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OpenID & SAML,
OpenID & SAML
OpenID & SAML, SAML
    OpenID &
   Identity Federation, SuisseID
Identity Federation, SuisseID
Strong Authentication ServiceZukunft
   StrongSign-On Konzepte mit
    Single Authentication Service
Single-Sign-on Concepts with Future
                                                  &
     Geneva Application Security Forum 2010
     March 4th 2010
 Robert Ott, Master of Science (Honors), CFO
     Robert Ott
 Fredi Weideli, Master of Computer Science, CTO
 clavidOpenID Representative Switzerland
     - ag, Zug
 5180 CFO, Clavid AG, Switzerland
     -
Agenda

• SECTION 1   OpenID - What is it? How does it work? Integration?

• SECTION 2   SAML - What is it? How does it work?

• SECTION 3   Identity Federation

• SECTION 4   A Word on SuisseID

• SECTION 5   Strong Authentication as a Service

• SECTION 6   Further Links / Conclusion / Q&A




                     Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                            Page 2
SECTION 1




            SECTION 1
            OpenID
            > What is it?
            > How does it work?
            > How to integrate?



                 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                        Page 3
OpenID - What is it?




>   Internet SingleSignOn                           >     Free Choice of Identity Provider
>   Relatively Simple Protocol                      >     No License Fee
>   User-Centric Identity Management                >     Independent of Identification Methods
>   Internet Scalable                               >     Non-Profit Organization



                            Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                   Page 4
OpenID - How does it work?


    User Hans Muster
    (Domain: www.iid.ch)



                                          AUTHENTICATION
                                                                                          Identity Provider
                                                                                          e.g. clavid.ch
    hans.muster.iid.ch

                                                                         Identity URL
         OpenID=hans.muster.iid.ch                                       e.g. hans.muster.iid.ch




                                                        Enabled Service




                                     Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                            Page 5
OpenID - How does it work?



       User Hans Muster

                                                 3

                                                4, 4a                                  Identity Provider
                                                                                       e.g. clavid.com
    hans.muster.clavid.com         5                           6

                             1                                        2 Identity URL
    Caption                                                              https://hans.muster.clavid.com
    1. User enters OpenID
    2. Discovery
    3. Authentication
    4. Approval
    4a. Change Attributes
    5. Send Attributes
    6. Validation                                       Enabled Service




                             Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                    Page 6
OpenID - How does it work?

Step 1:   A user decides to use a personalized Internet Service supporting OpenID (e.g. local.ch). The user clicks on
          „Login using OpenID“ and enters its OpenID (e.g. hans.muster.iid.ch).
Step 2:   The requested Internet Service converts the OpenID into an URL (http://hans.muster.iid.ch) and requests
          this URL in order to receive the Identity Provider of the user.
Step 2a: In this example, the user has delegated its OpenID to the Identity Provider clavid.ch.
Step 3:   The Identity Provider provides possible authentication methods for that specific user (in this case
          “Password”). Having successfully authenticated, the next step (approval) is initiated.
Step 4:   The user decides on the values of the requested attributes to be provided to the Internet Service. The
          Identity Provider usually provides user specific Personas (attribute templates) to assist the user in this
          approval process.
Step 4a: At this point, the user may decide to change attribute values and store them on the Identity Provider for
         future approvals for that specific service. Thus, a user can automate future approvals for specific Internet
         Services.
Step 5, 6: The attribute values are then signed and communicated from the Identity Provider to the Internet
           Service. The Internet Service validates the signature of the provided attributes and finally accepts the user
           to be authenticated.




                                      Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                             Page 7
OpenID - How does it work?




                 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                        Page 8
OpenID - How does it work?




                 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                        Page 9
OpenID - User Centric Identity Management

                           TOMORROW
                           ? FUTURE ?
                              TODAY
                                   OpenID Provider                                 Username
               Username                                                            Password
               Password




    Username                                                                                  Username
    Password                                                                                  Password




                          Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                 Page 10
OpenID - How to Integrate?

