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I See You
What not to do when someone is monitoring your network traffic
Andrew Beard
Brian Wohlwinder
In honor of Brian
• Lift with your legs, not your
back
• Engage your core, keep your
abs pulled in
• Avoid twisting your trunk
DEFCON 22
Our Setup
• COTS network visibility appliance for capture and analysis
• Common data tap from Packet Hacking Village
• General purpose rules and some written specifically for Wall of Sheep
to generate alerts and capture content for specific sessions
• Metadata capture for the duration of the event
• About 500M of compressed metadata between August 8 and 10,
2014
• A little over 6M transactions
Rules of Engagement
• Completely passive listener
• Ignore SSL/TLS content (metadata only)
• All credentials partially redacted
Overall Protocol Mix
HTTP
TLS/SSL
FTP
Other
XMPP
WebSocket
BitTorrent
IRC
Where’s the VPN traffic?
• Good question…
• Very few encrypted tunnels from what
we could tell. A few sessions, but
nowhere near what we expected.
• More Teredo IPv6 tunnels than real VPN
traffic
• Best guess, most aren’t using the WiFi
It’s all about the passwords
Plain Text Credentials
• POP3, IMAP, SMTP
• FTP
• IRC
• Telnet
• Occasional HTTP (mostly via URL or POST content)
POP3
+OK <21066.1407692429@************************>
CAPA
-ERR authorization first
USER lodgetreasurer@***************
+OK
PASS 2Q********
+OK
STAT
+OK 8 107321
IMAP
* OK IMAP4 Service Ready
1 LOGIN yihui.xu@******** N*****
1 OK LOGIN completed
FTP
220------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] -------
220-You are user number 129 of 200 allowed.
220-Local time is now 14:45. Server port: 21.
220-This is a private system - No anonymous login
220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server.
220 You will be disconnected after 3 minutes of inactivity.
USER dpi03@******
331 User dpi03@****** OK. Password required
PASS **********
230 OK. Current restricted directory is /
HTTP – In URL
/login?username=jacky&password=******
/login.php?username=revelation&password=******
/perfils/autenticar/5512899033.json?passwordKey=******&telefono=
**********&dispositivo=IPH&password=******&SO=iOS
7.1.2&deviceId=iPhone
When it comes to plaintext fail, mail is king
POP3
IMAP
SMTP
FTP
TELNET
IRC
HTTP
A problem of their own making
• For mail protocols, vast majority iPhones
based on outgoing MIME headers and IMAP ID
responses
• From what we can tell, most providers
supported SSL
• If your provider doesn’t support SSL, find a
provider that isn’t crap
• None of the major email service
providers represented
• Built-in profiles, SSL automatically
enabled
HTTP Basic Access Authentication
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: ******************************
Connection: keep-alive
Authorization: Basic bmF0YXMwOm5hdHRhczA=
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,
image/webp,*/*;q= 0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_4)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.125
Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Cookie: __cfduid=d95f675fe0594829173be04822ed312a41407700114750;
__utma=1768596 43.984037758.1407700117.1407700117.1407700117.1;
__utmb=176859643.3.10.140770011 7; __utmc=176859643;
__utmz=176859643.1407700117.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(dir
ect)|utmcmd=(none)
HTTP Basic Access Authentication
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: ******************************
Connection: keep-alive
Authorization: Basic bmF0YXMwOm5hdHRhczA=
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,
image/webp,*/*;q= 0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_4)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.125
Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Cookie: __cfduid=d95f675fe0594829173be04822ed312a41407700114750;
__utma=1768596 43.984037758.1407700117.1407700117.1407700117.1;
__utmb=176859643.3.10.140770011 7; __utmc=176859643;
__utmz=176859643.1407700117.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(dir
ect)|utmcmd=(none)
HTTP Basic Access Authentication
That looks a lot like base64…
localhost$ echo "bmF0YXMwOm5hdHRhczA=" | base64 -D; echo
natas0:nattas0
Username and password encoding. OK if the transport layer is
providing confidentiality, but not for straight HTTP.
