because the situation in Darfur was the first ever case to be referred to the
ICC through the UNSC, both China and Russia were unlikely to suspect that Omar al-Bashir
would have been indicted for the War in Darfur. Prosecuting a sitting head of state that would
cause further instability in an already volatile region may have provided more reason for China
and Russia to hesitate in supporting the referral, as both states opposed attempts to gain al-
Bashir’s cooperation after the Court’s indictment.13 In sum, while China and Russia had reasons
to push for national sovereignty and veto in the case of Sudan, political constraints through
international and regional pressure on the conflict alongside mediation failures and a lack of
alternatives led to supportive votes that allowed Resolution 1593 to successfully pass through.
Situation in Myanmar – China’s veto in the case of Myanmar was a very rare occasion
because only 7 vetoes have been raised in UNSC resolutions since the end of the Cold War. Like
Sudan, China has strong material and commercial interests in the region, largely defined by
energy security in the form of natural gas and oil pipelines. Unlike the Darfur War however, civil
conflict in Myanmar lacked the aforementioned attributes of internalization, regional pressure,
and absence of alternative solutions. In addition, the situation in Myanmar held distinctive
political implications that furthered the case for Chinese and Russian vetoes.
While the civil battle in Myanmar has been ongoing for decades, the ICC can still
prosecute violations that have occurred since the Statute’s enactment in 2002. Regardless of time
frame, ethnic persecutions have long been coincided with political conflicts between the military
junta and advocates for democratization. Because the conflict was also spread out over time,
Chinese and Russian presence and attempts at mediation were also insignificant. In contrast to
Darfur, there was little Western pressure for Chinese action in the region. China had not made

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any public efforts at resolving the domestic conflict of its neighbor, such as sending special
envoys to participate in diplomatic discussions.13 Furthermore, the government of Myanmar had
indicated openness to resolve, demonstrated through dialogue with the National League of
Democracy and meetings between military generals and members of ASEAN and the UN.
Nonetheless, the draft resolution in 2007 came forth after Burmese authorities announced that the
nation’s symbol for democratic change, Aung San Suu Kyi would be under house arrest for an
additional year.13
Additionally, China and Russia both stressed that the situation in Myanmar was not a
threat to international peace and security, a notion supported by ASEAN nations that saw the
conflict as a domestic issue that did not spillover to regional instability. The lack of support by
ASEAN as the regional institution meant conflict was confined within national borders, truly
internal affairs that meant the push for national sovereignty was in turn appropriate to apply here.
Ambassador Wang stated that the UN should facilitate reconciliation through “dialogue and
engagement, which needs time and patience,”17
attributes that were clearly ineffective and not
viable options in Sudan. Unlike the War in Darfur that had gained international coverage and the
support of powerful Western states, the situation in Myanmar was not deteriorating and still had
room for improvement. ASEAN members were clearly willing to try mediating, reducing the
need for China and Russia to support any interventionist agenda.
At its very core, the 2007 draft resolution pushed for a move toward democratization,
emphasizing “substantive political dialogue” and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi to resolve
national conflict. Hence, UNSC support for the prosecution of Myanmar’s authoritarian military
junta may have been interpreted as democracy promotion that counters Chinese and Russian
17
“Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution On Myanmar, Owing to Negative Votes by China, Russian
Federation.” Press Release. United Nations Security Council. 12 Jan 2007.

18. 18
interests. If China’s support led to adverse outcomes and intensified the Burmese civil war, there
were risks that instability could have spilled over the border to China’s Southern region and
begin to threaten its political climate. Border issues have been known to affect the neighboring
countries, including refugee flows, illicit drug trades, and money laundering issues between
Myanmar and China.13 Since the situation at present was not threatening enough during the time
of the resolution, China had little incentive to risk its domestic stability for a conflict that not
deemed a threat by neither the government of Myanmar nor its ASEAN neighbors. Indeed, low
reputation costs and risks of political instability allowed China and Russia some ease in
prioritizing national sovereignty and non-intervention, citing issues of political imprisonment,
refugees, and repression of citizens as normal issues that do not threaten global peace.17
Despite Chinese and Russian rhetoric that claimed Myanmar’s civil conflict to not be a
threat to international peace and security, the P5 powers have supported similar situations before.
For example, China’s abstention and Russian support allowed for the passing of Resolution 688
in 1991, denouncing political repression of Iraqi citizens and including clauses that protected
Kurdish refugees on the Turkish border.18
At the time, those violations were seen to “threaten
international peace and security in the region.” In actuality, China and Russia incurred little risk
to veto the resolution on Myanmar where the underlying reason of the conflict and any political
escalations would have been against Chinese and Russian national interests. With the existence
of alternative solutions and absence of regional support and great public attention on the matter,
there was no reason for China or Russia to set precedence for violating state sovereignty. As
such, the definition of what constituted a “threat to international peace and security” also became
flexible to cater to Chinese and Russian interests.
18
Resolution 688 (1991). United Nations Security Council. 5 Apr 1991.