Assumptions concerning your current Site
•   Users sign in with their username and password
•   There is a form, where new users have to register
•   Each user is identified by a unique ID in your database
•   A settings page let users manage their account info

Recipe
•    Extend the database to map the OpenIDs to the user IDs
•    Extend the registration page with an OpenID input field
•    Extend the sign in page with an OpenID input field
•    Extend the settings page to attach and detach openIDs



                       Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                              Page 11
OpenID - How to Integrate?

Ingredients

•    A OpenID Consumer Library



•    The Standard OpenID Logos



•    An OpenID Provider to test your site with




                      Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                             Page 12
OpenID - How to Integrate?

OpenID Libraries
Language      Library
C#            DotNetOpenId, ExtremeSwank
C++           Libopkele
Java          NetMesh InfoGrid LID, OpenID4Java, joid

Perl          Net::OpenID, OpenID4Perl

Python        JanRain

Ruby          JanRain, Heraldry

PHP           Jan Rain, Zend Framework OpenID Component, Saeven.net's JanRain
              Service Utility Class, Taral, Simple Class, sfOpenIDPlugin, CakePHP,
              EasyOpenID, OpenID For PHP, AuthOpenID Snippet
Coldfusion    CFKit OpenID, CFOpenID, OpenID CFC

Apache 2      mod_auth_openid



                          Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                 Page 13
SECTION 2




            SECTION 2
            SAML
            >What is it?
            >How does it work?




                 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                        Page 14
SAML – What is it?

SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language):
>   Defined by the Oasis Group
>   Well and Academically Designed Specification
>   Uses XML Syntax
>   Used for Authentication & Authorization

> SAML Assertions
    > Statements: Authentication, Attribute, Authorization

> SAML Protocols
    > Queries: Authentication, Artifact, Name Identifier Mapping, etc.

> SAML Bindings
    > SOAP, Reverse-SOAP, HTTP-Get, HTTP-Post, HTTP-Artifact

> SAML Profiles
    > Web Browser SingleSignOn Profile, Identity Provider Discovery Profile, Assertion
      Query / Request Profile, Attribute Profile


                                    Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                           Page 15
SAML – How does it work?


     User Hans Muster


                                 AUTHENTICATION
                           Redirect with                                         Identity Provider
                           <Response>
                             Redirect with                                       e.g. clavid.ch
                        (signed Assertion)
                            <AuthnRequest>
                         Access
                        Resource




                                               Enabled Service

                                                          e.g. Google Apps
                                                          for Business




                        Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                               Page 16
SAML – How does it work?


     User Hans Muster

                                                3
                                                2
                                                4                                      Identity Provider
                                                                                       e.g. clavid.ch

                              4
                          2
                      1
                  6




                                                     Enabled Service

                                                                e.g. Google Apps
                                                                for Business




                              Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                     Page 17
SAML – How does it work?

Step 1:   A user decides to use a personalized Internet Service connected to a SAML based Identity
          provider (e.g. Google Business Application Calendar).
Step 2:   The Internet Service recognizes that the user is not logged in yet. A SAML <AuthnRequest>
          is created and sent via redirect to the Identity Provider.
Step 3:   The Identity Provider provides possible authentication methods for that specific user (in this
          case “YubiKey” OTP). Having successfully authenticated, the next step is initiated.
Step 4:   The Identity Provider creates a SAML <Response> containing the user’s identifier for the
          specific target application. Then it signs the SAML <Response> and sends it via a Post-
          Redirect to the Internet Services (e.g. Google Calendar)
Step 5:   The Internet Service (e.g. Google Apps) verifies the signature of the SAML <Response>
          and now knows the user’s identifier provided by the Identity Provider.
Step 6:   The Internet Service can now be used by the user.