curl http://natas0:nattas0@*************
Basic Auth and API Keys
GET /cors?uri=https%3A%2F%2F********************%2Fapi%2Fv2%2F
categorie.json%3Fparent_id%3D0%26limit%3D250%26page%3D1
HTTP/1.1
Host: *********************
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Basic
YXBpOjQxNjY1YWJjY2JlYjA5YjFjZDY1MDA3N2I5ZWJkZWM0
Referer: http://**************************/Las-Vegas
Nevada-printer-ink-toner-cartridge-leader/
Origin: http://**************************
Connection: keep-alive
Basic Auth and API Keys
GET /cors?uri=https%3A%2F%2F********************%2Fapi%2Fv2%2F
categorie.json%3Fparent_id%3D0%26limit%3D250%26page%3D1
HTTP/1.1
Host: *********************
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Basic
YXBpOjQxNjY1YWJjY2JlYjA5YjFjZDY1MDA3N2I5ZWJkZWM0
Referer: http://**************************/Las-Vegas
Nevada-printer-ink-toner-cartridge-leader/
Origin: http://**************************
Connection: keep-alive
Basic Auth and API Keys
localhost$ echo 
"YXBpOjQxNjY1YWJjY2JlYjA5YjFjZDY1MDA3N2I5ZWJkZWM0" | 
base64 -D; echo
api:41665abccbeb09b1cd650077b9ebdec4
Session key for the current user. Anyone interested in buying a couple
tons of toner on their account?
Then we started getting bored…
A bunch of bored guys looking at your network traffic probably isn’t a good thing
Fun With Mobile Apps
GET
/gw/mtop.taobao.wireless.homepage.ac.loadPageContent
/3.0/?rnd=4C28D4EB4622CA84826DDB0E8D95B2EC&type=orig
inaljson&data=%7B%22utdid%22%3A%22U0gUZGIZnIwDAFX4Jg
Ni4RRk%22%2C%22userId%22%3A%***********%22%2C%22ua%2
2%3A%22iPhone%22%2C%22cityCode%22%3A%22330100%22%2C%
22nick%22%3A%22******%22%2C%22longitude%22%3A%22120.
050453%22%2C%22cityName%22%3A%22%E6%9D%AD%E5%B7%9E%2
2%2C%22latitude%22%3A%2230.286152%22%2C%22isPosition
%22%3Afalse%2C%22platformVersion%22%3A%227.1%22%7D
HTTP/1.1
Host: api.m.taobao.com
Fun With Mobile Apps
GET
/gw/mtop.taobao.wireless.homepage.ac.loadPageContent
/3.0/?rnd=4C28D4EB4622CA84826DDB0E8D95B2EC&type=orig
inaljson&data=%7B%22utdid%22%3A%22U0gUZGIZnIwDAFX4Jg
Ni4RRk%22%2C%22userId%22%3A%***********%22%2C%22ua%2
2%3A%22iPhone%22%2C%22cityCode%22%3A%22330100%22%2C%
22nick%22%3A%22******%22%2C%22longitude%22%3A%22120.
050453%22%2C%22cityName%22%3A%22%E6%9D%AD%E5%B7%9E%2
2%2C%22latitude%22%3A%2230.286152%22%2C%22isPosition
%22%3Afalse%2C%22platformVersion%22%3A%227.1%22%7D
HTTP/1.1
Host: api.m.taobao.com
User’s Default Location
{
"utdid": "U0gUZGIZnIwDAFX4JgNi4RRk”,
"userId": ”*********",
"ua": "iPhone",
"cityCode": "330100",
"nick": ”******",
"longitude": "120.050453",
"cityName": "杭州",
"latitude": "30.286152",
"isPosition": false,
"platformVersion": "7.1”
}
What’s the worst that could
happen?
It can’t be that bad…
“Is this important?”
From: Deborah Simon <dms@************>
To: Mitchell IPad Simon <md.simon@************>
“Is this important?”
From: Deborah Simon <dms@************>
To: Mitchell IPad Simon <md.simon@************>
Subject: Megan’s W-4
“Is this important?”
From: Deborah Simon <dms@************>
To: Mitchell IPad Simon <md.simon@************>
Subject: Megan’s W-4
One attachment, “2014 W4.pdf”
Nothing to worry about here
Dear God WHY!?
• Data confidentiality in transit vs at rest
• PGP
• S/MIME certificates cheap/free. Supported by most major mail client
(including mobile devices)
• Encrypted zip files or document-based encryption better than nothing
DEF CON 22 MUSIC ANNOUNCEMENT: THE ORB
You better have just done that spit-take. That's right. Electronica/Trip-Hop/IDM/dub music classics and
pioneers: The Orb. They're here. They're kicking. And on the 3rd day of DEF CON (Saturday night/Sunday
morning 00:00-01:00) their divine presence shall bless the glorious attendees who... attend their glorious
and divine performance. Those who do not attend will be forsaken and cast into the dystopian landscape
known as "the rest of Las Vegas." And so this event shall henceforth be written into the Dark Tangent's
Book of DEF CON, Volume 22 - also referred to by some as "the conference program." So say we all.
