This document reviews an article from the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport about Stephen Mumford's views on the interaction between aesthetic and moral values in sport. Mumford argues that aesthetic appreciation and moral assessment of sporting performances are interdependent, not autonomous. He provides three examples to support this: Leni Riefenstahl's propaganda film Triumph of the Will, Ben Johnson's 1988 Olympic performance before his doping was revealed, and a soccer match played under threat of death between Dynamo Kiev and German forces during WWII. The review discusses refinements needed to Mumford's perspective regarding the normative implications and questions his view of the Dynamo Kiev match.

1. i
MAKALAH
RIVIEW ARTIKEL JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT: MUMFORD
ON AESTHETIC–MORAL INTERACTION IN SPORT
Dosen Pengampu :
Dr. Made Pramono, S.S., M.Hum.
Disusun Oleh :
Adi Sanjaya
20060484061
2020 B
UNIVERSITAS NEGERI SURABAYA
FAKULTAS ILMU OLAHRAGA
JURUSAN PENDIDIKAN KESEHATAN DAN REKREASI
TAHUN AKADEMIK 2020

2. ii
KATA PENGANTAR
Assalamualaikum Wr. Wb. Bismillah dengan memanjatkan puji syukur kehadirat Allah SWT
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tepat pada waktunya.
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Gresik, 13 Maret 2021
Adi Sanjaya

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BAB I
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4. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
ISSN: 0094-8705 (Print) 1543-2939 (Online)
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Mumford on aesthetic–moral interaction in sport
Jason Holt
To cite this article: Jason Holt (2016): Mumford on aesthetic–moral interaction in sport,
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2016.1225505
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6. Mumford on aesthetic–moral interaction in sport
Jason Holt
school of Kinesiology, acadia university, Wolfville, Canada
KEYWORDS aesthetics; ethics; Mumford, s; sport film
We often think of moral and aesthetic values as entirely distinct. We distinguish the good from
the beautiful just as we distinguish both the good and the beau- tiful from the true. We do this for
the straightforward reason that these values need not, and often do not, have anything to do with
one another. The aesthetic properties of people or objects are completely irrelevant, we suppose,
to their moral status, and vice versa. Hence, there are ugly saints and beautiful sinners as well as
beautiful saints and ugly sinners. In this vein, we may likewise appreciate a work of art from an
aesthetic point of view, distinguishing the work from the artist as a matter of principle, even and
especially if the artist’s moral stature fails to equal their artistic achievements: an immoral artist
producing beautiful work. Think of your own examples. Generally, we find it unfair or confused
for either aesthetic judgement or moral assessment to influence the other.
This view – that aesthetics and ethics are autonomous realms of value – is what Stephen
Mumford calls ‘autonomism’. Mumford rejects this view, particu­ larly though not exclusively in
the domain of sport: ‘Factors that are ethically bad’, he says, ‘can detract from sport’s aesthetic
value, and factors that are eth­ ically good can improve sport’s aesthetic value’ (2012, 68). Since
‘some of the
CONTACT Jason holt jason.holt@acadiau.ca
© 2016 iaPs
ABSTRACT
Stephen Mumford argues that aesthetic and moral values in sport are inter-
dependent, focusing on cases where immorality taints beautiful performance. This
interdependence thesis is insightful but, I argue, in need of refinement, as its normative
implicationsareunclearandperhapsimplausible(e.g.the Nazi aesthetics problem). I
also challenge Mumford’s perspective on the infamous DynamoKievdeathmatch.
WhereasMumford claims that the match’s morally oppressivecircumstancesdetract
from it so that ‘it was not something knowingly we should have admired aesthetically’, I
argue that, on the contrary, and in light of what Mumford says about other cases, such
circumstances actually enhance the game’s aesthetics such that it would be wrong not to
appreciate it aesthetically.

