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Le pentest pour les nulsLe pentest pour les nuls
Alain MowatAlain Mowat
2Le pentest
› Externe
› Analyse d’un service VPN, un OWA et un site web hébergé par un presta-
taire externe
› Souvent très peu de failles
› Est-ce que l’entreprise est « sécurisée » pour autant ?
› Interne
› Admin du domaine en 20 minutes
› Souvent le même scénario
Exploit
Elevation de
privilèges
Latéral
Latéral
Latéral
Latéral
Creds admin
3Quelques statistiques
4Conclusions
› Arrêtez de faire tourner vos services en root/System
› Utilisez LAPS ou équivalent
› Évitez l’authentification « simple »
› Segmentez votre réseau
› Pas juste des VLANs différents… vous avez un FW, utilisez-le
› Segmentez vos utilisateurs
› Utilisez le(s) compte(s) admin du domaine avec parcimonie
› Seulement pour vous connecter aux DCs

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Le pentest pour les nuls #cybsec16

  • 1. Le pentest pour les nulsLe pentest pour les nuls Alain MowatAlain Mowat
  • 2. 2Le pentest › Externe › Analyse d’un service VPN, un OWA et un site web hébergé par un presta- taire externe › Souvent très peu de failles › Est-ce que l’entreprise est « sécurisée » pour autant ? › Interne › Admin du domaine en 20 minutes › Souvent le même scénario Exploit Elevation de privilèges Latéral Latéral Latéral Latéral Creds admin
  • 4. 4Conclusions › Arrêtez de faire tourner vos services en root/System › Utilisez LAPS ou équivalent › Évitez l’authentification « simple » › Segmentez votre réseau › Pas juste des VLANs différents… vous avez un FW, utilisez-le › Segmentez vos utilisateurs › Utilisez le(s) compte(s) admin du domaine avec parcimonie › Seulement pour vous connecter aux DCs