                                 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                        Page 18
SAML – How does it work?
1) Call Application URL

                                                     3) Application Usage
         2) Login




                          Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                 Page 19
SECTION 3




            SECTION 3
            Identity Federation




                Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                       Page 20
B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Problem
   Company A
    Intranet                                                                Internet Service A
                                                                                   Travel
                                   Proprietary Token                            Ticket Shop

               https                                                                Internet Service B
                                                      OpenID
                                                                                        Document
                                                                                       Management

                                                               SAML 1.0                   Internet Service C
                                                                                                 Personal
                                                                                                 Recruting

                                                             SAML 2.0                  SaaS Applications




                       Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                              Page 21
B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Mess
     Company A
       Intranet                                                                               Internet Service A
                              Proprietary Token
                                     OpenID                                                           Travel
                                                                                                   Ticket Shop
                                     SAML 1.0
                     https                                                                             Internet Service B
                                  SAML 2.0
Company B                                                                                                  Document
                                                                                                          Management
 Intranet           Proprietary Token
                                OpenID                                                                       Internet Service C
                               SAML 1.0
                                                                                                                   Personal
            https




                         SAML 2.0                                                                                  Recruting
      Company C
                              Proprietary Token                                                           SaaS Applications
        Intranet
                                     OpenID
                                     SAML 1.0
                      https




                                  SAML 2.0


                                          Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                                 Page 22
B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Solution
     Company A
       Intranet                                                                                                                                                                             Internet Service A
                                                                                                                                                                                                  Travel
                                                                                                                                                                                               Ticket Shop

                      https                                                                                                                                                                           Internet Service B
                                             Internet Identity
                                                 Provider                                                                                                                         Proprietary Token
Company B           Proprietary Token                                                                                                                                                                    Document
                                             Identity Mapping                                                                                                                                           Management
 Intranet
                                                                                                                                                                                          OpenID




                                                                                                             One Time Passw. (OTP)


                                                                                                                                                          Internet SSO
                                                                                                                                                                                                           Internet Service C




                                                                                      Biometric (AXSioncs)


                                                                                                                                     Mobile Phone (SMS)
                                             eID (Identity Card)
                               OpenID                                                                                                                                                     SAML 1.0               Personal
            https




                                                                   SSL Certificates
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Recruting




                                                                                                                                                                         Internet SSO
      Company C
                                 SAML 2.0                                                                                                                                               SAML 2.0        SaaS Applications



                                                                                                                                                           https
        Intranet
                       https




                                        Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                               Page 23
B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Solution

   Company A                                                                                                                                                                                   Company B
     Intranet                                                                                                                                                                                   Intranet


                https




                                                                                                                                                                                       https
                                                Internet Identity
                                                    Provider
            Proprietary Token                                                                                                                                               SAML 1.0                      Company C
                                               Identity Federation                                                                                                                                         Intranet




                                                                                                                One Time Passw. (OTP)
                                Internet SSO




                                                                                                                                                             Internet SSO
                                                                                         Biometric (AXSioncs)


                                                                                                                                        Mobile Phone (SMS)
                                                eID (Identity Card)
                                                                                                                                                                             SAML 2.0




                                                                                                                                                                                                  https
                                                                      SSL Certificates
                                 https




                                                                                                                                                              https




                            Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                   Page 24
SECTION 4




            SECTION 4
            A Word on SuisseID




               Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                      Page 25
A Word On SuisseID

•   SuisseID is currently in Early Draft Specification Phase
•   SuisseID should be available for public in spring 2010
•   SuisseID cost will be refunded by the Government in 2010
•   SuisseID will most probably be:
    – A signature certificate
    – An authentication certificate
    – All certificates conform to ZertES
    – Certificates contain a unique SuisseID number
    – An Identity Provider Services for attribute exchange

•   Eligible SuisseID certificate service providers will be:
    – Swiss Post (SwissSign), Swisscom, QuiVadis, Swiss Government



                               Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                      Page 26
A Word On SuisseID




                Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                       Page 27
SECTION 5




            SECTION 5
            Strong Authentication as a Service




                Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                       Page 28
OpenID - International Identity Providers




                                                                           Username/Password
                                                                           Certificates


                                                                           Biometric


                                                                           OTP



                  Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                         Page 29
Clavid Portal for Strong Authentication




                  Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                         Page 30
Clavid Portal - AXSionics




                   Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                          Page 31
Clavid Portal - Yubikey




                   Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                          Page 32
Clavid Portal - Certificates




                    Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                           Page 33
Clavid Portal - One Time Password




                                                                      OTP Methods:
                                                                      •    OATH HOTP (RFC4226)
                                                                      •    Challenge/Response (RFC2289)
                                                                      •    Mobile OTP (OpenSource Project)
                                                                      •    SMS
                                                                      •    ... others ...