7. JourNAl oF THE PHIloSoPHy oF SPorT 2
norms of sport are informed by aesthetic considerations’(ibid., 75) as well, ‘[t]he best way to characterise
the relationship’ between aesthetics and ethics insport ‘is therefore in terms of interdependence’(ibid., 78,
original emphasis). This inter- dependence thesis (my term, not his) represents not only Mumford’s
rejection of autonomism but also his positive account of the interrelatedness of aesthetic and moral values
in sport. Iwill argue that Mumford’s account, though insightful, needs further refinement to address open
concerns about normativity, issues that can be revealed and addressed by careful consideration of
relevant films: documentary and fiction, sport and otherwise.
In this paper, I am concerned, along with Mumford, with such aesthetic fea- tures of sport as the
elegance of athletic movements, the beauty of an athlete’s style, the drama of an athletic contest, and so on.
Such aesthetic properties often obtain as unintended by-products of sporting activity, although in
aesthetic sports, where the aesthetic qualities of performance are factors in scoring, certain aesthetic effects
often will be produced intentionally. So-called aesthetic sports are not of direct concern, nor is the
question of whether sport can count as art. Even so, itis vital that we distinguish the aesthetic from the
artistic. In general, a sunset may be aesthetic but is not a work of art, where apainting of that sunset, which
may or may not capture the sunset’s natural aesthetic beauty, is awork of art. Neither art nor beauty
necessarily implies the other. We should acknowledge, consequently, that the beauty or moral standing of
something in real life often will not transfer to depictions in art, and vice versa. To take a trivial example,
a real-life murder is amorally significant event, though the depiction of a murder in art typically will not
be, since the victim is not areal person. Still, itis important to remember that works of art can give us access
to the truth, sometimes impor- tant truths that are otherwise difficult to discover. our responses to
depictions in artworks, such as some of the films to be discussed, can be insightful, even if what such
works depict areto some or even agreat extent fictional.
Itis not only in the areaofsport that Mumford thinks the interdependence thesis holds. Indeed,
one of his key examples has nothing do to with sport, although he does not believe that aesthetic–
moral interdependence holds everywhere. Why does sport seem to be the preeminent domain in
which such interdependence holds? Itisworth speculating. onepossibility is that in sport, we have
plausibly the best representation of anotion that originated with ancient thinkers and to some degree
remains resonant today: the unity of the virtues. Although nowadays wedonot takesuch aunity tobe
true in general, in sportathletic excellence is something that many ofuscannot help but see as
beautiful and that weunderstand asrequiring suchvirtues ofcharacter as courage and a good work
ethic. Athletic contests are also holistic tests of ath- letes: physically, psychologically and morally, and
constitute not just truth but moments of truth that inspire such multidimensional achievement and so
are themselves beautiful. Forbetterorworse, this may bewhy many people are irked when‘ugly’
techniques or‘unathletic’ physiques prevail in sport.

8. JourNAl oF THE PHIloSoPHy oF SPorT 3
Before we begin, let us clarify a few terminological matters. When Mumford speaks of aesthetic
experience, he emphatically does not restrict aesthetically relevant attributes tothose formal
properties that aremore orless immedi- ately available in sensation – the lines and colours of a
sculpture, for instance. Mumford suggests that two indistinguishable sculptures might yield rather dif-
ferent aesthetic experiences, if one were titled ‘Freedom is beautiful’, for instance, and the other‘Make the
innocent suffer and die’(ibid., 71). Content and context might affect one’s aesthetic response to awork.
likewise, Mumford uses ‘ethical’ rather than ‘moral’, perhaps as a synonym for the latter, or possibly to
indicate the restricted sport context, similar in this respect to professional codes of ethics. lastly, Mumford
uses the term ‘interdependence’ to describe the relationship between aesthetics and ethics in sport. To
me this term connotes necessity, neither being able to exist without the other, where it appears rather
that the relationship posited is of a weaker kind, and might instead be designated with terms like
‘interaction’ or ‘interplay’. I draw readers’ attention tothis quibble with- out suggesting that it is anything
else.
Mumford’s examples
In his challenge toautonomism, Mumford discusses three key examples, the first to illustrate the general
plausibility of the interdependence thesis, the others sport-specific examples. Despite the fact that the
interdependence thesis pos- its the mutual influence of aesthetic and moral values, the bulk of
Mumford’s discussion concerns the moral-to-aesthetic direction of influence, mostly how morally bad
features of a sporting event can detract from its aesthetic appeal. Toencapsulate thepoint in theform of
aslogan, these examples aremeant to show, in effect, that immorality taints beautiful performance.
The first example is raised inresponse toahypothetical example from the autonomist. If we
consider the ancient Egyptian pyramids, an autonomist might say,we may praise them for their
aesthetic qualities despite, and in no way diminished by,the morally objectionable fact that they
were built byslave labour (ibid., 69). Notwithstanding our moral verdict, then, our aesthetic ver- dict
stands. Against this autonomist intuition, and without directly challenging the pyramids example,
Mumford asks us to consider leni riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), ahighly controversial film,
the ultimate piece of ‘docuganda’, an undeniably innovative and influential artistic achievement that
also, dis- turbingly, is a glorification of Nazism and an apotheosis of the Führer (ibid., 70, citing
Devereaux 1998). According to Mumford, whatever the film’s technical and artistic merits, because of our
intense negative response to its morally objec- tionable content, when we watch it, we find that its
beauty is tainted, that the propaganda has spoiled the aesthetic of its presentation.
Having argued that moral properties can affect aesthetic ones generally, Mumford moves on to his
second, this one sport-specific, example: Ben Johnson’s