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CASE STUDY PAIR 2: LIBYA AND SYRIA
Background
Much like the conflicts in Sudan and Myanmar, the civil wars in Libya and Syria arose
out of similar situations to each other. In this case, although ethnic strife was not a factor, both
conflicts rose out of the Arab Spring revolutions that took place between 2010 and 2012. The
Libyan Civil War began in February 2011 when in protest of Muammar Gaddafi’s longtime rule
and oppression, Libyans took to the streets. However, unlike Ben Ali who fled Tunisia a few
months earlier, Gaddafi vowed to stay in Libya to fight against the rebels until he won or died.19
As a result, Gaddafi used the military to suppress the protests and a civil war that lasted
approximately seven months broke out resulting in the overthrow and death of Muammar
Gaddafi. Over 30,000 people were killed during this time period.
During the war, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970 in which it referred the situation in
Libya to the ICC. This was the first time a country was unanimously referred to the ICC.20
Three
arrest warrants were issued for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al
Senussi for crimes against humanity.21
All three individuals were members of Gaddafi’s regime.
Foreign intervention played a key role in helping the rebels defeat Gaddafi, with the UK, France,
and Lebanon proposing the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973, which formed the legal basis for
a military intervention in Libya.22
Of the UNSC permanent members, France, the UK, and the
19
2011. “Libya Crisis: Gaddafi Vows to Fight to the Death,” BBC News. Web. 2 Feb. 2016
20 2011. In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting
Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 2 Feb. 2016
21
2011. Seventh Report Of The Prosecutor Of The International Criminal Court To The Un Security Council
Pursuant To Unscr 1970 (2011),” ICC Office of the Prosecutor. 2 Feb. 2016
22 2011. “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect
Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 2 Feb. 2016

20. 20
US voted in favor, while Russia and China abstained.23
As a result, NATO imposed a no-fly
zone and assisted the rebels with air support, while Gaddafi’s government was left to fend for
itself without foreign assistance.
Just one month after the start of the Libyan Civil War in March 2011, Syrians began
protesting, demanding democratic reforms and the release of political prisoners by Bashar Al-
Assad.24
The Syrian government responded with violent crackdowns. This of course transformed
into the civil war we are seeing in Syria today. The civil war has devolved into a humanitarian
crisis with a myriad of armed factions vying for control. Additionally, the amount of foreign
intervention involved in the conflict is substantial. Since the start of the war, over 250,000 people
have been killed according to the UN.25
Many of these deaths have been committed through
grave human rights violations by factions on all sides.
Four draft resolutions have been introduced in the UNSC in order to refer the Syrian
situation to the ICC, however all four resolutions were rejected due to Chinese and Russian
vetoes.26
The most recent example of this is from May 2014, just like the three attempts before,
the resolution failed to pass, preventing victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity to
testify before the ICC judges.27
23
ibid
24
"Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad: Facing down Rebellion - BBC News." BBC News. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.
25
Muggah, Robert. 2015. “From Syria to Sudan: How Do You Count the Dead?” The Guardian. Web. 2 Feb. 2016
26
"Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides." Vetoes. Web. 13 Mar. 2016.
27
ibid