                  Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                         Page 34
Clavid Portal - Personas




                   Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                          Page 35
Clavid Portal - Login Settings




                   Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                          Page 36
Clavid Login Dialog




                  Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                         Page 37
SECTION 6




            SECTION 6
            Conclusion
            >Further References
            >Questions & Answers
            >Contact Information



                 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                        Page 38
Further Links: on OpenID

OpenID Identity Providers can be found at:

                              >     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenID



                              >     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_OpenID_providers



                              >     http://www.openiddirectory.com/openid-providers-c-1.html



                              >     http://www.clavid.com/ (Strong Authentication in Europe)




                     Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                            Page 39
Conclusion

> OpenID: An open, well documented specification allowing Internet Single
  Sign-On (SSO) for individual “Public Services” (B2C)

> SAML: Trust based Internet and Intranet Single Sign-On for Business
  Services (B2B)

> Professional Identity Providers already in place

> User Centric Identity Management already integrated

> Join OpenID Switzerland in order to increase the OpenID momentum

> Enable your Internet Services to support OpenID or SAML !!!



                          Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                 Page 40
Demo

> SAML-Login to Google Business Apps using
  AXSionics Fingerprint


> SAML-Login to Salesforce.com using YubiKey OTP


> OpenID login to local.ch using Swiss PostZertifikat


> Online Identity Administration (Clavid Portal)




                          Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                                 Page 41
Questions & Answers




                Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                       Page 42
Contact Information




                 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010
                                        Page 43

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2010 - Fédération des identités et OpenID