9. JourNAl oF THE PHIloSoPHy oF SPorT 4
performance in the 100m and subsequent steroid scandal atthe 1988Seoul olympics. Before news
broke of his failed drug test and Johnson being stripped of the gold medal, Mumford says, we admired
his performance with ‘aesthetic awe’. Minus the scandal, Johnson’s race would have remained ‘one of
our finest examples of aesthetics in sport. But it is specifically because of the ethical flaw ofJohnson –
that he hadcheated –that wenolonger seeit ashaving aesthetic value’ (2012, 73, 74). Here, Mumford
claims, the sport aesthetic has not just been spoiled, it has been spoiled completely. In addition to immoral
content, then, character flaws andthe resulting immoral behaviour sometimes undermine aesthetic
appreciation.
Mumford’s third example concerns neither content nor character but rather context: the infamous
Dynamo Kiev death match in the Second World War between occupying German forces and a team
of Kiev locals. Citing for details Dougan’s Dynamo: Defending the Honour of Kiev (2002), Mumford
describes the scenario asfollows:
Players were forced to play against a Nazi team with death the price for winning. There may have
beensome beauty and profundity in Dynamo nevertheless win- ning the game, and accepting
the fatal consequences. But this also could have been their last show of resistance in what they
saw as ahopeless situation. In either case, it would have beenwrong for us as spectators atsuch
a match to sit and admire its beauty as a game if we were aware of the moral context in which it
was conducted. The circumstances were morally abhorrent and it was consequently not
something knowingly weshould have admired aesthetically. (2012,75)
It is because this particular example will figure prominently in the subsequent discussion, and to
represent Mumford accurately, that Ihave quoted him so extensively above. Mumford is explicit in
emphasising that, on his view, what spoils the game’s aesthetic is not content or character but rather the
immoral context in which the game occurred.
Each of Mumford’s examples thus illustrates a different potential source of undermining the
aesthetic virtue ofaperformance in artorsportbyrelevant moral flaws incontent, character or context.
As illustrations of the interdepend- ence thesis, these examples are certainly plausible. We may observe
further that when people express dismay about the so-called ugly side ofsport,the term ‘ugly’ aptly
captures something negative about sport that is disconcerting both from anaesthetic and from anethical
standpoint. on the positive side, the virtue ofsportsmanship seems toappealtous bothonamoral level
andanaesthetic one. So neither‘ugly’ nor‘sportsmanlike’ is merely a term of, respectively, purely aesthetic
or purely moral criticism or praise. Immorality in sport is itself ugly, just as the virtue of sportsmanship is
itself beautiful. It is for such reasons that I find Mumford’s interdependence thesis to be onthe whole
insightful, although, as I argue below, his particular articulation of it leaves open certain crucial questions
and thus motivates as yet unrealised refinements.