21. 21
Figure 4. Most Similar Systems Design: Libya vs. Syria
INDICATORS Libya Syria
Human Rights Score Not Free Not Free
Signatory to Statute No No
UN Special Rapporteur No Yes
Regime Type Autocracy Autocracy
Battle Deaths 2,000-30,000 16,000 - 300,000
Strength of Judiciary 0 (Worst) 0.4
Arms Trade with P5 $63M $803M
China's Vote in UNSC Resolution Support Against (Veto)
Russia's Vote in UNSC Resolution Support Against (Veto)
OUTCOME INDICTED NOT INDICTED
Just like with Myanmar and Sudan, we used the Most Similar Cases model in order to
compare Libya and Syria. What is interesting to note is that, unlike Myanmar and Sudan, there
are actually less commonalities between the two cases. While we initially thought that this would
be a bad comparison, we noticed something strange about what was similar and what was
different between the two. In Figure 4 we see that Libya and Syria 1) both have poor human
rights scores, 2) both are not signatories to the Statute, 3) are not both assigned a UN Special
Rapporteur, 4) are both autocratic, 5) have different levels of casualties and intensities of
conflict, and 6) have rather different arms trade values with P5 countries. When we look at these
independent variables we actually see that Russia and China had more of an incentive to support
resolutions that pertained to Syria over Libya. Syria has been in conflict for far longer and there
have been far more casualties and rights violations. Additionally, Syria also already has a UN
Special Rapporteur looking into violations, which puts it in jeopardy of being investigated. So

22. 22
why would Russia and China oppose a resolution on Syria over the resolution in Libya? The
answer it seems can be found in the UN archives that document votes on different UNSC
resolutions.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
Resolution 1970: Situation in Libya – The Libya situation was referred to the ICC
through the UNSC in 2011. The resolution marked the first time the UNSC had unanimously
referred a situation to the ICC.28
The resolution implemented a travel ban and asset freezes for
over 16 members of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and family, including his son Saif Al Islam and
Abdullah Senussi. As a result of the resolution, the ICC issued three arrest warrants for those
three individuals citing crimes against humanity.29
It would be wrong to say that it is not
important that this resolution was passed unanimously, however what is more important is why it
was passed unanimously. This is the first time Russia and China both supported a resolution.
Which is interesting because like the Sudan case, Libya is one of the two cases that go against
Russia and China’s values on national sovereignty and non-intervention. However, what makes it
more interesting is the fact that Russia and China go on to abstain in the UNSC Resolution
1973.30
Resolution 1973 was a resolution that was passed with 10 UNSC members in favor, none
against, and 5 abstentions (including Russia and China). The resolution allowed for the
establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya with the authorization to use “any means necessary” to
28
2011. In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting
Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 2 Feb. 2016
29
2011. Seventh Report Of The Prosecutor Of The International Criminal Court To The Un Security Council
Pursuant To Unscr 1970 (2011),” ICC Office of the Prosecutor. Web. 2 Feb. 2016
30
"Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians,
by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." UN News Center. UN. Web.
13 Mar. 2016.

23. 23
protect civilians.31
The reason we are discussing Resolution 1973 even though it is not involved
in the ICC referral process is because Resolution 1970 and subsequent issuing of arrest warrants
essentially showed the world that the Gaddafi regime was implicated in crimes against humanity
and that they were no longer truly a legitimate government. This paved the road for Resolution
1973 and the eventual military intervention and decapitation of the Gaddafi regime.
The implications for why Russia and China supported resolution 1970 and abstained
rather than vetoed Resolution 1973 are important. In primary source documents from the UN
archives, delegates from both China and Russia explained why they voted for UN Resolutions
1970 and 1973. In Resolution 1970, the Chinese delegate Li Baodang stated that, due to the
necessity of the cessation of violence, support from the Arab League and African Union, and
special circumstances in Libya, the Chinese voted in favor of the resolution.32
On the Russian side, there was similar reasoning stated by Vitaly Churkin. After voting in
favor of Resolution 1970, Mr. Churkin stated that referral of the Libya situation was necessary
due to support from the Arab League and the African Union, necessity of action in order to
prevent full scale civil war and preserve Libya as a united and sovereign state, and belief that the
Libyan resolution would lead to a political solution within Libya.33
With regard to Resolution 1973, Mr. Li Baoding stated that his abstention was due to
several reasons. First, the Chinese were concerned with the grave situation in Libya with regard
to human rights violations. Second, the Chinese were also concerned with the possible
implementation of the resolution and the possibility of intervention and use of force. Mr. Li
Baoding stated that he asked specific questions regarding this issue, but was not given answers.
31
ibid
32
"United Nations Official Document." UN News Center. UN. Web. 14 Mar. 2016.
33
ibid