More fun with misconfigured mail clients
To: *****@theorb.com
From: Bill Quinn
Subject: ***** pick up amount Rio 8/9
Hey *****,
Please pick up the balance of $6,500 for tonights performance in
Vegas.
Let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks,
Bill Quinn
Madison House, Inc.
Imagine for a moment…
• You know someone is going to
be picking up a check for $6500
• You have detailed knowledge of
the transaction
• You have unrestricted access to
the intended recipient’s email
account
Imagine for a moment…
• You know someone is going to
be picking up a check for $6500
• You have detailed knowledge of
the transaction
• You have unrestricted access to
the intended recipient’s email
account
Quick Recap
• Through misconfiguration or a lack of controls it’s pretty easy for
potentially sensitive or harmful info to make it’s way over a network
• Consider defense in depth. Use multiple layers of encryption in
transit, just in case.
• Don’t trust your email password as the only thing keeping you from
financial or other loss.
• Treat every network as untrusted (especially the ones that warn you
ahead of time)

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I See You

  • 1. I See You What not to do when someone is monitoring your network traffic Andrew Beard Brian Wohlwinder
  • 2. In honor of Brian • Lift with your legs, not your back • Engage your core, keep your abs pulled in • Avoid twisting your trunk
  • 4. Our Setup • COTS network visibility appliance for capture and analysis • Common data tap from Packet Hacking Village • General purpose rules and some written specifically for Wall of Sheep to generate alerts and capture content for specific sessions • Metadata capture for the duration of the event • About 500M of compressed metadata between August 8 and 10, 2014 • A little over 6M transactions
  • 5. Rules of Engagement • Completely passive listener • Ignore SSL/TLS content (metadata only) • All credentials partially redacted
  • 7. Where’s the VPN traffic? • Good question… • Very few encrypted tunnels from what we could tell. A few sessions, but nowhere near what we expected. • More Teredo IPv6 tunnels than real VPN traffic • Best guess, most aren’t using the WiFi
  • 8. It’s all about the passwords
  • 9. Plain Text Credentials • POP3, IMAP, SMTP • FTP • IRC • Telnet • Occasional HTTP (mostly via URL or POST content)
  • 10. POP3 +OK <21066.1407692429@************************> CAPA -ERR authorization first USER lodgetreasurer@*************** +OK PASS 2Q******** +OK STAT +OK 8 107321
  • 11. IMAP * OK IMAP4 Service Ready 1 LOGIN yihui.xu@******** N***** 1 OK LOGIN completed
  • 12. FTP 220------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ------- 220-You are user number 129 of 200 allowed. 220-Local time is now 14:45. Server port: 21. 220-This is a private system - No anonymous login 220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server. 220 You will be disconnected after 3 minutes of inactivity. USER dpi03@****** 331 User dpi03@****** OK. Password required PASS ********** 230 OK. Current restricted directory is /
  • 13. HTTP – In URL /login?username=jacky&password=****** /login.php?username=revelation&password=****** /perfils/autenticar/5512899033.json?passwordKey=******&telefono= **********&dispositivo=IPH&password=******&SO=iOS 7.1.2&deviceId=iPhone
  • 14. When it comes to plaintext fail, mail is king POP3 IMAP SMTP FTP TELNET IRC HTTP
  • 15. A problem of their own making • For mail protocols, vast majority iPhones based on outgoing MIME headers and IMAP ID responses • From what we can tell, most providers supported SSL • If your provider doesn’t support SSL, find a provider that isn’t crap
  • 16. • None of the major email service providers represented • Built-in profiles, SSL automatically enabled
  • 17. HTTP Basic Access Authentication GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: ****************************** Connection: keep-alive Authorization: Basic bmF0YXMwOm5hdHRhczA= Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9, image/webp,*/*;q= 0.8 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.125 Safari/537.36 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Cookie: __cfduid=d95f675fe0594829173be04822ed312a41407700114750; __utma=1768596 43.984037758.1407700117.1407700117.1407700117.1; __utmb=176859643.3.10.140770011 7; __utmc=176859643; __utmz=176859643.1407700117.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(dir ect)|utmcmd=(none)