10. JourNAl oF THE PHIloSoPHy oF SPorT 5
Normativity and Nazi aesthetics
Probably the most pressing questions left open by Mumford’s account are questions concerning
normativity. Forexample, although he finds the cine- matic beauty of Triumph of the Will spoiled by
its offensive Nazi propaganda, Mumford admits that analien intelligence orneo-Nazi might well
find their positive aesthetic judgement of the film inured to such influence (ibid., 72). A key issue then
is that although Mumford deems permissible the spoilage of one’s positive aesthetic response to
riefenstahl, what is less clear is whether he also holds it to be obligatory. The latter is amore
controversial commitment. ought we to have our aesthetic experience of riefenstahl’s film spoiled by its
content? Are we in the wrong if this does not happen, no matter the reason? It seems fairly clear that
Mumford’s answer would be yes, suggesting that any normal, reasonable, fully informed response
will include aesthetic spoilage (ibid.), just asin the deathmatch case,he maintains, it would have been
wrong for us as spectators tosit andderive aesthetic pleasure from suchbeauty asthe game might
have had (ibid., 75).
Such a normative reading of Mumford’s position might seem unfair despite what appearstobe
sufficient textual evidence. However, it would bedecid- edly less charitable to interpret him as
offering a purely relativised or merely descriptive account. Mumford is not simply asserting that he
finds the Triumph of the Will’s aesthetic spoiled, or that most people do. Nor is his claim the weakly
normative one tothe effect that it is permissible onsome level tofail tofind the film aesthetically
pleasurable. (Note that this may be morally permissible, or permissible in a general undefined
normative sense, without being aesthet- ically permissible.) However, nor is Mumford making the
vacuous claim that, in considering different value types, morality almost invariably trumps aesthetics –
especially when the moral stakes arehigh, but perhaps not when the moral stakesarelow and
aesthetic stakes arehigh (e.g. Iwould not hesitate toslap someone’s face if that somehow preserved the
last known copy of Shakespeare’s plays). rather, the implication of Mumford’s position is that, for
instance, to have a full, robust aesthetic response to riefenstahl or the Dynamo Kiev death match – in
other words, failing to have one’s aesthetic response overruled by an appropriate moral response –is to
be in the wrong. But perhaps, as I will discuss later, an appropriate moral response not only is
compatible with but also may require such aesthetic response.
Although Idispute in particular Mumford’s perspective on the Dynamo Kiev example, before direct
criticism of it, I would like to broach what seems to be a more provocative general problem lurking in
the wings. Call this the Nazi aes- thetics problem, which seems to be implied by Mumford’s view and is
analogous to the better-known Nazi data problem (i.e. whether it is morally permissible to use medical
data obtained from inhumane Nazi experiments).1 I assume that in the cases of Nazi aesthetics and Nazi
data alike there are significant moral issues

11. JourNAl oF THE PHIloSoPHy oF SPorT 6
in play, and that we are not naively dismissing the aesthetically or scientifically valuable merely
because ofwhere they come from or what they are associ- ated with, that we are not committing,
severally or jointly, either the genetic or guilt-by-association fallacy. If itis obligatory to have spoiled an
aesthetic appre- ciation of Triumph of the Will because of its content and the Dynamo Kiev death match
because of its context, on pain of inconsistency it is presumably likewise for the swastika, for the
Hitler-designed VW Beetle, for the Hugo Boss-designed SS uniforms, and for artistic film techniques
innovated by leni riefenstahl. In these cases too, onMumford’s view, it appears that the immorality of
content or context should trump aesthetic value. Although this might be rather plausible in the case of
the Nazi swastika, it is decidedly less so for the Beetle’s silhouette, Hugo Boss couture or even
riefenstahl’s film aesthetics.
Insights from film
Although Mumford doesdiscuss film in the context of his argument, atleast Triumphof theWill,
other examples, some of which are not discussed by Mumford, will prove useful for evaluating
and refining the interdependence thesis. I offer the following two examples that individually and
collectively reveal imperfections in Mumford’s view as is stands.
Consider first that if, as Mumford holds, the aesthetic of Triumph of the Will is tainted by its morally
offensive content, subsequent use of such aesthetics asriefenstahl originated will beproblematic as
well. Wemay find it morally permissible to use, say, Nazi insignia in a historical film about the
Holocaust, as in Schindler’s List, but in such acase there is anunmistakably clear and justified moral
commentary on Nazism. But take Star Wars (1977), which has nothing to do with the Second World
War, yet the aesthetic of which owes a lot to Triumph of the Will. The last scene of the film, where Princess
leia awards military medals to luke Skywalker and Han Solo, is apage taken by writer/director George
lucas right out of riefenstahl, not only the way the shots are set up, but also the mili- taristic fanfare,
ceremonial pomp and celebratory circumstances –a different tri- umph of adifferent will. on Mumford’s
view, however, lucas’s use of riefenstahl’s aesthetic must be either morally objectionable or aesthetically
flawed. yet it is neither. In borrowing from riefenstahl, lucas has not committed either amoral or an
aesthetic error, which means that even if the original aesthetic is impure, it was purifiable–andsoin a
limited sense autonomous –all along. Weshould note also that it is not the fictional status of Star
Wars that makes lucas’s use of the riefenstahl aesthetic seem unproblematic. Any filmmaker, even a
docu- mentarian, would seemingly be okay in using riefenstahl’s aesthetics so long asthe trumpeted
ideology, if any, proved tobemorally acceptable, aswith the fictional rebellion of Star Wars and
unlike real-life Nazis. The only way to avoid the dilemma it seems is toinsist that riefenstahl’s aesthetic
simply cannot be transposed out of its original context into inoffensive works, that the film’s