  • 1. OpenID & SAML, OpenID & SAML OpenID & SAML, SAML OpenID & Identity Federation, SuisseID Identity Federation, SuisseID Strong Authentication ServiceZukunft StrongSign-On Konzepte mit Single Authentication Service Single-Sign-on Concepts with Future & Geneva Application Security Forum 2010 March 4th 2010 Robert Ott, Master of Science (Honors), CFO Robert Ott Fredi Weideli, Master of Computer Science, CTO clavidOpenID Representative Switzerland - ag, Zug 5180 CFO, Clavid AG, Switzerland -
  • 2. Agenda • SECTION 1 OpenID - What is it? How does it work? Integration? • SECTION 2 SAML - What is it? How does it work? • SECTION 3 Identity Federation • SECTION 4 A Word on SuisseID • SECTION 5 Strong Authentication as a Service • SECTION 6 Further Links / Conclusion / Q&A Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 2
  • 3. SECTION 1 SECTION 1 OpenID > What is it? > How does it work? > How to integrate? Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 3
  • 4. OpenID - What is it? > Internet SingleSignOn > Free Choice of Identity Provider > Relatively Simple Protocol > No License Fee > User-Centric Identity Management > Independent of Identification Methods > Internet Scalable > Non-Profit Organization Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 4
  • 5. OpenID - How does it work? User Hans Muster (Domain: www.iid.ch) AUTHENTICATION Identity Provider e.g. clavid.ch hans.muster.iid.ch Identity URL OpenID=hans.muster.iid.ch e.g. hans.muster.iid.ch Enabled Service Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 5
  • 6. OpenID - How does it work? User Hans Muster 3 4, 4a Identity Provider e.g. clavid.com hans.muster.clavid.com 5 6 1 2 Identity URL Caption https://hans.muster.clavid.com 1. User enters OpenID 2. Discovery 3. Authentication 4. Approval 4a. Change Attributes 5. Send Attributes 6. Validation Enabled Service Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 6
  • 7. OpenID - How does it work? Step 1: A user decides to use a personalized Internet Service supporting OpenID (e.g. local.ch). The user clicks on „Login using OpenID“ and enters its OpenID (e.g. hans.muster.iid.ch). Step 2: The requested Internet Service converts the OpenID into an URL (http://hans.muster.iid.ch) and requests this URL in order to receive the Identity Provider of the user. Step 2a: In this example, the user has delegated its OpenID to the Identity Provider clavid.ch. Step 3: The Identity Provider provides possible authentication methods for that specific user (in this case “Password”). Having successfully authenticated, the next step (approval) is initiated. Step 4: The user decides on the values of the requested attributes to be provided to the Internet Service. The Identity Provider usually provides user specific Personas (attribute templates) to assist the user in this approval process. Step 4a: At this point, the user may decide to change attribute values and store them on the Identity Provider for future approvals for that specific service. Thus, a user can automate future approvals for specific Internet Services. Step 5, 6: The attribute values are then signed and communicated from the Identity Provider to the Internet Service. The Internet Service validates the signature of the provided attributes and finally accepts the user to be authenticated. Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 7
  • 8. OpenID - How does it work? Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 8
  • 9. OpenID - How does it work? Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 9
  • 10. OpenID - User Centric Identity Management TOMORROW ? FUTURE ? TODAY OpenID Provider Username Username Password Password Username Username Password Password Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 10
  • 11. OpenID - How to Integrate? Assumptions concerning your current Site • Users sign in with their username and password • There is a form, where new users have to register • Each user is identified by a unique ID in your database • A settings page let users manage their account info Recipe • Extend the database to map the OpenIDs to the user IDs • Extend the registration page with an OpenID input field • Extend the sign in page with an OpenID input field • Extend the settings page to attach and detach openIDs Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 11
  • 12. OpenID - How to Integrate? Ingredients • A OpenID Consumer Library • The Standard OpenID Logos • An OpenID Provider to test your site with Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 12
  • 13. OpenID - How to Integrate? OpenID Libraries Language Library C# DotNetOpenId, ExtremeSwank C++ Libopkele Java NetMesh InfoGrid LID, OpenID4Java, joid Perl Net::OpenID, OpenID4Perl Python JanRain Ruby JanRain, Heraldry PHP Jan Rain, Zend Framework OpenID Component, Saeven.net's JanRain Service Utility Class, Taral, Simple Class, sfOpenIDPlugin, CakePHP, EasyOpenID, OpenID For PHP, AuthOpenID Snippet Coldfusion CFKit OpenID, CFOpenID, OpenID CFC Apache 2 mod_auth_openid Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 13
  • 14. SECTION 2 SECTION 2 SAML >What is it? >How does it work? Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 14
  • 15. SAML – What is it? SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language): > Defined by the Oasis Group > Well and Academically Designed Specification > Uses XML Syntax > Used for Authentication & Authorization > SAML Assertions > Statements: Authentication, Attribute, Authorization > SAML Protocols > Queries: Authentication, Artifact, Name Identifier Mapping, etc. > SAML Bindings > SOAP, Reverse-SOAP, HTTP-Get, HTTP-Post, HTTP-Artifact > SAML Profiles > Web Browser SingleSignOn Profile, Identity Provider Discovery Profile, Assertion Query / Request Profile, Attribute Profile Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 15
  • 16. SAML – How does it work? User Hans Muster AUTHENTICATION Redirect with Identity Provider <Response> Redirect with e.g. clavid.ch (signed Assertion) <AuthnRequest> Access Resource Enabled Service e.g. Google Apps for Business Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 16
  • 17. SAML – How does it work? User Hans Muster 3 2 4 Identity Provider e.g. clavid.ch 4 2 1 6 Enabled Service e.g. Google Apps for Business Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 17