24. 24
Finally, despite these concerns regarding the use of force, the Chinese did not veto the resolution
because of concerns about protecting civilians by the Arab League and African Union.34
Mr. Churkin of Russia stated that abstention in this matter was due to the mix of the
possibility for large-scale military intervention, which they did not support and the fact that the
African Union and the Arab league requested immediate measures to be implemented to protect
civilian lives. Mr. Churkin went on the state that responsibility for increased violence caused by
any military intervention will “fall squarely on those who might undertake such an action.”35
Draft Resolutions in 2012, 2013, and 2014: Situation in Syria – While the resolution
to refer Libya to the ICC was fully supported by Russia and China, the four draft resolutions that
have been introduced in the UNSC from 2012 to 2014 have been vetoed by both countries. When
we first looked into this, we believed that it was primarily because of Russian and Chinese ties
with the Syrian regime. However, it turned out that the answers were in the primary sources of
the UN archives and some secondary sources that gave us insight into what UN delegates and
politicians did not voice. In general, reasoning for the vetoes from Russia and China in every
instance remained relatively unchanged. China continuously cited the need for a political
solution and that the resolutions violated the principles of national sovereignty and non-
intervention.36
Russia, while citing the same reasoning throughout the four vetoes, was a little
more explicit in its language. Mr. Churkin stated that the resolutions not only violated the
principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, but they were also reminiscent of the
resolution in Libya. Russia supported and abstained in the two relevant Libya resolutions
34
"United Nations Official Document." UN News Center. UN. Web. 14 Mar. 2016.
35
ibid
36
"Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides." Vetoes. Web. 23 Feb. 2016.

25. 25
mentioned above, however, Russia did not support how the resolutions, specifically Resolution
1973 was implemented by the western P5 members.37
Motives for Voting Behavior
The different reasoning in the Libyan and Syrian cases point to a different type of
behavior by China and Russia, which may tell us that while China and Russia do try to promote
their tenets of protecting national sovereignty and upholding the principle of non-intervention,
there are other issues at play that are now actually pushing Russian and Chinese foreign policy to
evolve. Besides the primary sources that we found, secondary sources reveal other factors at play
in Russia and China’s voting behavior in the cases of Libya and Syria. Our own theories
supported by these secondary sources allow for us to theorize more accurately what might be
happening in these two cases.
Situation in Libya – As we stated before with Sudan and Myanmar, the principles of
national sovereignty and non-intervention are key to understanding Russian and Chinese voting
behavior. The situation in Libya has presented us with a reason to look for ulterior motives to
understand why China and Russia deviated from their foreign policy tenets. One of the strongest
indicators for why China and Russia voted in favor of Resolution 1970 comes from Richard
Weitz at the Hudson Institute who stated that Western diplomats pressured both China and
Russia into supporting resolution 1970 and abstaining (not vetoing) resolution 1973 by
reminding the delegates that they had supported the 2005 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) UN
resolution.38
In fact, according to Jack Renner’s policy analysis entitled “The Responsibility to
37
ibid
38
Weitz, Richard. 2011."West's Diplomacy Trumps China Fear." The Diplomat. Web. 14 Mar. 2016.

26. 26
Protect: A Comparative Analysis of UN Security Council Actions in Libya and Syria”, the R2P
principle was a very big part of the Libya resolutions. Renner says that both Russia and China
may have seen the R2P principle as important and chose to reduce reputational costs by
supporting Resolution 1970 and abstaining in Resolution 1973.39
Additionally, lack of economic
and political incentives to protect the Libyan regime may have played a role. Renner discusses
how, although China had some economic ties with Gaddafi, political ties were strained due to
Gaddafi’s support for Taiwan.40
With Russia, it seemed that although Russia and Libya had many trade and military
agreements between them, Russia did not see Libya as an important enough partner to jeopardize
its image in the world and strain other relations. Furthermore, both China and Russia believed
regional support from the Arab League and African Union warranted action. Finally, timing (in
regard to when different resolutions were passed and how they played out) and lack of
anticipation of blowback seem to be important issues to consider.
Before the Libya situation, the only referral of a sitting head of state had been the referral
of Al Bashir in Sudan in which no military action was taken against Sudan. Therefore, it might
have been the case that Russia and China did not truly believe that the western powers would
lead a military intervention and destabilize Libya. In fact, former president Dmitri Medvedev
said that Russia supported 1970 and abstained from voting on 1973 because they wanted to
prevent an escalation of violence, however “unfortunately, we see from the developments now
unfolding that real military action has begun. This is something that cannot be allowed
to happen.” This shows that Russia had not anticipated such action to occur in Libya. We believe
that this action in Libya influenced Russia and China’s actions in vetoing the referrals of Syria.
39
Renner, Jack H. 2014. “The Responsibility to Protect: A Comparative Analysis of UN Security Council Actions in
Libya and Syria,” University of Indiana, 9-11
40
ibid, 9