12. JourNAl oF THE PHIloSoPHy oF SPorT 7
aesthetic is in principle confined within that film. Such particularism is not only implausible, it also
unfairly reduces Mumford’s view to the essentially trivial claim that Triumph’s immorality
overshadows its artistry. The interdependence thesis is surely more interesting than that, and this will
become more evident by turning again to the Dynamo case.
Mumford’s take on the Dynamo Kiev death match, though plausible, is open to challenge when
viewed through the lens of John Huston’s film Victory (1981, uK title: Escape to Victory), effectively a
fictionalisation of the death match with an international team of PoW’s, including Pelé, standing in for
the Kiev locals. Asbefore, Mumford doesadmit that there ‘may have beensome beauty and
profundity in Dynamo nevertheless winning the game’, but nonetheless insists that because the
‘circumstances were morally abhorrent, it was … not some- thing … we should have admired
aesthetically’ (2012, 75, my emphasis). In my view, however, the morally objectionable circumstances
diminish or undermine only some aesthetic aspects of the match, specifically the efforts of the German
side. Bycontrast, the efforts ofthe Dynamo side, and the dramatic nature of the game as a whole, are
aesthetically enhanced, not despite but because of the immorality ofthe context and the courage
required toface it. AsVictory illustrates, the efforts under coercion of actual Kiev locals or fictional
PoW’s have aprofound aesthetic poignancy that Mumford seems at best tounder- estimate. To see
Pelé’s character score on a slow-motion bicycle kick is a thing ofbeauty, notjust the skilled movement
itself but asit happens inthefaceof the morally oppressive circumstances that are depicted in the film
and that, by extension, we understand to have occurred in the Dynamo Kiev case. In either case,as
helpless sympathisers, it would bewrong ofus nottobesomoved by the beautiful play ofthe
courageous victims. Even Mumford himself affirms that answering a call to courage in athletic
performance serves to enhance its beauty. But he offers as example not Dynamo Kiev but Bobby
Moore, footballer who captained England’s 1966 World Cup win (and coincidentally played on the PoW
side in Victory) despite, it was later revealed, abattle with cancer (ibid.). If Moore’s courage in facing
cancer enhanced the beauty of England’s World Cup win, it is hard toseehow the courage ofDynamo
Kievin facing the Nazis isany less aesthetically enhancing. The aesthetic poignancy of the historical
narrative was no doubt one of Huston’s motivations for making Victory in the first place. one might
protest on Mumford’s behalf that the aesthetic enhancement of beautiful play in oppressive
circumstances as depicted in fiction simply does not imply the appropriateness of such response in actual
circumstances. However, I believe the Victory/Dynamo Kiev example demonstrates that an aesthetic
response is permissible not simply because ofthe psychological distance of watching a fictionalised
account of an actual event, but also because the film gives us some insight into how we should react in
real life. Not only are the move- ments such as Pelé’s bicycle kick both real and really beautiful, if we
imagine ourselves in the film as if it were our reality, as if we were helpless sympathetic