  • 18. HTTP Basic Access Authentication GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: ****************************** Connection: keep-alive Authorization: Basic bmF0YXMwOm5hdHRhczA= Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9, image/webp,*/*;q= 0.8 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.125 Safari/537.36 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Cookie: __cfduid=d95f675fe0594829173be04822ed312a41407700114750; __utma=1768596 43.984037758.1407700117.1407700117.1407700117.1; __utmb=176859643.3.10.140770011 7; __utmc=176859643; __utmz=176859643.1407700117.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(dir ect)|utmcmd=(none)
  • 19. HTTP Basic Access Authentication That looks a lot like base64… localhost$ echo "bmF0YXMwOm5hdHRhczA=" | base64 -D; echo natas0:nattas0 Username and password encoding. OK if the transport layer is providing confidentiality, but not for straight HTTP. curl http://natas0:nattas0@*************
  • 20. Basic Auth and API Keys GET /cors?uri=https%3A%2F%2F********************%2Fapi%2Fv2%2F categorie.json%3Fparent_id%3D0%26limit%3D250%26page%3D1 HTTP/1.1 Host: ********************* Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Content-Type: application/json Authorization: Basic YXBpOjQxNjY1YWJjY2JlYjA5YjFjZDY1MDA3N2I5ZWJkZWM0 Referer: http://**************************/Las-Vegas Nevada-printer-ink-toner-cartridge-leader/ Origin: http://************************** Connection: keep-alive
  • 21. Basic Auth and API Keys GET /cors?uri=https%3A%2F%2F********************%2Fapi%2Fv2%2F categorie.json%3Fparent_id%3D0%26limit%3D250%26page%3D1 HTTP/1.1 Host: ********************* Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Content-Type: application/json Authorization: Basic YXBpOjQxNjY1YWJjY2JlYjA5YjFjZDY1MDA3N2I5ZWJkZWM0 Referer: http://**************************/Las-Vegas Nevada-printer-ink-toner-cartridge-leader/ Origin: http://************************** Connection: keep-alive
  • 22. Basic Auth and API Keys localhost$ echo "YXBpOjQxNjY1YWJjY2JlYjA5YjFjZDY1MDA3N2I5ZWJkZWM0" | base64 -D; echo api:41665abccbeb09b1cd650077b9ebdec4 Session key for the current user. Anyone interested in buying a couple tons of toner on their account?
  • 23. Then we started getting bored… A bunch of bored guys looking at your network traffic probably isn’t a good thing
  • 24. Fun With Mobile Apps GET /gw/mtop.taobao.wireless.homepage.ac.loadPageContent /3.0/?rnd=4C28D4EB4622CA84826DDB0E8D95B2EC&type=orig inaljson&data=%7B%22utdid%22%3A%22U0gUZGIZnIwDAFX4Jg Ni4RRk%22%2C%22userId%22%3A%***********%22%2C%22ua%2 2%3A%22iPhone%22%2C%22cityCode%22%3A%22330100%22%2C% 22nick%22%3A%22******%22%2C%22longitude%22%3A%22120. 050453%22%2C%22cityName%22%3A%22%E6%9D%AD%E5%B7%9E%2 2%2C%22latitude%22%3A%2230.286152%22%2C%22isPosition %22%3Afalse%2C%22platformVersion%22%3A%227.1%22%7D HTTP/1.1 Host: api.m.taobao.com
  • 25. Fun With Mobile Apps GET /gw/mtop.taobao.wireless.homepage.ac.loadPageContent /3.0/?rnd=4C28D4EB4622CA84826DDB0E8D95B2EC&type=orig inaljson&data=%7B%22utdid%22%3A%22U0gUZGIZnIwDAFX4Jg Ni4RRk%22%2C%22userId%22%3A%***********%22%2C%22ua%2 2%3A%22iPhone%22%2C%22cityCode%22%3A%22330100%22%2C% 22nick%22%3A%22******%22%2C%22longitude%22%3A%22120. 050453%22%2C%22cityName%22%3A%22%E6%9D%AD%E5%B7%9E%2 2%2C%22latitude%22%3A%2230.286152%22%2C%22isPosition %22%3Afalse%2C%22platformVersion%22%3A%227.1%22%7D HTTP/1.1 Host: api.m.taobao.com
  • 26. User’s Default Location { "utdid": "U0gUZGIZnIwDAFX4JgNi4RRk”, "userId": ”*********", "ua": "iPhone", "cityCode": "330100", "nick": ”******", "longitude": "120.050453", "cityName": "杭州", "latitude": "30.286152", "isPosition": false, "platformVersion": "7.1” }
  • 27. What’s the worst that could happen? It can’t be that bad…
  • 28. “Is this important?” From: Deborah Simon <dms@************> To: Mitchell IPad Simon <md.simon@************>