27. 27
Situation in Syria – Syria is a much easier situation to understand than Libya. The fact
that Russia and China vetoed resolutions to refer Syria four times, while stating that the
resolutions violated principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, support Russian and
Chinese foreign policy of protecting those tenets. However, it is important to understand that
although these are important reasons, they are not the only reasons. While China and Russia both
have better ties with Assad than they did with Gaddafi,41
it seems that a learning aspect that is a
result of the Libya situation influenced both Russia and China. In other words, Russia and China
learned that the western powers could and would use ICC referrals to legitimize overthrowing
regimes unfriendly to them. Both Russia and China perceived NATO as “overreaching its
mandate in Libya.”42
Specifically, China has stated that it desires a political solution to the Syria
situation. Russia, on the other hand, has not necessarily supported a political solution. Although
Russia has stated during the voting procedures that it vetoed the resolutions because it supported
a political and internal solution to the problem, we have seen Russia enter the Syria war
militarily since the last vote in 2014. Although Russia’s (and China’s) political solution
reasoning may seem altruistic, it is more likely that Russia fears the precedent of forcing, what it
considers, legitimate leaders to leave through intervention. Former Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov stated in 2011 that “the belief that foreigners will help us’ to overthrow the regime could
become ‘contagious’” and “would be ‘an invitation to a whole array of civil wars.’”43
So as we can see learning curves, timing, reputation costs, fears of instability, and
whether or not there was regional support for the resolution all played a role in determining how
41
Renner, Jack H. 2014. “The Responsibility to Protect: A Comparative Analysis of UN Security Council Actions in
Libya and Syria,” University of Indiana, 19-22
42
ibid, 20-21
43
ibid, 22

28. 28
the Chinese and Russians voted with regard to Syria and Libya. Although both countries have
their own motivations for voting certain ways, the fact of the matter is that both countries’
motivations come from similar reasons. Moreover, both countries’ foreign policies seem to be
shifting, pushing them into larger roles on the international stage. The situations in Syria and
Libya reveal that both China and Russia have been learning how to utilize the ICC to push their
foreign policies just like the Western powers did in 2011.
CONCLUSION
While state sovereignty and non-intervention remain strong tenets of both Chinese and
Russian foreign policies, we have discovered that other factors (displayed in Figure 5) play a
significant role in their voting behavior on UNSC resolutions that attempt to refer cases to the
ICC. All of these factors combined with the learning curves of both China and Russia suggest
that future UNSC referrals to the ICC will be less likely. As of right now, both China and Russia
see ICC referrals as just another tool of the West to allow foreign intervention and regime change
in sovereign states. Therefore, it is difficult to find global humanitarian situations that would be
ripe for an ICC investigation while being amenable to all five permanent members of the
Council. In the aftermath of both the Darfur and Libya resolutions, there is a good deal of
mistrust among the P5 members and misconceptions over the ICC’s mandate.
With that being said, we argue that finding possible cases that would warrant ICC
consideration is still a worthwhile endeavor. Now that we have a better idea of what conditions
cause China and Russia to either support or oppose ICC referrals, we can better advise
international organizations and NGOs on how to focus their efforts. With this information, they
can strategically use their political resources to raise the reputational costs enough to get China
and Russia to change their rigid stance towards UNSC referrals to the ICC.

29. 29
One potential target that warrants consideration and may be amenable to all five
permanent members of the Security Council would be terrorist organizations. Since terrorist
organizations are non-state actors without international recognition of sovereignty, China and
Russia would be more likely to support an ICC referral as long as there was regional support.
The current situation in Somalia, for instance, appears to be a case where the UNSC could
potentially refer members of the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization to the ICC. With a weak
Somali judicial system and regional support against Al-Shabaab, we see no reason why the
UNSC P5 members would block such a resolution. Going for so-called easy targets may be a
way for the other members of the P5 to regain the trust of China and Russia in regards to ICC
referrals.
When the ICC was created, nobody expected the international criminal justice system to
improve over night. The fight against impunity will be an arduous process but better
understanding the mindset of the Chinese and Russians will go a long way in improving the
efficacy of international justice. While we would have benefitted from more than ten weeks to
probe further into this topic, we hope our contributions will serve as a starting point for those
who hope to continue the battle against impunity. In the meantime, the international community
should keep its attention focused on the future actions of the UNSC with regard to the ICC to see
how China and Russia vote on future resolutions.