13. JourNAl oF THE PHIloSoPHy oF SPorT 8
onlookers in the crowd, we find our aesthetic appreciation of such beautiful play enhanced precisely
becauseit is occurring despite and in revolt against such oppression. As adepiction in the film, Pelé’s
bicycle kick becomes more beautiful whenweimagine it tobethe reality it represents, inthe context of
the actual death match. Indeed, it seems that such anempathetic imagining is an essential part of being
moved by the film at all. That is why, for instance, Max von Sydow’s Nazicharacter issoovercome by
theenhanced beautyofthebicycle kick goal that he rises to imprudent applause in the face of his
superior’s stern disapproval. Despite clear disanalogies, we might also consider Jesse owens’s
performances inthe 1936Berlin olympics along similar lines.2 Animmoral context is acall to
courage that, when answered, aesthetically enhances physical performance. rising tosuchanoccasion
is athing ofevengreater beauty. Failing torespond aesthetically in such cases is not a moral obligation,
as Mumford maintains, but rather arguably a moral failure.
Conclusion
I have argued that the normative implications of Mumford’s interdependence thesis should be made
clearer, that the position gives rise to apartly implausible view of what I have called the Nazi aesthetics
problem, and that, in particular, Mumford’s interpretation of the Dynamo Kiev death match is open to
serious challenge. Aesthetic appreciation ofthe deathmatch, whether atrue game or not, whether in
real life or fictionalised form, need not necessarily be ruled out by the deplorable circumstances, and
might even be augmented once our attention is shifted to anappreciation, from both amoral and an
aesthetic point of view, of the courage of the victimised players. Such criticism Iinterpret as indi- cating
refinements to, rather than an outright rejection of, Mumford’s position. That I have marshalled for my
argument consideration of particularly relevant films has been not just convenient but indicative of a
potential new direction for fruitful inquiry. Sport films can illuminate important issues in the philosophy
ofsport,3 even if there is little call for a‘philosophy of sport film’.
Notes
1. on the Nazi problem, see Schafer (1986).
2. I refer here to owens’s actual athletic performances, which are distinct from but nonetheless
arguably still accessible through different representations of them. Compare the owens biopic
Race (2016) with riefenstahl’s own Olympia (1938).
3. For other examples of work that engages sport film from a philosophical perspective, see
Holt and Pitter (2011) and de Melo (2012).

14. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Some of this
material was presented at aDepartment ofPhilosophy colloquium at Dalhousie university.
Thanks also to Charlene Weaving for recommending Watching Sport.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
References
Devereaux, M. 1998. “Beauty and Evil: The Case of leni riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will.” In
Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, edited by J. levinson, 227–256. Cambridge:
Cambridge university Press.
Dougan, A. 2002. Dynamo: Defending the Honour of Kiev. london: Fourth Estate.
Holt, J., and r. Pitter. 2011. “The Prostitution Trap of Elite Sport in He Got Game.” In The Philosophy
of Spike Lee, edited by M. Conard, 15–25. lexington: university Press of Kentucky.
de Melo, V. A. 2012. “Sharing (Modern) Experiences: Sport (Body) – (Image) Cinema.”
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 39: 251–266.
Mumford, S. 2012. Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Emotion. New york: routledge. Schafer,
A.1986.“on using Nazi Data: The CaseAgainst.” Dialogue 25: 413–419.

15. 1
RIVIEW ARTIKEL
Judul Mumford on aesthetic–moral interaction in sport
Pengarang Jason Holt
Nama Jurnal Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
Volume, Tahun
Issue, Halaman
Volume 44, 2017 - Issue 1, 72-80
BAB I
PENDAHULUAN
1.1 Latar Belakang
Pandangan bahwa estetika dan etika adalah wilayah nilai yang otonom - adalah apa yang
disebut Stephen Mumford sebagai 'otonomisme'. Mumford menolak pandangan ini, terutama
meskipun tidak secara eksklusif dalam domain olahraga: 'Faktor yang secara etis buruk',
katanya, 'dapat mengurangi nilai estetika olahraga, dan faktor yang secara etis baik dapat
meningkatkan nilai estetika olahraga' (2012, 68). Karena 'beberapa dari norma olahraga
diinformasikan oleh pertimbangan estetika' (ibid., 75) juga, '[t] cara terbaik untuk
mengkarakterisasi hubungan 'antara estetika dan etika dalam olahraga ' karena itu dalam
istilah saling ketergantungan'(ibid., 78, penekanan asli).antar Tesis ketergantungan ini (istilah
saya, bukan dia) mewakili tidak hanya penolakan Mumford terhadap otonomisme tetapi juga
penjelasan positifnya tentang keterkaitanestetika nilai-nilaidan moral dalam olahraga. Saya
akan berpendapat bahwa akun Mumford, meskipun berwawasan, membutuhkan
penyempurnaan lebih lanjut untuk mengatasi kekhawatiran terbuka tentang normativitas,
masalah yang dapat diungkapkan dan ditangani dengan pertimbangan cermat terhadap film
yang relevan: dokumenter dan fiksi, olahraga, dan lainnya.
Dalam tulisan ini, J. Holt prihatin, bersama dengan Mumford, dengan fitur estetika
olahraga seperti keanggunan gerakan atletik, keindahan gaya atlet , drama pertandingan
atletik, dan sebagainya.
1.2 Rumusan Masalah
Apakah nilai estetika dan moral dalam olahraga saling bergantung satu sama lain?
1.3 Tujuan
Mengetahui bahwa nilai estetika dan moral dalam olahraga saling bergantung