  • 18. SAML – How does it work? Step 1: A user decides to use a personalized Internet Service connected to a SAML based Identity provider (e.g. Google Business Application Calendar). Step 2: The Internet Service recognizes that the user is not logged in yet. A SAML <AuthnRequest> is created and sent via redirect to the Identity Provider. Step 3: The Identity Provider provides possible authentication methods for that specific user (in this case “YubiKey” OTP). Having successfully authenticated, the next step is initiated. Step 4: The Identity Provider creates a SAML <Response> containing the user’s identifier for the specific target application. Then it signs the SAML <Response> and sends it via a Post- Redirect to the Internet Services (e.g. Google Calendar) Step 5: The Internet Service (e.g. Google Apps) verifies the signature of the SAML <Response> and now knows the user’s identifier provided by the Identity Provider. Step 6: The Internet Service can now be used by the user. Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 18
  • 19. SAML – How does it work? 1) Call Application URL 3) Application Usage 2) Login Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 19
  • 20. SECTION 3 SECTION 3 Identity Federation Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 20
  • 21. B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Problem Company A Intranet Internet Service A Travel Proprietary Token Ticket Shop https Internet Service B OpenID Document Management SAML 1.0 Internet Service C Personal Recruting SAML 2.0 SaaS Applications Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 21
  • 22. B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Mess Company A Intranet Internet Service A Proprietary Token OpenID Travel Ticket Shop SAML 1.0 https Internet Service B SAML 2.0 Company B Document Management Intranet Proprietary Token OpenID Internet Service C SAML 1.0 Personal https SAML 2.0 Recruting Company C Proprietary Token SaaS Applications Intranet OpenID SAML 1.0 https SAML 2.0 Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 22
  • 23. B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Solution Company A Intranet Internet Service A Travel Ticket Shop https Internet Service B Internet Identity Provider Proprietary Token Company B Proprietary Token Document Identity Mapping Management Intranet OpenID One Time Passw. (OTP) Internet SSO Internet Service C Biometric (AXSioncs) Mobile Phone (SMS) eID (Identity Card) OpenID SAML 1.0 Personal https SSL Certificates Recruting Internet SSO Company C SAML 2.0 SAML 2.0 SaaS Applications https Intranet https Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 23
  • 24. B2B Identity Federation - The Protocol Solution Company A Company B Intranet Intranet https https Internet Identity Provider Proprietary Token SAML 1.0 Company C Identity Federation Intranet One Time Passw. (OTP) Internet SSO Internet SSO Biometric (AXSioncs) Mobile Phone (SMS) eID (Identity Card) SAML 2.0 https SSL Certificates https https Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 24
  • 25. SECTION 4 SECTION 4 A Word on SuisseID Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 25
  • 26. A Word On SuisseID • SuisseID is currently in Early Draft Specification Phase • SuisseID should be available for public in spring 2010 • SuisseID cost will be refunded by the Government in 2010 • SuisseID will most probably be: – A signature certificate – An authentication certificate – All certificates conform to ZertES – Certificates contain a unique SuisseID number – An Identity Provider Services for attribute exchange • Eligible SuisseID certificate service providers will be: – Swiss Post (SwissSign), Swisscom, QuiVadis, Swiss Government Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 26
  • 27. A Word On SuisseID Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 27
  • 28. SECTION 5 SECTION 5 Strong Authentication as a Service Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 28
  • 29. OpenID - International Identity Providers Username/Password Certificates Biometric OTP Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 29
  • 30. Clavid Portal for Strong Authentication Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 30
  • 31. Clavid Portal - AXSionics Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 31
  • 32. Clavid Portal - Yubikey Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 32
  • 33. Clavid Portal - Certificates Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 33
  • 34. Clavid Portal - One Time Password OTP Methods: • OATH HOTP (RFC4226) • Challenge/Response (RFC2289) • Mobile OTP (OpenSource Project) • SMS • ... others ... Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 34
  • 35. Clavid Portal - Personas Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 35
  • 36. Clavid Portal - Login Settings Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 36
  • 37. Clavid Login Dialog Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 37
  • 38. SECTION 6 SECTION 6 Conclusion >Further References >Questions & Answers >Contact Information Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 38
  • 39. Further Links: on OpenID OpenID Identity Providers can be found at: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenID > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_OpenID_providers > http://www.openiddirectory.com/openid-providers-c-1.html > http://www.clavid.com/ (Strong Authentication in Europe) Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 39
  • 40. Conclusion > OpenID: An open, well documented specification allowing Internet Single Sign-On (SSO) for individual “Public Services” (B2C) > SAML: Trust based Internet and Intranet Single Sign-On for Business Services (B2B) > Professional Identity Providers already in place > User Centric Identity Management already integrated > Join OpenID Switzerland in order to increase the OpenID momentum > Enable your Internet Services to support OpenID or SAML !!! Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 40
  • 41. Demo > SAML-Login to Google Business Apps using AXSionics Fingerprint > SAML-Login to Salesforce.com using YubiKey OTP > OpenID login to local.ch using Swiss PostZertifikat > Online Identity Administration (Clavid Portal) Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 41
  • 42. Questions & Answers Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 42
  • 43. Contact Information Geneva Application Security Forum 2010, March 4th 2010 Page 43