  • 29. “Is this important?” From: Deborah Simon <dms@************> To: Mitchell IPad Simon <md.simon@************> Subject: Megan’s W-4
  • 30. “Is this important?” From: Deborah Simon <dms@************> To: Mitchell IPad Simon <md.simon@************> Subject: Megan’s W-4 One attachment, “2014 W4.pdf”
  • 31. Nothing to worry about here
  • 32. Dear God WHY!? • Data confidentiality in transit vs at rest • PGP • S/MIME certificates cheap/free. Supported by most major mail client (including mobile devices) • Encrypted zip files or document-based encryption better than nothing
  • 33. DEF CON 22 MUSIC ANNOUNCEMENT: THE ORB You better have just done that spit-take. That's right. Electronica/Trip-Hop/IDM/dub music classics and pioneers: The Orb. They're here. They're kicking. And on the 3rd day of DEF CON (Saturday night/Sunday morning 00:00-01:00) their divine presence shall bless the glorious attendees who... attend their glorious and divine performance. Those who do not attend will be forsaken and cast into the dystopian landscape known as "the rest of Las Vegas." And so this event shall henceforth be written into the Dark Tangent's Book of DEF CON, Volume 22 - also referred to by some as "the conference program." So say we all.
  • 34. More fun with misconfigured mail clients To: *****@theorb.com From: Bill Quinn Subject: ***** pick up amount Rio 8/9 Hey *****, Please pick up the balance of $6,500 for tonights performance in Vegas. Let me know if you have any questions. Thanks, Bill Quinn Madison House, Inc.
  • 35. Imagine for a moment… • You know someone is going to be picking up a check for $6500 • You have detailed knowledge of the transaction • You have unrestricted access to the intended recipient’s email account
  • 36. Imagine for a moment… • You know someone is going to be picking up a check for $6500 • You have detailed knowledge of the transaction • You have unrestricted access to the intended recipient’s email account
  • 37. Quick Recap • Through misconfiguration or a lack of controls it’s pretty easy for potentially sensitive or harmful info to make it’s way over a network • Consider defense in depth. Use multiple layers of encryption in transit, just in case. • Don’t trust your email password as the only thing keeping you from financial or other loss. • Treat every network as untrusted (especially the ones that warn you ahead of time)

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Brian couldn't be here today Recovering from severe back issues
  2. In honor of Brian, wanted to say a few words about protecting your back Picking something up or just bending over Avoid long and painful recovery, and bailing on your co presenter
  3. Setup last year Couple very basic (and very stupid) was to pass credentials in the clear Weird things we found Wall of Sheep at DEFCON 22, August 2014 Fidelis sponsor Fun to park a couple guys on a network tap and see what we could find
  4. Mostly OpenVPN Keep it on cellular Paranoid enough to use VPN, paranoid enough not to use shared network
  5. So that’s where we started
  6. Fish in a barrel
  7. Metadata collection. Plug Bro, Critical Stack, Liam Randall Other HTTP, HTTP POST + keyword
  8. Very different from the protocol mix above, in other category less than 10% 75% here Why? Beaconing. Almost all other protocols are active, and transactional. You have to do something. Mail, especially on mobile devices, a given. Repeated logins. Easy to misconfigure something in the background.
  9. One class of credentials on the wire, straight plaintext. Another class, encoded Don't like obfuscated, because it's a poor job
  10. HTTP client header
  11. Content aware, Bro Liam Randall, Critical Stack awesome Bro training
  12. Rule looking for any interesting documents. Found a lot, mostly from defcon file share. Large percentage of FTP traffic. So a woman walks over, sits down at our setup, and says “teach me something”. Show her setup, how things work, starts playing around. About 5 minutes later she says “Is this important?”
  13. All data in transit. Consider implication though. Even if they hadn’t been actively looking at the file anyone could have logged.
  14. Part of a larger email exchange