16. 2
BAB II
PEMBAHASAN
Contoh Mumford
Dalam tantangannya terhadap otonomisme, Mumford membahas tiga contoh kunci, yang
pertama untuk mengilustrasikan kemasukakalan umum tesis saling ketergantungan, contoh-
contoh khusus olahraga lainnya.
Contoh pertama dimunculkan sebagai tanggapan atas contoh hipotetis dari otonom. Jika
kita mempertimbangkan piramida Mesir kuno, seorang otonom mungkin berkata, kita dapat
memuji mereka karena kualitas estetika mereka meskipun, dan sama sekali tidak dikurangi
oleh, fakta yang tidak dapat diterima secara moral bahwa mereka dibangun oleh kerja paksa
(ibid., 69). Jadi, terlepas dari putusan moral kita, putusan estetika kita tetap berlaku.
Contohyang ke yang kedua, yang satu ini khusus olahraga, Ben Johnson Penampilan di
100 m dan skandal steroid berikutnya diSeoul 1988 Olimpiade. Sebelum berita tersiar
tentang tes narkoba yang gagal danJohnson dicabut medali emas, kata Mumford, kami
mengagumi penampilannya dengan 'kekaguman estetika'.
Contoh ketiga Mumford tidak menyangkut konten atau karakter melainkan konteks:
pertandingan kematian Dynamo Kiev yang terkenal dalam Perang Dunia Kedua antara
pendudukan pasukan Jerman dan tim penduduk Kiev.
Normativitas dan Estetika Nazi
Mungkin pertanyaan paling mendesak yang dibiarkan terbuka oleh akun Mumford adalah
pertanyaan tentang normativitas. Masalah kuncinya kemudian adalah bahwa meskipun
Mumford menganggap dibolehkan pembusukanseseorang respons estetika positifterhadap
Riefenstahl, yang kurang jelas adalah apakah dia juga menganggapnya wajib. Yang terakhir
adalah komitmen yang lebih kontroversial.
Haruskah pengalaman estetika film Riefenstahl kita dimanjakan oleh isinya? Apakah
kita salah jika ini tidak terjadi, apapun alasannya? Tampaknya cukup jelas bahwa jawaban
Mumford adalah ya, yang menunjukkan bahwa setiap respons yang normal, masuk akal, dan
terinformasi lengkap akan mencakup kerusakan estetika (ibid.), Seperti dalam kasus
pertandingan kematian, dia berpendapat, itu akan salah bagi kami sebagai penonton. untuk

17. 3
duduk dan memperoleh kenikmatan estetika dari keindahan seperti yang mungkin dimiliki
permainan (ibid., 75).
Wawasan dari Film
Meskipun Mumford memang membahas film dalam konteks argumennya, setidaknya
Triumph of the Will, contoh lain, beberapa di antaranya tidak dibahas oleh Mumford, akan
terbukti berguna untuk mengevaluasi dan menyempurnakansaling ketergantungan tesis.
BAB III
PENUTUP
3.1 Kesimpulan
J. Holt berpendapat bahwa implikasi normatif darisaling ketergantungan Mumford tesis
harus diperjelas, bahwa posisi tersebut menimbulkan pandangan yang sebagian tidak masuk
akal tentang apa yang saya sebut sebagai masalah estetika Nazi, dan bahwa, khususnya,
interpretasi Mumford tentang kematian Dynamo Kiev pertandingan terbuka untuk tantangan
serius.
3.2 Saran
Sesuai dengan apa yang disampaikan oleh J. Holt bahwa suatu implikasi normatif yang
dinyatakan oleh Mumford harus memiliki tesis yang memperkuat pernyataannya tersebut.
Saran yang bisa disampaikan untuk penulis riview ini adalah banyak-banyak membaca dan
menggali informasi terkait apa yang sedang diriview.
LINK
DAFTAR PUSTAKA
Holt, J 2016. Mumford on aesthetic–moral interaction in sport Jason Holt. Journal of the
Philosophy of Sport. 44. 72-80