30. 30
Figure 5. Findings and Hypotheses
HYPOTHESIS ON QUALITATIVE FINDINGS CONCLUSION
National Sovereignty
While China & Russia focus on national
sovereignty, they disregard domestic jurisdiction
and support referrals when their strategic interests
are threatened
No
Reputation Costs
With enough external pressure and
internationalization, China & Russia will not
obstruct UNSC referrals in fear of damaging their
international reputation
Yes
Regional Support
Regional actors and institutions influence how
China and Russia define threats to international
peace & stability, and consequently how they vote
in referrals
Yes
Timing
China and Russia will vote favorably in referrals
if there is no anticipation of political instability or
blowback that affect their interests in the future
Yes
Strategic Interests
China and Russia will vote negatively when there
are any risks to economic interests and
commercial investments
Yes
Alternative Solutions
China and Russia will not support cases that have
room for mediation and alternative solutions to
resolve the conflict
Yes

31. 31
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33. 33
APPENDIX
Situation Date Vetoes Reason Situation Date Votes Reason
Syria 10/4/11 China, Russia • Principles of
National
Sovereignty &
Non-intervention
• Reminiscent of
Libya (Russia)-->
regime change
and instability
• Strong
condemnation of
regime, weak
condemnation of
opposition
Libya
(R.1970)
2/26/11 Russia:
Yes,
China:
Yes
• Gross human rights
violations in Libya
• Resolution supported by
African Union and Arab
League (Regional support)
• Believed that the resolution
was meant purely for allowing
solution through political
means
Syria 2/4/12 China, Russia • Principles of
National
Sovereignty &
Non-Intervention
• Non-adherence
to principles of
UN Charter: Help
ease tensions,
promote political
dialogue, diffuse
disputes and
maintain peace
and stability
***Libya
(R.1973)
3/17/11 Russia:
Abstain,
China:
Abstain
• Arab League wanted
immediate implementation of
protection of civilians
• Desire to support Arab
League and protect Libyan
civilians
• Uncertainty on
implementation of no-fly
zone; potential for large-scale
military intervention
• Verbal statements during
negotiations claimed military
intervention was not the
intention of the resolution
• Serious concerns from China
and Russia not addressed by
other council members, vote
was not vetoed due to special
circumstances in Libya
Syria 7/19/12 China, Russia • Principles of
National
Svoereignty &
Non-Intervention
• Promotion of
Western
geopolitical plots
to violate national
sovereignty and
overthrow Assad
regime
• Targeting of
Assad regime
Sudan
(R.1593)
3/31/05 Russia:
Yes,
China:
Abstain
China:
• Neither supported Sudan's
human rights abuses nor the
ICC overstepping its
jurisdiction
• Preferred a political solution
where perpatrators stood trial
in the Sudanese justice system
Russia:
• Perpetrators of gross human
rights violations must be

34. 34
Chart explaining Russian and Chinese UNSC votes in Sudan, Myanmar, Libya, and Syria
44
"Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides." Vetoes. Web. 23 Feb. 2016.
45 "Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides." Meetings & Outcomes. Web. 23 Feb. 2016.
over opposition
groups
• Contradicts UN
aims to promote a
political
settlement in
Syria
punished
• Need for normalization and
stability in Sudan
Syria 5/22/14 China, Russia • Principles of
National
Sovereignty &
Non-Intervention
• Escalation of
conflict leading to
regional
instability
• Pursuit of
regime change
• Failing to
promote peace
through internal
political processes
*This chart was created from information provided by the United
Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library44 45
**All reasons given for specific votes are from primary sources, i.e.
the reasons stated by Russian and Chinese permanent
representatives to the UN. All UNSC voting records contain
records of representatives’’ statements.
Myanmar
(Burma)
1/12/07 China, Russia • Principles of
National
Sovereignty &
Non-Intervention
• China, Russia,
and ASEAN:
situation in
Myanmar posed
no threat to
stability
• Myanmar
situation
exceeded the
mandates of the
Security Council
• Myanmar
needed time for
political
processes,
external
involvement
would worsen the
situation
***Although this chart is meant to show how Russia and China
voted on UNSC referrals to the ICC, UNSC Resolution 1973, which
implemented a no-fly zone in Libya, was included due to how
relevant it is in both the Libyan and Syrian situations